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Abstract 
 
In the wake of September 11th, policy analysts, journalists, and academics have tried to 
make sense of the rise of militant Islam, particularly its role as a motivating and 
legitimating force for violence against the US. The unwritten assumption is that there is 
something about Islam that makes it bloodier and more violence-prone than other 
religions. This dissertation seeks to investigate this assertion by considering incidents of 
Islamically motivated terrorism, violence, and war, and comparing them to examples of 
Christian, Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu bellicosity. In doing so, it aims to evaluate if 
religious violence is primarily the product of beliefs, doctrine and scripture, or if religious 
violence is the result of other factors such as cultural, political, social and economic 
circumstances. 
 
This dissertation focuses on religious wars—wars, terrorism, and violent conflicts that 
have saliently religious goals, specifically battles to defend holy nations, sacred spaces 
and revolutions aimed at creating religious governments—and tests three variables for 
their ability to explain the conditions under which religious wars arise: threat perception, 
the intertwining of political and religious authority, and the amount of resources available 
to a given religious group. It argues that religious violence is the result of specific 
interpretations of a religion’s beliefs and scriptures, not the religions per se, and that 
violent interpretations of a religion are the product of individuals—usually religious 
leaders—who are grounded in specific circumstances. Therefore, in order to understand 
the conditions under which these violent interpretations of a religion occur, one needs to 
identify, first, who is interpreting the religion and by what authority; second, the social, 
political and economic circumstances surrounding these violent interpretations; and third, 
the believability of these interpretations by members of religious communities.  
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Title: Professor of Political Science 
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Introduction 
 
 
 In the days following the September 11th terrorist attacks in the New York and 
Washington, DC, the government, the media, and citizens in the US and around the world 
tried to make sense of an inconceivable act of brutality that took nearly everyone by 
surprise. Within hours of the attacks, pictures of Osama Bin Laden flashed across 
television broadcasts accompanied by descriptions of his fatwas—Muslim legal edicts—
calling for Muslims to rise up and fight the US in the name of Islam. Within days, as 
journalists and law enforcement agencies began to piece together the details of the 
hijackers and their motives, it became evident that Islam played some role in the terrorist 
attacks. This point was reinforced with the recovery a hijacker’s piece of luggage that did 
not make its connecting flight in Boston. In the bag, law enforcement agencies found a 
copy of the Qur’an in addition to written instructions for how the hijackers should behave 
on the day of the attacks and assurances that they would be divinely rewarded for the 
actions they were about to commit: “You will be entering Paradise. You will be entering 
the happiest life, everlasting life.”1      
These pieces of evidence surrounding Islam’s role in the September 11th attacks 
prompted many journalists to declare that Islam was, somehow, the guilty culprit in the 
terrorists’ acts. Middle East historian Ervand Abrahamian argues that, “the media framed 
the whole crisis within the context of Islam, of cultural conflicts, and of Western 
                                                 
1 Quote taken from: “‘Oh God, Open All Doors for Me,’” The Washington Post, September 28, 2001; for 
details on the contents of hijacker Mohammad Atta’s suitcase, see Peter Finn and Charles Lane, “Will 
Gives a Window Into Suspect’s Mind; Czechs Say Atta Met With Iraqi Official,” The Washington Post, 
October 6, 2001 
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civilization threatened by the Other.”2  For example, an October New York Times article 
asserted: 
From the assassination of Anwar Sadat to the fatwa against Salman Rushdie to the 
decade-long campaign of bin Laden to the destruction of ancient Buddhist statues 
and the hideous persecution of women and homosexuals by the Taliban to the 
World Trade Center massacre, there is a single line. That line is a fundamentalist, 
religious one. And it is an Islamic one.3 
 
That same article further proclaimed that: “Most interpreters of the Koran [sic] find no 
arguments in it for murder of innocents. But it would be naïve to ignore in Islam a deep 
thread of intolerance towards unbelievers, especially if those unbelievers are believed to 
be a threat to the Islamic world.”4  
In the post-September 11th world, policy analysts, journalists, and academics have 
aimed to comprehend the rise of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, including the role that Islam 
has played as a motivating and legitimating force for violence against the US. The 
emerging unwritten assumption within this literature is that there is something about 
Islam that makes it bloodier and more violence-prone than other religions. For example, 
much attention has been paid to Islam’s doctrine of jihad, or holy war, as the source of 
Islam’s bellicosity. 5 Likewise, scholars and journalists have pointed to Islam’s doctrine of 
martyrization as another source that promotes violence within the faith. 6 Still others have 
suggested that Islam is a repressive if not backwards religion that is incapable of adapting 
to modernity, evidenced by women dressed in veils and the degree of social, economic 
                                                 
2 Ervand Abrahamian, “The US Media, Huntington, and September 11,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, (2003), pp. 529-544 
3 Andrew Sullivan, “This is a Religious War,” The New York Times,  October 7, 2001 
4 ibid 
5 For example, see: “Think Tank; Two Views: Can the Koran Condone Terror?” The New York Times, 
October 13, 2001   
6 For example, see: “After the Attacks: The Organization; Old War Escalates on a New Front: The Trail of 
Relentless Martyrs,” The New York Times, September 16, 2001; John F. Burns, “The World: Martyrdom; 
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and political chaos in countries that are predominantly Muslim; September 11th, 
therefore, was an act of frustration against the premier country of modernity, the US.7 
Regardless of the evidence cited, Islam has been on trial since September 11th with the 
charge that there is something uniquely violent about its beliefs, doctrines, and practices.  
This dissertation seeks to investigate the assertion that Islam is an inherently and 
uniquely violent religion. In order to do this, it will consider not only violent incidents 
involving Islamically motivated terrorism and war, but also examples of Christian, 
Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu bellicosity. Furthermore, this dissertation will consider 
incidents of religious violence in contemporary times as well as historically. In doing so, 
it aims to investigate if religious violence is largely the product of beliefs, doctrine, and 
scripture, or if religious violence is the result of other factors such as political, social and 
economic circumstances. 
Many historical and contemporary conflicts have been identified as religious 
wars. They include incidents such as the Christian Crusades, Muslim and Jewish violence 
in the Middle East, Hindu and Muslim riots in India, Catholic and Protestant unrest in 
Northern Ireland, and the Iranian Revolution and the rise of the Ayatallah Khomeini, to 
name a few.  This list demonstrates, first, that incidents of religious violence can be 
named in religions other than Islam, such as Christianity, Judaism, and even Hinduism, a 
religion commonly associated with Gandhi and non-violence. Furthermore, this list 
                                                                                                                                                 
The Promise of Paradise that Slays Peace,” April 1, 2001 (Specifically considering Islamic suicide bombers 
in Palestine.) 
7 For example, Bernard Lewis argues: “In the course of the twentieth century it became abundantly clear in 
the Middle East and indeed all over the lands of Islam that things had indeed gone badly wrong. Compared 
with its millennial rival, Christendom, the world of Islam had become poor, weak, and ignorant.” Bernard 
Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pg. 151. See also chapter 3: “Social and Cultural Barriers,” in which Lewis 
identifies three barriers to Islam’s modernization: women, science, and music, pp. 64-81; and chapter 4: 
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reveals that religious violence has occurred in episodes, which is to say that religious 
violence is visible at some points in time and in certain places but not at others. For 
example, western European Christians are no longer fighting Crusades. Likewise, the 
Iranian Revolution and the creation of the world’s first modern Islamic republic occurred 
in Iran in 1979, not in Turkey or Indonesia. Similarly, Hindu and Muslim riots in India 
are not ongoing but occur at some point and in some cities. Therefore, this dissertation 
aims to provide insights into the following puzzle: Why are some religions violent at 
some points in time but not at others? What is causing this variation? 
 This dissertation argues that religious violence is the result of specific 
interpretations of a religion’s beliefs and scriptures, not the religions per se, and that 
violent interpretations of a religion are the product of individuals—usually religious 
leaders—who are grounded in specific circumstances. Therefore, in order to understand 
the conditions under which these violent interpretations of a religion occur, one needs to 
identify, first, who is interpreting the religion and by what authority; second, the social, 
political and economic circumstances surrounding these violent interpretations; and third, 
the believability of these interpretations by members of religious communities.    
 In order to investigate the conditions under which violent interpretations of a 
religion are generated and believed, the terms religion and religious war need to be 
clearly defined. Chapter one, therefore, offers definitions of these terms. It argues that 
religion is more than beliefs and scriptures; rather, it includes six elements: beliefs, texts, 
leaders, practitioners, identity, and resources such as buildings and money. Furthermore, 
chapter one argues that the purpose of religion is not merely to propagate love and peace; 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Modernity and Social Equality,” in which Lewis argues that Islam is a barrier to social equality to “the 
slave, the woman, and the unbeliever,” pp. 82-95.   
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rather, it is a system of beliefs organized around the concept of “earthly” and “eternal” 
salvation, or redeeming humanity and the earth from a fallen state, either in this world or 
the hereafter. Salvation, it argues, is important for understanding religious bellicosity, 
particularly through the notion that dying on the battlefield in defense of a religion will 
procure eternal salvation. This is true not only of Islam—which has a doctrine of 
martyrization—but also of Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, which all 
have examples of holy warriors fighting in defense of their faith. Furthermore, earthly 
salvation has provided motivation for groups wishing to foment religious revolutions 
with the aim of overthrowing their governments, installing religious theocracies, and 
returning society to a state of pristine righteousness. This is particularly true of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran. However it is also true of revolutionary movements within 
Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism.  
Chapter one also makes a distinction between two types of religious bellicosity: 
“wars with religion,”—violent conflict in which religion serves as motivation and 
justification for the use of force in wars with “secular” or non-religious goals—and 
“religious wars,” wars in which the end goals of the violence are saliently religious. In 
particular, this dissertation names three end goals of religious wars: the defense of holy 
nations (land and people deemed essential to the preservation of the faith), battles over 
sacred space (specific sites believed to have a unique connection with the divine), and 
religious revolutions that aim to create religious governments. While these goals do not 
cover all objectives of religious wars, this dissertation argues that they include the 
bloodiest incidents of religious violence in historical and contemporary times.  
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 Chapter two offers a causal argument for religious wars. It names three study 
variables as possible causes of religious wars—threat perception, the intertwining of 
religious and political leaders, and the amount of resources available to a belligerent 
group—and tests these variables in the case studies for their ability to explain the 
conditions under which religious violence and war occur.  
 The case studies are divided into three sections, which correspond to the end goals 
of religious wars identified above: defense of holy nations, battles over sacred spaces, 
and religious revolutions. In order to investigate the charge that there is something 
uniquely violent about Islam, each section considers one case involving Islam and 
compares that case with a similar example of religious violence in a different tradition. 
Furthermore, this approach—using qualitative methods, particularly process tracing—
allows for the investigation of incidents of religious violence within a particular religion 
across time and then compares violence and war across religious traditions. This research 
design, therefore, aims to identify causes of specific incidents of religious wars in 
addition to finding common causes of religious wars across space, time and religious 
tradition.        
Section one, the defense of holy nations, compares cases of Buddhist and Muslim 
violence aimed at defending land and people believed to be essential to the preservation 
of these faiths. Chapter three considers Buddhist battle s to defend the dammadipa in Sri 
Lanka, a land and people that, it is believed, the Buddha ordained to protect and 
propagate his teachings. It argues that religious battles have included the goal of making 
Sri Lanka purely Sinhalese Buddhist in order to realize its divine mandate. This goal, and 
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the governmental policies enacted to favor Sinhalese Buddhists over other religious and 
ethnic groups, sparked riots and eventually dragged the country into civil war.  
Chapter four considers Muslim battles to defend the dar al Islam, the territory of 
Islam, comparing a wave of jihads in the 19th century with the current rise of jihads, 
including Bin Laden’s current call for jihad against the US. It argues that both waves of 
jihads have largely been in response to international threats—such as colonialism in the 
19th century and cultural, political, and economic globalization today—in addition to 
domestic threats, specifically corrupt leaders that militant groups perceive as failing to 
uphold the tenets of Islam. The US, in particular, has become the target of Islamically 
motivated terrorism due to perceptions of its foreign policy intents—through its nearly 
unconditional support of Israel, military actions against several Muslim countries 
including Afghanistan and Iraq, and its support of unpopular regimes in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia—in addition to its spread of culture and values abroad.      
Section two considers battles over sacred spaces, comparing the cities of 
Ayodhya, in northern India, with Jerusalem in Israel and Palestine. Chapter five traces 
three major waves of violence over contested sacred spaces in Ayodhya, the celebrated 
birthplace of Ram in Hinduism and the site of a 16th century Muslim mosque, which was 
destroyed by an estimated 300,000 Hindu militants in 1992. It argues, first, that violence 
over the site has not been constant but, rather, has occurred in waves. Second, that the 
rise of Hindu militancy is largely the result of the call for Hindus to realize Hindutva, a 
Hindu nation in India that excludes foreign cultures, religions and political ideologies. 
Ayodhya has become the epicenter of the bid to make India into Hindutva, offering an 
example of perceived foreign threats—namely Islam—to Hindu culture and faith. 
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Chapter six outlines Christian, Muslim and Jewish battles for control of 
Jerusalem’s holy sites, including Christian Crusades aimed at capturing the Tomb of 
Christ, Muslim jihads fought to regain control of Jerusalem, and Israel’s seizure of 
Jerusalem in 1967 and the religious reactions it produced within Jewish and Muslim 
militant movements. It argues that these incidents of religious violence have occurred in 
reaction to threats imposed to sacred sites by the policies of the governing group. This 
includes the current “al-Aqsa Intifada,” which has occurred within the context of 
threatening Israeli policies towards Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza Strip and was 
sparked by the controversial visit of right-wing politician Ariel Sharon (now Israel’s 
prime minister) to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem on September 28, 
2000. 
Section three considers religious revolutions that aim to overthrow existing 
governments and create theocracies in their place. Chapter seven describes the revolution 
that perhaps comes to most people’s minds when considering the creation of a religious 
government, the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It traces Iran’s two revolutions in the 20th 
century, the 1906 revolution for a constitution and democratically elected parliament and 
the 1979 revolution, which ultimately called for the overthrow of the Shah and the 
creation of a religious government. It argues that the 1979 revolution developed saliently 
religious goals through the participation of Islamic organizations, which mobilized the 
masses through its interpretations of Islam, and through the leadership of the Ayatallah 
Khomeini, who succeeded in uniting religious and secular movements to realize the goals 
of deposing the Shah and ending US influences in Iran. 
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Chapter eight investigates the rise of Marxism and its applications in the Russian, 
Chinese and Cuban Communist revolutions with the aim of considering, first, if Marxism 
functions like a religion and, second, if anything can be learned from US foreign policy 
effort to undermine Marxist ideology during the Cold War. It argues that Marxism 
contains elements that make it similar to religion, particularly its salvific goal of 
liberating the masses from the ills of capitalism. Marxism in practice did little to realize 
these goals, however, and ultimately failed to garner support from the masses. Therefore 
the failure of these regimes to deliver on their promises did more to undermine the 
popular legitimacy of Marxism than did US efforts to debunk the ideology. 
This dissertation concludes by offering general findings from the case studies and 
their policy implications. The case studies demonstrate, first, that religions other than 
Islam have engaged in violence and war. Therefore, the charge that Islam is uniquely 
violent does not stand up to empirical observation. Second, the case studies reveal that 
threat perception towards holy nations is a salient cause of religious wars. However, the 
sources of these threats are not other religions. Rather, two threats tend to produce a 
religious reaction. First, drastic political and social changes—such as the transformations 
brought on by colonialism in the 19th century and cultural, economic, and political 
globalization today—have threatened the structure and order of traditional societies, often 
producing a religious backlash. Second, oppressive regimes have prompted religious 
leaders to mobilize their constituents with the goal of overthrowing these regimes and 
establishing more just systems—based on religious values—in their place.  
The former threat, radical challenges to the order of society, impacts US foreign 
policy aims of spreading democracy around the globe, which often caries liberal values 
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that may be threatening to societies with their own values and norms. The US 
government, therefore, should seek to promote structural democracy—such as universal 
suffrage, checks and balances on authority, and transparency in the government—and to 
separate structural democracy from liberal values that may not be essential to healthy 
democratic governments. Second, the US government should consider its political, 
financial, and military support to governments that are deemed a threat to the masses 
within certain states, specifically Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which are neither democratic 
nor popular and have fueled the creation of militant Islamic movements bent on 
overthrowing these regimes. The US has become a terrorist target, in part, for their 
support of these governments.  
Second, along these lines, the findings in this dissertation reveal that the presence 
of religion in government—through monarchies, religious political parties or 
governmental posts—does not, ipso facto, lead to religious wars. Therefore, the US 
government should not restrict the presence of religious political parties in emerging 
democracies around the world, particularly if it is the will of the people to have these 
parties run in elections. Furthermore, allowing religious movements to run in elections 
has several benefits: it brings them into the political system instead of alienating them 
from it; it provides these groups with a method of voicing their grievances through non-
violent means; it holds these groups accountable for their rhetoric; it makes these groups 
compete for constituents; and, if elected, it forces these groups to work with other parties 
and compromise. Thus religious parties should not be considered anti-democratic, even 
though they clash with the US norm of separation of church and state.   
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Finally, the US government should identify the militant religious organizations 
most threatening to the US and its interests and work towards disbanding and 
delegitimating these groups. Specifically, it should continue to deny these groups 
material resources, such as financing and technological resources, in addition to 
restricting communications and transportations technologies. It should also seek to 
disband these organizations by capturing its leaders and shutting down their bases of 
operation. However, the US government should consider non-violent means of attaining 
these goals because military force could reinforce the misperception that the US is trying 
to destroy the Muslim world, as argued by Bin Laden, and offer fuel for anti-US 
mobilization. Likewise, assassinating leaders could further radicalize those within the 
organization and provide propaganda for recruiting. Instead, the US government should 
capture these leaders and force them to live out ignoble and unglorious life-sentences in 
prison, thus denying these organizations recruitment propaganda. 
The US government, therefore, has considerable options in dealing with the 
current threat it faces from Islamically motivated terrorism. Furthermore, valuable 
insights can be gained from looking at religious violence across religions and throughout 
time; specifically that, first, the current examples we see of Islamically motivated 
violence, war and terrorism against the US have not always existed; and, second, that 
other examples of religious violence have come and gone, suggesting that Islamically 
motivated terrorism may not always be the primary religious threat to the US.  
Moreover, it is worth remembering that the terrorist attacks of September 11th—in 
which 19 hijackers commandeered four planes, driving three into US buildings—is not 
even the first example of religiously motivated terrorism of this kind. In World War II, 
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Japanese kamikaze pilots, “the wind of God,” drove planes into nearly 200 US warships 
on religiously inspired military missions.8 In these cases, the inspiration was belligerent 
interpretations of Shintoism and Buddhism, religions most commonly associated with 
peaceful and non-violent norms. Kamikaze manuals, not unlike the instructions penned 
by a September 11th hijacker, encouraged their pilots to “transcend life and death,” and 
promised that “after the crash they will become like gods (kami)—that they will meet 
their friends and joke with them in their god- like state.”9 Thus, the religious threat today 
comes from a belligerent interpretation of Islam, but it has not always been that way, nor 
will it likely always be so.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Albert Axel and Hideaki Kase, Kamikaze: Japan’s Suicide Gods, (London: Pearson Education: 2002), pg. 
169 
9 Quotes taken from pg. 78 and pg. 77, respectively.  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Religion and Religious Wars  
 
 The end of the Cold War and September 11th have ushered in a new era in global 
politics. An important threat to the post-Cold War peace is religiously motivated 
violence, war and terrorism, particularly the current terrorist threat to the US, which 
involves Islam. International relations scholars need to rigorously address this topic in 
order to impose clarity and structure on academic and policy debates surrounding the 
current threat of religious bellicosity. In order to do this, however, scholars need to take 
religion seriously as a force of international politics. This requires knowledge of religious 
beliefs and practices; the role of religions in society, culture and politics; and the 
conditions that fuel religious violence and war. 
This chapter aims to provide a foundation for understanding religiously motivated 
violence and war. It will, first, provide an argument for why religion must be taken 
seriously as a phenomenon of international relations in general, and studies on causes of 
war in particular. Second, it will present definitions of the key variables in this 
dissertation.  Specifically it will propose a definition for religion that includes both its 
content and its purpose. It will also define two types of religious war. And lastly, this 
chapter will outline the religions to be studied and offer an argument for why these 
religions are important for the study of religiously motivated conflict and war. 
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Religion and the Study of War and Violent Conflict 
 
 Religion—as a social, historical, and political phenomenon—has received scarce 
attention in international relations literature in general1 and on religion’s involvement in 
war and violent conflict in particular.2  In the post-Cold War world and particularly in 
light of September 11th, scholars of international relations need to take religion seriously 
as a powerful force in modern-day politics, society, and individuals’ lives.  
Prior to September 11th, few international relations scholars had either the interest 
or the foundational knowledge necessary for studying religious violence and war. This is 
noted by international relations scholar Robert Jervis who argues that: “Terrorism 
grounded in religion poses special problems for modern social science, which has paid 
little attention to religion, perhaps because most social scientists find this subject 
                                                 
1 As noted by Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations,” International 
Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2001), pp. 53-74.  
     Examples of works on religion as a social and political force in international relations include Religion 
and International Relations, edited by K.R. Dark, (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000); Religion: The 
Missing Dimension of Statecraft, edited by Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994); Jeff Haynes, Religion in Third World Politics, particularly chapter five: “Links 
between Religion and Foreign Policy in the Third World,” (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1993); 
Religion and Global Order, edited by John L. Esposito and Michael Watson, (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 2000); Daniel Philpott, “Religious Roots of Modern International Relations,” World Politics, Vol. 5, 
no. 2 (January 2000); and Cuba at the Crossroads: The Visit of Pope John Paul II and Opportunities for 
US Policy, (Washington, DC: Committee on Foreign Relations: Committee on International Relations, 
1998). 
      Works on religion in international relations also focuses on the role of ethics in the global arena. Some 
examples include Roger Epp, The Power of Moral Sanction: Towards a Modest Place for Religion In the 
Study of Foreign Policy, (Center for International Relations Occasional Paper, no. 20, Queens University, 
1987); Kenneth W. Thompson, Words and Deeds in Foreign Policy, (New York: Fifth Morgenthau 
Memorial Lecture on Morality and Foreign Policy, The Carnegie Endowment, 1986); and Paul Ramsey, 
Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, (Lanham MD: University of America Press, 1983). 
2 International relations scholarship on religion as a cause of war and violent conflict focuses primarily on 
religion’s contribution to ethnic conflict. This includes political scientist Jonathan Fox’s large-n research on 
religion’s impact on ethnic conflict, including: “Is Islam More Conflict Prone than Other Religions? A 
Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics Vol. 6, No. 2, (Summer 
2000), pp-124; “Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts,” International Politics, 
Vol. 38, (December, 2001), pp. 515-523; “Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conflict: Islam and the West,” 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 4, (2001), pp. 459-472; “Religious Causes of Discrimination 
against Ethno-Religious Minorities,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, (2000), pp. 423-450. Works 
by other scholars include: Liz Fawcett, Religion, Ethnicity and Social Change, (New York: St. Martin’s 
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uninteresting if not embarrassing.”3 The notable exception to this trend is Samuel 
Huntington who, in his controversial book The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of 
World Order, predicted that the post Cold War world would be marked by violent 
conflicts between civilizations, which, at their roots, are defined by religion. 4 
Huntington’s book is important, first and foremost, because it puts religion on the map as 
an important dimension of international relations and cause of war.  However, his 
hypothesis—while appearing to come true in light of September 11th—does not specify 
the conditions under which religions, as civilizations, rise up and engage in violent 
conflict. Therefore, more scholarship is needed in order to understand the conditions 
under which religious violence and war arise. 
The field of international relations, however, faces several problems when 
addressing religion’s impact on war and violent conflict. First, religious studies as an 
academic subject is largely absent in the US educational system. Religion—as a historic, 
political and social force—is rarely taught in American public schools.5 Few academic 
institutions in the United States require or even offer courses on world religions as part of 
a liberal arts degree.6 Furthermore, religion as an academic discipline has been cordoned 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 2000); Scott Thomas, “Religion and International Conflict,” in Religion and International Relations, 
edited by K.R. Dark, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 1-23.  
3 Robert Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?” 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1, (2002), pp. 37-54. Quote taken from pg. 37 
4 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,  (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996) 
5 It is important to note that the argument for teaching a course on world religions should be distinguished 
from the debate on allowing prayer and courses on spiritual development in public schools. The first 
category calls for teaching world religions as a historic, social and polit ical phenomenon. The latter 
category argues for allowing spiritual practices and instruction of specific religion, usually Christianity, in 
public schools. The current interpretation of the law allows for the first type of instruction but prohibits the 
second type. See Benjamin B. Sendor, A Legal Guide to Religion and Public Education, (Kansas: National 
Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1988); and Richard C. McMillian, Religion in the Public 
Schools: An Introduction, (New York: Mercer, 1984). 
6 Religious scholar Ninian Smart notes that although religious studies or the study of world religions has its 
origins in the 19th century, it has only become an academic discipline in the late 1960s, see “Methods in My 
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off into its own world, hindering interdisciplinary studies of its impact on other academic 
fields such as politics, history, and the natural sciences.7 Moreover, this lack of 
knowledge on religion is heightened by the unspoken assumption that religion cannot be 
studied within the context of the rational sciences; the two subjects are incompatible.8 All 
o these factors have contributed to the lack of rigorous work done in international 
relations on religiously motivated violence and war. 
The field of international relations in general and scholars on causes of war in 
particular need to seriously address the role of religion in history, society, and inter-state 
relations because it appears that religion is reasserting itself in global politics. First, the 
post-Cold War world has seen a rise in religiously motivated conflict.9  Religion has been 
identified as contributing cause to the conflicts in the Balkans, heightened tensions in the 
Middle East, the civil war in Sri Lanka, Hindu-Muslim violence in South Asia, increasing 
Islamic militancy throughout the world, and persisting troubles in Northern Ireland, to 
name a few cases. Furthermore, most scholars agree that Islam has played a critical role 
in the September 11th attacks on the US and that Islam continues to be a factor in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Life,” The Craft of Religious Studies, edited by Jon R. Stone, (New York and London: St. Martins Press, 
1998), pp. 18-20.  Mark Juergensmeyer notes that survey courses in world religions are difficult to offer 
because they require a broad range of knowledge on history and numerous religious traditions but that, 
nevertheless, this is perhaps one of the most important courses to teach in a liberal arts education because it 
is information that students would not get elsewhere, Mark Juergensmeyer, “A Brief Argument in Favor of 
an Endangered Species: The World Religion Survey Course,” Teaching the Introductory Course in 
Religious Studies: A Sourcebook, edited by Mark Juergensmeyer, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), pp. 227-
233. 
7 A brief survey on the creation of religion as a separate, academic discipline includes Terrence N. Tice, 
“Schleiermacher on the Scientific Study of Religion,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher and the Founding of the 
University of Berlin: The Study of Religion as a Scientific Discipline, edited by Herbert Richardson, 
(Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); D.G. Hart, The University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in 
American Higher Education, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Ian G. Barbour, 
Religion in an Age of Science, (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990); and Gavin Flood, Beyond 
Phenomenology: Rethinking the Study of Religion, (London and New York: Cassell, 1999). 
8 This observation is also noted by Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International 
Relations,” International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2001), pp. 53-74. 
9 Assaf Moghadam, “A Global Resurgence of Religion?” Report Prepared for the Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs, Harvard University, November 16, 2002, unpublished manuscript. 
 29 
 
 
current terrorist threat to the US. Few scholars agree, however, on the degree and ways in 
which Islam fuels the international terrorist threat to the US.10 Therefore, if religion is in 
fact contributing to these and other contemporary conflicts, international relations 
scholars need to identify how and under what conditions it contributes to violence and 
what unique resources religion brings to war and unrest. In order to do this, however, 
scholars need to explain what religion is and how it functions in society, politics and 
individuals’ lives.      
Definitions: What is Religion? 
 
 This section offers definitions of the key variables in this dissertation. First, the 
term religion needs to be clearly defined and operationalized. This task is complicated by 
the fact that there is no agreed upon definition of religion in academic circles; rather 
much debate exists within and across academic disciplines on the nature and purpose of 
religion in human history.  This section presents a few commonly cited definitions of 
religion—specifically those offered by Emile Durkheim, Clifford Geertz, and Max 
Weber—and from these scholars constructs the definition of religion to be used in this 
dissertation.  
Sociologist Emile Durkheim offers a definition of religion that stresses its 
corporate nature in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.11 Durkheim defines religion 
by dividing human phenomenon into two opposing realms, the sacred and profane. 
                                                 
10 For example, at a January 2002 conference in Florida aimed at educating journalists about Islam, scholars 
Samuel Huntington, Bruce Hoffman and Roy Mottahedeh defended arguments on Islam’s role in the 
terrorist threat to the US. Huntington argued that Al Qaeda is first and foremost about Islam; Hoffman 
argued that Al Qaeda is primarily a political movement that uses religion to legitimate and mobilize 
terrorists, and Mottahedeh argued that Al Qaeda cannot be understood in religious terms. See David 
Brooks, “Understanding Islam,” The Daily Standard , January 21, 2002, www.weeklystandard.com, 
downloaded on 1/22/02.  
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Religious beliefs and rituals are concerned with relating to and maintaining the sacred. 
Durkheim duly notes that the realm of sacred is not fixed but rather “anything can be 
sacred,” and “the circle of sacred objects cannot be determined once and for all.”12  
Furthermore, for Durkheim religion is, at its core, a social phenomenon. He states: 
The really religious beliefs are always common to a determined group…they are 
not merely received individually by all the members of this group; they are 
something belonging to this group, and they make its unity. The individuals which 
[sic] compose it feel themselves united to each other by the simple fact that they 
have a common faith.”13 
 
Durkheim contends that commonly held beliefs towards the sacred create practices, 
expressed in the corporate form of a “church,” which he defines by stating: 
Sometimes the church is strictly national, sometimes it passes the frontiers; 
sometimes it embraces an entire people…sometimes it is directed by a corps of 
priests, sometimes it is almost completely devoid of an official directing body. 
But wherever we observe the religious life, we find that it has a definite group at 
its foundation. 14 
 
Therefore, Durkheim defines religion as “an eminently collective thing” formed by 
beliefs and practices relating to the realm of the sacred, which is ever-changing.  
Durkheim’s definition of religion is important for understanding the causes of 
religious violence because he believes religions are, at their root, corporate. Religion, 
therefore, is not merely about beliefs and rituals, but shared beliefs and rituals that unite a 
group of people into a community. This dissertation will argue that the corporate nature 
of religion needs to be taken seriously in order to understand religious violence. In other 
words, religious violence is seldom the product of a lone individual and his or her beliefs; 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life , translated by Joseph Ward Swain, (London: 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1915)  
12 Durkheim, pg. 37 
13 Durkheim, pg. 43 
14 Durkheim, pg. 44 
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rather religious violence is the reflection of a group or community and the circumstances 
in which they live.  
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz’ often-cited definition of religion argues that: 
Religion is: 1) a system of symbols which acts to 2) establish powerful, pervasive 
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men [sic] by 3) formulating 
conceptions of a general order of existence and 4) clothing these conceptions with 
such an aura of factuality that 5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely 
realistic.15 
  
Geertz’ definition of religion is useful for understand religious violence because, first, his 
definition argues that religion creates a “general order of existence;” in other words, 
religion helps define human purpose on earth.  Second, Geertz’ definition acknowledges 
that a religion’s “system of symbols” is a powerful motivator of human behavior. Geertz 
therefore recognizes that religion is an important and powerful force in human history. 
This dissertation will argue that these two points are also important for understanding 
religious violence and war; religion is a powerful force for mobilization in addition to its 
ability to establish existential order.  
Both of these scholars, while offering unique definitions, fail to address a key 
component of religion, namely the role of human agency in shaping and maintaining 
religious beliefs and systems. Neither Durkheim nor Geertz considers who maintains 
these systems; their definitions suggest that religious beliefs and practices simply evolve 
of their own accord.  Durkheim claims that “churches” are the core manifestation of 
religious beliefs, but he does not delve into the role of individuals—namely religious 
leaders—in maintaining beliefs and rituals surrounding the sacred. Geertz makes no 
mention at all of agency in his definition.  
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Sociologist Max Weber adds the critical component of agency to his definition of 
religion in The Sociology of Religion.16  Weber acknowledges the importance of symbols, 
rituals and beliefs in his definition, stating that religion is “the relationship of men [sic] to 
supernatural forces which takes the forms of prayer, sacrifice and worship…”17 In 
addition, Weber includes two interconnected elements to this definition. First, he 
observes that religions tend to change and develop in complexity over time. Second, as 
religions develop into more complex systems of beliefs and rituals, the role of religious 
leaders—what Weber calls priests—takes on increasing importance in maintaining the 
religion. Religious leaders, according to Weber, are defined by three elements: they make 
up an organized and permanent structure; they are connected with “some type of social 
organization” such as a congregation or a class; and they are trained both in specialized 
knowledge or “doctrine” and vocational skills. 18 Overall, therefore, priests are tasked 
with studying religious beliefs and practices with the purpose of maintaining the tradition 
and leading communities of practitioners.   
The definitions proposed by Durkheim, Geertz, and Weber, therefore, are all 
united in their recognition of beliefs and rituals as central to religion. Durkheim stresses 
the corporate nature of religion in his definition. Geertz acknowledges the powerful 
motivating factor of religion and its role in creating a general order of existence for 
humans. And Weber adds agency to his definition, including the role of clergy in 
developing and maintaining religious beliefs and rituals.  
                                                                                                                                                 
15 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, Reader in 
Comparative Religion: An Anthropological Approach, Fourth Edition, (New York: Harper Collins, 1979), 
pp. 79-80 
16 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, translated by Ephraim Fischoff, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963) 
17 Weber, pg. 28 
18 Weber, pp. 28-29 
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All of these definitions lack, however, two additional elements: none of these 
definitions includes material assets that are common to most all religions,19 and none of 
these definitions includes the role of religion in forming group identity. Material 
resources need to be included in a definition of religion for two key reasons. First, most 
religions contain material resources such as houses of worship and sacred sites, which 
one would expect to find in a religion. However, most religions also possess more 
mundane material resources such as buildings, schools, hospitals, printing presses and 
money, resources that are not commonly identified with religion. 20 Furthermore, religions 
tend to have social resources, such as trained leaders, organizations, and networks that 
inform and connect their congregants. Therefore, religion’s resources can be vast and 
numerous.  With this wider inclusion of resources, religions have the power to educate, 
inform, mobilize and organize people. Assets, therefore, are a particularly important 
resource when considering the ability of religions to motivate bellicose behavior. 
Second, religion often plays a key role in forming group identity. Identity is 
different from other aspects of religion because it is both endogenous and exogenous to a 
religion. Identity is endogenous when adherents to a tradition choose to define their 
identity, in part or whole, by their inclusion to a particular religion. Religious identity, 
                                                 
19 Religious scholar Ninian Smart in The World’s Religions: Old Traditions and Modern Transformations, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), describes religion in terms of seven “dimensions,” of 
which one is the material dimension. The other six dimensions include: the practical and ritual dimension; 
the experiential and emotional dimension; the narrative or mythic dimension; the doctrinal and 
philosophical dimension; the ethical and legal dimension; and the social and institutional dimension, pp. 9-
26. This concept is expanded in Dimensions of the Sacred: Anatomy of the Worlds Beliefs,  (San Francisco: 
HarperCollins, 1996).  
20 See Christian Smith, “Correcting a Curious Neglect, or Bringing Religion Back In” for an insightful 
discussion on the resources that religion brings to mass mobilization.  Smith notes legitimization for 
protest, moral imperatives for justice, powerful symbols, self-discipline, trained leaders, financial 
resources, solidarity, pre -existing communication channels, and identity as resources that religion gives to a 
social movement. See Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement and Activism, edited by 
Christian Smith, (New Yo rk: Routledge, 1996), pp. 9-21 
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however, can also be exogenous, specifically when identity is assigned by others who 
associate individuals and groups with a given religion.  
With all of the variables in mind, this book will use the following definition of 
religion:  
an organization recognized as holy—relating to the divine or supernatural—
consisting of a) beliefs, b) texts, c) leaders, d) a community, e) identity, and f) 
material resources. 
  
Religion is defined this way because this dissertation will assert that religion is more than 
abstract ideology or a system of beliefs and symbols. Rather, a working definition of 
religion needs to capture non-material elements, such as beliefs, but also material 
resources such as schools, buildings, land, and money.  Furthermore, most religions are 
composed of leaders that interpret scriptures, maintain religious traditions and lead a 
community of practitioners. Lastly, religion, as a corporate phenomenon, also serves as 
one form of identity to those who associate with or are associated with a religious group. 
This definition, therefore, captures the interplay of six broad elements of religion: 
resources, beliefs, texts, religious authority, practitioners, and the role of religion in 
informing group identity. 
Religion’s unique contribution to war and violent conflict is its combination of 
these six elements.21 Independently, these elements are typical causes of war. For 
example, non-material motivators for war can be found outside of religion, most notably 
nationalism, which has fueled belligerent behavior since the 19th century, particularly the 
First and Second World Wars. Material resources are most commonly connected to a 
state’s ability to cause war; they are a major calculus in balance of power theories aimed 
                                                 
21 It is important to note that religious resources could also be used for pacific ends. This dissertation will 
only consider religion as a cause of bellicosity. 
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at explaining bellicosity and peace among nations. Likewise, social resources such as 
leaders and members occur in a secular context, most notably the state. And identity can 
be informed by any number of traits such as race, ethnicity and regionalism, which can be 
a cause of war and violent conflict.  
Religion, as a combination of all six of these elements, is uniquely situated for 
inspiring and mobilizing the masses, including for belligerent ends. States usually 
contains all of these elements but states, by definition, are confined to tangible borders. 
Religions, on the other hand, can cross borders. “Nations,” as a collection of people that 
perceive themselves as unified by a shared history, 22 can cross borders; but cross-border 
nations almost never come with a readymade organization of leaders, buildings and other 
resources essential for mobilization. Religion’s unique contribution to war and violent 
conflict, therefore, is that all of these elements are contained within this one entity. 
Applying this definition to empirical examples of religion requires two further 
refinements. First, although religions—such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam—exist 
in theory, in practice these religions do not exist as monoliths; rather, there is much 
diversity within religions across time and space. In other words, there is no one 
Christianity or Judaism in historical context but, rather, many Christianities, Judaisms 
and so on. This is true of all religions.  
Furthermore, religions in practice are not constant but, rather, change over time 
according to historical context. Religions in practice are the product of interpretation, 
usually generated by religious leaders, who are, in turn, grounded in specific 
                                                 
22 This is drawing on definitions of nations proposed by Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for 
Understanding, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 
(London and New York: Verso, 1983); and Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Cambridge: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
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circumstances. This dissertation argues that interpretations of religions and not the 
religions per se are essential for understanding religious violence; specifically, certain 
interpretations of religion that call for violence. This dissertation, therefore, aims to 
provide insights into the conditions under which violent interpretations of religions are 
generated. In theory, these conditions should fuel violent interpretations across various 
religious traditions, not just within a given religion. This will be discussed further in 
chapter two.  
It is also important to state that this dissertation stresses a non-reductionist view 
of religion’s role in violent conflict and war. First, while this dissertation does not purport 
that religions are “true” in the sense that religious beliefs can be scientifically proven 
correct or false, it does argue that religions are real; religions are real “in the minds and 
lives of those who participate in the religion in question,” as religious scholar Ninian 
Smart states.23 Religions, therefore, need to be understood and respected on these terms. 
Second, this dissertation argues that religiously motivated violence and wars ultimately 
have something to do with religion; it is not exclusively the result of other phenomenon 
and motivations such as economic, ethnic, or class grievances. Religion is a powerful 
force that is capable of motivating and mobilizing nations, societies, and individuals; 
religious violence, therefore, needs to be understood as one manifestation of this 
powerful force. 
Lastly, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that, ipso facto, no religion is 
inherent ly more prone to violence than another.24 To argue that one religion is inherently 
                                                 
23 Ninian Smart, “Methods in My Life,” pp. 18-35 
24 The question has also been explored quantitatively by Jonathan Fox in “Is Islam More Conflict Prone 
than Other Religions? A Cross-Sectional Study of Ethnoreligious Conflict,” Nationalism and Ethnic 
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more violent than another is to suggest that there is something within that religion, such 
as its scriptures or beliefs, that makes it prone to violence. However, as the case studies 
will show, most if not all religions have gone through periods of bellicosity and periods 
of peace. Therefore, none of the major religious traditions fit this description. This is true 
both of Islam—a religion stereotyped as inherently violent—and Buddhism, a religion 
most often associated with its norm of ahimsa, or non-violence. In contrast, this 
dissertation argues that it is not religious beliefs and scriptures that determine the 
bellicosity of a religion, but rather the interpretation of beliefs and scriptures. 
Interpretations are the product of individuals, usually religious leaders, who are 
responding to their political, economic, and social environments. It is these contextual 
factors, it will be argued, that contribute to religion’s episodic bellicosity. This point will 
be discussed further in chapter two and elucidated in the case studies. 
The purpose of religion 
In addition to defining the content of religion, it is important to offer a definition 
of the purpose of religion, or what is the core concept of most religious beliefs. Similar to 
a definition of religion, there is much debate on the purpose of religion in human life. 
This dissertation proposes a unifying theme for what is at the core of most of the world’s 
religions, the concept of salvation, and offers arguments for why salvation matters to 
religious violence. Examples will be more fully developed in the case-study chapters.  
One commonly held belief about religions is that, at their roots, religions are 
about love and peace.  If this were true, then comprehending religiously motivated 
violence and war would be very difficult. But are love and peace the main goals of most 
                                                                                                                                                 
Politics Vol. 6, No. 2, (Summer 2000), pp-124, in which he finds that, statistically, Islam is not more 
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religions? This dissertation argues that, while undoubtedly all religions contain scripture 
and practices that are committed to the principles of love and peace, these are not the core 
concepts around which religions are structured. Rather, most religions, at their core, have 
a set of beliefs and practices organized around the goal of salvation, of which there is 
more than one understanding. 25  
This is not to say that all religions have salvation as their goal. In the Sociology of 
Religion, Weber divides religions between those that are concerned with an ethic of 
salvation and those that are not.26 Confucianism, Shintoism, and “naturist” centered 
religions are not organized around the concept of salvation. 27 However, most of the 
world’s major religious traditions are concerned with and organized around this 
objective.28 For example the monotheistic traditions of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, 
Sikhism, and the Baha'i faith all focus on a relationship with God through faith, 
obedience, prayer and praise.29 God is understood as the proprietor of salvation; religion 
                                                                                                                                                 
conflict prone than other religions.  
25 Salvation is a Christian term, deriving from the Latin root Salvus, to make safe. Soteriology is the 
theology of salvation. This term, therefore, is inherently Christian. However, it will be used for the sake of 
simplicity and clarity.  
26 Weber, Chapter IX, “Theodicy, Salvation, and Rebirth,” pp. 138-150 
27 Weber, Chapters IX-XII, pp. 138-206  
28 Examples of literature that explore comparative understandings of salvation across religions include 
Stephen Kaplan, Different Paths, Different Summits: A Model for Religious Pluralism and Soteriological 
Diversity, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); Ninian Smart, Worldviews: Crosscultural 
Explorations of Human Beliefs,  (Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995); John P. Reeder, Source, Sanction, 
and Salvation: Religion and Morality in Judaic and Christian Traditions, (Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 
1988); Klaus K. Klostermaier, Liberation, Salvation, Self-Realization: A Comparative Study of Hindu, 
Buddhist, and Christian Ideas, (Madras: University of Madras Press, 1973); The Saviour God: 
Comparative Studies in the Concept of Salvation, edited by SGF Brandon, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1963); Harris Franklin Rall, Religion as Salvation, (Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury 
Press, 1953); John William Parker, The Idea of Salvation in the World’s Religions, (London: Macmillan, 
1935).   
29 For a basic outline of Christian beliefs, see Harvey Cox, “Christianity,” Our Religions, edited by Arvind 
Sharma, (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993); for Islam, see “Islam,” pp. 427-491, Religions of the World, 
third edition, chief editor, Don Reisman, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993); for Judaism, see Milton 
Steinberg, Basic Judaism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, inc., 1947); for Sikhism, see “Sikhism,” 
Religions of the World, third edition, chief editor, Don Reisman, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993), pp. 
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is the means through which to enter into a relationship with the divine aimed at salvation. 
Buddhism and Hinduism have the concept of reincarnation, the belief that the 
accumulation of past actions, karma, forms present states of being. The religious goal is 
release from the cycle of life, death and rebirth into nirvana, a perfect state of being.30  
The term salvation is most commonly associated with the concept of “eternal 
salvation,” or with what comes after this life. Attaining eternal salvation usually involves 
some action on the part of individuals or groups in the here-and-now; it could be the act 
of believing, of enlightenment, of obedience, or of praise and devotion. Salvation, 
therefore, usually involves a process, a path, a transformation on earth that takes one into 
hereafter. In the monotheistic traditions, eternal salvation—often defined as paradise or 
heaven—is most typically attained through faith or belief in God, obedience to God’s 
laws and commandments, and worship or praise of God.31 In Buddhism and Hinduism, 
eternal salvation is defined by the release from the cycle of life, death and rebirth into a 
state that transcends life and death, which is nirvana. Nirvana is attained through 
knowledge, enlightenment and praise. In Hinduism, liberation from the lifecycle is 
attained either through adherence to the Veda rituals and practices maintained by Hindu 
priests, through the practice of yoga as directed by a guru, or through praise and devotion 
                                                                                                                                                 
156-161; for the Baha’i faith, see Peter Smith, The Babi and Baha’i Religions: From Messianic Shiism to a 
World Religion, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
30 Scholarship on Hindu and Buddhist notions of salvation include Edward Conze, “Buddhist Saviours,” 
The Saviour God: Comparative Studies in the Concept of Salvation, edited by SGF Brandon, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1963), pp. 67-82; and Ninian Smart, “The Work of the Buddha and the Work 
of Christ,” The Saviour God: Comparative Studies in the Concept of Salvation, edited by SGF Brandon, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963), pp. 160-173; and Klaus K. Klostermaier, Liberation, 
Salvation, Self-Realization: A Comparative Study of Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian Ideas, (Madras: 
University of Madras Press, 1973).  
31 For a basic outline of Christian beliefs towards salvation, see Harvey Cox; for Judaism, see Milton 
Steinberg; for Sikhism, see “Sikhism,” pp. 156-16, Religions of the World; for the Baha'i faith, see Peter 
Smith.  
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to a deity, which is bhakti.32 In Buddhism, salvation is attained by following the dharma, 
or the way to enlightenment revealed by the Buddha.33  
The path to eternal salvation is important for understanding religiously motivated 
violence and war because all major traditions have historic or contemporary examples of 
the belief that dying on the battlefield in the name of a religion will procure eternal 
salvation. For example, it is well known that current-day militant Islamic groups such as 
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizbollah and Al Qaeda promise eternal paradise to 
those who die in the line of Jihad, or holy war to defend the faith. 34 However, it is also 
important to point out that very similar doctrines exist in other traditions as well. 
Buddhist inspired Bushido warrior ethics promise that, through death on the battlefield, 
“the solider could, like the gods themselves, attain seishi no choetsu, a state transcending 
both life and death.”35 Christian Crusader Knights were granted remission of all their 
sins, securing their eternal salvation. 36 In addition, Judaism, Sikhism, and Hinduism have 
similar examples of “holy warriors.” Therefore, it is important to identify the conditions 
under which eternal salvation is understood to be fulfilled on the battlefield and when 
these religious doctrines are applied to historical circumstances as a means of motivation 
for war. 
                                                 
32 Madeleine Biardeau, Hinduism: The Anthropology of a Civilization, translated from the French by 
Richard Nice, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 17-30 
33 This is elucidated in Conze, pp. 73-74. See also “Chapter 11: Buddhism as a World Religion,” in 
Religions of the Third World. 
34 Examples of works on these groups includes: Meir Hatina, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic 
Jihad Movement, (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, 2002); Magnus Ranstorp, The Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage 
Crisis, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); and Hisham H. Ahmad, Hamas: From Religious Salvation to 
Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994).  
35 James A. Aho, Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious Symbolisms of Military 
Violence, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981) pg. 130  
36 Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading, (Philadelphia: University of 
Philadelphia Press, 1991), pg. 36 
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There is, however, another type of salvation that is perhaps less commonly 
associated with the term yet is as important for understanding religiously motivated 
conflict and war; it is a salvation concerned with saving the world in the here-and-now. 
This type of salvation, which will be called “earthly salvation,” contends that the earth—
particularly individuals, societies, and nations but also animals and the environment—is 
in a state of decline and needs to be restored to a particular order. The mandate to restore 
the world to its intended state of harmony and justice is true of religious movements 
vying for the creation of religiously run states, which includes groups within Islam, 
Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism. This is also true of other 
movements not usually associated with religions, such as Marxism and extreme 
environmentalist movements. 
Earthly salvation is important for understanding religiously motivated conflict and 
war because violence could be a means for achieving these saving ends. 37 For example, 
participants in the Iranian Revolution used violence to overthrow a corrupt, secular 
regime and put in its place a religious government, one that was believed to create a more 
just and pious society. 38  The same could be said for various Marxist movements around 
the globe. Communism, as expressed in the Communist Manifesto promised to end a 
corrupt economic system in which the majority of the population was forced to sell its 
labor as a commodity to the benefit of the wealthy few. In its place it offered social 
                                                 
37 In addition, it is important to note that concern for the current state of the world is also an impetus that 
drives religious-based charities, which see themselves in service and aid towards fellow humanity. 
However, this latter motivation for earthly change is seldom involved with the destruction of current 
governments and ways of life as a means for achieving desired ends. 
38 John L. Esposito and Michael Watson state in regard to modern political Muslim movements: “The key 
issue is what Islam could do for Muslims in the modern world—rescue them from decline, purify society, 
combat external forces of corruption.  For radicals (or fundamentalists) the triumphant moment was the 
Iranian Revolution, unifying political and religious authority to enforce the sharia law as the law of the 
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equality, better treatment of women, free education for children, and the right to the fruits 
of one’s own labor.39 The path to this communist utopia, however, was by revolution; in 
practice, these revolutions were almost always bloody.  
It is important to note that these two salvations are not mutually exclusive; in 
some cases they work together. For example, militant Muslim groups such as the 
Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah have social and political wings, in 
addition to a wing devoted to violent operations.40 These organizations aim to save both 
in the here-and-now in addition to promoting salvation through death in the struggle 
against earthly foes. Likewise, Christian and Jewish extremists agitating for the 
destruction of the Dome of the Rock and the construction of the Third Temple in 
Jerusalem believe that changing the here-and-now will hasten the second coming of the 
Messiah, which will usher in a new world.41 Therefore, while some movements are either 
focused primarily on one form of salvation or another, there are religious movements that 
simultaneously combine both forms in their paths towards salvation.   
Overall, by arguing that salvation is the core purpose of most religions and by 
arguing that violence may become a means of attaining salvation in certain conditions, 
this dissertation asserts that religious violence is neither illogical nor irrational. In other 
words religious violence is not incompatible with the main aims of religion and, under 
certain conditions, violence may be the fulfillment of salvation. Furthermore, as will be 
                                                                                                                                                 
land, to pursue social justice and roll back Western economic and cultural influence.” Religion and Global 
Order, edited by John L. Esposito and Michael Watson, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000) pg. 9   
39 “The Communist Manifesto,” Karl Marx: Selective Writings, edited by David McLellan, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 221-247 
40 For Hamas, see Hisham A. Ahmad.  For the Hezbollah, see Ranstorp, pp.37-47 
41 See Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Chapter Three, “Gush Emunim: A Fundamentalism of the 
Land,” pp. 89-128, The Glory and the Power: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1992)  
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demonstrated, religious violence is most often in reaction to real life threats to a 
religion’s practitioners or resources and thus it is rational.  
What is religious war? 
 The term religious war also requires definition. 42 Religion is present to some 
extent in perhaps all wars and violent conflicts, however, the ways in which religion 
operates in violent unrest varies greatly.  To gain some perspective on the different ways 
in which religion motivates bellicose behavior, this section will present two definitions 
for religiously motivated war and violent conflict—“wars with religion” and “religious 
wars”—which are distinguished by their end goals.43  
The first type of wars and violent conflicts, “wars with religion,” are ones in 
which religion contributes to violent campaigns that have “secular” or non-religious 
goals. In such cases, religion enters into the causal chain of violent conflicts but does not 
define the end goals.  For example, the war between Serbia and Croatia and the civil war 
in Bosnia had religious content, but specific religious goals have not played a primary 
role in these conflicts or their resolutions. In these cases, ethnicity—informed in part by 
religion—d distinguishes one group from another44 and has fueled secessionists 
movements; religion is not the causus belli for the establishment of a state with religious 
law or the preservation of sacred land.45 Another example of religion’s contribution to 
                                                 
42 In this dissertation, religious war and “holy war,” should be understood as synonymous. Wars are 
differentiated from “violent conflicts” using the standard 1,000 battle-deaths-per-year definition.  
43 It is important to note that this dissertation will focus on violent religious conflict and war; religious 
conflict and tension in general—unless it develops into violence against property and people—will not be 
addressed. 
44 See Petra Ramet’s work on religion and ethnicity in the Balkans as one example: Balkan Babel: Politics, 
Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) 
45 Some assertions have been made that Kosovo is a region of religious importance to the Serbs; that it is 
the “Jerusalem of the Serb people,” and that military action should be taken to defend the land from non-
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war is through the use of religious rhetoric as a legitimating and mobilizing force for 
wars with non-religious goals. One of many examples of this form of war includes the 
Bush (I) administration’s use of Christian Just War Doctrine language to legitimate the 
use of force against Iraq in 1991and mobilize the US population for war.46 This type of 
rhetoric has also been used in the current Global War on Terror against Osama Bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda.47  
The second type, “religious wars,” is defined as violent conflicts and wars with 
saliently religious end goals. As previously argued, religions have assets that are 
understood to be holy to the religion, including land, buildings, sacred sites, and 
practitioners. This dissertation will demonstrate that the defense of assets believed to be 
essential to the function of a religion, can—under certain conditions—lead to religious 
wars. In particular, this dissertation will consider three goals of religious wars: the 
defense of “holy nations,” religious communities and territory believed to be essential to 
the preservation of a religion; the defense of sacred sites, specific areas of land believed 
to have a unique relationship with the divine; and the creation of religious governments 
through the means of revolution. 
In order to understand the distinction between wars with religion and religious 
wars, dynamics between religion and the government and religion and society need to be 
explored. First, the relationship between religion and government is important for 
understanding religiously motivated violence and war. As argued in the beginning of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
Serb occupation. See “How it all started: No place for both of them” in The Economist, April 3rd, 1999, pg. 
18 
46 See, for example, President George Bush’s speech to the National Broadcasting Convention, January 28, 
1991 at the Sheraton Washington Hotel, Washington DC, The Whitehouse Office of the Press Secretary, pp. 
1-3. Bush stated: “America has always been a religious nation—perhaps never more than now…But with 
the support and prayers of so many, there can be no question in the minds of our soldiers or in the minds of 
our enemy about what Americans think. We know that this is a just war,” pg. 3. 
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chapter, the norm in academia is to relegate religion to the fringes of politics, society and 
history. This tendency is further heightened by the current-day institutional separation 
between religious organizations and the government in most western countries. The result 
is that religion is most often understood as a phenomenon that is completely separate 
from and relatively uninfluential to political thought and action.  This understanding, 
however, fails to capture the different ways in which religion operates in political life, 
both historically and in contemporary times.  
It is therefore important to acknowledge that, while there may be institutional 
separation between religion and the government in the West, religion still operates in the 
political lives of these countries, particularly in the US. For example, debates over 
legalized abortion and federally funded stem-cell research in the US are two political 
issues that involve religion. In these cases religion enters into the debate in the form of 
religiously-based ethics and morals concerning the sanctity of life.48 Religious influence 
is also present in policies for war and violent conflict. A current-day example is the 
religious rhetoric used by the US government in the Global War on Terror, as previously 
mentioned. Immediately following the September 11th bombing of the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, George W. Bush described the war against Osama Bin-Laden 
and his followers as a “Crusade,” a term harkening back to the Christian offensive against 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 William Safire, “On Language; Words at War,” The New York Times , September 30, 2001 
48For an example on the religious influences on abortion in the US see Faye Ginsburg, “Saving America’s 
Souls: Operation Rescue’s Crusade against Abortion,” in Fundamentalisms and the State, edited by Martin 
E. Marty and Scott Appleby, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994) pp. 557-582. For an example of 
the religious influences on federally funded stem-cell research in the US see: Michael Lind, “The Right 
Still Has Religion,” The New York Times, December 9, 2001; Katharine Q. Seelye with Frank Bruni, “The 
President’s Decision: The President; A long Process that Led Bush to His Decision,” The New York Times, 
August 11, 2001; “The Stem Cell Debate; The Embryonic Journey and its Milestones,” The New York 
Times, December 18, 2001.   
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the Muslim world in the Middle Ages.49  Separation of church and state, therefore, does 
not mean that religion no longer plays a role in the policies of the state. Rather, in most 
cases, it means that political and religious leaders are structurally separate.  
It is also important to note that the West has not always had an institutional 
separation between religion and the government. Prior to the sixteenth century, religion 
and the government were intertwined. This is visible in the form of religiously based 
monarchies such as the Hapsburgs and Tudors, the relationship between the Papacy and 
heads of state in Medieval Europe, and the norm of kings and queens as the heads of 
Protestant Churches as was the case in Prussia and the Scandinavian countries.50 
Moreover, the current-day institutional separation between religion and government in 
the West is not representative of the whole world. Religious monarchies still exist in 
North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia.51 Furthermore, religious 
political parties are present in Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh and Malaysia. Therefore, religion still plays a role in modern-day political 
life, to varying degrees. In order to understand how religion operates in the political life 
of a state, therefore, it is useful to think of religion and the government as a spectrum, not 
as distinct binary categories. This dissertation aims to explore the particular kinds of 
relationships between governments and religion that may produce religious violence. 
Second, the role that religion plays in societies is important for understanding 
religiously motivated violence and war. One common research approach for 
                                                 
49 The Whitehouse promptly apologized after Bush was criticized for his choice of language, see William 
Safire, “On Language; Words at War,” The New York Times, September 30, 2001.  
50 The King or Queen of England is still recognized as the head of the Church of England today.  
51 Examples of current-day religious monarchies include Morocco in North Africa; Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the UAE in the Middle East; Nepal in South Asia; and Brunei and Malaysia in East Asia, to name a 
few. 
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understanding the role of religion in society is to measure religiosity, the degree to which 
members in a society practice a religion. This approach, however, presents problems to 
understanding the ways in which religions function in society. First, it is difficult to 
consistently measure religiosity across religious traditions. For example, Christians, Jews, 
and Muslims attend worship services as part of their practice of religion. One could 
estimate a society’s religiosity, therefore, by what percentage of Christians, Muslims, and 
Jews attend worship services on a regular basis. However, other traditions such as 
Buddhism and Hinduism are not organized around regular worship services. Measuring 
the religiosity of Buddhists and Hindus, therefore, cannot be assessed by the same 
methods.  Furthermore attempts at measuring current religiosity in societies and 
religiosity across time require thorough and reliable data, which often is not available.52 
Statistically attempting to measure religious adherence, therefore, is difficult and favors 
traditions organized around regular worship services. 
Second, religiosity only measures one form of religion’s impact on society and, 
therefore, does not tell the whole story of how religions can function in groups, societies 
and nations. Societies can still respond to religious rhetoric and imagery regardless of 
how often individuals attend religious services. In this case, religion operates more subtly 
as one dimension of a group’s history and culture; it is part of the worldview of a given 
group or society. 53 For example, in the West, days of rest and public holidays are still 
centered around the Christian day of worship and its liturgical year, regardless of whether 
these days are spent in worship or not. In Israel, public holidays are determined by Jewish 
                                                 
52 See for example, Laurence R. Iannaccone, “Looking Backward: Long-Run Religious Trends Across 
Thirty Nations,” unpublished manuscript, 2001 
53 Religious scholar Ninian Smart advocates for this understanding of religion’s influence on society, see 
“Methods in My Life.” 
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holidays, and in most Muslim nations their holidays come from Islam. Religion, 
therefore, has affected the organization of these societies. Furthermore, religious rhetoric 
can also resonate with the non-religiose. Bush’s use of the term Crusade and his reference 
to Bin Laden as evil are examples of religious rhetoric that have resonated throughout the 
United States. Religion, therefore, still informs much about a society’s worldview—its 
organization, history, and culture—regardless of the religiosity of its members.  
Third, another form of religion’s impact on society is how it informs identity. 
This is one component of Huntington’s argument in The Clash of Civilizations. 
Huntington contends that:  
A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest 
level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans 
from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as 
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and the subjective self-
identification of people.54  
 
This dissertation argues, in accord with Huntington, that religion plays an important role 
in forming group identity. However, unlike Huntington, this book will demonstrate that 
the role of religion in forming group identity is not objective but largely subjective; it is 
the product of interpretation and changes over time. Moreover it will argue, as noted 
before, that religious identity is both endogenous and exogenous to a religious group. 
Thus, while individuals and groups have a choice as to whether or not to identify 
themselves with a religion, groups often do not have a choice as to how others identify 
them. 
Therefore, religion’s impact on society should be understood as more than 
religiosity to include how society organizes and identifies itself. This dissertation aims to 
                                                 
54 Huntington, pg. 43 
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explore the ways in which religion’s relationship with society can lead to religiously 
motivated conflicts and wars.    
Which Religions and Why  
 
Finally, it is necessary to outline the religions that will be studied in this 
dissertation and to offer a defense for their selection. Five religions will be considered: 
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. These religions have been chosen 
for two reasons: either these religions are demographically salient, and/or they have 
played an important role in regional and global politics. For example, Christianity and 
Islam are recognized as the world’s two biggest religions, with an estimated 2 billion and 
1 billion adherents, respectively. 55 These religions, therefore, are demographically salient. 
Judaism, on the other hand, is believed to have roughly between 14,000,000 to 
15,050,000 members worldwide, making up less than 1% of the world’s population. 56 
Despite its small numbers, Judaism has had a considerable impact on history and current 
politics in the Middle East. Therefore a study on religion and violent conflict would not 
be complete without considering both demographically significant religions and those 
that are politically salient. 
In addition, this dissertation will include a chapter on Marxism—its beliefs, 
interpretations, and manifestations in Russia, China, and Latin America—in order to 
consider if the rise and fall of Marxism as a political ideology bears any resemblance to 
the current Islamically motivated threat to the US.  In doing so, this dissertation aims to 
                                                 
55 There is much debate over how to measure religious demographics, both within states, as noted earlier, 
and globally. Adherents.com, offers an array of sources that attempt to measure religious demographics, or 
what it calls “sociological/statistical” numbers. They calculate the global number of Christians to be 2 
billion and Muslims to be 1.3 billion, see www.adherents.com. Ninian Smart estimates the number of 
Christians to be 1,965,993,000 and Muslims to be 1,179,326,000, see Atlas of the World’s Religions, edited 
by Ninian Smart, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pg. 13   
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provide insights into the accusation that Islam has provided the foundation for a “new 
Cold War” and a “clash of civilizations.” 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter presented three critical points to the study of religiously motivated 
violence and war. First, as a social, political and historical phenomenon, religion needs to 
be taken seriously as a force that impacts the field of international relations in general and 
causes of war in particular. This is especially true given the increasing number of 
conflicts that appear to be motivated by religion and the current terrorist threat to the US, 
which involves Islam. The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to present theories on the 
conditions under which religions become involved in violence and the particular 
resources that they bring to social and political unrest and war. 
 Second, in order to construct theories on how and when religions become 
belligerent, this chapter proposed definitions of two variables, religion and religious war. 
It defined religion as the combination of six variables: beliefs, texts, resources, religious 
leaders, religious communities, and religious identity. This chapter also proposed a 
unifying theme on the purpose of religion—the goal of salvation—identifying two types, 
eternal and earthly salvation. From these definitions of religion’s elements and purpose, 
this chapter presented two ways in which religion affects wars and violent conflicts: 
“wars with religion;” religion as a contributing factor to wars with secular ends; and 
“religious wars,” wars with saliently religious goals. Lastly, this chapter named the five 
religions to be considered in this book—Judaism, Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
56 Adherents.com and Atlas of the World’s Religions, respectively 
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Islam, in addition to Marxism—arguing that these religions are important to the study of 
religious bellicosity either for their demographic salience and/or their impact on politics.   
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Chapter 2  
The Causes of Religious War 
 
 
Religion has been correlated to a wide variety of wars and violent conflicts 
including the Christian Crusades, the Iranian Revolution, the current Balkans crises, 
terrorist organizations in the Middle East, Hindu-Muslim riots in India, and the civil war 
in Sri Lanka, to name a few. However, although there are many examples that correlate 
religion to war, causation has not been adequately assigned; scholars have offered few 
theories that explain how and under what conditions religious conflicts arise. In 
particular, the field of international relations needs to construct more systematic theories 
aimed at explaining the conditions under which religious violence arises in order to better 
understand this phenomenon.   
This chapter aims to fill this gap by offering causal arguments for religiously 
motivated wars and violent conflicts. As argued in chapter one, religion in practice—the 
application of religious beliefs and scriptures to individual, social and political life—is 
the result of interpretation; these interpretations are the product of individuals, usually 
religious leaders, who are grounded in specific contexts. Furthermore, chapter one argued 
that bellicose interpretations of a religion, not the religion per se, causes religious 
violence, but that bellicose interpretations occur at some points in time but not at others. 
Therefore, the main puzzle this chapter will explore is: Why do violent interpretations of 
a religion occur at some points in time and in some places but not at others? What 
explains this variation of war and peace in the world’s religions?  
 This chapter argues that violent interpretations of a religion are the result of 
political, social and economic circumstances surrounding those who interpret the faith; in 
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particular, it will consider three variables as causes of bellicose interpretations of a 
religion: the nature of actual or perceived threat; the relationship between religious and 
political leaders; and the amount of material, social and technological resources available 
to a given religious community. These three variables will be tested against six case 
studies to determine if they explain the conditions under which violent interpretations of 
the faith and religious wars occur. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section offers a brief survey of 
existing literature on religion and war in addition to outlining three existing theories on 
the causes of religious wars, considering their strengths and limits. The second section 
presents two causal arguments for religious violence and war: “wars with religion,” 
religion’s involvement in wars with secular goals; and “religious wars,” wars with 
saliently religious goals. The third section outlines the cases to be studied and methods 
that will be employed. And the fourth section offers concluding remarks.  
Literature on Religion as a Cause of War 
 Academia has produced a rich body of literature on religion and war that spans 
across a number of themes and fields of study. This section divides existing literature on 
religion and war into two broad camps that correspond to the two types of wars involving 
religion—works that identify religion’s correlation to secular wars, and works that 
address wars with saliently religious goals. In addition, this section will outline three 
existing theories on religion and war and discuss their strengths and limits. 
Religion and secular wars 
   Literature on religion and secular war can be divided into two categories: the role 
of religious-based ethics in declaring and fighting wars; and the connection between 
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religion, ethnicity and nationalism in wars and violent conflicts. First, much attention has 
been paid to religious-based ethics in justification for the use of force and conduct in war. 
Most notably, there is a wide body of literature on the Christian “Just War Doctrine,” 
developed by Augustine of Hippo in the 4th century CE and later codified by Aquinas, 
Grotious, Gratian, Anselm, and St. Bernard.1 There are also works that consider the role 
of religion in justifying the use of force and battle-ethics in Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, 
and Buddhism.2  These works are important for understanding religion’s role in 
legitimating the use of force and the use of religious rhetoric for mobilization. However, 
these works do not answer two important questions. First, they do not explain the 
conditions under which specific religious systems, their resources, and their practitioners 
become engaged in violence and war. And, second, these works tend not to explain the 
variation between war and peace in the world’s major religions. 
Second, there is also literature that links religion to nationalism and ethnicity as a 
cause of war. Two notable examples of such works are sociologist Mark 
Juergensmeyer’s, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular 
                                                 
1 Works that consider the use of the Just War Doctrine include Fredrick H. Russell, The Just War in the 
Middle Ages, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975); Paul Ramsey Just War: Force and Political 
Responsibility, (New York: Scribner, 1968); James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), to name a few  
2 Several works compare Christian Just War ethics with Islam’s ethics in jihad.  These works include: John 
Kelsay, Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics, (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993); and Just War 
and Jihad: Historical and Theological Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions, 
edited by John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).   A work that 
considers Ancient Israel’s ethics in war is: Susan Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics 
of Violence, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). A study that considers Hinduism’s concept of a 
Just War as  expressed in the Mahabharata  is M.A. Mehndale’s Reflections on the Mahabharata War, (New 
Delhi: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1995). A recent work that considers the role of Buddhism in 
shaping Japanese Bushido ethics is Mikael S. Adolphson, The Gates of Power: Monks, Courtiers and 
Warriors in Pre-Modern Japan, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000). In addition James A. Aho’s 
Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious Symbolisms of Military Violence, 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981) offers a study of Buddhist ethics in warfare in Chapter 7, “Mysticism 
and the Martial Arts: The Meaning of Bushido in Tokugawa Japan,” pp. 127-142. 
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State, which considers the rise of religious nationalism in the post-Colonial era,3 and 
anthropologist Petra Ramet’s, Balkan Babble: Politics, Culture and Religion in 
Yugoslavia, which delineates the role of religion in distinguishing identity and politics in 
the former Yugoslavia.4 These works are useful for a discussion on religiously motivated 
wars and conflicts because, first, they demonstrate that religion plays an important role in 
the formation of group identity, as argued in chapter one, and therefore are valuable for a 
theory on religion’s contribution to ethnic and nationalist conflicts. Second, this literature 
demonstrates that religion is not the only salient cause of such wars; rather in such cases 
religion is one of several key elements that fuels bellicose behavior. In other words, if 
religion were removed from the causal chain, there would still be war and violent 
conflict, although it might perhaps look different.  Therefore, the goals in such conflicts 
are not uniquely religious; they usually involve control of an existing state or the creation 
of a new one but not the preservation of a religious tradition or its resources.  
Religion and religious wars   
In addition to the abovementioned literature, there are other studies on religiously 
motivated violence and war, works that describe conflicts with saliently religious goals. 
This literature focuses on two phenomena in particular: religious “fundamentalism,” and 
                                                 
3 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1993). Other examples of works on religion and nationalism in violent 
conflict and war include: Peter F. Sugar, East European Nationalism, Politics and Religion  (Brookfield, 
VT: Aldershot, 1999), and Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the 19 th Century (Working Paper 
no. 8, Seattle: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 1996); and Peter van der Veer, “The 
Politics of Devotion to Rama,” in Bhakti Religion in North India: Community, Identity, and Political 
Action, edited by David N. Lorenzen, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995).  
4Petra Ramet, Balkan Babble: Politics, Culture and Religion in Yugoslavia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992). Other works on religion and ethnicity in conflict include: the large-n works on religion in ethnic 
conflict by Jonathan Fox noted in chapter one, Religion, Ethnicity and Self-identity: Nations in Turmoil 
edited by Martin E. Marty and Scott R. Appleby, (Hanover: University Press of New England: 1997); and 
Yusuf Bangura, The Search for Identity: Ethnicity, Religion, and Political Violence, (Geneva: United 
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1994). 
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religious terrorism. First, in the post-Cold War era much attention has been paid to the 
phenomenon called fundamentalism, especially Islamic fundamentalism, including works 
by John L. Esposito, Olivier Roy and Bassam Tibi.5 In addition, scholars have produced 
comparative works on fundamentalism, particularly Martin Marty’s and Scott Appleby’s 
five-volume Fundamentalists Project, which provides a comprehensive look at 
fundamentalist movements across religions, cultures and contexts.6 They define 
fundamentalism by arguing that:  
Religious fundamentalism has appeared in the 20th century as a tendency, a habit 
of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in 
certain representative individuals and movements, which manifests itself as a 
strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve 
their distinctive identity as a people or group.7 
   
Fundamentalism, therefore, is defined by its goal, which is to protect a religious group 
that perceives itself to be under threat.  
                                                 
5 There is a large and rapidly expanding body of literature on Islamic fundamentalism.  A few examples 
include: Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the World Disorder, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Religious Fundamentalism and Ethnicity in the Crisis of 
the Nation-State in the Middle East, (Conference Paper, Berkeley: University of California, 1992); Karen 
Armstrong, The Battle for God, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2000); John L. Esposito, Voices of Resurgent 
Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983)  
     Works on specific fundamentalist groups and countries include: Magnus Ranstorp, The Hizbo’allah in 
Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); John L. 
Espositio, The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989) 
     Works on comparative fundamentalist movements include: The Fundamentalism Project, edited by 
Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991-1995); Martin E. 
Marty, The Glory and the Power: The fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World, (Boston: Beacon 
Hill Press, 1992); Scott R. Appleby, Religious Fundamentalisms and Global Politics, (New York: Foreign 
Policy Association, 1994); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious 
Violence, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000)  
     The US Congress Committee on International Relations has also compiled reports from congressional 
hearings on Islamic Fundamentalism and its threat to US interests including: Islamic Fundamentalism in 
Africa and Implications for US Policy, (1992); The Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa, (1995); 
Algeria’s Turmoil, (1998); and Extremist Movements and their Threat to the Unites States, (2000). 
6 The five volume series includes: Fundamentalisms Observed (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991); Fundamentalisms and Society, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Fundamentalisms and 
the State, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Accounting for Fundamentalisms, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994); and the final volume of theories and common themes between different 
movements, Fundamentalisms Comprehended, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).  All volumes 
are edited by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby. 
7 Fundamentalisms and the State, pg. 3  
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Fundamentalism—while often employing force to achieve these ends, including 
terrorism—does not always use violence to preserve religious identity. One example of a 
fundamentalist group that has not used violence is the Haredi, the Ultra Orthodox Jews in 
Europe and Israel. This group reacted to the Enlightenment and Jewish integration in 19th 
century Europe by closing off their communities to assimilation and zealously keeping 
Jewish laws, beliefs and customs; these means of preservation are non-violent.8 In 
contrast, there are Jewish fundamentalist groups that have resorted to violence as a means 
of defending their faith against perceived threats. For example, the Jewish Defense 
League and its offshoot Kach along with the settler movement Gush Emunim have 
resorted to bombings, assassinations, and other forms of terrorist activities in order to 
defend Eretz Yisrael, “greater Israel,” which, as is discussed in chapter six, includes the 
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and other areas around the current day state of 
Israel. Therefore, fundamentalism can have non-violent and violent manifestations.  
Fundamentalism is also distinct from religiously defined ethnic and national 
identity in that it is saliently religious; the preservation of a group’s interpretation of a 
religion is the goal. Religious identity can cross borders, as with the Haredi in European 
countries and Israel; it can also cross races, as with the Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews. 
Thus the uniting element of these different groups is not their race or nationality but, 
rather, their particular interpretation of religious beliefs and practices.9 This trend is 
                                                 
8 Samuel C. Heilman, “Who Are the Haredim?” in Defenders of the Faith: Inside the Ultra-Orthodox 
Jewry, (New York: Schocken Books, 1992); and Samuel C. Heilman, “The Orthodox, the Ultra Orthodox, 
and the Election of the Twelfth Knesset,” pp. 135-154, Elections in Israel—1988, edited by Asher Arian 
and Michael Shamir, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) 
9 An example of a Sephardic Ultra Orthodox movement is Shas in Israel, which aims to spread its particular 
interpretation of Judaism throughout Israel and the Diaspora via social programs and by holding offices in 
the Israeli government. 
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visible not only in Judaism but also Islam, Christianity, and even Hinduism and 
Buddhism, as the case studies will demonstrate.  
Literature on fundamentalism is useful for a discussion on causes of religious 
wars in that it provides a valuable body of comparative case studies on movements across 
religions and contexts. However these works tend to consider only movements in the 
modern era; they do not address religious violence prior to the 20th century. Therefore 
potentially valuable comparisons with historical examples are not made. And second, this 
literature does not offer answers on why some groups choose violence as a means of 
defense and others do not. 
Second, also in the post-Cold War era and especially in light of the events of 
September 11th, there is a growing body of literature on religious terrorism, particularly 
studies on groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Lebanese 
Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and, to a lesser extent, Aum Shinrikyo.10 This literature is of 
particular importance to current questions regarding religious violence towards the US 
and possible counter-terrorism measures in US foreign policy. However, these works 
tend not to compare contemporary religious terrorism with examples of religious 
terrorism in the past, missing an opportunity to analyze causes and solutions of historic 
cases. Furthermore, this literature has yet to make rigorous comparisons between 
religious groups and other groups—such as Marxists or anarchists—that use terrorism in 
                                                 
10 Some examples of scholarship on religious terrorism include historic works such as Bernard Lewis, The 
Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam, (New York: Octagon Books, 1980); Martin Hengel, The Zealots: 
Investigations into the Jewish Freedom Movement in the Period from Herod I until 70 A.D., translated by 
David Smith, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989). Works on specific movements include Magnus Ranstorp, 
The Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1997), Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the 
New Global Terrorism, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1999); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind 
of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), to name a 
few.   
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order to understand the unique contributions that religious ideology brings to terrorist 
movements. 
There are an additional two categories of literature on religion and war that are 
important for this study. First, much scholarship has been generated on historical cases of 
a particular religion’s involvement in specific wars. This includes works on the English 
Civil War, the American Revolution and Civil War, Wars in Burma, China, Japan, and 
the Sikh Wars against the British in the 19th century, to name a few. 11 Such scholarship 
provides invaluable empirical data that is useful for testing theories of religious 
bellicosity. This dissertation, therefore, will draw on this body of secondary literature to 
test the strength of the causal arguments proposed.  
Second, much literature exists on the role of religion as a cause of peace and 
religion’s obligation to promote peace in times of violent conflict. This includes works 
within Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. 12 It also includes the works of 
                                                 
11Works considering the presence of religion in specific conflicts is enormous and covers a wide range of 
topics.  A brief list of examples of Christianity in certain wars includes:  Craig Rose, England in the 
1690’s: Revolution, Religion and War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1999); Religion and the 
American Civil War, edited by Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout and Charles Reagan Wilson, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); Keith L. Griffin, Revolution and Religion: American Revolutionary War 
and Reformed Clergy, (New York: Paragon House, 1994); William Gribbin, The Churches’ Militant: The 
War of 1812 and American Religion, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); George Hodges, Religion 
in a World at War [World War I] , (New York: MacMillan, 1917), to name a few.  
     Buddhism’s involvement in specific conflicts includes: Trevor Ling, Buddhism, Imperialism and War in 
Burma and Thailand in Modern History, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979); Stanley J. Tambiah, 
Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka, (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992); David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, (Washington, D.C.: The US 
Institute for Peace, 1994) 
     Judaism’s involvement in specific conflicts include the state of Israel’s justification for land and force 
in, “1967: Zionism Becomes a Holy War,” Chapter 7 of Karen Armstrong’s Holy War, (London: 
MacMillian Publishers, 1988); and Robert Goldenberg, The Nations that Know Thee Not, (New York: New 
York University Press, 1998) 
     Sikh involvement in war includes works on the First and Second Sikh Wars such as Arjan Dass Malik, 
An Indian Guerilla War: The Sikh Peoples’ War: 1699-1768, (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1975); Hugh 
C.B. Cook, The Sikh Wars: The British Army in the Punjab: 1845-1849, (London: L. Cooper, 1975); and 
D.H. Butani, The Third Sihk War?: Towards or away from Kalistan? (New Delhi: Promilla, 1986)   
12 A small sample of works that consider religion’s obligation to non-violence include: Stan Windass, 
Christianity Versus Violence: a Social and Historical Study of War and Christianity, (London: Sheed and 
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various think tanks and non-governmental organizations religion’s peace-making 
capacity, such as the US Institute for Peace’s Religion and Peacemaking Initiative.13 
While important, this dissertation argues that these works cannot be fully understood 
without also considering the flipside of religion—its ability to cause war and violent 
conflict.   
Existing theories on religion and war 
In addition to empirical work on the role of religion in war and violent conflict, 
there are a few theories that attempt to explain the causes of religious violence.  First, in 
Violence and the Sacred, Rene Girard develops a theory that correlates sacrifice—which 
he claims is the central component of religion—to human violence.14  Girard posits, in 
accord with Freud, that sacrifice is a means of venting human aggression. 15 Religious 
sacrifice, therefore, offers a channel through which humans can release violent desires, 
diverting those hostile desires from one another.  Girard claims that human violence 
occurs when symbolic sacrifices are no longer believable or satisfying to a given society.  
This is what he calls a “sacrificial crisis,” which, in turn, leads to human violence.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Ward, 1979); and John Howard Yoder, When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just War Thinking, (New 
York: Orbis Books, 1996). An example of Islam’s obligation to peace includes: M.R. Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, 
Islam and World Peace: Explanations of a Sufi, (Philadelphia: Fellowship Press, 1987). Hinduism and its 
obligation to peace is largely the product of two 20th century scholars, Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan. Works by Gandhi include: Non-Violence in Peace and War, (Ahmedbad: Navajivan 
Publishers, 1948); and Satyagraha (Non-Violent Resistance), (Ahmedbad: Navajivan Publishers, 1951). An 
example of Radhakrishnan’s work is Religion and Society, (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1947). Works on 
Buddhism’s contribution to peace are many in number.  Key works include Thich Nhat Hanh’s Being 
Peace, (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1987); Celebrating Peace, edited by Leroy S. Runner, (Indiana: Notre 
Dame Press, 1990); and the Dalai Lama, Disarmament, Peace and Compassion, (Westfield: Open Media 
Press, 1995) and Heart of Compassion: The Dalai Lama Reader, (Delhi: Full Circle Press, 1997), to name a 
few. 
13 For more information, visit their website at http://www.usip.org 
14 Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred, translated by Patrick Gregory, (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977)  
15 Although Freud and Girard disagree on the source of this hostility.  Freud believes it is the result of the 
Oedipal Complex, see Totem and Taboo, translated by James Strachey, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989) 
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Girard’s theory presents three problems for explaining religious violence and war. 
First, sacrifice is not a central component to all religions. Most notably, Buddhism does 
not have sacrifice as one of its tenets; therefore Girard’s theory does not explain violence 
and war generated by Buddhism. Second, Girard’s theory explains sub-conscious human 
desire and the actions that these thoughts produce.  His theory, although tested by several 
scholars of religious studies for its explanatory power,16 does not consider conscious 
decision-making of religious elites and their communities to engage in violence and wars. 
And third, Girard’s theory does not adequately explain the conditions under which ritual 
sacrifice fails and a sacrificial crisis emerges.  
In response to Girard’s theory, Mark Juergensmeyer offers his own theory for 
religious violence.  In “Sacrifice and Cosmic War,” Juergensmeyer argues that religion’s 
primary purpose is to establish “ultimate order” and that this process involves conquering 
the “ultimate disorder,” which is death. 17 Sacrifice and divine battles between gods—
present in most religious scriptures or beliefs—are symbolic representations of a religious 
system battling with and attempting to conquer Evil, which is death and disorder.18 In 
times of “threat and calamity”—such as war, occupation, corruption, lawlessness, and 
famine—cosmic and earthly violence become conflated; the celestial war between Good 
and Evil is understood to be occurring in the here-and-now. When conflated, earthly 
battles become holy battles. Juergensmeyer’s theory posits that holy battles for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
while Girard believes it is  the result of competition with “the other.” This is what he calls “mimetic desire.” 
See Girard, chapter 6, “From Mimetic Desire to Monstrous Double,” pp. 143-168. 
16 See Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World, edited by Mark Juergensmeyer, (London: Frank Cass, 
1992), for the compilation of essays testing Girard’s theory.  
17 Mark Juergensmeyer, “Sacrifice and Cosmic War,” pp. 108-109, Violence and the Sacred in the Modern 
World. This theory is further developed in chapter two of Mark Juergensmeyer’s, The New Cold War?: 
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)  
18 Juergensmeyer, “Sacrifice and Cosmic War,” pp. 106-111 
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conquest of Good over Evil know no specific enemy or definitive goal; rather the battle is 
against amorphous Disorder.  
Juergensmeyer’s theory is useful in that, first, it touches on a very important 
component of religion—the struggle of Good over Evil. As argued in chapter one, most 
religions are concerned with the path towards earthly and/or eternal salvation. Salvation 
is the struggle of Good over Evil, both in the here-and-now and the hereafter. Therefore 
Juergensmeyer’s theory corresponds with the argument that salvation is a core concept of 
religion. Second, Juergensmeyer notes that earthly circumstances, especially threat and 
calamity, bring the struggle for salvation to the here-and-now. This theory, therefore, 
provides an explanation for why religious groups may become involved in violence and 
war at some times while not at others.  However, this dissertation will challenge 
Juergensmeyer’s assertion that religious violence knows no goals; rather, it will 
demonstrate specific goals that religious wars have. 
The third theory on religious war is inferred from literature on fundamentalism; it 
is not proposed by any one source but rather is implicit in the writings of many scholars 
on this topic. The theory posits that religious fundamentalism is largely reactionary; it is 
in response to perceived or actual threat. For example, in The New Cold War?, 
Juergensmeyer argues that fundamentalism is a reaction to secular nationalism, which 
threatens religious worldviews and ways of life.19 David Little asserts that religious 
fundamentalism is in reaction to colonialism.20 Karen Armstrong and Bruce Lawrence 
posit that religious fundamentalism is in reaction to the forces of modernity, such as 
                                                 
19 Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War 
20 David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994) 
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cultural, economic and political globalism.21 These various threats to religious groups 
spark a reaction, either violent or non-violent, with the goal of preserving the religious 
group’s identity and way of life. 
These observations suggest two causes of religious fundamentalism that are useful 
for identifying the underlying causes of religious violence. First, they suggest that 
fundamentalism is largely reactionary, not preemptive; it is a response to perceived or 
actual threat. Second, these observations suggest that the social, political and economic 
circumstances of a given group explain why some groups turn towards fundamentalism 
and others do not. This is in contrast to those who argue that there is something within a 
religion that makes it prone towards fundamentalism and violence. However, this theory 
does not explain why some fundamentalist groups choose violence as a means of defense 
and others do not. 
 These three theories, particularly Juergensmeyer’s theory for cosmic war and the 
implicit argument in the fundamentalism literature, form the foundation for this 
dissertation’s causal argument, which is outlined in the following section. 
Causal Arguments for Religion, War, and Violent Conflict 
As previously argued, if the source of religious violence exists within a religion, 
either through its scripture or beliefs, then it stands to logic that its practitioners would be 
in a perpetual state of war. However, none of the five religions studied in this dissertation 
fits this description; all of these religions have historical examples of violence and 
examples of peace, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters. This variation 
                                                 
21 Karen Armstrong, The Battle For God, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2000); and Bruce B. Lawrence, 
Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age, (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 
1989) 
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between religious peace and violence suggests that there are factors other than scriptures 
and belief that cause war and violence.  The previous chapter posited that religious 
violence is the result of interpretations of the faith, which is the product of individuals 
grounded in specific circumstances. Therefore, in order to understand the conditions 
under which violent interpretations of a religion are generated, it is necessary to identify 
the variables that fuel these interpretations.  
There are several theories in international relations literature that are useful for 
explaining how and under what conditions religious violence arises. Political scientist 
Michael E. Brown confronts similar questions to the abovementioned puzzles when 
attempting to explain the causes of ethnically motivated violence and war. Brown notes 
that if “ancient hatred theory” were true—the idea that two ethnic groups have been at 
war for centuries and are thus inherently prone towards reciprocal violence—then one 
should expect to see perpetual war between such groups. In other words, ancient hatred 
theory does not explain the variation of war and peace between ethnic groups.22 In order 
to explain this variation, Brown looks for a “catalyst” to ethnic conflict, something that 
sparks violence at certain times and not at others. He identifies “political elites” as such a 
catalyst and argues that they are the ones who whip up ethnic hatred at some points in 
time but not at others.23  
Another useful theory for explaining variation between religious war and the 
peace is Thomas Christensen’s theory for elite-driven mobilization. Christensen argues 
that international threats can present domestic elites with difficult challenges to providing 
security for their state. This, in turn, can lead elites to adopt “a more hostile or more 
                                                 
22 Michael E. Brown, “Introduction,” in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, (Cambridge: 
MIT Press in association with Harvard’s CSIA Studies in International Security, 1996), pp. 1-31 
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ideological foreign policy than they otherwise would prefer” with the aim of generating 
domestic mobilization to meet the state’s security needs.24 Christensen’s theory, as with 
Brown’s, focuses on the role of elites—in this case foreign policy elites—and their role in 
identifying threats, defining actions to meet these threats, and explaining threats and 
actions to mobilize citizens and other domestic resources for foreign policy ends. 
Christensen acknowledges that elites’ use of ideology is critical for mobilizing domestic 
support to meet exogenous threats. 
Lastly, this dissertation will use the insights of international relations scholar 
Robert Jervis—particularly his articulation of the security dilemma—to explain threat 
perception as a motivator for elite-driven religious war. Jervis argues that the 
offense/defense balance between states—factors such as geography, military equipment, 
technology and intentions—is often difficult to distinguish, which makes states feel 
insecure. It is this uncertainty that breeds the “security dilemma”—defensive measures 
taken by one state which, in turn, are interpreted as hostile acts by another state, thus 
prompting that state to take defensive actions, which spirals both states into a diminishing 
sense of security. 25  Threat perception and the security dilemma, it will be argued, are 
critical for explaining variation between religious war and peace throughout time and 
space. This is not to say that all religious violence is in reaction to threat; undoubtedly 
there is some religious violence that comes from preemptive opportunity. However, this 
dissertation will argue that most religiously motivated war is in response to a perceived or 
actual threat; it is thus reactive instead of proactive. 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Brown, pg. 23 
24 Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pg. 4 
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This dissertation will concentrate on violent interpretations of the faith and the 
wars and conflicts they produce. It was consider, in particular, three variables as causes 
of religiously motivated war and violent conflict: the relationship between political and 
religious leaders as a cause of religious wars; the role of threat perception in shaping 
leaders’ actions; and the amount of material, social and technological resources in 
determining actions of groups. 
Religious and governmental authorities  
Following on Brown’s and Christensen’s arguments, this dissertation will focus 
on the role of elites—what it will call leaders—in precipitating violence and war. It 
therefore assumes that leaders are the ones who call for war and violence and who also 
determine the goals of violent campaigns.  Both religious and political leaders are 
important for understanding religion’s involvement in war. Religious leaders are the ones 
charged with interpreting scripture and maintaining religious traditions; these religious 
resources can be valuable tools for justifying the use of force and mobilizing populations 
for war. Political leaders also manage resources—particularly the military—that could be 
used for defense in times of threat.  
In particular, the relationship between religious and political leaders will be 
explored for its impact on religiously motivated war and violence. The conventional 
wisdom concerning religion and government, particularly for those in the West, is that 
religion and state authority should be separate. Ideally, this separation should preserve the 
integrity of both bodies of authority by removing religion from politics and society and 
by allowing for religious liberties, free of governmental interference. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. XXX, No. 2, January, 
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separation of religious and governmental authorities does not always produce religious 
peace. On the contrary, this dissertation will demonstrate that secular governments, under 
certain conditions, are a cause of religious violence; they help produce violent 
interpretations of a religion aimed at challenging the authority of the state. Therefore, 
separation of religion and state is not necessarily the path to religious peace.  
This dissertation posits that, under certain conditions, the relationships between 
religious and state leaders can produce religious wars. First, if political and religious 
leaders’ authorities are intertwined, then both groups of leaders can use each other’s 
resources for their own ends. This relationship, therefore, could produce wars with either 
religious or secular goals. Religious and state authority can be intertwined through 
religious monarchies, religious political parties, religious law, and government posts for 
religious leaders. It is important to note that the intermixing of religious and political 
leaders can have positive consequences; both bodies can check and restrain each other, 
preventing neither side from becoming too powerful.  
However, the dynamic between religious and government authorities can also 
lead to collusion; one form of authority calling on the other to legitimate its agendas, 
including plans for war and violent conflict. This relationship can further religious 
leaders’ goals. Likewise, in this dynamic, state leaders can call on religious leaders to 
legitimate wars with secular goals. For example, the intertwining of religious and 
political leaders in Iran and Saudi Arabia has allowed religious leaders to use government 
funding to promote radical Islamic groups outside their borders, which is discussed in the 
chapter four. Likewise, the rise of Hindu nationalist parties in Indian government has 
                                                                                                                                                 
1978, pp. 167-214 
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arguably created a more permissive environment in which these groups can assert their 
religious goals, which is discussed in the chapter five. 
Second, this dissertation argues that if religious authority is subordinate to state 
authority, then a government’s wars will have secular goals. However, as the case studies 
will reveal, this dynamic can also produce another result—religious leaders who violently 
challenge the authority of the government, with the goal of affecting a revolution and 
seizing control of the state. This dynamic is particularly evident in the current wave of 
radical Islamic groups calling for jihad against their own governments, such as in Egypt, 
Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia, which are discussed in chapter four.  
However, this is visible not only in Islam, but also within revolutionary movements in 
Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism and Christianity. Even in the US, Christian terrorist 
groups, inspired by Reconstructionist Theology, have emerged with the aim of 
overthrowing the US government and installing Christian theocracy in its place.26 
Therefore, as the case studies will show, neither of these relationships between 
governmental and religious authorities has consistently produced violent ends. There are 
numerous examples of intertwined religious and government authorities that have created 
peace. For example, the Dalai Lama is both the spiritual and political leader of the 
Tibetan people; he has called for peaceful resistance against Chinese occupation. 
Historically, however, the Tibetans have engaged in violence and war under the office of 
the Dalai Lama.27 Likewise, the subordination of religion to the state has produced both 
peaceful and violent results. The US and most of the West enjoys peaceful dynamics 
between religious and governmental authorities. As previously mentioned, however, this 
                                                 
26 Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, chapter two: “Soldiers for Christ,” pp. 19-43 
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relationship has produced religious violence in Egypt, Palestine, Israel, India, and 
Indonesia. Therefore, dynamics between state and religious authorities are not the sole 
cause of religious war and violence. 
Threat perception 
Because the relationship between religious and state authority does not produce 
clear results for religious bellicosity, other variables must be important for determining 
the conditions under which religious wars occur. This dissertation, therefore, considers 
the role of real or perceived threat in determining religious violence and war.  The case 
studies will demonstrate that the majority of religious wars are called by leaders in 
reactions to perceived or actual threat, not as opportunity to gain resources or adherents 
to the faith. It is important to note, however, that not all religious wars are threat driven. 
There are historical examples of religious wars called to expand territory, most notably 
the jihads to expand the dar al Islam, the territory of Islam, in the 7th century CE, which 
is discussed in chapter four. However, the majority of religious wars are fought for 
defensive ends.  
This dissertation posits that religious leaders will react to threats against sites, 
territory, and communities believed to be essential to the preservation of a religion. 
Religious mobilization to protect sacred sites is particularly evident in the battles over 
Jerusalem and Ayodhya, both discussed in the following chapters. Religious mobilization 
can also occur over territory and populations deemed essential to a faith tradition. 
Examples include Sinhalese Buddhist claims to Sri Lanka, Hindu nationalists’ bid to 
make India distinctly Hindu, Jewish extremists’ call to seize land they believe to be theirs 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 The Dalai Lama , My Land and My People: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet, 
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by divine right, and Muslim actions to defend the dar al Islam. All of these events will be 
discussed in the following case studies.   
However, this dissertation will also reveal that threats aimed at radically altering 
the order of society tend to produce a religious reaction. Radical social transformation 
comes from several different sources including wars, occupation, new ideologies, and 
new political systems. For example, 19th century European colonial powers radically 
transformed the social fabric of the regions they occupied. They introduced land reform, 
new educational systems, new political structures, new religions and worldviews, and 
new ways of thinking about identity. These transformations produced reactions in 
Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, as described in several of the following chapters. 
Likewise, in the post-Colonial period, the efforts of several governments to implement 
secular-nationalist agendas—complete with social, economic and political reforms—
produced religiously motivated backlashes. This is true in India, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, 
Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia, as will be discussed in the cases studies. In addition, the 
current rise of globalization has also threatened religious groups and nations around the 
world, producing backlashes that are often violent. Therefore, the threat of radical social 
and political transformation often provokes a religious reaction, which can be violent. 
Material, social and technological resources 
Finally, this dissertation posits that resources are important for explaining the 
conditions under which religious violence occurs. Specifically, it will consider three sets 
of resources: material resources, which include money, property, buildings (including 
schools and clinics), and military equipment; social resources, which include charismatic 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New York: Warner Books, 1997), pp. 40-43, 55, 76-77,105 
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leaders, educated leaders, networks, and organizations; and technological resources, 
which include transportation and communications technology.  This dissertation posits 
that the greater the resources available to religious leaders and groups, the more likely 
these groups will choose violence as a means of achieving their goals. And conversely, 
the fewer resources these groups have, the less likely they will choose violence and the 
more likely they will use other means, such as hiding from the threat or isolation, to 
defend their faith.  
The case studies will reveal that, of these three types of resources, social 
resources—particularly educated leaders and well-structured organizations—are 
important for explaining the ability of religious groups to assert their demands, including 
through the use of force. 
Religious wars and wars with religion 
As previously argued, this dissertation asserts that religion’s involvement in war 
can be divided into two distinct causal paths: “religious war,” wars and violent conflicts 
with salient religious goals; and “wars with religion,” those with “secular” or non-
religious goals. Furthermore, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that religious wars are 
fought specific goals in mind. In particular, it aims to explain the causes of three saliently 
religious end-goals in religious wars. First, it argues that religious groups fight to defend 
“holy nations,” territory and people deemed critical to the survival of the faith. Second, it 
argues that religious group fight to defend sacred sites, pieces of land recognized as 
important for the practice of the faith. And third, it argues that religious groups fight for 
control of the government, via religious revolutions, which will allow these groups to 
implement their interpretation of the faith. These goals, while not covering every aim for 
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which religious groups become involved in war and violent conflicts, covers the most 
prominent religious wars in history and in modern times.  
This dissertation argues that religious wars to defend holy nations, sacred space 
and create religious governments arise from particular threats, especially threats to the 
order of society and to religious land and constituents. Furthermore, certain relationships 
between religious and political leaders will help produce religious wars, specifically if the 
religious and political leaders’ authority are mixed or if religious leaders are separate 
from political leaders and threatened by the state. Finally, religious groups will choose 
violence depending on the amount of resources available to the group.  
However, not all wars have religious goals, although it is quite possible that all 
wars involve religion in some capacity. In wars with secular goals, religion is one of 
many potential ideologies—along with and not exclusive to nationalism, Marxism, 
liberalism, and even secularism—that leaders can use for mobilization. This dissertation 
argues that if the threats facing the state do not directly impact religious leaders, their 
land, and their constituents, then the goals will not be religious; rather, they will be 
secular including objectives such as state expansion and defense; the capture or defense 
of resources; the maintenance of trade and transportation routes; and regime preservation 
or removal. Wars with religion arise either from the mixing of political and religious 
leaders’ authority, which will allow political leaders to draw on religious authority to 
legitimate and mobilize for war, or through the separation of religious and political 
leaders, which will produce secular wars from the government.28   
                                                 
28 Although this relationship can also produce wars where religious leaders challenge the authority of the 
state, as described in the section on religious wars. 
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As the case studies will reveal, the primary difference between causes of religious 
wars and wars with religion is the nature of threat. Threats to the order of society, sacred 
sites, or religious constituents will compel religious groups to react. Threats to territory, 
governments, or resources will compel states or groups to react in order to defend these 
resources, possibly using religion as a means of mobilization or justification. These 
arguments are summarized in Table 2.1. 
2.1 Causal Argument and Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of general hypotheses: 
1. Threat perception 
The greater the actual or perceived threats to co-religionists and resources, the 
more likely religious leaders will generate bellicose interpretations of a 
religion. 
  
2. Fusion of religious and political leaders: 
If religious and political leaders authorities are intertwined, then the greater 
the chances that they will use each other’s resources to call for, justify, and 
execute war, including both religious wars and wars with religion. 
 
3. Material, social and technological resources:  
The greater the resources, the more likely the religious group is to use force to 
attain their goals. 
 
 
Cases and Methods  
This dissertation will focus only on “religious wars,” wars and violent conflicts with 
saliently religious goals: defense of holy nations, defense of sacred space, and religious 
revolutions aimed at installing a religious government. It will consider six cases divided 
1) Threat perception 
2) Religious and 
political mixing  
Religious war 
Bellicose 
interpretations  
of a religion 
Resources 
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into three categories. First, it will consider religious violence and war to defend “holy 
nations,” land and people central to the preservation of specific religions. This section 
will trace Buddhist battles aimed at defending the dhammadipa in Sri Lanka, the land of 
the Buddha’s teachings. It will also address the jihads of the 19th century and compare 
them to jihad movements today including Osama Bin Laden’s declaration of war against 
the US. Second, the case studies will look at religious violence to defend specific sacred 
sites, namely battles over Ayodhya and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India; and 
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim battles over Jerusalem. Third, this dissertation will trace 
the rise of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It will then compare this religious revolution to 
Marxist revolutions in Russia, China and Latin America, considering the similarities and 
differences between Islam and Marxism as revolutionary ideologies.  
These cases were chosen because the end goals of these battles are saliently 
religious.  Jihad movements have called on religious doctrines and scriptures to defend 
the dar al Islam and its Muslim inhabitants. Similarly, the bid to make Sri Lanka saliently 
Sinhalese stems from the belief that the island is divinely Buddhist. Likewise, Jerusalem 
and Ayodhya are battles over contested sacred spaces that have involved Jews, Muslims 
and Christians, and Muslims and Hindus, respectively. These cases were also chosen 
because they tend to be the incidents that spring to mind when thinking of religious war: 
the Crusades, Hindu-Muslim riots, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iranian Revolution, 
and the current declaration of jihad against the United States. Therefore, these cases in 
particular have been chosen for their association with religious violence and war. Lastly, 
these cases cover five religious traditions—Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam and 
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Christianity, in addition to Marxism—demonstrating the spread of religious violence and 
war across traditions in addition to within religious traditions across time and space. 
The following cases will not be considered in this dissertation: the Holocaust, the 
conflict in Northern Ireland, the recent Balkan wars, the Genocide in Rwanda, and 
Catholic uprisings in Latin America in the second half of the 20th century. The Holocaust 
is often considered a war involving Christian persecution of Jews. While it is true that 
Jews were the primary target of Hitler and he used Christian symbols and history to 
mobilize the masses, Jews were singled-out not for their religion, but for their supposed 
“race,” which the Reich argued was inferior to the “Aryan” race of the Germans. This is 
evident in the fact that other “inferiors” were targeted along with the Jews including 
Roma (Gypsies), homosexuals, the infirm, and the mentally deficient. Therefore, Hitler’s 
inspired genocide was racially motivated, not religiously salient.  
The Northern Ireland conflict is not considered because the goals of the fighting 
sides are not saliently religious. The groups are distinguished by their religious identities: 
the Catholic “Republicans” and the Protestant “Unionists.” However, despite the fact that 
religion defines identity, and despite the fact that religion is used as a means of 
mobilization for the conflict, the goals of both sides are not saliently religious. The 
Republicans, who are primarily Catholic, are fighting for an end to British occupation 
and reunification with the Republic of Ireland. The Unionists, who are primarily 
Protestant, want to maintain political, economic, social, and military ties with the United 
Kingdom. Thus these goals, therefore, are not saliently religious.   
Similarly, fighting groups in the Balkans are distinguished by religious affiliation: 
the Serbs are Christian Orthodox, the Bosnjaks and Albanians are Muslim, and the Croats 
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are Catholic Christians. However, despite these religious distinctions and the use of 
religious resources to differentiate and mobilize the masses for war, the goals of these 
fighting parties, for the most part, are not to preserve religious order or create states with 
religious governments, but rather to create independent, viable states that can be defended 
from attack.29  
The Rwandan Genocide involved the participation of members of Christian 
clerisy, including Catholic priests and nuns, Episcopal priests, and several pastors of 
other Protestant churches.30 However, groups in the conflict were distinguished not by 
religion but ethnicity, Hutus and Tutsies. This led to massacres within religious groups, 
not between them; for example, Catholics Hutus killed Catholic Tutsies. The goal of this 
conflict, therefore, was the eradication of one ethnic group by another, not the eradication 
or preservation of one religious group over another.  
Finally, Latin America experienced several uprisings involving Catholicism in the 
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and today in Chiapas, southern Mexico. Latin America was the 
birthplace of Liberation Theology, an interpretation of the Gospels that called for 
resistance to social injustice—often at the hands of governmental and military 
oppression—including the use of force. The Catholic clerisy actively participated in 
resistance movements by mobilizing constituents, organizing and leading groups, and 
                                                 
29 It is worth noting that a few groups in the Balkans have named saliently religious goals as a causus belli. 
For example, some Serbs believe that Kosovo is the “Jerusalem of the Serbs;” it is the site where the Serb 
nation was born and has struggled against advancing Muslim forces since the 14th century. See “How it all 
started: No place for both of them” in The Economist, April 3rd, 1999, pg. 18. There are also a few radical 
Islamic groups in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia, who have declared the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia to be a jihad, however, these groups are few and have been unsuccessful in rallying the masses 
behind their cause. See Stephen Schwartz, “The Arab Betrayal of Balkan Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, (March, 2002), pp. 1-12  
30 James C. McKinley, Jr., “Church and State: Seeking Complicity in a Genocide,” The New York Times, 
June 10, 2001 
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even dying for these causes.31 However, the goals for which these groups were fighting 
were not religious; in many cases they sought to install new governments based on 
Marxist principles, not a Christian theocracy. Therefore, these violent conflicts did not 
have saliently religious end goals.    
Methods and research design  
As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the puzzle this dissertation seeks to 
answer is: Why do violent interpretations of a religion occur at some points in time and in 
some places but not at others? What explains this variation? In order to answer this 
puzzle, this dissertation will employ a two-fold method of comparison. First, it will 
analyze religious groups in one place throughout history, considering cases where 
religious groups that were once pacific have become violent and vice versa. In doing so, 
this dissertation will test the proposed hypotheses for variables that cause religious 
groups to choose violence—the relationship between political and religious elites, the 
perception of threat, and the resources available to that religious group—to determine if 
they explain the conditions under which religious groups become violent as a means of 
attaining their goals. Second, these different case studies will be compared according to 
their subcategory—holy nations, sacred space, and religious revolutions—further testing 
the explanatory power of variables exogenous to religion and thus common across 
different traditions. 
This dissertation employs qualitative methods, primarily process tracing, to test 
the hypotheses against case studies. The case studies trace developments over time within 
                                                 
31 For an introduction to Liberation Theology, see The Dictionary of Historical Theology, edited by Trevor 
A. Hart, (Grand Rapids: Patler Noster Press, 2000) pp. 318-320; and The Oxford Companion to Christian 
Thought , edited by Adrian Hastings et al, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 387-390 
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one group, in addition to comparing cases across religion, time and context, making use 
of small and medium-n approaches. The hope in employing these methods is to identify 
patterns of variables that cause religious violence and war across space, time and 
religious tradition. This method may also illuminate characteristics that are unique to 
different religions and how these differences affect religious bellicosity. For case studies, 
this dissertation relies primarily on the rich body of secondary literature in order to test 
the theories. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that existing literature on religion and war, while 
descriptively rich, offers few theories that explain religious war and violent conflict 
across religious groups, space and time. In response, therefore, this chapter presented 
causal arguments for religion’s involvement in wars and violent conflicts, building on the 
two definitions of “religious wars” and “wars with religion” outlined in chapter one. This 
chapter argued that three variables are important for understanding when certain religious 
groups engage in violence and war: the relationship between religious and governmental 
authorities, the role of threat perception, and the amount of resources available to the 
religious community. Furthermore, this chapter argued that religious wars—wars with 
saliently religious end-goals—are largely defensive and include three broad pursuits: the 
defense religious nations, the defense of sacred sites, and the instillation of a religious 
government through revolution. These arguments will be tested for their explanatory 
power in the following case studies using qualitative methods.
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I. 
Holy Nations 
 Overview of Religious Wars to Defend Holy Nations  
 
 
 The role of ethnicity and nationalism as causes of violence and war is a timely 
academic topic, particularly in the post-Cold War era. There are many competing 
definitions of ethnicity and nationalism and the various ways in which they fuel bellicose 
behavior. For example, Donald Horowitz argues that ethnicity includes numerous visible 
and invisible traits—such as skin color, physique, place of birth, tribal or clan affiliation, 
language, cultural practices, history, and religious affiliation—which are believed to be 
ascriptive, or given at birth, and which unite groups and distinguish them from one 
another.1 Anthony Smith adds the importance of territory or a “homeland” to his 
definition of ethnicity and omits religion as an ethnic trait.2 Walker Connor’s definition 
of nationalism stresses “national consciousness,” the importance of a group’s political 
aspirations of a group, most notably self-rule or the creation of a state.”3 Therefore, 
nationalism could involve ethnic traits or other unifying elements, such as a set of beliefs 
and ideology, and the desire to make those particular traits politically salient.    
This section considers a specific subset of nationalism, holy nations, which are 
religious communities and the land they inhabit. As argued in chapter one, religions are 
inherently corporate phenomena; they involve groups of people that identify and are 
identified by a specific set of beliefs, scriptures, and practices.  In other words, religion 
is—or becomes under certain circumstances—the salient definition of the group and the 
land they inhabit. Unlike sacred sites—which are parcels of land believed to have a 
                                                 
1 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 41-
54 
2 He names six traits in his definition of ethnicity—a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared 
history, a distinctive shared culture, an association with specific territory, and a sense of solidarity. See 
Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 21-32 
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unique connection with the divine—holy nations involve much greater areas, even entire 
regions that have been deemed the “homeland” of the religion. These areas, together with 
the practitioners that inhabit them, are believed to share in a holy mission aimed at the 
preservation and promotion of the faith.  If threatened, therefore, not only is the survival 
of the group at stake, but so is the very existence of the religion. 
 This section examines two examples of holy nations that have, at times, engaged 
in religious wars to defend land and people believed to be necessary for the preservation 
of a faith tradition. The first case considers the rise of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in Sri 
Lanka and Sinhala-Tamil violence beginning in the 1950s. It analyzes three waves of 
violence: the riots in 1956 and 1958; the 1977 riots; and riots in 1981 and 1983 followed 
by the outbreak of civil war. It argues that the rise of Sinhala nationalism stems from the 
belief that the Sinhala are a Buddhist nation—a land and people chosen by the Buddha 
himself to protect and promote his teachings throughout the world—and, therefore, that 
the island should be primarily if not wholly Buddhist. The creation of governmental 
policies preferential to the Sinhala—particularly in areas of language, land cultivation, 
and university quotas—sparked a reaction from the island’s other ethnic and religious 
groups. Unlike the Sinhala, Tamil national aspirations have been based on language, 
ethnicity, and a historic presence on the Island; Hinduism has neither been a salient 
motivator nor goal for which the Tamils are fighting. 
The second case analyzes two major waves of jihad aimed at defending the dar al 
Islam, the land and people that preserve the Muslim faith. It considers, first, the outbreak 
of dozens of jihads throughout the Muslim world in the 19th century and, second, the 
current rise of jihads that began in the 1970s, including the emergence of Osama Bin 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), especially pp. 91-92 
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Laden and Al Qaeda. It argues that both of these waves of jihad have been largely in 
response to international and domestic threats. The most notable international threat in 
the first wave was colonialism and the radical changes it brought to Muslim societies. 
Current international threats facing the Muslim world include the rise of globalization 
and the political, social, economic and cultural elements that have accompanied this 
worldwide trend. In addition, certain US foreign policies have been perceived as 
threatening to the dar al Islam, particularly its tight alliance with Israel, the presence of 
US troops on Saudi soil, and military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, the US has 
become a target of Islamic militants wishing to drive America out of Muslim land.  
Domestic threats to the dar al Islam include, most notably, corrupt leadership that has 
failed to uphold the tenets of Islam. In the modern era, this has come to include secular, 
non-democratic governments, such as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which have 
been targets of Islamic militants.   
These cases were chosen because they offer an insightful comparison between 
two religions seldom seen as having much in common. Islam is the religion perhaps most 
popularly perceived as inherently violent, particularly given its doctrine of jihad or “holy 
war.” Conversely, Buddhism is typically understood to be a peaceful religion, one that 
stresses compassion and has non-violence as one of its tenets. However, as these two 
cases demonstrate, religious violence geared towards defending the Buddhist dammadipa 
looks very similar to violence aimed at defending the dar al Islam.  
Both Sinhala Buddhists and Muslims across the ummah, the worldwide Muslim 
community, have taken up arms in the face of international threats. Likewise, militant 
groups within both religions have attacked their own governments for failing to defend 
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the faith. Both groups have been particularly brutal and employed terrorist tactics on 
civilians and government targets in attempts to change the status quo. Furthermore, 
Buddhist and Muslim religious wars have proven costly in lives and resources. Thus the 
two cases demonstrate that bloodshed and brutality to achieve saliently religious goals is 
not a uniquely Muslim phenomenon.   
 Comparing the two cases also reveals important differences. Most notably, 
Buddhist violence to defend the dammadipa has largely been contained to Sri Lanka, 
which is smaller in demographics and territory than Muslim religious wars to defend the 
dar al Islam. It is also worth noting that militant Buddhist nationalism has not spread to 
other Buddhist countries, or even other Theravadan Buddhist countries—the particular 
branch of Buddhism practiced in Sri Lanka—such as Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, or 
Laos. The dar al Islam, on the other hand, is much larger in demographics and territory; 
it spans across nearly every continent and has over one billion adherents. Moreover, 
historic and current jihads to defend the dar al Islam have occurred in several countries 
simultaneously; with recent jihads, these movements may be linked through 
organizations like Al Qaeda. This difference makes jihad larger and more of a global 
concern than Buddhist violence to defend the dammadipa.     
Furthermore, violence in Sri Lanka is of regional concern to South Asia but it is 
not of primary importance to US foreign policy. Sri Lanka does not possess assets that 
are critical to the US, such as natural resources or basing privileges. Specific countries 
within the dar al Islam, on the other hand, are of both regional and US foreign policy 
concern. The Middle East—particularly the Persian Gulf states—contain the world’s 
primary oil reserves, which are of critical importance to the US. Moreover, the United 
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State’s commitment to Israel, fueled in part by domestic demands, remains a foreign 
policy priority. These two foreign policy concerns have kept the US in the Middle East 
both politically and militarily. Thus the threat posed by militant Muslims aimed at 
defending the dar al Islam is, first, more of a foreign policy concern given the Middle 
East’s resources and the defense of Israel, and, second, is a bigger problem to the US 
given its political and military presence in the region. 
 Finally, it is important to note that religious wars to defend holy nations are not 
confined to Buddhism and Islam. Hindu nationalism in India has been on the rise, 
particularly since the 1980s. There are those who claim that India should be purely Hindu 
and its government should protect and foster Hindutva, the Hindu nation. Hindu 
nationalism is addressed in chapter five on Ayodhya and the battle for sacred space. 
Likewise, Jewish militants in Israel claim that Eretz Yisrael, the territory outlined in the 
Jewish Bible, is Jewish by divine right. Proponents of this interpretation argue that Jews 
should seize as much land as possible within Eretz Yisrael—by force if necessary—and 
make it wholly Jewish. This case is considered in chapter six in battles over Jerusalem. 
Finally, although not considered in this dissertation, it is important to note that 
Christianity has also been interpreted with the aim of creating a holy nation. In particular, 
“Reconstruction Theology,” which has inspired movements like the Christian Patriots, 
argues that the US should be a Christian Theocracy in which there is no separation 
between church and state and all citizens are brought to the faith. This interpretation has 
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fueled violent groups such as the Covenant the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, and 
abortion bombers and assassins.4  
                                                 
4 For more on militant Christianity in the US, see Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The 
Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), especially Chapter 2: 
“Soldiers for Christ,” pp. 19-43 
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Chapter 3 
Buddhist Violence in Sri Lanka: 
The Call to Defend the Dhammadipa 
 
The civil war in Sri Lanka has been one of the bloodiest and most protracted 
conflicts in the 20th century. Somewhat surprising to most, the warring factions—the 
Sinhalese and Tamils—practice Buddhism and Hinduism respectively, two religions 
commonly associated with peace and nonviolence. Furthermore, Sinhalese violence has, 
at times, involved members of the Buddhist monastic order including a monk’s 
assassination of the country’s prime minister in 1959. How could the peaceful teachings 
of the Buddha and the same religion that produced the non-violent example of Gandhi 
also be involved in bloody battles in Sri Lanka?  
This chapter seeks to provide insights into the causes of Sinhalese-Tamil riots and 
the twenty-year civil war in Sri Lanka. Drawing from the causal argument presented in 
chapter two, it will focus on three variables as possible explanations for religious 
violence in Sri Lanka: the relationship between religious and political leaders, the role of 
threat perception in influencing the actions of religious and political leaders, and the 
amount of resources ava ilable to groups initiating the violence. It will test three empirical 
predictions from these study variables. First, if threatened, religious leaders will call for 
violence to defend their status within society. Second, religious violence will increase if 
political and religious leaders’ authorities are intertwined and, conversely, violence will 
decrease if their authority is separated. And third, the group initiating the violence has 
greater resources relative to the group they are challenging. 
This chapter argues that Sinhalese motivations and goals in the violence have 
been fueled by the belief that Sri Lanka is a Buddhist nation, a special land and people 
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designated by the Buddha himself to keep his teachings and promote them throughout the 
world. Sinhalese violence, therefore, is motivated by saliently religious goals. Tamil 
violence, on the other hand, has aimed to create an independent state in Tamil-majority 
regions on the island. Their motivations have not been driven by religious goals but 
rather by the preservation of territory they deem to be Tamil by historic right. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief 
introduction to Buddhism and Hinduism, outlining these religions’ histories in Sri Lanka. 
The second section offers an overview of historic and contemporary incidents of violence 
on the island. The third sections describes three major waves of Sinhalese and Tamil 
violence in Sri Lanka—the 1956 and 1958 riots; the 1977 riots; and the 1981 and 1983 
riots and outbreak of civil war—positing general and specific causes for these violent 
incidents. And the fourth section offers concluding remarks. 
Overview of Buddhism and Hinduism 
 It is commonly assumed that Buddhism and Hinduism are pacific religion and—
unlike the monotheistic faiths of Christianity, Judaism and Islam—their practitioners are 
strict proponents of ahimsa, or non-violence towards all living things. However, the 
historical record of Buddhism and Hinduism is far from non-violent. In order to 
understand the involvement of Sri Lankan Buddhists in violent conflict, it is necessary to 
outline the basic beliefs and structure of Buddhism in general and Sri Lankan Buddhism 
in particular. This section, therefore, provides an introduction to Buddhism and describes 
the way in which it has operated in society and politics in Sri Lanka. Likewise, this 
section offers a brief overview of Hindu beliefs and practices of the Tamils. 
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Buddhism 
 Buddhism1 emerged around a human named Siddhartha Gautama, a sixth century 
BCE prince in present day India.2 As a member of royalty, Siddhartha was raised in an 
environment sheltered from the pain of the world. One day, however, his confrontation 
with an old, dying man and the shock of his suffering led Siddhartha to renounce his 
wealth and leave his wife and child in search of the end to human pain and suffering.3 
After several years of studies and meditation as a Hindu ascetic, he discovered that the 
path to enlightenment lay neither in extravagance nor self-depravation but in the place of 
balance and equilibrium between the two extremes. This knowledge allowed him to 
conquer his desires and temptations, to attain salvation from samsarna—which is the 
cycle of life, death and rebirth—and to emerge as “the awakened one,” or the Buddha.4  
The path to salvation in Buddhism, therefore, involves finding a perfect state of 
harmony with all living things, which will cause karma—the accumulative effects of 
one’s actions—to cease and will release one from the cycle of samsarna to a state that 
transcends life and death, which is nirvana. The Buddha’s path to liberation is outline in 
the “Four Noble Truths:” that life is impertinent and suffering, dukkha; that suffering 
arises from attachments to and cravings for the impertinent, samudaya; that suffering 
ceases when these desires end, nirodha; and that ending these desires is possible by 
practicing the “Eightfold Path.” The Eightfold Path consists of magga, which involves 
                                                 
1 There is an argument that Buddhism is not a religion but—given its lack of central authority and tight 
organizational structure—it is a philosophy. However, this definition of Buddhism fails to capture that 
there are trained leaders in Buddhism, monastic orders, scriptures, an identifiable community of believers 
and rules, or dogma, that have existed since the time of the Buddha. In other words, Buddhism is an 
“organized” religion as is Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Therefore, Buddhism conforms to the definition 
of religion proposed in this dissertation. 
2 Historical Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Charles S. Prebish, (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow 
Press, 1993),  pg. 2  
3 Historical Dictionary of Buddhism, pg. 3 
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three qualities—wisdom, morality, and meditation—and eight “right” actions: seeing, 
thinking, speaking, behaving, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and contemplation. 5    
 The historic Buddha and his path to enlightenment make up the first of three 
“jewels” or the “triple refuge” of Buddhism, which is the structure of the faith. The 
second refuge is the teaching of the Buddha, the Dharma6—written down in the 
Tipitaka—the “three baskets” of texts concerning community behavior (usually of the 
monastic order), practical teachings, and philosophical teachings.7 Buddhist scripture, 
therefore, consists of the Tipitaka, of which there is more than one translation, plus local 
texts and stories.8 The third refuge is the monastic order, the Sangha, which is the body 
of religious leaders in Buddhism. 
 As with all other religions, Buddhism does not exist as a monolith.  There are 
three major branches in Buddhism, or “vehicles.” The first and oldest is Theravada 
Buddhism, which predominates in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia. 
Theravada Buddhism is organized around the Pali cannon of the Tipitaka and names the 
Sangha as the main body responsible for maintaining the tradition. Buddhist kings, 
Sangharaja, have been particularly important for supporting the Sangha and the Dharma, 
thus creating a tight relationship between religious and political authority. 9 Mahayana 
Buddhism—which is concentrated in China, Korea, Vietnam and Japan—was formed in 
reaction to what its leaders believed to be the elitist approach of Theravada Buddhism. It 
stresses compassion and strives to present a religion for the masses. Mahayana Buddhism 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Historical Dictionary of Buddhism, pg. 4 
5 For a very concise description of these tenets, see “Essentials of Buddhism,” 
http://home.earthlink.net/~srama/, downloaded on 1/24/03 
6 Also transliterated Dhamma 
7 Sacred Texts and Authority, edited by Jacob Neusner, (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 1998), pp. 61-62  
8 Sacred Texts and Authority, pg. 61 
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has produced numerous offshoots including “Pure Land” Buddhism and Zen Buddhism. 10 
The third Vehicle is Vajrayana or Tantric Buddhism, which is most prevalent in Tibet. 
Tibet also has adopted local religious beliefs and practices, which gives the faith unique 
tenets, most notably the offices of the Lamas.11 
 Buddhism began in current day India but quickly spread throughout South, East, 
and Southeast Asia via Buddhist missionaries and along trade routes. In the third century 
BCE, the Indian King Asoka converted to Buddhism and dispatched Buddhist 
missionaries to the North, Northwest, and South of his kingdom, including Sri Lanka. In 
the following centuries, Buddhism spread East along Central Asia’s trade routes, taking 
hold in China, Korea, and Japan by the sixth century CE. 12  
 Most scholars agree that missionaries introduced Buddhism to Sri Lanka around 
the third century BCE. 13 However, it is popularly believed that the Buddha himself 
visited the island three times during his life, 250 years before Buddhist missionaries came 
to the island.14 In these visits he designated the island and the Sinhalese as the 
Dhammadipa, special keepers of the faith where Buddhism was destine to “shine in 
glory.”15 Throughout its history, Sri Lanka has become the center of Theravada 
Buddhism. In the 11th century, Sri Lankan monks created commentaries on the Tipitaka, 
which they then carried to Thailand, Burma, Cambodia and Laos, consolidating the 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Religions of the World, Third Edition, edited by Robert K.C. Forman et al, (New York: St. Martins Press, 
1993), Chapter 11: “Buddhism as a World Religion,” pp. 195-219, specifically pp. 195-200 
10 Religions of the World, pp. 200-210 
11 Religions of the World, pg. 213 
12 Religions of the World, pg. 194 
13 ibid 
14 Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics, and Culture in Sinhala Life , (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991), pg. 26 
15 Kemper, quoting the Mahavamsa , pg. 26 
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Theravadan tradition across these regions.16 In the modern era, Sri Lankan monks have 
continued to send out missionaries to spread and consolidated this form of Buddhism. 17 
In addition to the Tipitaka, Sri Lankan Buddhists have their own sacred texts that 
describe the history of Buddhism on the island. The Dipavamsa is the oldest text, which 
chronicles early kings and the Sangha on the island. Compiled by monks, it also serves as 
a polemical defense of orthodox beliefs and practices of Theravada Buddhism.18 
Borrowing largely from this earlier text, the Mahavamsa continues this tradition by 
chronicling Sinhalese kings and the history of Buddhism on the island. Monks first 
compiled the Mahavamsa around the sixth century CE and have updated it five times 
since— in the 12th century, in the 1750s, in 1871, in 1933, and most recently in 1977—
claiming to present an unbroken history of the Sinhalese Buddhists in Sri Lanka from the 
time of the Buddha.19 It is important to stress that the Mahavamsa is not a historical 
document but rather a combination of myth, history, lineage, religion and politics.  
The Mahavamsa is particularly important for understanding modern-day 
motivations for Buddhist violence.  A major portion of the Mahavamsa is historic battles 
between Tamils and Sinhalese kings beginning around the 12th century CE. As will be 
described, contemporary Sinhalese monks and politicians have interpreted these passages 
as examples of the chronic threat posed by Tamils to the Sinhalese and to Buddhism. 
Finally, a key component of Theravada Buddhism, as previously mentioned, is the 
relationship between the king, the Sangha, and the Dharma. Historically in Sri Lanka, the 
                                                 
16 Religions of the World, pg. 198 
17 David Little, Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994), pg. 21-
23, 33 
18 Kepmper, pp. 35-36 
19 Kemper, pg. 42. Kemper notes that the extensions to the Mahavamsa  are commonly called Culavamsa , 
or continuations. 
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king protected and promoted the Sangha, which maintained the texts and traditions of 
Buddhism and which, in turn, reinforced the king by endorsing his leadership and 
offering council. The laity—all subjects of the king not affiliated with the Sangha—also 
supported the system by providing some material support to Sangha—such as food from 
crops and recruits for the Sangha—in addition to patroning temples and sacred sites.20 
Although this social and political relationship had high and low points throughout Sri 
Lanka’s history, the introduction of colonial occupation—particularly the British in the 
19th century—ended this system, thus restructuring political, social, and religious 
dynamics on the island. 
Hinduism 
 In addition to Christian and Muslim minorities on the Island—each about 8% of 
the island’s population—the other major religion in Sri Lanka is Hinduism, which makes 
up roughly 15% of the island’s population. 21 Hinduism played an important role in the 
formation of Tamil group identity in the 1800s. However, in the 20th century and the call 
for Tamil independence in Sri Lanka, Hinduism has not played a salient role; its leaders, 
its practices, and interpretations of its scriptures have neither motivated its practitioners 
nor designated the goals for which Tamil militants are striving.  Therefore, this section 
will only provide a brief overview of Tamil Hinduism in southern India and Sri Lanka.22 
 Most scholars concur that Tamils in Sri Lanka are ancestors of Tamils in southern 
India and that they share several ties including a common language and religion. Most 
                                                 
20 Richard Gombrich and Gananath Obeyesekere, Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pg. 5 
21 “Sri Lanka: Country Profile,” BBC News Online, www.news.bbc.co.uk, downloaded on 5/4/2000 
22 For more details on Hindu beliefs, scriptures and practices, see this dissertation’s chapter “Ayodhya: 
Hindu and Muslim Battles for Sacred Space.” 
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Hindus in Indian Tamil Nadu and in Sri Lanka are devotees of Saiva and practice a 
distinct form of Hinduism called Saiva Siddhanta or Dravidian Hinduism, which is based 
on sacred texts called the Agamas.23 In northern India, Hindu textual authority is based 
largely on the Vedas, ancient scriptures that outline ritual practices such as sacrifice. In 
addition, the Brahmin caste predominates in the North, whereas the South came to be 
populated with mostly lower caste Hindus.24 Finally, Hindus in the south mostly speak 
Tamil whereas in the north, most speak Hindi.  
In the 19th century, with the aid of colonialism, the southern part of India 
underwent a transformation of identity based on its unique religious, linguistic and 
alleged racial distinctions from the North. This awakening evolved into to the Self 
Respect Movement in the 1930s and the petition for an independent state in the South 
called Dravidanad.25 Efforts to establish an independent Tamil state eventually died out 
in the 1950s after India’s independence and the creation of a federal government with 
considerable state autonomy. 26 
In the 19th century, the Tamils in Sri Lanka also underwent a transformation of 
identity based, in part, on their religious beliefs and practices. This awakening was led by 
an Indian Tamil named Arumuga Navalar. Navalar oversaw the reconstruction of Hindu 
temples in the area, stressed the importance of Hindu texts, and encouraged Tamils to 
boycott Christian missionary schools.27 However, aside from this initial phase of 
religious revivalism, Tamil Hindus in Sri Lanka have not organized around their religion 
                                                 
23 The roots of Saiva Siddhanta in the South can be traced back to the teachings of medieval scholar 
Meykanda Devar. See Little, pg. 131, footnote 8 
24 Little, pg. 38 
25 Little, pp. 39-42 
26 Sankaran Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the Question of Nationhood, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 78-88 
27 Little, pp. 40-41 
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nor fought for saliently religious goals. Rather, more recent Tamil identity and separatism 
has been based largely on linguistic demands and territorial claims defined by historical, 
not religious, precedent. These points will be elucidated in the following sections.  
Overview of Sri Lankan History and Conflicts 
 
 Both Sinhala and Tamil Sri Lankans have myths, based partly on historic fact and 
partly on folklore, about when and how the island became populated. These stories play 
an important role in each ethnic group’s current claims to territory on the island. 
 The Sinhalese believe that their ancestors came to the island around the 5th 
century BCE.  The myth is that the island was uninhabited before the arrival of the first 
Sinhala, Vijaya, who then proceeded to populate the island with his offspring.28 
Alongside this myth of progeny, a popularly held Sinhalese belief claims that the Buddha 
himself visited the island on three occasions and designated Sri Lanka, the Sinhala 
people, and their king as special keepers of the faith. 29 These events were later chronicled 
in various manuscripts including the Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa.   
 Also around the third century BCE, it is generally believed that Tamils from 
South India came to the island in connection with trade routes. In 237 BCE, two Tamils 
usurped the Sinhalese throne and ruled for a reported 22 years.30 Ten years later, the 
Tamil King Elara ascended to power and ruled for 44 years. Elara’s rule came to end 
after a 15 year- long battle with the Sinhala warrior king Duttagamani, who eventually 
succeeded in killing Elara and regaining the throne. There is much debate over the true 
                                                 
28 Kemper, pg. 108 
29 Kemper, pg. 52 
30 K.M. de Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880-1985, (New York: 
University of America Press, 1986), pg. 11 
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content of this period of history. 31 Sinhalese tales of Elara often depict him as an 
illegitimate ruler and threat to Sinhala society whereas Tamil’s describe his rule as just 
and tolerant with Duttagamani as an ethnic cleanser.32   For the Sinhalese, this battle 
forms the bulk of the Mahavamsa and Duttagamani is portrayed as a hero, an ideal 
Buddhist leader and protector of the faith. 33  
 From the second century BCE until around the seventh century CE, the Sinhalese 
kingdom flourished on the island. The kings built massive monuments to Buddhism and 
constructed a sophisticated irrigation system that allowed for cultivation of the island’s 
Dry Zone.34 It was in this time tha t the Mahavamsa was written, chronicling the Sinhala 
kings and their various accomplishments. Although the Mahavamsa depicts this era as 
one of national unity, the Sinhalese kingdom was not the only polity on the island. Three 
Tamil kingdoms also existed in the southern part of the island, although these kingdoms 
were not mentioned in the Mahavamsa.35  
 In the 10th century CE, warriors from the southern Indian kingdom of Cola 
invaded the island and captured Anuradhpura, the Sinhalese capitol.36  Although the 
Sinhalese managed to recapture the throne in the 12th century, the Colas retook the city 
and most of the kingdom, pushing the Sinhalese south. From the 13th century until the 
arrival of colonial powers in the 16th century, the Sinhalese and Tamils maintained 
separate kingdoms on the island, with the Dry Zone as a buffer between the two.37  
                                                 
31 Kemper, pg. 132 
32 Kemper, pg. 117 
33 Kemper, pg. 124 
34 De Silva, pg. 9 
35 De Silva, pg. 12 
36 De Silva, pg. 13 
37 Gananath Obeyesekere, “On Buddhist Identity in Sri Lanka,” Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and 
Accommodation, third edition, pp. 222-247, (Walnut Creek: Altamira Publishers, 1995), pg. 234;  De Silva, 
pg. 14 
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 The introduction of Portuguese (1505-1568) and Dutch (1568-1796) colonial rule 
was contained primarily to the littoral areas of the island, leaving the Kandy Kingdom of 
the Sinhalese and the Jaffna Kingdom of the Tamils largely intact. However, despite the 
limited presence of colonial powers on the island, both the Portuguese the Dutch brought 
missionaries who introduced Christianity to the population. Today, Christians make up 
approximately 8% of the island’s population, nine-tenths of which are Catholic.38   
Unlike its colonial predecessor, British rule introduced dramatic changes on the 
island. In 1815, the British signed an agreement with the last Sinhala king of Kandy, 
Nyakkar, which put the entire island under British rule.39 The agreement stipulated to 
respect Buddhism and allow the Sangha to continue unhindered.40 However, the arrival of 
Anglican missionaries in the beginning of the 1800s coupled with fewer resources 
allocated to the Sangha sparked monk-led rebellions against the British in 1818 and the 
1820s.41 These uprisings, however, did not succeed in changing the status quo. 
The expanding presence of Christian missionaries, especially through missionary-
run schools on the island, prompted Sinhala and Tamil backlashes in the 1800s.42 From 
the second half of the 19th century, both Tamil Hindus and Sinhalese Buddhists formed 
organizations aimed at resisting Christian influences. This included the formation of the 
Maha Bodhi Society in 1891 and the creation of the Young Lanka League, both of which 
were founded by the Buddhist leader Dharmapala, who is regarded as the father of 
                                                 
38 “Sri Lanka: Country Profile;” and De Silva, pg. 18  
39 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), pg. 158 
40 Little, pg. 13 
41 Kemper notes that around 15,000 Sinhalese died in the 1818 uprising, pg. 100. For more on the monks’ 
uprisings in the 1920s, see Little, pg. 17; and De Silva, pg. 33. 
42 De Silva, pp. 35-37 
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Sinhala nationalism.43 It also included a series of debates between Christian missionaries 
and Buddhist monks on the validity of their religious beliefs.44 The Tamils attempted to 
counter the influences of Christian missionaries by creating their own schools and 
strengthening Saiva Hinduism on the island. 45 Muslims on the island—who trace their 
lineage back to Arab and Malay origins—also organized their own schools to counter the 
cultural and religious threat posed by the presence of Christian missionaries.46 
In 1915, Sinhala and Muslim tensions over competing economic interests erupted 
into riots after rumors of a Muslim attack on a Buddhist temple.47 British forces quelled 
the riots by imposing martial law and imprisoning numerous Sinhalese leaders, including 
Buddhist monks. Dharmapala, who was fingered as one of the leaders in the riots, fled the 
island and went into exile.48 In 1916—amidst expanding colonial influences—Sinhalese, 
Tamil and Muslim elites formed the Ceylon Reform League, which became the Ceylon 
National Congress in 1919. The goals of the National Congress were not to challenge 
British rule but, rather, to work for reforms under the British system. 49 However, the 
National Congress quickly collapsed and Tamils broke away to create their own 
organization.  
In the 1920s, in an attempt to mollify tensions on the island and Tamil grievances 
in particular, the British authority imposed quotas in elections and government 
appointments. This policy became a major contention within the Sinhala elite and 
                                                 
43 Little, pg. 24; De Silva, pg. 41  
44 Little, pp. 17-18 
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46 De Silva, pg. 40 
47 Tambiah, pg. 7 
48 Little, pg. 34-35; Tambiah, pp. 8-9; De Silva, pg. 50, 62 
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prompted the formation of Sinhala organizations aimed at redressing this grievance.50 It 
was at this time that Buddhist monks became active in various movements including 
unions and political parties. In the 1947 elections, Buddhist monks formed the Ceylon 
Union of Bhikkus (LEBM), an umbrella organization designed to influence government 
policies, and were present in all major political parties.51  The United National Party 
(UNP) won the elections and Don Stephen Senanayake became independent Ceylon’s 
first prime minister. 
Senanayake strove to galvanize Ceylon into a nation by using a secular nationalist 
ideology; this aim, however, never took root.52 Rather, Sinhalese and Tamil communities 
continued to polarize, forming their own organizations and political parties. The 1956 
elections proved to be a watershed for Sinhalese and Tamil relations. Through 
concentrated support from Buddhist monks, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and the Sri Lankan 
Freedom Party (SLFP) won the elections. Within days of assuming office, Bandaranaike 
issued the “Sinhala Only” Act, which made Sinhalese the official language of the 
country. The act ignited Sinhala-Tamil riots throughout the country. In attempts to 
mitigate these tensions, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, the 
leading Tamil politician, signed a pact promising greater inclusivity of Tamil rights and 
calling for greater autonomy to Tamil regions through the formation of administrative 
councils. The pact collapsed, however, after intense pressure from Buddhist monks, 
which prompted further riots in 1958. 53  In 1959, a Buddhist monk assassinated 
Bandaranaike, citing his conciliatory tones to Tamils as the motive for the murder.  
                                                 
50 Tambiah, pg. 11-12; De Silva, pg. 58; Little, pg. 52-53 
51 Little, pg. 63; Tambiah, pg. 15, 19  
52 Little, pg. 58 
53 Tambiah, pp. 48-50 
 102 
 
 
In 1960, Bandaranaike’s wife Sirimavo became prime minister, ushering in a new 
era of Sinhala and Buddhist preferential policies. Her regime survived a 1962 Christian-
led coup attempt, which prompted the purging of Christians from the government and 
military. 54 In 1970, Bandaranaike and the SLPF won another round of elections. In the 
face of flagging economic growth and high unemployment, Sinhala youth mounted an 
insurrection through the organization of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). In 
response, the government made concessions to Sinhalese nationalists by renaming the 
country Sri Lanka—harkening back to the ancient Sinhalese name for the island—and by 
rewriting the constitution, giving Buddhism and the Sinhala language a primary place in 
the country. 55 
The 1972 constitutional reforms spurred new tactics in Tamil politics. 
Chelvanayakam left the federal government and called for a Tamil secessionist 
movement. He founded the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, which later became the 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), and forged an alliance between “indigenous” 
Tamils and “estate” Tamils, 19th century émigrés from India.56 In addition, militant Tamil 
organizations emerged during this time including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), which became the dominant militant group by the mid-1980s.  The formation of 
these militant organizations paved the way for an armed Tamil resistance and civil war on 
the island.57 The Vaddukoddia Resolution, signed in 1976, called for Tamils to fight to 
                                                 
54 Little, pg. 72 
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liberate the homeland and issued the first formal declaration for an independent Tamil 
state.58 
The 1977 elections brought the UNP back into power under the premiership of 
J.R. Jayewardene, who called for a new era of economic reform and multi-ethnic 
tolerance. Despite these claims, Jayewardene continued to implement policies that 
favored the Sinhalese Buddhist population including the restoration of Buddhist sites and 
revitalized efforts to colonize the Dry Zone with Sinhalese.59 The result of these elections 
sparked another round of riots in 1977.  In response to increasing acts of violence and 
terrorism against government sites in the North, Jayewardene signed the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act in 1979, which granted the government sweeping powers to detain 
suspected terrorists. Tamil-Sinhaha riots broke out again in 1981 over the government’s 
failure to implement reforms allowing for district councils to manage local affairs.60  
In 1983, the country’s worst riots occurred after a Sinhalese funeral procession 
turned into attacks against Tamils in and around the capital city Colombo. The riots 
resulted in the deaths of around 2,000 to 3,000 people and from 70,000 to 100,000 Tamils 
were made homeless and forced into refugee camps.61 The riots prompted the Indian 
government to intervene, eventually leading to the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Agreement of 
1987 and the deployment of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF). Both Sinhala and 
Tamil militants protested the accords and the presence of the IPKF, initiating violent 
campaigns aimed at ousting the Indian military presence. An estimated 40,000 to 60,000 
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people were killed as a result of JVP initiated violence alone.62 The 1988 elections 
ushered in a new leader, Jayewardene’s former prime minister Premadasa, who vowed to 
dismantle the JVP and end the presence of the IPKF, both of which he accomplished by 
1990.63   
In the 1990s, the LTTE launched a new offensive in the Eastern Provinces, 
forcibly expelling Muslims in the region and conducting a series of massacres of civilians 
in Polonnaruwa district and Kalmunai.64 The LTTE also executed over 600 Sri Lankan 
police and assassinated several political leaders, including Indian Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Premadasa in 1993.65 These attacks prompted 
several Tamil groups to join forces with the Sri Lankan government in attempts to 
destroy LTTE forces. Tamils and Sinhalas formed the People’s Alliance Government 
under President Kumaratunga in 1994, which brokered a ceasefire and round of peace 
talks in 1995.66  
Negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE quickly broke 
down and a new phase of the civil war began with a suicide attack on a naval boat in the 
Trincomalee Harbor. This was followed by a LTTE attack on the Central Bank in 
Colombo, which killed more than 200 people.67 In 1998, after the government initiated a 
public relations campaign with the Tamil population in the North, new elections drove 
the LTTE into the Vanni Jungles.68 Attacks continued until the implementation of a 
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February 2002 ceasefire, brokered by Norway, which has led to peace talks between the 
Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. 69  
Explaining the Waves of Sri Lankan Violence and Peace 
 
 This chronology reveals that Sinhalese and Tamil violence has not been constant 
but, rather, has gone through several waves of peace and unrest. There are eight major 
incidents of violence in the island’s recorded history: the ancient battle between 
Duttagamani and Elara around the second century BCE; the Cola conquest of the 
Sinhalese Kingdom beginning in the 10th century CE; violent uprisings of the Sangha 
against the British in the 1820s; Sinhalese-Muslim riots in 1915; the riots of 1956 and 
1958; the 1971 JVP-led insurrection against the government; 1977 Tamil riots; and the 
1981 and 1983 Sinhalese-Tamil riots, which then led to full-scale civil war. See Table 3.1 
for details. 
This section investigates three major incidents of violence and their surrounding 
periods of calm: the 1956 and 1958 riots; the 1977 riots; and the 1981 and 1983 riots 
followed by the outbreak of civil war. These incidents have been chosen because, first, 
with the exception of the ancient battle between Duttagamani and Elara, they include all 
the major outbreaks of violence between Tamils and the Sinhalese. Second, these violent 
clashes have occurred in the context of a newly emerging independent state and, 
therefore, offer insights into the challenges and opportunities of forming governments in 
multi-ethnic and multi- religious countries. And third, the twenty-year-old civil war has 
been one of the longest of the 20th century and has involved neighboring India, making it 
a conflict of regional concern.  
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The other incidents of violence are not critical for understanding the Sinhala-
Tamil tensions. The fifteen-yearlong battle between Duttagamani and Elara will not be 
considered as a separate case but, rather, will be assessed as a historical tale interpreted 
by recent political and religious leaders for the purpose of mobilizing groups for violent 
ends. Furthermore, the monks’ rebellions in the 1820s, the 1915 riots between Sinhalese 
and Muslims, and the 1971 JVP-led insurrection will not be independently addressed 
because they did not involve Tamils. 
Drawing on the causal argument from chapter two, this section will ask the 
following questions surrounding these episodes of violence: Is there an identifiable threat 
or the perception of a threat to which the violent parties are responding? What are the 
resources available to the involved religious groups? And what is the relationship 
between political and religious leaders?  
The Turbulent Peace of the 1800 to Independence. The 1956 and 1958 Riots 
 This section considers the absence of major Sinhalese and Tamil riots during 
British colonization and the island’s independence followed by events leading up to the 
1956 and 1958 riots.  It argues that, prior to 1956, both groups attempted to use methods 
of civil society—formation of political organizations and parties, petitions and peaceful 
demonstrations—to voice their grievances to British authorities. However, the island’s 
independence and the 1956 election of Sinhalese nationalists backed by Buddhist monks 
closed the door to civil society, making violence a more likely avenue of protest. In order 
to understand the evolution towards violence, it is important to outline the rise of Sinhala 
and Tamil nationalism, the organizations they formed, and how these developments 
impacted politics on the island. 
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3.1 Major Incidents of Violence in Sri Lanka 
Date Groups Causes End 
~180BCE Sinhala King 
Duttagamani and Tamil 
King Elara 
Sinhala efforts to 
regain throne 
Duttagamani kills 
Elara, regains throne 
~900 CE Sinhala Kingdom and 
Cola Kingdom (India) 
Cola conquest of 
Sinhala Kingdom 
Capture Sinhala capitol 
and kingdom 
1820s Buddhist monks and 
British 
Loss of resources and 
legitimacy of the 
Sangha 
British put down 
violence 
1915 Sinhalese and Muslims Rumored attacks on 
Buddhist temples 
Sinhalese attacks on 
Muslim merchants 
British impose martial 
law, imprison key 
Sinhala leaders 
1956 Sinhalese monks/laity 
and Tamils in 
Colombo and North  
Sinhala Only Act  Government deployed 
army 
1958 Sinhalese and Tamil 
citizens  
Government 
abandoned B-C Pact. 
Rumored Tamil 
attacks on Sinhalese 
in North 
Government declared 
state of emergency, 
called out army, 
imposed curfew 
1971 Government and JVP 
(Sinhalese revolutionary 
movement) 
High unemployment. 
Pressure government 
for more Sinhala 
Buddhist policies 
Government quelled 
uprising, imprisoned 
thousands  
1977 Tamil militant groups 
and the police.  
Tamil and Sinhala 
citizens  
Frustration over 
Sinhalese-biased 
policies. Minor 
incident in Jaffna 
Government declared 
a state of emergency 
and called out the 
army 
1981 Tamil militants and 
the police. Citizens  
Derail district council 
elections  
Called out armed 
forces 
1983 Tamil militants and 
police. Citizens  
Funeral for 13 police 
killed by LTTE 
Government declared 
emergency (after 5 
days) 
1983-
present 
Tamil militants and 
government forces. 
Sinhala militants and 
government forces 
Riots of 1983. Call for 
independent Tamil 
state. Sinhala call for 
new government 
Protracted arm 
struggle. Indian 
intervention. Third 
party negotiations  
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Most scholars on Sri Lanka date the origins of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism to 
the mid-1800s and identifying the cause as a reaction to British occupation of the 
island.70 Anthropologist Stanley Tambiah claims: “There is no doubt that Sinhala 
Buddhist revivalism and nationalism, in the form we can recognize today, has its origins 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”71 Likewise, the emergence of Tamil 
nationalism is tied to this era as well. Consciously or not, the British instituted policies 
that drastically altered the social and political makeup of the island, leading to new forms 
of identity.  
Perhaps the biggest change to Sri Lanka was the introduction of mass education 
through Christian missionary schools. Prior to mass education, the educated were 
confined primarily to the religious elite.72 Mass education opened literacy up to people 
outside of the clerisy and gave them new skills. These new skills created a stratum of 
society that was neither the clerisy nor the peasantry, changing the traditional categories 
within pre-colonial society. In turn, it was the emergence of a literate middle class that 
came to play an important role in the development of Sinhalese and Tamil nationalism. 
Christian-run schools also produced religious converts within both Sinhalese and 
Tamil communities. These converts spread new belief-systems into local communities 
and created a sub-category within both Sinhalese and Tamil groups.73 Mass education 
exposed the population to new ideas and ways of thinking including western concepts of 
identity, society, and politics.74 Of particular importance were the concepts of history, 
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race and language as a source of identity. 75 Both British and local scholars began to 
conduct inquiries into the historical roots of the different groups on the island. Most 
scholars deemed the Sinhalese to be of superior Aryan stock and their language of Indo-
European lineage.76 The Tamils, on the other hand, were linked to the Dravidians of 
southern India.77 These categories have persisted despite the fact that racial distinctions 
cannot be identified between the Sinhalese and Tamils.78 In turn, these categories 
presented a new way of thinking about and organizing society on the island. 
Mass education also fostered the creation of journals, newspapers and other forms 
of print media and their consumption. These media outlets, in turn, bound people together 
through information in a way that was new and made possible only through literacy. By 
the end of the 1800s, both Sinhalese and Tamils had their own publications including the 
Sinhala Bauddhaya, and the works of Tamil Arumuga Navalar.79 
Another major change introduced by the British was the use of English as a skill 
for government employment.80 The British instituted English as the government’s 
language and, in doing so, produced competition between groups to learn English and 
attain these coveted posts. The best place to acquire English skills was in the Christian 
missionary schools. Thus groups that refused to attend these schools had trouble 
competing with those who received this education. The relative number of groups gaining 
government posts became a major grievance in the 1920s. 
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Third, the British conduced censuses and comprised demographics of the island’s 
population, which changed the way these groups saw each other. In these censuses, 
people were counted according to religion, not caste, region, class or other possible 
categories. Thus religion became the salient distinction between groups. Moreover, the 
census presented information about relative numbers of groups. Whereas Tamils thought 
of themselves as one of two majorities, with the aid of census material, they and the 
British became aware of their minority status, prompting policies aimed at protecting 
their rights as a minority group.81 Furthermore, British historians and officers sketched 
narratives of the island’s demographic history, including the borders of former kingdoms. 
They created documents that would later be used by ethnic groups attempting to 
determine historical rights to territory. For example, the “Cleghorn Minute,” a 1799 
document produce by the first British officer to govern the island, named the borders of 
the Tamil Jaffna kingdom. This document has been used by modern Tamils to cite 
territorial dimensions of a separate Tamil state.82   
These drastic changes to society produced reactions within the religious authority 
of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities. The introduction of Christian-run 
schools in particular fueled a religious backlash. As previously mentioned, Sinhalese 
Buddhist monks were the literate class and also the ones charged with maintaining and 
interpreting the teachings of the Buddha. Monks were also the ones that recorded history, 
most notably through the Mahavamsa, which has chronicled the political and religious 
developments of the island.83  
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The introduction of Christian-run schools aimed at mass education challenged the 
structure of society. First, the emergence of schools outside the Sangha presented the 
masses with a new authority figure, the teacher, which competed with the monk as the 
source of knowledge.84 Second, the emergence of British authorities and Christian 
schools changed the traditional relationship between the laity, the king and the Sangha. 
Historically, the role of the Sangha and its various tasks were the concern of the king. 
However, with the separation of the Sangha from the king in 1815, the monastic order no 
longer had to answer to the king’s reforming powers. Coupled with a rising educated 
middle class, the Sangha now faced new criticism from the laity. In particular, monks 
were criticized for not being more active in society and politics and for not taking a 
greater role in the lives of the people.85  Monks therefore began to perform new roles in 
society, such as chaplains in prisons, hospitals and the military, and began to offer 
messages on radio and TV. 86 These new roles for monks later came to include 
participating in trade unions and political parties, which will be discussed below. 
Third, the educated laity became new chroniclers of history; literate individuals 
began investigating, recording, debating and interpreting history outside the Sangha. This 
led not only to lay people offering new interpretations of history for the public but also 
interpreting Buddhist doctrines for the masses, something that was without precedent. 
The archetype of the “new historian” was Dharmapala, who was educated in Christian 
schools and not part of the Sangha. He self- identified as a new authority figure in 
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Sinhalese Buddhist society, a person outside the Sangha but, yet, one who conformed to 
many of its practices including service to society and a vow of celibacy. 87  
Dharmapala was the principal architect in what religious historians Gombrich and 
Obeyesekere have termed “Protestant Buddhism,” the transformation of Buddhist 
authority and interpretation of Buddhist scriptures in reaction to the threat of Christianity 
and British authority. Dharmapala targeted his interpretation of Buddhism towards the 
newly emerging literate middle class. He took the Sangha’s code of conduct—preserved 
in the Vinaya texts of the Tipitaka—and created a code for the laity, which included 200 
rules that covered topics ranging from hygiene, travel, and funerals to civil behavior.88 
These rules contained not only traditional Buddhist practices but also elements of 
western, Christian piety—particularly concerning the behavior of women—and thus 
fused together the new and the old for the creation of etiquette defined as “pure and ideal 
Buddhist norms.”89  In addition, Dharmapala called for greater reliance on the Pali 
cannon for Buddhist beliefs and practices, encouraging the literate to read the texts for 
themselves.90 He also stressed the importance of individuals taking responsibility for their 
own salvation and the prosperity of the faith. 91 Dharmapala criticized the Sangha for not 
being more active in worldly affairs, particularly the village monks.92 In 1891, he 
founded the Maha Bodhi Society aimed at revitalizing Buddhism and, in 1912, he went 
on an island-wide tour to promote his interpretation of Buddhism and to awaken 
Sinhalese Buddhist identity. 93 These new interpretations of the faith gave Buddhism a 
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revitalized role in Sinhalese society and helped to define and differentiate the Sinhalese 
Buddhists from their neighbors and their colonial powers. 
Tamil and Muslim religious groups also had similar reactions to colonialism and 
the presence of Christian schools. The Tamils attempted to counter the influences of 
Christian missionaries by creating their own schools under the leadership of Arumuga 
Navalar, who sought to preserve and strengthen Saiva Siddhanta on the island. Navalar 
also organized the reconstruction of Hindu temples and revitalized the study of Hindu 
texts. 94 In addition, Muslims on the island organized to counter the cultural and religious 
threat posed by the presence of Christian missionaries. The Muslim leaders Orabi Pasha 
and M.C. Siddi Lebbe stressed the need for education within the Muslim community and 
established schools free of Christian subjects.95  
Following this religious revival within the different faiths on the island, the 
educated class began to form social and political organizations. Most notably, this 
included the creation of the Ceylon Reform League in 1916, which became the Ceylon 
National Congress in 1919. The Congress was composed of educated elites who 
attempted to affect political change through civil society. In particular, it advocated for 
greater suffrage and political representation within the British administration, which was 
granted in the Donoughmore Constitution just prior to the 1931 elections.96  The Tamils 
left the Congress in the early 1920s, however, and formed the All Ceylon Tamil Congress 
in attempts to ensure greater protection for Tamils within the administration and the 
political system.97 It was this break, coupled with a boycott of the Donoughmore 
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Constitution and 1931 elections, that marked the beginning of Sinhala majoritarian 
politics on the Island.98  
In the 1930s, Buddhist religious leaders became more active in politics by 
forming organizations and endorsing political parties.  Initially, Buddhist monks were 
active in emerging Marxist parties and trade unions, identifying with the Marxist ideal of 
supporting the disenfranchised working class.99 At the same time, other monks began to 
mobilize for Buddhist and Sinhala specific ends. In 1935, these monks founded the All 
Ceylon Buddhist Congress, an umbrella organization aimed at coordinating efforts to 
protect Sinhala Buddhist interest. That same year the politician S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike 
founded the Sinhala Maha Sabha, also with the goal of promoting Sinhala Buddhist 
interests.100 The Sinhala Maha Sabha emerged as the dominant political voice within the 
Sangha, eventually winning out over the Marxist oriented monks. 
After World War II, the British administration began to lay the foundation for 
Ceylon’s independence. In 1946, Buddhist monks issued the Vidyalanakara Declaration, 
which called for monks to participate in politics and social mobilization. 101 That same 
year, the monk Walpola Rahula published The Heritage of the Bhikku, arguing that 
monks had always played a critical role in politics and, in fact, it was the fulfillment of 
their duties.102 Rahula’s book sparked a debate within the Sangha and the wider Sinhalese 
population over the role of monks in politics. The Maha Bodhi Society, the All Ceylon 
Buddhist Council and several high-ranking monks all opposed Rahula’s assertions, 
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claiming that monks should not participate in elections or hold office.103 Despite this, 
Rahula formed the Ceylon Union of Buddhists (LEBM) in 1946, with the aim of using 
elections to protect the financial and political rights of the Sangha.104  
In the 1947 elections, all major parties had Buddhist monks who endorsed their 
campaigns.105 The United National Party (UNP) won, the party formed out of the Ceylon 
National Council, and Senayanake became prime minister, later to become the first prime 
minister of independent Ceylon in 1948. Although Senayanake espoused a secular 
ideology, he implemented policies that favored the Sinhalese. In 1949, he passed 
legislation that denied citizenship to more than 900,000 “estate” Tamils brought in under 
British rule to work on the tea and coffee plantations.106 He also made references to 
historic Sinhala kings and initiated an irrigation project to the Dry Zone of the island, 
harkening back to projects constructed in the golden age of the Sinhala kingdom. In 
addition, he made official visits to Buddhists temples and monuments, emphasizing his 
personal identity as a Sinhala Buddhist.107 These actions prompted Tamil withdrawal 
from the UNP and the formation of the Tamil Federal Party in 1949, under 
Chelvanayakam, followed by the 1950 Federal Party’s call for greater regional autonomy 
and a federation-style government.108  
In 1951, Bandaranaike, the founder of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, broke away from 
the UNP and formed the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP). Oxford educated and 
initially Christian, Bandaranaike converted to Buddhism in the 1930s and called on the 
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Mahavamsa to argue that the island’s history and destiny were uniquely Sinhalese and 
Buddhist; therefore the government’s role should be to preserve and ensure this 
destiny. 109  This argument gained momentum and provided his political party with a 
popular base that would bring him to power in the coming election. 
Alongside the emergence of the SLFP and Bandarainake, the debate over the 
relationship between the Sangha and the government continued in the 1950s. In 1954, the 
All Ceylon Buddhist Council formed the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry, a panel of 
seven Buddhist monks and seven laity aimed at evaluating the health of Buddhism on the 
island.110 The report, entitled The Betrayal of Buddhism, was issued in 1956, coinciding 
both with the 2500th anniversary of the Buddha’s enlightenment and with Sri Lanka’s 
national elections. The report argued that Buddhism—and the Sinhalese as the protectors 
of Buddhism—had been under siege for more than four hundred years, first by Tamil 
invaders and then by colonial powers, which had left its institutions weak and vulnerable. 
The threat to Buddhism, however, was more than just one of military occupation; it was 
also cultural, specifically the cultural threat posed by the Christian missionary schools.111  
Moreover, the current government in particular had failed to protect Buddhism and had 
left it prey to these various threats. To remedy the situation the committee proposed, first, 
to create the Buddha Sansana 112 Act, which would establish a government council aimed 
at protecting Buddhist interests. Second, it argued for the withdrawal of government 
grants to Christian schools. And third, it called for the government to give preferential 
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treatment to Buddhist schools.113 This report and its recommendations became the 
foundation of Bandaranaike’s 1956 election campaign. 114 
That same year D.C. Wijayawardena, a wealthy and educated layperson, wrote 
Revolt in the Temple, “to commemorate 2,5000 years of Buddhism, of civilization in 
Lanka, and of the Sinhalese nation that came into being with the Buddha’s blessing.”115  
In it he argued that Ceylon “was primordially destine as a land that united Buddhism with 
the Sinhalese nation.”116 Moreover, Buddhism was the religion of the state: the king had 
always been Buddhist, and the Sangha have always participated in politics through their 
council to the king.117 The book served as another set of demands on the government to 
“restore” Buddhism to its place as the official religion of the island and to promote and 
protect the faith. 
The 1956 elections proved to be the turning point in the island’s modern history.  
Both Buddhist monks and various Sinhala and Buddhist organization joined forces to 
defeat the UNP and elect Bandaranaike and the SLFP in its place. The Eksath Bhikku 
Peramuna, an umbrella organization of Buddhist monks and laity, was formed with the 
express purpose of defeating the UNP. Monks staged a hunger strike in front of the 
parliament and referred to the government as mara, or the devil.118 The organization and 
efforts of the monks in backing the SLFP were so successful that Tambiah states: “it is no 
exaggeration to claim that the 1956 elections…were the climatic and singular moment in 
twentieth-century political life when a significant number of monks organized to win an 
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election.”119 Bandaranaike’s campaign capitalized on the fears and demands articulated in 
books such as The Betrayal of Buddhism and Revolt in the Temple to demand a 
government committed to the protection of Sinhala Buddhist interests.  
The new government promised to revitalize and restore Buddhism to its pre-
colonial state, to make Sinhala the dominant language of the country, and to foster 
Sinhala culture and identity. 120 To these ends it implemented new legislation, the most 
explosive of which was the Sinhala Only Act, which proposed to make Sinhala the 
official language of Ceylon. The Act initially called for Sinhala to be the language used 
in government and universities, which would put non-Sinhala speakers at a disadvantage 
for both employment and educational opportunities. Furthermore, the Act alienated 
minorities on the island not only for its discriminatory effects but also for its expressly 
Buddhist biases.121  
The Sinhala Only Act raised immediate protest from minority groups, who 
demanded its revocation. Tamils staged sit- ins around the capitol, which prompted 
counter-demonstrations by Buddhist monks.122 These demonstrations degenerated into 
riots in which over 100 people were injured, followed by the looting of an estimated 43 
shops, most of which were Tamil, and around 113 arrests.123 In the Gal Oya valley, bands 
of Sinhalese youth attacked the Tamil minority, resulting in an estimated 100 dead.124 
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The riots, lootings and murders ended with the deployment of the army in the troubled 
areas.125  
The government attempted to mitigate tensions over the Sinhala Only Act by 
softening its specifications. Negotiations between the government and the Tamil 
Federalist Party resulted in the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, which called for 
the use of Tamil as an administrative language along with Sinhala, especially in the North 
where Tamils were concentrated, and for the creation of district councils, which would 
allow Tamils greater autonomy and control of their political and social destiny.126  
Several scholars on Sri Lanka note that had this pact been fully implemented and allowed 
to take hold, ethnic tensions on the island may not have escalated into civil war.127 The 
pact, however, was met with mass demonstration by monks and other Sinhalese 
nationalists who staged sit-ins and hunger strikes outside Bandaranaike’s home.128 One 
monk even claimed in front of a crowd of 5,000 demonstrators that the pact would “lead 
to the total annihilation of the Sinhalese race.”129 Moreover, the UNP, now under the 
leadership of future prime minister and president Jayawardene, also opposed the pact and 
agitated for its rejection; the UNP even organized a procession to the Buddhist Temple of 
the Tooth130 to pray for the Pact’s destruction.  131 In the end, Bandaranaike gave in to the 
protesters’ demands and abandoned the agreement.  
Amidst the tensions and disappointment surrounding the collapse of the 
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, a new and bloodier round of riots exploded in May 
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of 1958. The riots began in the North and Eastern Provinces after a band of Sinhalese 
gathered at a railway station and attacked a train that was believed to be carrying Tamil 
passengers. This was followed by the derailment of a train carrying Sinhalese passengers 
through a Tamil town.  In the same town the former mayor, a Sinhalese, was shot while 
driving his car.132 This event was broadcast over the media and blamed on Tamils, which 
then prompted bands of Sinhalese to take to the streets in several cities throughout the 
country. 133  
The riots were particularly bad in the cities of Padaviya and Polonnaruwa, where 
the government had recently transferred Sinhala laborers to work on development 
projects.134 The riots included looting and destruction of property, the majority of which 
was Tamil owned, and attacks on Tamils resulting in numerous deaths. The riots spread 
to Colombo, where bands of Sinhalese attacked Tamil neighborhoods and merchants’ 
stores.135 After several days of rioting, Bandaranaike addressed the nation on radio, 
pinning the origins of the violence to the murder of a Sinhalese policeman by Tamils, 
further inciting Sinhalese- led violence.136 After four days of violence, the government 
declared a state of emergency, called out the troops and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew. 
However, before the violence could be contained, bands of Tamils launched a counter 
attack against Sinhalese in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The Tamil bands burned 
homes, attacked Sinhalese fishermen, and sacked Buddhist temples before the violence 
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could be successfully put down. 137 Bandaranaike modified the Sinhala Only Act in 
attempts to appease the Tamils and end the current tensions.138 
The 1956 and 1958 Sinhala and Tamil riots contain elements that conform to the 
causal argument proposed in this dissertation. First, religion played a salient role in the 
changing dynamics between the Tamils and Sinhalese and the violence these changes 
produced. Specifically, Buddhist monks became more active in the political landscape as 
Ceylon moved towards independence; their agendas, in turn, were a source of threat and 
alienation to the non-Buddhists on the island. Buddhist monks not only endorsed political 
leaders and parties, they actively sought to shape their platforms and policies. Through 
the formation of organizations, committees and reports, members of the Sangha put 
pressure on the government to protect and foster Buddhism. These efforts succeeded in 
bringing to power Bandaranaike and the SLFP, which were sympathetic to the Sangha’s 
religious demands. Furthermore, the monks and their organizations succeeded in 
pressuring Bandaranaike to abandon the reforms of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam 
Pact in 1957, magnifying the tensions that fueled the riots of 1958.    
Furthermore, religion was a salient factor in the 1956 and 1958 riots through the 
use of Buddhist scriptures—specifically the Mahavamsa— by monks, laity and 
politicians to shape and justify governmental actions and policies. Banadaranaike used 
the Mahavamsa as a benchmark for leadership and the ideal state of the island. But even 
Senayake, who claimed to be committed to a secular agenda for a multi-ethnic state, 
called on the Mahavamsa as inspiration for his plans to redevelop irrigation projects in 
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the Dry Zone of the country.  The Mahavamsa, therefore, was a powerful tool used not 
only to mobilize but also to shape and justify governmental priorities. 
It is interesting to note that, despite the rise of Buddhism in Sinhalese politics in 
the 1940s and 1950s, the Tamils did not follow suit. Hinduism played an important role 
in Tamil mobilization against British Christian influences in the mid-1800s, as previously 
mentioned, particularly in the efforts to restore Hindu temples in the North and encourage 
Saiva Siddhanta. However, after the influences of Navalar, the emphasis on preserving 
Hinduism dwindled. Tamil leaders of the 20th century, particularly Chelvanayakam, did 
not call on Hinduism to mobilize Tamils against the Sinhalese Buddhist national threat, 
nor did Hindu leaders on the island emerge and form organizations aimed at political 
mobilization. This is particularly curious given that “estate” Tamils and indigenous 
Tamils were divided by history, geography, and interests, but had Hinduism in common. 
In the end, discrimination against the Tamil language proved to be the more salient point 
of mobilization for Tamils. 
The events also shows that both groups have mobilized under perceived or actual 
threat. The threats posed by British colonization in general and Christian missionaries in 
particular caused Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims to mobilize in the 19th century in 
attempts of countering this threat. These groups mobilized to create their own resources, 
specifically their own schools, but also to foster a sense of identity independent of their 
colonial powers. Religion played a key role in both of these pursuits. Sinhala, Tamil and 
Muslims groups formed new schools that taught skills necessary for modern society but 
also offered knowledge on their respective religions. The creation of modern-day 
nationalist identities also involved religion. Dharmapala helped develop a Sinhalese 
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identity that was defined by Buddhist practices built on the Sangha’s code of ethics. 
Likewise, Tamil and Muslim leaders stressed their unique identities through religion, 
promoting Saiva Siddhanta within the Tamil community and Islamic values for the 
Muslims.    
In the 20th century, particularly in the 1940s, Sinhalese leaders spoke in terms of a 
two-pronged threat. First, they cited external enemies to Buddhism. This included 400 
years of colonial occupation, but also the perceived chronic threat posed by Tamils on the 
island and their ethnic kin twenty miles away in southern India. The second threat was 
the government, which either had to use its powers to protect and strengthen Buddhism 
against these threats or, if not, became a threat to the faith itself. Their prescription, laid 
out in Buddhism Betrayed, was for the government to resume its role as the protectorate 
of the Dharma and initiate policies that would restore the faith to its pre-colonial glories.  
The proactive policies described by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists were a direct 
threat to Tamils and other non-Buddhist groups. The application of policies such as the 
Sinhala Only Act directly threatened Tamil access to government jobs and admissions to 
universities on the island. Furthermore, the idea to resurrect irrigation projects and 
relocate Sinhalese into the Dry Zone of the country threatened land that Tamils believed 
to be theirs. 
The Sinhalese, as the primary perpetrators of the violence in 1956 and 1958, had 
resources that gave them the advantage over the Tamils. Aside from being the numerical 
majority on the island, the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalsts’ greatest resource was a 
government that was sensitive to their demands and sympathetic to their actions. Prior to 
1956, both Sinhalese and Tamils had worked through civil society means to voice 
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demands and ensure their rights. Both groups formed organizations—initially together as 
the Ceylon National Congress then through separate organizations—aimed at better 
political representation under the British. After independence, both groups used civil 
disobedience as a means of voicing their discontent with government policies. 
However, with the rise of Sinhala nationalists to the government, these non-
violent means of working to protect rights began to break down. The Bandaranaike- led 
government provided the Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists with a new opportunity to 
implement their ethnic and religious agenda. The Tamils and other groups did not have 
this avenue of power. The 1956 riots were the result of mass demonstrations that got out 
of hand; they displayed, however, that the government was slow to respond to ethnic 
violence and when it did respond, it was lenient towards the Sinhalese. This became 
clearer with the 1958 riots, in which Tamils were erroneously fingered as the perpetrators 
and the Sinhalese were allowed several days to carry out their aggressions against Tamils 
in various cities.  Although Chelvanayakam and the Tamil Federation Party made a 
promise to adhere to non-violent civil disobedience following the 1956 riots, this 
commitment did not prevent the Sinhalese- led atrocities in 1958 nor did it stop the 
Tamil’s violent response. 
The Peace of 1958-1977. The Violence of 1977 
 This section considers the absence of major Sinhalese and Tamil riots between 
1958 until the outbreak of violence in 1977. It argues that the calm is best explained by 
the continued attempts of Tamil leadership under the Federal Party and the Tamil United 
Liberation Front (TULF) to work within the political system to achieve regional 
autonomy. This avenue was abandoned after two decades of negotiations failed to 
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produce results for the Tamils and after militant Tamil groups began to form following 
Sinhalese-centric changes to the constitution in 1972. The 1977 riots, touched off by 
election results, demonstrated that the Tamils were capable of organizing and fighting 
against the state, foreshadowing the civil war to come. In order to understand these 
developments, it is important to outline the government’s policies in this era and the 
Tamil response. 
Following the bloody riots of 1958 and the government’s conciliatory gestures 
towards the Tamil community, a Buddhist monk assassinated Bandaranaike in 1959. His 
wife Sirimavo replaced him and was elected to office as a member of the SLFP in 1960. 
Mrs. Bandaranaike’s tenure in office was underscored by the implementation of a 
nationalist Sinhalese Buddhist agenda to the detriment of both Tamils and Christians on 
the island. Her government reversed all ambiguities with the Sinhala Only Act and made 
Sinhala the exclusive language of the government administration throughout the island by 
1961.139  In addition, she proposed legislation that would place all schools under 
government authority including, most notably, the Christian-run schools that were still 
administered by missionaries from the West; Catholic schools in particular were 
targeted.140 As part of this legislation, which was fully implemented in 1967, Christian 
schools were required to teach Buddhism.141 These policies prompted a Christian-led 
coup attempt in 1962, which was followed by Bandaranaike’s decision to purge the 
government and military of Christians.142  
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In the 1965 elections, Dudley Senanyake and the UNP defeated Mrs. 
Bandaranaike. The new government under Senanyake made one attempt to mitigate 
Tamil grievances in the 1965 Senayake-Chelvanayakam Pact. The pact, similar to its 
predecessor, the 1957 Bandarainake-Chelvanayakam Pact, sought to establish greater 
regional autonomy for the Tamils. The pact, however, was defeated by a SLFP and UNP 
alliance in parliament.143 
The 1970 elections reinstated Mrs. Bandaranaike and the SLFP to power through 
a “United Front” coalition with several parties including the Sri Lanka Communist Party. 
In 1971, a Sinhalese insurrection led by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) forced the 
government to look at grievances within its own ethnic group. The JVP was founded by 
Rohana Wijeweera in the late 1960s as an organization bent on affecting radical change 
in Sri Lanka, either through the government or by popular revolution. 144 The movement 
consisted primarily of Sinhalese Buddhist youth but also including monks.145  The JVP 
managed to capture several rural villages, which its members held for a few weeks before 
the government brutally put down the uprising.146 An estimated 2,000 to 3,000 were 
killed in the uprising, mostly JVP members.147 The JVP was new in that it fused together 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist aspirations with force in a way that was attractive to 
Sinhalese youth. This latter point in particular made them a dangerous threat to the 
stability of the government in the 1980s, which will be discussed in the following section. 
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Following the 1971 insurrection, the government introduced radical reforms 
aimed at appeasing discontented Sinhalese. First, Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government 
renamed the country Sri Lanka, harkening back to the name of the Sinhalese kingdom. 
This was followed by major reforms to the Soulbury Constitution drafted in 1946 
including making Sinhalese the sole language of Sri Lanka, revoking the protection of 
minority rights, and giving Buddhism “the foremost place [in the Republic of Sri 
Lanka]…” and making it “the duty of the state to protect and foster Buddhism…”148 In 
addition, the government implemented more restrictions on university entrance 
requirements and regional quotas based on ethnicity. These two policies favored the 
Sinhalese over the Tamils. Between 1969 and 1974, northern Tamils admitted into 
science programs dropped from 27.5% to 7%.149 In turn, a university education was 
necessary for government employment, further restricting the Tamils in this line of 
work.150   
The 1972 constitutional reforms set in motion a new era in Tamil political tactics. 
Chelvanayakam and the Federal Party issued a six-point program two days after the 
initiation of the new constitution. In it the Tamils argued for linguistic equality between 
Tamil and Sinhala, full citizenship for all Tamils, the creation of a secular government 
and state, a new constitution that enshrines equality, a decentralized government, and the 
abolishment of untouchabilty.151 The government rejected the proposal. That same year, 
Chelvanayakam left the federal government and called for Tamils to secede from Sri 
Lanka. He formed the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, later to become the Tamil 
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United Liberation Front (TULF), which created an alliance between Tamils in the north 
and “estate” Tamils.152 
Alongside the efforts of the TULF to work through the political system for 
change, militant Tamil organizations emerged during this time including the Tamil New 
Tigers (TNT), the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the People’s Liberation 
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation 
Front (EPRLF), the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which eventually killed off the 
competition and emerged as the primary paramilitary organization in the 1980s.153 The 
rise of the LTTE will be addressed in the following section.  
For both the TULF and rising Tamil militant groups, two decades of negotiations 
with the Sinhalese dominant government for greater autonomy had resulted in little to no 
visible progress. The Tamils even argued that—in the face of rising Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalist policies and increasing numbers of Sinhalese being transferred into the Dry 
Zone—they were literally losing ground.154 This loss of political progress was also 
coupled with growing economic problems throughout the entire island, problems that 
both the Tamil and Sinhalese populations felt and that helped to pave the way for a 
change of leadership in the 1977 elections.155  
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In 1976, the TULF drafted the Vaddukoddia Resolution, which officially called 
for the creation of an independent Tamil state on the island. The drafters chose the name 
Eelam, hearkening back to what the TULF identified as a historic Tamil homeland that 
existed prior to colonization. 156 The Vaddukoddia Resolution also called for all Tamils, 
“estate” and indigenous alike, to defend the homeland by force and to “throw themselves 
fully in the sacred fight for freedom and to flinch not till the goal of a sovereign socialist 
state of Tamil Eelam is reached.”157 The Resolution received the backing of the major 
Tamil parties and movements, both “estate” and indigenous, which was a first for the 
Tamil movement.158  
In 1977, however, the Tamils received a blow with the death of the three main 
leaders of the independence movement: Ponnambalam, Murugeysen Tiruchelvam and 
Chelvanayagam. Their passing created a void within the Tamil leadership which helped 
pave the way for the rise of militant groups composed of young leaders and disaffected 
youth.159  
Also in 1977, the UNP succeeded in taking back the government under the 
leadership of Junius Richard Jayewardene. Both Sinhalese and Tamil parties had used 
ethnicity as a means of mobilizing votes, which whipped up tensions between groups.160 
In addition, campaigning had succeeded in winning the TULF, headed by 
Armirthalingam, the second largest number of seats in parliament. The new government 
promised economic reform and an era of social tolerance, what Jayewardene termed 
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dharmistha, alluding to the Indian Buddhist King Asoka, who introduced an era of peace 
and prosperity to the Subcontinent.  As part of his new policy of tolerance, Jayewardene 
promised to modify wording in the constitution, to give the Tamil language a more 
prominent place, and to give district councils more authority. 161  In addition, the 
government promised to redress grievances surrounding university admissions policies. 
These promises were implemented in 1978.  
However, despite the conciliatory actions of the new government, voices within 
the Tamil community argued that it was too little too late. Militant groups, which had 
taken hold in the early 1970s, were frustrated by the TULF’s inability to affect political 
change in the government.  In August of 1977, only a month after elections, riots between 
Sinhalese and Tamils broke out after a minor incident between the police and a group of 
Tamil youth in Jaffna.162 Violence spread throughout Jaffna to Colombo, Kandy, and 
then to various provinces throughout the island. The clashes left an estimated 100 Tamils 
dead and made over 25,000 homeless.163 The government declared a state of emergency, 
imposed a curfew and deployed the military to quell the violence.164 
 The peace of 1959 to 1977 followed by the outbreak of Sinhalese and Tamil riots 
in 1977 contains elements that conform to the causal argument proposed in this 
dissertation. First, religion continued to play played a salient role in the changing 
dynamics between the Tamils and Sinhalese. Specifically, the protection and promotion 
of Buddhism, as an integral component of the Sinhalese nationalist agenda, was a key 
demand of monks and politicians during this era. This is visible in the policies initiated 
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by Mrs. Bandaranaike, most notably changes made to the constitution that gave 
Buddhism a privileged place in Sri Lankan society and politics. The prominence of 
Buddhism is also visible in Mrs. Bandaranaike’s efforts to promote irrigation projects to 
the Dry Zone of the country and populate it with Sinhalese, the historic heartland of the 
Sinhalese Kingdom of the Mahavamsa. These religious, cultural and historical issues—
coupled with discriminating reforms in university admissions and the failure to 
implement policies creating district councils—added to the Tamil community’s sense of 
threat towards the Sinhalese dominated federal government. 
 Frustrations over Sinhalese-centric policies created new trajectories in Tamil 
tactics and strategies. The Tamils formed organizations in response to the 1972 
constitutional reforms. This included the TULF, which united “estate” and indigenous 
Tamils, but also militant youth movements that abandoned diplomatic channels and 
pursued change through armed struggle. As with the 1956 and 1958 riots, religion did not 
play a salient role in the mobilization of Tamils or in their justification for a forceful 
response to Sinhalese threats. The TULF organized around shared language and ethnic 
heritage between “estate” and indigenous Tamils, not around Hinduism. Likewise, the 
emerging militant organizations capitalized on leftist Marxist ideologies, not on Hindu 
ideologies. 
 The rise of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism was clearly a threat to Tamil 
communities on the island. The government’s preferences for Buddhism and the 
Sinhalese language were a cultural threat. However, in addition, greater restrictions on 
university admissions to Tamils—which imposed barriers to government jobs—coupled 
with the transplant of Sinhalese into Tamil and Muslim areas in the Dry Zone were 
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economic and territorial threats to the Tamils. The failure of two decades of negotiations 
prompted a stronger response from the Tamils, including the call for an independent state 
and the use of force to achieve that goal. 
 The Sinhalese-dominant government’s actions during this era have two possible 
motivations. First, Mrs. Bandaranaike’s pro-Sinhalese Buddhist policies appear to have 
been motivated by the opportunity to implement a Sinhalese nationalist agenda and less 
by fears of Buddhism’s extinction. In the early 1970s, at the time of the constitutional 
reforms, there were no new threats posed by foreign sources or domestic minorities. 
However, Mrs. Bandaranaike’s policies could also have been the result of the threats 
posed by factions within the Sinhalese Buddhist community. The 1971 JVP insurrection 
was aimed not at Tamils but, rather, at the Sri Lankan government, which they saw as too 
conservative on issues relating to Sinhalese nationalism. It is possible that the pro-Sinhala 
policies were implemented as a means of appeasing this rightwing threat; however, many 
of the policies, including particularly the elevation of Sinhala as the national language, 
predate the 1971 insurrection. Therefore, it appears that the SLFP government led by 
Mrs. Bandaranaike was acting more out of opportunity than threat regarding the 
promotion of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism. As in the previous rounds of riots, the 
Sinhalese had the resources of the state at their disposal. Similar to the 1956 and 1958 
riots, casualties and property damage were greater among the Tamils, suggesting that the 
government failed to protect them against Sinhala rioters.  
 The biggest change between the 1956 and 1958 riots and the 1977 riots, however, 
was the resources available to the Tamils. Specifically, the greater degree of organization 
with the Tamil community—including at the political level with the TULF and on the 
 133 
 
 
ground with Tamil militant groups—allowed the Tamils to strike back with greater 
velocity. The Tamils, particularly the disaffected youth, were better mobilized by the 
time of the 1977 riots. Although the Tamil community was fraught with internal divisions 
and suffering from the death of its key leaders in 1977, they were nevertheless better 
prepared to fight back than in the previous riots.     
The Riots of 1981 and 1983 and Escalation to Civil War 
 This section addresses the riots of 1981 and 1983—the worst in the country’s 
history—followed by the outbreak of civil war. Specifically, it considers the 
consolidation of Tamil militant groups, their resources, and their relationship to Tamil 
politicians. It also addresses the emergence of ultra-nationalist Sinhalese Buddhist 
organizations—the JVP and the MVP—and their use of force for saliently Buddhist 
goals. Finally, this section considers the current bid for peace. This section argues that the 
escalation to civil war in Sri Lanka is best explained by the consolidation of Tamil 
militant groups into the LTTE and the resources they gathered through various 
international sources. Likewise, the presence of Sinhalese Buddhis t nationalist militant 
groups fueled the conflict by challenging the government’s authority and destabilizing 
peace talks. 
 The period between the 1977 riots and the riots of 1981 and 1983 continued to be 
politically turbulent for the island. In 1977, as an alleged confidence building measure 
within the Sinhalese community, Jayewardene released from jail members of the JVP, 
who were imprisoned as a result of the 1971 insurrection. This act, instead of calming 
Sinhalese Buddhist anxieties, paved the way for a new wave of militancy. 165  In 1979, 
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following the death of 14 Sri Lankan police in LTTE raids and the bombing of an Air 
Ceylon airliner, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gave 
sweeping powers to the police and military to conduct operation against suspected 
terrorists, the overwhelming majority of whom were Tamil.166  
 In 1981, as a conciliatory measure to the Tamil community, the government 
passed legislation that would allow for the creation of District Development Councils 
(DDC) throughout the country. The LTTE and other militant groups opposed the 
initiative, arguing that full secession was the only route for the future of the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka.  In attempts to derail the 1981 elections, Tamil militants assassinated a Tamil 
member of the UNP and several police officers. This, in turn, sparked riots in the city 
resulting in the burning of the Jaffna Public Library, which housed over 90,000 volumes 
of Tamil books.167 The government did not hold inquiries into the causes of the event or 
attempt to punish the parties responsible for the library’s destruction, which enraged the 
Tamil population. 168 Shortly after this event, Sinhalese gangs in Colombo and 
Ratnapura sacked, looted and burned Tamil shops and houses, causing at least seven 
deaths and the destruction of more than 200 buildings.169 Jaywardene called out the 
armed forces to stop the violence. 
In 1982, despite his controversial policies and actions, Jayewardene won another 
term in office. Sporadic incidents of violence continued throughout the following year 
including an LTTE attack on a train outside of Jaffna and a few attacks on Tamil 
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merchants spearheaded by Sinhala militant groups.170 However, the most serious riots in 
Sri Lanka’s history came in July of 1983, after LTTE forces killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers 
in a raid in Jaffna. The following day, riots broke out in Colombo following the soldiers’ 
funeral procession. The riots began around the area of the cemetery then quickly spread 
to Tamil neighborhoods. Angry Sinhalese mourners looted and burned Tamil shops and 
houses, eventually killing between 2,000 to 3,000 people and forcing from 70,000 to 
100,000 Tamils into refugee camps, or just over 60% of the Tamil population in the 
area.171 In addition, an estimated 35,000 Tamils fled to India and, within the coming year, 
the number is believed to have reached 125,000.172 
 The government was slow to respond to the violence.  In particular, Jayewardene 
did not address the nation until five days after the riots had begun, at which time he 
crit icized the Tamils for instigating the events through their terrorist acts.173  
Furthermore, rumors that the government had supplied lists of Tamil-owned businesses to 
angry Sinhalese groups and that the police and military actually participated in the riots 
weakened the government’s credibility with the Tamil population. 174 Following the riots, 
the government banned the JVP, which it fingered as the organization responsible for 
most of the bloodshed.175 This, however, did little to console the Tamil population. 
 The 1983 riots were the turning point for Sinhalese and Tamil relations on the 
island. From this point, the Tamil bid for a separate homeland took a more militant 
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trajectory, which quickly led to full-scale civil war. Three stages are visible in the war, 
which will be briefly outlined below: from the early 1970s until the early 1990s; from 
1990 until 1995; and from 1995 until the present ceasefire in February 2002. 176  
The first phase of the Sri Lankan civil war ran from the mid-1970s until 1990, and 
involved three developments. The first was the emergence of Tamil militant groups in the 
early 1970s and their attacks primarily on Sri Lankan police, military and government 
targets, including the 1972 assassination of the mayor of Jaffna.177 These developments 
further escalated after the 1983 riots, at which time militant Tamil groups attacked 
Sinhalese civilians in the North. The Sri Lankan government deployed forces to the area, 
which attempted to dismantle militant Tamil organizations in the region. 
The second development in this phase was the LTTE’s machiavellian 
consolidation of power and emergence as the primary militant organization in Tamil 
Eelam. Beginning in May of 1986, the LTTE engaged in fratricidal killings, murdering 
the leadership of three rival militant organizations, the TELO, the EPRLF and the 
PLOTE. By 1987, the LTTE stood as the only major militant organization fighting for 
Tamil independence.178 Militants affiliated with other groups were taken prisoner, forced 
into exile or retreated to areas on the island not dominated by the LTTE. 179 The LTTE’s 
goal, not unlike its rival militant organizations, was the creation of an independent state, 
an objective that it has not wavered on over the course of the twenty-year civil war. Also 
like its militant rivals, the LTTE began as a Marxist-Leninist group, consistent with 
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numerous armed movements around the globe in the 1970s. However, the group quickly 
moved more towards a right-winged ideology based on Tamil ethnicity and nationalism, 
which succeeded in gaining recruits and some popular support.180  
The LTTE has been extremely successful in raising money and military assets 
from international sources. In particular, the LTTE has mobilized the Tamil diaspora for 
the cause of an independent state of Eelam. As early as the 1970s, Sri Lankan Tamils had 
set up organizations, based in London, aimed at raising awareness of the Tamil’s plight 
and mobilizing the diaspora to contribute money to its cause. This includes organizations 
such as the Eelam Revoultionary Organization of Students (EROS), the Tamil Liberation 
Organization (TLO), and various charity groups.181 By 1995, an estimated 40% of the 
LTTE’s war budget was generated from overseas donations, which climbed to 60% by 
1996.182 The LTTE also has engaged in money laundering, gold smuggling, drug 
trafficking, arms transfers, and real estate investments to raise money. 183 In 1984, the 
LTTE set up an information news center in London and publish several periodicals 
including Kalathi, Viduthalai Pligai and Tamil Land.184 In addition, the LTTE has 
worked with other liberation movements, especially the Palestinians but also groups from 
“Libya, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Turkey and Yemen” along with 
ties to the ETA in Spain. 185 Therefore, by the 1980s, the LTTE had become a resource-
rich, powerful organization and a formidable foe in the Sri Lankan civil war. 
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The third development in the first phase of the war was India’s involvement in the 
conflict. The Indian government, under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, became publicly 
involved in the Sri Lankan conflict following the 1983 riots. However, prior to this, it is 
believed that Indira’a government, through the Indian secret service the Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW), began training Tamil militant as early as 1982, first by allowing 
training camps to be built in Tamil Nadu, followed by financing and arms.186  
After the 1983 riots, Indira offered India’s services as a mediator between Tamils 
and the Sri Lankan government. It is believed that several motives were behind this offer. 
First, the Indian government claimed a special relation to the conflict given the ethnic tie 
between Tamils in Sri Lanka and those in Tamil Nadu. This tie was strengthened by 
public opinion in Tamil Nadu, which was outraged by the riots and pressured the Indian 
government for action. 187 Second, India wanted to act as a defense umbrella for the 
smaller countries in South Asia and to proactively seek stability in the region; intervening 
in the Sri Lankan conflict was an important step in achieving this goal. 188 Third, it is also 
argued that the Indiria- led government intervened in the conflict as a means of pandering 
to Tamil Nadu votes in the upcoming 1984 elections.189 Therefore, India’s involvement in 
the Sri Lankan conflict stemmed from a mixture of domestic and international policy 
motives. 
India pushed for reconciliation in Sri Lanka by, first, sending a mediator to the 
island to talk with both parties. This was followed by the 1984 All Party Conference, 
which sought to reach common ground on the creation of district councils for the North 
                                                 
186 Gunaratna, “Internationalization of the Tamil Conflict,” pg. 116. This story broke in the press, including 
India Today, in 1984. See K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind , pg. 214   
187 K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, pp. 200-201 
188 K.M. de Silva, Reaping the Whirlwind, pg. 196 
 139 
 
 
and Eastern Provinces of the island, and by encouraging the Sri Lankan government to 
grant citizenship to “estate” Tamils, which it did in 1988.190 Following Indira’s 
assassination in 1984, her son Rajiv continued to negotiate for a peaceful resolution to the 
escalating civil war.  He met with President Jayewardene in 1985 and agreed to further 
help coordinate talks between the Tamils and Sri Lankan government, first in Thimpu, 
Bhuttan, followed by talks in New Delhi, which resulted in the Delhi Accords of 1985.191 
The Delhi Accords eventually became the framework for the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace 
Agreement, signed in July of 1987. The accords called for the creation of nine provincial 
councils across the island, a referendum in the East Province to determine if its citizens 
wanted to merge their district with the North, the repatriation of recent Tamils refugees, 
the expulsion of Tamil militants on Indian soil, and the rapid deployment of 7,000 Indian 
troops to form the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).192 
 The LTTE flatly rejected the agreement and began to attack the IPKF shortly after 
their deployment. This forced the Indian government to increase the number of deployed 
soldiers in the region, eventually reaching between 75,000 to 100,000 troops at its 
zenith, 193 and costing the lives of more than 1,250 soldiers before their withdrawal in 
1990.194   
It is important to note that Sinhalese militants were equally hostile towards to 
1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement as were the Tamils. Following a 1985 LTTE attack on 
Buddhist pilgrims in Anuradhapura, in which 150 civilians were killed, Sinhalese 
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Buddhist nationalists began to form organizations aimed at protecting Buddhism and 
defending the homeland against the Tamil threat. In 1986, militant monks founded the 
Mavbima Surakime Vyaparaya (MSV). The MSV acted as an umbrella organization that 
sought to coordinate efforts of other Sinhala nationalist groups and work with political 
parties, specifically the SLFP, to maintain territorial unity of Sri Lanka and Sinhalese 
Buddhist sovereignty over the island.195 It drew heavily on the Mahavamsa to justify this 
goal, claiming that the ancient Sinhalese kings unified the island as part of their role of 
protecting the Sangha, which in turn protected the teachings of the Buddha.196  
Furthermore, the organization argued that force was necessary to repel the Tamil threat 
and defend the Buddhist state. To this end, the MSV believed that monks should be “foot 
soldiers” for “the revolutionary struggle.”197 The organization sought to mobilize the 
Sinhalese population through the creation of literature, speeches, and demonstrations 
including union strikes.198  
The JVP—the same revolutionary organization that attempted to overthrow the 
government in 1971—also remobilized during this period for militant action to “defend 
the motherland.” Along with the MSV, the JVP took up arms to protest the signing of the 
1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement, which it believed would compromise the territory and 
sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Beginning in 1987, the JVP launched an insurrection aimed at 
overthrowing the government and thwarting the implementation of the accords. The 
organization had almost no external support for its operations but, rather, relied on the 
charismatic and innova tive leadership of Rohana Wijeweera along with popular support 
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and the structure of the Sangha to organize and violently challenge the government.199 
They carried out assassinations of UNP politicians, raids on military installations, 
bombing attacks on government buildings including the parliament, and violent attacks 
on infrastructure nodes such as power plants and the state-run media.200  They also 
organized widespread strikes, boycotts on Indian-made products, and mass 
demonstrations.201 From 1987 to 1989, an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 people were killed 
as a result of the JVP insurrection. 202 
 In 1988, a new UNP president was elected, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who 
articulated two goals in his campaign: the end of terror caused by the JVP, and the 
complete withdrawal of the IPKF.  The government’s vow to dismember the JVP was, 
ironically, aided by the JVP’s threat to kill family members of Sinhalese soldiers in the 
Sri Lankan army, which alienated their popular base.203 In 1989, the government captured 
and assassinated Wiljeweera and, by 1990, they had succeeded in killing off the 
organization’s key members, effectively destroying the movement.  Likewise, Premadasa 
negotiated to have the IPKF withdrawal from the island by March of 1990, marking the 
end of phase one of the civil war.204  
  Phase two of the civil war lasted from the withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990 until 
the breakdown of major negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government 
in 1995.  Amidst negotiations with the Indian government for the withdrawal of the 
IPKF, the new Sri Lankan government also engaged in talks with the LTTE. In 1989, 
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Premadasa reconvened the All Party Conference (APC) with the aim of reaching 
common ground between the LTTE and the government on the creation of regional 
councils.205 Negotiations broke down after the SLFP withdrew from the talks and the 
LTTE rejected the district council schema, charging that it compromised the goal of an 
independent Tamil state.206  
 Failed negotiations resulted in renewed violence, this time between the LTTE and 
government forces in the Eastern and Northern Provinces. Between 1990 and 1993, the 
LTTE launched several attacks against the Sri Lankan police and military including the 
seizure of 600 police, who were later executed, and attacks on army camps at Mankulam, 
Elephant Pass, and Poonarin. 207  The LTTE also assassinated several politicians including 
the Deputy Defense minister, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, the former Deputy 
Defense minister, and President Premadasa in 1993.208 Furthermore, the LTTE conducted 
attacks against civilians in the Eastern and Northern Provinces, including the 1990 ethnic 
cleansing of Muslims from the North and confiscating of their property. 209  
 The government responded to these acts with military confrontation, particularly 
after the assassination of Premadasa, who was replaced by D.B. Wijerunga. During phase 
two, remnants of rival Tamil militant groups joined forces with the Sri Lankan military to 
challenge the LTTE. 210 The 1994 elections ushered in the People’s Alliance government, 
headed by Chadrika Kumaratunga. This new government revitalized negotiations with 
the LTTE. In January of 1995, the government and LTTE agreed to a ceasefire and 
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several rounds of talks.211 In negotiations, the LTTE made four demands: the end of the 
embargo to the North; the end of Sri Lankan fishing businesses off the northern coast; the 
removal of a key military camp in the North; and the legal right for LTTE members to 
carry weapons in the North. The government agreed to all demands except the removal of 
the military camp in the North. 212 In response, the LTTE withdrew from negotiations and 
resumed fighting in April of 1995. Phase two of the civil war cost over 11,000 lives of 
civilians and soldiers and around 12,000 LTTE troops.213 
Phase three of the Sri Lankan civil war began with an LTTE suicide attack on a 
naval boat in the Trincomalee Harbor and lasted until the February 2002 ceasefire and 
resumption of negotiations. This phase of the war was marked by combined military 
confrontation and the Sri Lankan government’s negotiations with the LTTE. In 1995, the 
government recaptured Jaffna City and Kilinochchi, two LTTE strongholds.214 In 
retaliation, the LTTE attacked the Central Bank in Colombo, killing more than 200 
people followed by attacks on the country’s oil refinery plants.215  
Amidst this violence, the government used military and diplomatic methods 
aimed at ending the war. This included efforts to rebuild civil society in Jaffna after its 
capture in 1995, and by holding elections in which the LTTE was defeated and forced to 
retreat to the jungles.216 In 2000, the Norwegian government began to work with 
members of LTTE and the Sri Lankan government on a resolution to the conflict.217 This 
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resulted in a ceasefire in February of 2002, followed by talks in Thailand later that 
year.218 The parties have yet to reach an agreement but have made progress on confidence 
building measures including the return of internally displaced refugees and the creation of 
a sub-committee to work on this issue.219 
 The riots of 1981 and 1983 followed by the outbreak of civil war contain elements 
that conform to the causal argument proposed in this dissertation. First, religion 
continued to play a salient role in Sinhalese and Tamil tensions. Sinhalese Buddhist 
militant organizations were a key disruption to the peace, specifically the formation of the 
MSV and the reemergence of the JVP in the 1980s. Both of these militant organizations 
formed in reaction to threats of federal devolution to Tamils in the North and East. Both 
groups made it their priority to “protect the motherland,” to keep the territorial and 
sovereign unity of the island under Sinhalese Buddhist authority. Both groups identified 
this goal through their interpretation of the Mahavamsa and the belief that the Sinhalese 
people were chosen as a special race to defend and propagate the teachings of the 
Buddha. Furthermore, both groups contained Buddhist monks and organized militant 
operations through various temples and monasteries. Both groups enjoyed popular 
support throughout the 1980s. These groups’ militant operations against the Sri Lankan 
government and IPKF proved to be costly and bloody.   
However, despite the mobilization of the Sinhalese through religious reasoning, 
the Tamils continued organize their militant resistance through non-religious channels. 
After the 1983 riots, the Tamils received support from India along co-ethnic lines, but 
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religion appeared to play no role in the Tamil-Indian alliance. The goal to create an 
independent state and protect the Tamil “homeland”—defined by history not religion—
was the clarion call to mobilize and take up arms. Thus Tamil violence was not inspired 
by religion. 
 Second, both Tamil and Sinhalese militants took up arms in response to threats 
during this era. Somewhat ironically, both groups responded to the same threats posed by 
the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement. Both the LTTE and the JVP opposed the creation 
of district councils. The LTTE wanted nothing short of an independent state, while the 
JVP demanded the entire island and Sinahlese Buddhist leadership over the territory. The 
accords’ call for provincial autonomy threatened both of these groups’ goals. 
Furthermore, both the LTTE and JVP opposed the deployment of Indian forces. In 
addition to the presence of Sri Lankan troops, the LTTE saw the IPKF as a threat to their 
regional stronghold and a potential hindrance to their operations against the Sri Lankan 
government. The JVP opposed the IPKF for what they believed to be an Indian attempt to 
seize pieces of Sri Lanka and compromise its territorial integrity. The 1987 accords, 
therefore, and the presence of the IPKF created a common threat for both groups. 
 Perhaps the greatest change to Tamil and Sinhalese dynamics was the LTTE’s 
ability to consolidate Tamil backing and raise substantial resources for its operations 
against the IPKF and the Sri Lankan military and government. By killing off rival 
militant groups, the LTTE was able to emerge as the primary Tamil organization by the 
mid-1980s. This in turned allowed for resources—donations, recruits, materiel, publicity, 
and investments—to be concentrated into this one force, making their organization truly 
formidable. The JVP was also able to conduct a series of crippling attacks. However, 
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without the overseas networks to replenish their resources, the government was able to 
destroy the movement in under two years.  
 Another important development to the Sri Lankan conflict is the changes that 
occurred between Sinhalese religious militants and the Sri Lankan government. With the 
rise of bloody confrontation between Buddhist revolutionaries and the government, 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist groups ceased to be an asset to political parties and power- 
politics.  Premadasa came to power in 1988 with the promise to end JVP assaults on 
civilians and government property, a goal that he carried out by 1989, albeit with 
enormous bloodshed. It appears that the power of militant monks ended at this time and, 
while monks still continue to play an active role in political agitation, their presence is 
less of a force than it once was.  
Finally, the civil war has come to a tentative halt with the aid of Norway—a truly 
neutral third party—and their work on negotiations. These negotiations show signs of 
hope, with both Tamil leaders and the Sri Lankan government meeting face-to-face and 
considering alternatives to violence. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that Sinhalese motivations and goals for violence in Sri 
Lanka have been saliently religious. This is in contrast to several scholars who have 
argued that the violence in Sri Lanka is not about religion. For example, Barbara 
Crossette’s analysis of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict is: “Although most Sinhalese are 
Buddhists and most Tamils are Hindu, the present dispute was never religious…”220 
Likewise, Gamini Samaranayake states at the end of his chapter: “Although religion is 
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not a factor which contributed to the origin and development of the conflict, the Buddhist 
clergy (Sangha) have played an influential role in the ethnic conflict.”221 Lastly, the 
Historical Dictionary of Sri Lanka claims: “It is important to point out that the current 
ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils is not based on a Buddhist-Hindu 
religious divide. Its origins are largely linguistic, political and economic. Religion enters 
it only indirectly through the identity issue.”222  
These analyses claim that the conflict in Sri Lanka is largely ethnic. However, this 
argument fails to explain key motivations of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. First, the 
salient goal of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and their organizations has been the 
creation of not just a Sinhalese state in Sri Lanka, but a Sinhalese Buddhist state, 
excluding not only other ethnic groups but religious groups as well. The 19th century 
Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist Dharmapala articulated this goal, calling for all 
Sinhalese—as de facto Buddhists—to unify, embrace their faith, and defend the sacred 
land of Sri Lanka from “foreign” elements including Christians, Muslims and Tamils.  
Religious and political leaders adopted this call including Prime Minister S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike and his wife, in addition to members of the JVP and the MSV. Therefore, 
the goal of extreme Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists is not just the eradication of ethnic 
“foreign” elements but religious ones as well; Sri Lanka, in their minds, should be purely 
Buddhist and purely Sinhalese. 
Second, interpretations of religious texts have also played an important role in the 
Sri Lankan violence. Dharmapala based his call for Sinhalese Buddhist rights to Sri 
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Lanka on his interpretation of the Mahavamsa, a religious text that has chronicled the 
relationship between the king, the Sangha and the Dharma of the Buddha on Sri Lanka. 
The Mahavamsa claims that Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese are a chosen nation through 
which the Buddha’s teachings were destine to “shine in glory.” Religious and political 
leaders have also interpreted the Mahavamsa to identify what they claim to be a chronic 
threat to the “Buddhist island”—external invasion and foreign occupation by Tamils and 
colonialists—and the need to take action to defend the Dharma of the Buddha.  
Third, religious clerics have played a key role in fomenting and executing violent 
action against non-Buddhists on the island. This is most visible from the 1950s until the 
present day. Monks formed various organizations, such as the LEBM, the Eksath Bhikku 
Peramuna, the JVP and the MSV, with the aim of protecting Buddhism against non-
Buddhist threats and even the Sri Lankan government. The government’s attempts to 
create regional autonomy for the Tamils—in 1956, 1976, and 1986—all collapsed under 
intense pressure from monks performing sit-ins, hunger strikes, and fomenting riots. The 
JVP and MSV in particular called on monks to use violence in order to “defend the 
motherland” against territorial concessions to the Tamils, resulting in between 40,000 to 
60,000 deaths before the government’s successful destruction of the JVP in 1989. 
Therefore, radical Buddhist monks have caused considerable bloodshed on the island.    
Fourth, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists have benefited from their ties to the 
government; this has been the greatest resource that has allowed for the implementation 
of their goals. Tamil-Sinhalese dynamics took a turn for the worse when Bandaranaike 
and the SLFP came to power in 1956, implementing policies that discriminated against 
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non-Sinhala speaking citizens. Relations worsened when Mrs. Bandaranaike changed the 
country’s constitution to give Buddhism and Sinhala a special place in the country, and 
renamed the island to reflect its Sinhalese history. Furthermore, the government did not 
sufficiently restrain Sinhalese violence against Tamils in the riots preceding the civil war; 
evidence even suggests that police and the armed forces participated in the 1983 riots. 
Therefore, Sinhalese nationalists benefited from their ties to the government. This 
relationship changed after the government violently put down the Sinhalese militant 
threat of the JVP.  
Tamil mobilization and goals, on the other hand, have not involved religion. 
Initial Tamil reactions to British colonization in the 1800s did involve religion, 
specifically the efforts of Hindu activist Navalar to revitalize Saiva Siddhanta among the 
Tamils in northern Sri Lanka through stressing Hindu texts, rebuilding temples, and 
creating Hindu schools. However, since that time, Tamils have neither mobilized nor 
articulated their goals around religion.  
The key leaders of the Tamil independence movement were secular individuals. 
This is particularly true of Chelvanayagam, who was secular and socialist in his political 
ideology. Moreover, Tamil religious leaders have not played a visible role in the current 
conflict. Virtually nothing has been written about Hindu leaders in Sri Lanka and their 
reaction to the conflict, suggesting their inactivity in the war. Likewise, Hindu scriptures 
have not surfaced as a tool of mobilization or justification for “defending the homeland.” 
Rather, the call to arms and defense of Tamil-majority areas has been founded on historic 
precedent, specifically through the existence of the Jaffna Kingdom just prior to the era 
of colonization. Tamil territory, therefore, is based on history, not religious precedent.  
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Likewise, Tamil unity on the island has not been based on religion. The 
“indigenous” Tamils, concentrated in the North, and the “estate” Tamils of the Eastern 
Province did not initially enjoy unity against the Sri Lankan government. In 1948, when 
the government revoked citizenship to “estate” Tamils, “indigenous” Tamils did not 
mobilize to fight the policy. However, after a series of damaging legislation involving the 
status of the Tamil language and restrictive quotas for university admittance, Tamils 
united in the 1970s to fight these discriminations. Tamil unity on the island, therefore, 
was driven by language and access to education, not by religion.   
In addition, material support for Tamil military action against the Sri Lankan 
government has not been generated through religious networks or resources. Tamil 
militants enjoyed a friendly relationship with India in the 1980s, including permission to 
build training camps in Tamil Nadu along with funding and materiel. This was 
complimented by Indian efforts to negotiate a peace agreement between the Sri Lankan 
government and the Tamils, ensuring regional autonomy to the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. The motivation, in part, for Indian support of the Tamil movement was based 
on ethnic ties between the Tamils of Sri Lanka and their “kin” in Tamil Nadu. This tie 
was not forged through religion.  
The Tamils have also been very successful in securing financial and political 
support from Tamils in the diaspora. This includes, most notably, various London-based 
organizations and their networks with other liberation movements from around the globe. 
It also includes Tamil groups in countries like Canada and the US, and the efforts of these 
groups to lobby on behalf of the Tamil cause. Tamils have also been active with various 
media outlets and human rights NGOs, spreading information about the treatment of 
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Tamils by the Sri Lankan government. These organizations and networks do not appear 
to be motivated by religion; they are generated primarily through ethnic ties to Tamils. 
The religious motivation and goals of the Sinhalese on the one hand, compared to 
the ethnic motivations of the Tamils on the other, reveal some interesting dynamics 
concerning religious wars. First, this case demonstrates that religious violence can be in 
reaction to non-religiously motivated threats. Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism formed in 
reaction to British colonization, a mixture of religious threats—most notably the 
introduction of Christianity through missionary schools—and non-religiously motivated 
threats such as restructuring of society brought on by an educated middle-class, economic 
changes to the island, and newfound competition for government jobs. However, the 
current Tamil threat does not involve religion. Tamils are not attempting to make the 
island Hindu instead of Buddhist. Rather, Tamils are seeking territorial autonomy based 
on ethnic, historic, and linguistic justification. These are non-religious goals. However, 
this has fueled a religious reaction from Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. 
The flip side of this dynamic is that religiously motivated violence and goals can 
produce a non-religious reaction.  Sinhalese Buddhists have called for violence to defend 
the faith and create a Buddhist-pure state free of  “foreign” ethnic and religious groups. 
The Tamils, in response, have mobilized to defend territory that they believe to be 
historically theirs; they have not countered this religiously motivated threat with their 
own religious arguments. This suggests that the maintenance of territory is a salient issue 
for which both groups are fighting. However, the motivations underlying both Tamil and 
Sinhala demands for territory are quite different. The Sinhalese are driven by arguments 
that are saliently religious whereas the Tamils are motivated by ethnicity.  
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4.1 Sinhala and Tamil Violence 
 Threat Perception Resources Religious and 
Political Authority 
1956-1958 
Riots 
Tamils—Sinhala Only 
Act 
Singhalese—Believed 
decline of Buddhism 
Tamils—Political 
organization 
Sinhalese—Orgs., 
monks, parties 
Government 
sympathetic and 
aided Sinhalese 
agenda 
1977 Riots Tamils—Gov. policies, 
colonize Dry Zone 
Sinhalese—Gov. believed 
to be too sympathetic to 
Tamils 
Tamils—emerging 
militant orgs, unity of 
Tamil population 
Sinhalese—Orgs, 
monks, state 
Government 
sympathetic and 
aided Sinhalese 
agenda 
1981, 1983 
Riots and 
Civil War 
Tamils—Gov. policies, 
IPKF 
Sinhalese—JVP/gov. 
Tamil insurgency 
Tamils—internat. org, 
financial and military 
resources, safe havens 
Sinhalese—loss of state 
support and resources 
Government 
attacked by 
Buddhists, reduction 
of influence with 
government 
 
 Chapter 4 
Defending the Dar al Islam:  
Jihad in the 19th Century and Today 
 
 
“The doctrine of Jihad is not the product of a single authoritative individual or 
organization’s interpretation. It is rather the product of diverse individuals and authorities 
interpreting and applying the principles of sacred texts in specific historical and political 
contexts.”—John L. Esposito, Unholy War.1 
Jihad is perhaps the example that comes to most people’s minds when considering 
the role of religion in violent conflict and war. Particularly after the September 11th 
attacks in New York and Washington, DC, most Americans are concerned with the role 
that Islam and its doctrines of jihad and martyrization have played in mobilizing 
individuals for war against the US. What is the doctrine of jihad in Islam? Who interprets 
this doctrine? Why are jihads called at some times and not at others? Why have Bin 
Laden and his followers called for jihad against the US? Why now? 
 This chapter aims to offer insights on these questions by comparing two major 
waves of jihad in history: the outbreak of jihads throughout the Muslim world in the 19th 
century; and the current surge of jihads around the globe, including Bin Laden’s call for 
war against the United States. Drawing from the causal argument presented in chapter 
two, this chapter will focus on three variables as possible explanations for the call to 
jihad: the relationship between religious and political leaders, the role of threat perception 
in influencing actions of religious leaders and their groups, and the amount of material 
resources available to religious groups initiating violence. This chapter will test three 
empirical predictions from the causal argument. First, religious leaders will use violence 
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if they feel their authority is under threat. Second, religious violence will occur more 
frequently if political and religious leaders are intertwined, allowing religious leaders the 
opportunity to use state resources to further their agendas. Third, jihad will be initiated in 
response to perceived or actual threat to the people and land deemed essential to the 
vitality of the religion. And fourth, the religious group initiating the violence will have 
sufficient resources including strong leadership, organization, finances and technological 
assets to carry out the jihad. 
This chapter argues that, first, there is no one doctrine of jihad; rather, jihad is 
subject to interpretation and these interpretations are the product of individuals grounded 
in specific circumstances. Therefore, in order to understand why jihad is called at some 
times and not at others, social and political circumstances need to be considered. Second, 
the call for jihad is largely in response to perceived or actual threats to Muslim land, 
communities, or the very existence of the faith. Therefore, in times of great threat, real or 
perceived, leaders have called for jihad to defend Islam; this is also true of the current 
wave of jihads around the world including Bin Laden’s war against the US. Third, the 
call for jihad involves several doctrines and religious resources within Islam including the 
doctrine of martyrization and the use of legal opinions, or fatwas, to justify the use of 
force. Fourth, Jihads require resources to succeed, especially skilled leaders and resilient, 
efficient organizations. Jihads are enhanced in scope and intensity by networks, means of 
communication, and financial resources. These latter resources explain, by in large, the 
current successes of various jihad movements around the globe and differentiate these 
movements from their 19th century counterparts.     
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This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section provides a brief overview 
of Islam: its core beliefs, its historical developments, its divisions, and its leadership. The 
second section outlines the doctrine of jihad, considering the legal doctrine, mystical 
dimensions, holy warriors and martyrization, and a brief overview of historical examples 
of jihad. The third section analyzes two major waves of jihad: in the 19th century, and the 
current wave of jihads beginning in 1979, including Bin Laden’s call for war against the 
US. And the fourth section offers concluding remarks. 
Overview of Islam 
 
Islam is a rich, complex, and diverse religious tradition that spans across every 
continent and has nearly 1,400 years of history. For the purpose of understanding the 
doctrine of jihad, this chapter will provide a very brief outline of Islam’s core beliefs, the 
historical development of the faith and community, divisions within Islam, and forms of 
leadership.  
The central message of Islam stresses the oneness of God, or tawhid, and the role 
of the Prophet Muhammad in transmitting God’s message. This belief, which is called the 
shahaddah or the proclamation of faith, forms the first of five pillars of Islam; one who 
proclaims the shahaddah is a Muslim. The other four pillars include ritual prayer said five 
times a day facing towards Mecca (salat); fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, the 
month the Prophet first received revelations from God (sawm); almsgiving to the poor 
(zakat); and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), which should be taken by every Muslims at 
least once in his or her life, finances and health permitting. Along with the pillars, Islam 
emphasizes the unity of the worldwide Mus lim community, the ummah, which, in 
 156 
 
 
principle, is not divided by gender, race, class or any other human distinction. 2 In 
addition Islam, like Judaism, has religious law, Shari’a. Ideally, Shari’a should be upheld 
by a nation’s leader and be the law that governs society. 
Islam began not as a new religion but, rather, as a reform movement of existing 
monotheistic religions, particularly Judaism and Christianity. 3 Like Judaism and 
Christianity, the call to reform came through a prophet, Muhammad ibn Abdullah, who 
began receiving divine revelations in 610 CE during the lunar month of Ramadan, on the 
night now called the “Night of Power.” Along with receiving God’s messages, the 
Prophet Muhammad (here forward the Prophet) was commanded to recite, to spread the 
message. The first ten years of the Prophet’s preaching were met with hostility by the 
people of Mecca, forcing the Prophet, his family, and his followers to leave for the city of 
Medina in 622 CE, in what became known as the hijra, or emigration. Unlike in Mecca, 
the Medinans were receptive to the Prophet’s message; the community grew and returned 
to Mecca in 630 CE after defeating the city’s army and negotiating peaceful terms with 
its leaders.4  From this point, the faith spread throughout the region rapid ly, particularly 
in the following decades.  
After the sudden death of the Prophet in 632 CE, a debate broke out within the 
Muslim community regarding leadership and succession. The majority within the 
community believed that a new leader, called the khalifa or Caliph, should be elected 
from within the community. A minority believed that the Prophet had designated a 
successor, his cousin and son- in- law Ali, and that leadership be in the form of an Imam, 
                                                 
2 For more details on key beliefs in Islam, see John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), Chapter Three: “Religious Life and Belief,” pp. 69-113 
3 Esposito, Islam, pg. 14 
4 Esposito, Islam, pg. 12 
 157 
 
 
which should be determined from the bloodline of the Prophet.5 This division in the 
understanding of leadership and succession evolved into the Sunni and Shii factions, 
respectively. Shii Islam underwent an additional schism over succession of leadership, 
creating the Ismaili Shii faction, which exists primarily in South Asia today, and the 
Twelver Shii faction, which predominates in Iran but also has substantial numbers in Iraq 
and Lebanon. In 874 CE, the Twelver Shii Imam disappeared. This faction believes that 
he has gone into hiding and will return as the Mahdi, the “expected one” to restore justice 
to the world at the end of the ages. 
In addition to the split between Sunni and Shii Muslims, political authority of the 
ummah has undergone several changes since the time of the Prophet. Ideally, the 
community should be united and governed by one “rightly guided leader,” the Imam or 
Khalifa.6 However, the first four Caliphs after the Prophet were the only ones to realize 
this ideal.  Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar (634-644), Uthman (644-656), and Ali (656-661) 
are therefore called the “rightly guided caliphs” and this brief era is known as the 
“Golden Age of Islam.”7 These leaders are also special because they were all companions 
of the Prophet, earning the title al-salaf al salih, the pious ancestors. After the Golden 
Age, political authority fractioned into multiple, and often competing, polities. 
Alongside political leaders, Islam also has trained scholars, the Ulama, which are 
schooled in history, philosophy, language, law, and art. The Ulama are usually 
responsible for formulating shari’a law and often guide communities on their religious 
paths. Within the Ulama, there are leaders who act as religious judges, Muftis and Qadis.  
                                                 
5 Esposito, Islam, pp. 37-47 
6 Imam, has come to mean several thing in Islam. It still refers to the one “rightly guided” leader in Shii 
Islam. It also refers to the one who leads a mosque in Sunni Islam. 
7 Esposito, Islam, pp. 37-39 
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Islam also has mystical leaders, Sufis, often given the title Sheikh or Pir. Lastly, there are 
individuals who attain status as religious leaders either through their charisma or success, 
but are neither Sufis nor members of the Ulama.  They are also often referred to as 
Sheiks, Pirs or Mullahs. 
The Doctrine of Jihad and Holy Warriors in Islam 
 
This section outlines the different types of jihad in Islam. First, it considers jihad 
as a legal doctrine and debates surrounding its function and use. Second, this section 
looks at two non-juridical forms of jihad, the belief in the mahdi—the “expected one” 
who will restore justice to earth at the end of ages—and the notion of baraka, or God’s 
blessing on military leaders evident in battlefield success. Third, this section presents the 
concept of holy warriors in Islam and the doctrine of martyrization. Lastly, this section 
offers brief examples of different forms of jihad throughout history. 
Jihad as a legal doctrine 
Jihad is one component of Islamic law, or shari’a, along with all other matters 
governing the familial, social, and political dimensions of Muslim life. Therefore, in 
order to understand jihad as a legal concept, it is important to outline the sources and 
development of Islamic law, who interprets the law, and how the law has changed over 
time.  
Islamic law is based on two primary texts: the Qur’an, which is the literal word of 
God; and the Sunna, which are sayings of the Prophet recorded in the Hadith and the 
customs of the Prophet and his companions.8 The Qur’an, as the literal word of God, is 
                                                 
8 David S. Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Law, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pg. 4. Pearl cites the 
definitions of scholars Ignac Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, translated by Andras 
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the primary text and cannot be contradicted by any passages of the Sunna or 
interpretations of the law. However, despite this, the Qur’an contains few passages that 
offer explicit legal instruction; the Sunna, therefore, is used as authoritative examples of 
how the Prophet and his companions applied the message of the Qur’an to actions in 
every day religious, societal and political life.9  
The Qur’an and the Sunna are the textual sources of Islamic law. However, the 
textual sources of law alone cannot prescribe guidance for all human actions; this 
requires interpretation. Under the first Islamic polity, the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750 
CE), the leaders adopted legal scholars, Qadis, for the purpose of applying the message 
of the Qur’an and the examples of the Sunna to the everyday problems of social and 
political life. Qadis usually were promoted from within the ranks of the Ulama, who 
possessed the skills and knowledge necessary for interpreting the law. Under the Abbasid 
Dynasty (750-1258 CE), Qadis and members of the Ulama codified the law through 
qiyas, a process of analogy by comparing cases, and ijma, consensus among the jurists in 
the interpretation. Therefore the traditional sources of Islamic law are the Qur’an, the 
Sunna, qiyas, and ijma.10  
Islam spread rapidly throughout the region in its first few decades, establishing 
urban centers in Medina, Mecca, Kufa, and Damascus. Expansion brought the faith into 
contact with regional norms and practices that posed different questions for the law. 
Within these urban centers, different schools of law emerged to tackle these unique 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Ruth Hamori, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); and Joseph Schacht, Origins of 
Muhammedan Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), which are the foundational western works 
on Islamic jurisprudence.  
9 Pearl notes there are only around 80 verses in the Qur’an that offer explicit legal instruction, pg. 1. This is 
also noted by Esposito, Islam, pg. 77  
10 Pearl, pg. 14; Esposito, Islam, pp. 79-83 
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questions, producing variance in the law. Ultimately, several schools of law developed. 
Four of these schools remain in Sunni Islam today: the Hanafi school, which was the 
official school of the succeeding Abassid Dynasty and is most commonly practiced today 
in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, the Balkans and Cyprus; the Maliki school, which grew 
out of Medina and is practiced in the North and West African countries and in the eastern 
coastal territories of the Persian Gulf; the Shafi’i school, which began in Cairo and is 
most commonly practiced in Southeast Asia today; and the Hanbali school, which is 
followed in Saudi Arabia.11  In addition, there are several schools within the Shia branch 
of Islam; the most prominent is the Jafari school, which is practiced by Twelver Shias 
concentrated in the Persian Gulf and Lebanon. 12 
Three bodies of religious authority have been responsible for developing and 
applying Islamic law. First, as previously mentioned, the Ulama have studied the textual 
sources of the law—the Qur’an and the Sunna—to debate how these texts reveal the will 
of God for the everyday lives of Muslims. Ulama still perform this task today. Second, 
also previously mentioned, dynasties employed Qadis, usually from within the Ulama, as 
the official body responsible for applying the law. Qadis issued legal edict, hukm, which 
were fixed and binding but not to serve as a legal precedent for future cases. Third, also 
usually from within the ranks of the Ulama, were the muftis or legal consultants. 
Traditionally a mufti issued a legal opinion, fatwa, which was non-binding. 13 However, 
with the decline of Qadis, fatwas have taken on greater importance for interpreting legal 
matters. More recently, individuals that are not part of the Ulama and do not have 
                                                 
11 Pearl, pp. 16-17 
12 Esposito, Islam, pg. 85 
13 Esposito, Islam, pg. 86 
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training in Islamic law have issued fatwas; this includes Bin Laden, which will be 
discussed in the second half of this chapter. 
Islamic law involves all aspects of Muslim life including personal, spiritual, 
family, societal, criminal, economic and political life. The doctrine of jihad, therefore, is 
just one component of shari’a law and—like all other categories of the law—has been 
subject to debate and interpretation by various scholars and jurists over time.  In order to 
understand the legal aspects of jihad, it is necessary to explain the broader meaning of the 
word, the early legal understandings of jihad, and subsequent interpretations of the 
doctrine that have had a lasting impact. 
Jihad, in its broadest sense, means to struggle, to strive, or to make an effort to 
follow the path of God.14 This struggle occurs both in the spiritual and in the physical 
world. The spiritual jihad, often called the Greater Jihad, involves the individual struggle 
that each person faces in his or her walk as a Muslim, including resistance to earthly 
temptations and the submission to the will of God. It is generally believed that the 
spiritual struggle is the more difficult and more important of the two jihads and thus it is 
the Greater Jihad. The Lesser Jihad is the physical struggle to spread and defend the faith, 
including by force.15 The distinction between the lesser and greater jihad comes from an 
ahadith of the Prophet. After returning from battle he is quoted as saying: “We have 
returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad.”16 The greater jihad is therefore 
understood not as the physical battle but the spiritual struggle.  In addition, the greater 
and the lesser jihads are understood as four actions: the Jihad of the Heart, which 
                                                 
14 Esposito, Unholy War, pp. 27-28 
15 Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History, (The Hague: Mouton 
Publishers, 1979), pg. 10 
16 Peters, pg. 118; and Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 28 
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involves overcoming one’s sinful nature; the Jihad of the Tongue, which is ordering good 
over evil; the Jihad of the Hand, which involves disciplinary measures; and the Jihad of 
the Sword, which is fighting and defending against non-believers.17 Therefore, the term 
jihad has many meanings, both spiritual and physical.  
There are dozens of passages in the Qur’an that address fighting, qital, and war; 
these passages do not all say the same thing.  For example, Sura 2:190 states: “Fight in 
the way of Allah against those who fight against you, but begin no hostilities. Lo! Allah 
loveth not aggressors.”  Sura 22:39 states: “Sanction is given to those who fight because 
they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give them victory.” Sura 9:12 states:  
And if they break their pledges after their treaty (hath been made with you) and 
assail your religion, then fight the heads of disbelief—Lo! they have no binding 
oaths—in order that they may desist. 
 
The “Sword Verses,” Sura 9:5 asserts:  
 
Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye may 
find them, and take them (captive), and prepare for them each ambush. But if they 
repent, and establish worship and pay the poor-due [zakat], then leave their way 
free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. 
 
And Sura 9:29 states:  
 
Fight against those who do not believe in Allah nor in the Last Day and do not 
make forbidden what Allah and His messenger have made forbidden, and do not 
practice the religion of truth of those who have been given the Book, until they 
pay the jizya off hand, being subdued.18    
 
Religious scholars have debated how to interpret these different verses for when 
and who to fight, with varying conclusions. Religious historian Reuven Firestone notes: 
The Qur’an’s message on this topic [jihad], however, is actually far from 
consistent. The verses on warring are numerous, amount to scores in number, and 
                                                 
17 Peters, pg. 10; James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions, (University 
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), pg. 61 
18 Suras 2:190, 22:39, 9:12, 9:5, and 9:29, The Qur’an, Pickthall translation, (London: Ta-Ha Publishing, 
Ltd. 1930, first publication). Sura 9:29 taken from Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 14  
 163 
 
 
are spread out over more than a dozen chapters…Some qur’anic statements may 
or may not even refer to war, depending on how one views their context, but are 
nevertheless considered by post-qur’anic tradition as articulating divine 
pronouncements on the subject.19  
 
Some scholars have argued for a hierarchy of verses, placing the sword verses as a last 
resort. Others have argued that the passages were revealed to the Prophet in connection to 
the circumstances of the community, calling first for non-violence, then defensive force, 
culminating with offensive force when the community was strong enough to initiate 
attack against unbelievers.20 Other scholars have argued that when these passages were 
transmitted to the Prophet determines their importance, making the last verses, the Sword 
Verses the most important.21 Therefore, these verses have not produced a consensus 
about when Muslims should fight and to what ends. 
The classical legal doctrine of jihad, which is the Lesser Jihad, was an attempt to 
comprehend the messages of the Qur’an and Sunna and apply them to actions towards 
non-believers. This doctrine begins by dividing the world into two spheres, the dar al 
Islam, which is the abode or land of Islam, and the dar al harb, which, literally, is the 
land of war.22 Legally, the dar al Islam is that land which is governed by a just Muslim 
ruler and is ordered by shari’a law. 23 The dar al harb is all other land and is marked by 
chaos, inequality, and corruption. In the legal understanding of Jihad, it is the duty of 
those in the dar al Islam to spread their order, justice and belief in one God to the dar al 
                                                 
19 Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
pg. 47 
20 Firestone, pp. 48-51. Firestone demonstrates in his book that this hypothesis does not conform to the 
order in which texts were revealed. 
21 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Times, (Princeton: Markus Weiner Publishers, 1996), pg 
2 
22 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 35 
23 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 11 
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harb by force, if necessary. More recent scholars of Islamic jurisprudence have called 
this “offensive” jihad.24  
It is important to note that, despite this bifurcation of the world and the 
classification of all non-Muslim territory as the land of war, this does not mean that jihad 
against non-believers is perpetual or even inevitable.25 Classical law has provided 
guidelines for how and when to conduct offensive jihad, but these guidelines are subject 
to interpretation. 26 These principles assert, first and foremost, that offensive jihad is a 
collective duty; it is fought by members of the dar al Islam corporately for the good of 
the whole community. By classical standards the Imam, the leader of the dar al Islam, 
must call for a raid against the dar al harb once a year, preferably to those most 
threatening to the community. This call can be delayed if conditions are not ideal. 27 
Before a Muslim ruler attacks the dar al harb, he invites the local inhabitants to either 
accept the faith of Islam and become Muslims—this is called the da’wa—or to pay a poll 
tax, jizya, and a land tax, kharadj.28 If they become Muslims or if they submit to taxes, 
then war does not occur. Most schools of law consider lands where non-Muslims pay the 
poll tax as dar al harb. However the Shafi’i school names a third sphere, the dar al sulh 
or dar al ‘ahd, which is the land of treaty between Islam and harb.29 
In addition, classical hukm on law describe those exempt from participating in 
offensive jihad, specifically women, children, the elderly, the mentally ill, slaves, and the 
                                                 
24 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, Chapter 4: “The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern Islam,” pp. 105-150; 
Johnson, Chapter 4: “Authority to Make Holy War,” pp. 76-99 
25 Johnson, citing Majid Khadduri,  War and Peace in the Law of Islam, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1955), pg. 63 
26 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 12  
27 Johnson, pg. 62; Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 13 
28 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 18-19 
29 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 11 
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infirm.30 Sources also outline the proper procedures for the da’wa, methods of warfare, 
when soldiers can flee the battlefield, who is protected during battle, and when jihad 
ends. All of these issues are debated in the different schools of fiq, creating variation of 
opinion. 31 
Along with offensive jihad to spread the dar al Islam, there is the obligation for 
all Muslims to defend the faith if attacked; this is “defensive” jihad. Defensive Jihad is 
discussed much less in the classical texts. All schools agree that if Muslim land and 
people are attacked, all must fight to defend the faith including those exempt under 
offensive Jihad.32 The imperative for all to fight is not only for the defense of land held 
by Muslims and their inhabitants but also for the very survival of the faith. The classical 
texts suggest that, unlike the organized nature of offensive jihad, the response to attack is 
a spontaneous reaction, not one issued or organized by the community’s leader.33  
After the initial expansion of Islam in the 7th century, defensive jihad has become 
more the norm in Islamic holy war. For Shia Muslims, offensive jihad has not been an 
option since the time of their Imam’s disappearance in 874 CE, because an Imam is 
required to call and organize offensive holy war. Likewise, the use of offensive jihad in 
Sunni Islam has been rare. Ideal leadership in Sunni Islam is for one rightly guided ruler, 
the Caliph, to preside over the entire Muslim community, as previously mentioned.34 
However, as early as 756 CE, multiple Muslim dynasties emerged with different leaders 
                                                 
30 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 15-16 
31 For details on all of these issues and their variants within the different schools of law, see Peters, Islam 
and Colonialism, pp. 15-37  
32 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 15; Johnson, quoting Ann K. S. Lambton, State and Government in 
Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981); and Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, The Just Ruler in Shiite Islam: The Comprehensive 
Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pg. 63 
33 Johnson, pg. 63 
34 Johnson, pp. 64, 139 
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making the legal ideal of offensive jihad under one Imam impossible.35 Moreover, the 
fractioning of the ummah led to fighting between Muslims.  This prompted debates about 
the definition of a Muslim, a Muslim ruler and his territory, and the right to use force 
against other Muslims. This latter point is of particular importance for current battles of 
jihad, which are typically directed not only at external, non-Muslim enemies, but also at 
Muslim rulers and populations deemed “un-Islamic.” This will be discussed further 
below.  
Lastly, it is important to note that there is another option besides force for 
Muslims living under non-Islamic leadership, which is emigration or hijra. The example 
of hijra comes from the Prophet, who left Mecca with his followers in 622 CE and settled 
in Medina as a means of escaping the hostilities of those opposed to the message of the 
Qur’an, as previously mentioned. The hijra has been interpreted as an option for Muslims 
in the dar al harb. As will be discussed in the following section, jihad movements have 
called for hijra as a means of consolidating forces and resources for attack against the dar 
al harb.  
In addition to classical law—and more important for understanding modern 
examples of jihad—are scholarly interpretations of jihad in the post-classical period. In 
particular, the writings of Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328) have contributed to radical Islamic 
groups in the modern era including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Bin Laden. 36  
Taymiyya—who lived during the fall of the Abassid Dynasty to the Mongols and whose 
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36 In Bin Laden’s 1996 Fatwa in particular, quoted in Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Islam, translated by 
Anthony F. Roberts, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), pg. 317. For Taymiyya’s influence on 
radical Islamic groups in Egypt, see Peters, Jihad , chapter 5: “The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad: 
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family had to flee from Baghdad to Damascus—offered a revitalized call for jihad against 
internal and external threats to Islam. Taymiyya was a member of the Ulama and adhered 
to the Hanbali school of law in addition to practicing Islamic mysticism, Sufism. 
Taymiyya argued that faith and action were intrinsically bound in Islam as were religious, 
social and political power.  He called for the faith to return to its foundations—the 
Qur’an, the Sunna, and the examples of the Prophet and his companions in the “golden 
age” of Islam. 37 He exemplified the hijra of the early community as one means of 
protecting and purifying the Muslim community. In addition, Taymiyya was outspoken 
against the impiety of the Mongol rulers in the region who claimed to be Muslim but did 
not conform to many of its practices, particularly the implementation of Shari’a law. He 
issued several fatwas legitimating the use of force against the Mongols, despite the fact 
that they were Muslim; these fatwas set a precedent for future use of force of Muslims 
against other Muslims believed to be unfaithful in their practice of Islam.38 
Ibn Taymiyya’s interpretations of Islam and staunch call to protect the purity of 
the faith directly impacted Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), the founder of 
what has become known as Wahabbism. Like Taymiyya, Wahhab interpreted Islam 
through the Hanbali school of jurisprudence to argue that the decline in the Muslim world 
was due to Muslim leaders’ straying from the true path of Islam. He stressed the need for 
Islam to return to its basics—the oneness of God or tawhid, the Qur’an, the Sunna, and 
the example of the pious ancestors, al salaf al-salih, of the Golden Age of Islam—and to 
end reliance on the interpretations of previous scholars. He called for a return to pure 
Islam by waging war against resisters and non-believers—non-Muslims and Muslims 
                                                 
37 Peters, Jihad, chapter 5: “The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad: Ibn Taymiyya on Jihad,” pp. 43-
54; Esposito, Unholy War, pp. 45-46 
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alike—and by cleansing the faith from deviant innovations, including Sufism. 39 In order 
to realize these goals, Wahhab formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud, a local 
tribal chief in the Gulf region. Together they used each other’s resources to consolidate 
power, unite the tribes of Arabia, and pave the way for a future Saudi nation, which was 
formally declared in 1932.40 
The advent of European colonialism into the Muslim world brought western and 
Islamic ideals into direct contact. This confrontation produced two polarized camps 
within Islamic thought, which also led to different interpretations of jihad. The first group 
sought to accommodate western ideals into Islam; they viewed resources from the West 
not as incompatible with the faith but, rather, as tools that could prosper the tradition. 
This group included scholars such as Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) Muhammad 
Abduh (d. 1905) and Muhammad Iqbal (1875-1938) of South Asia; and Taha Hysayn 
(1889-1973) in Egypt.41 These scholars stressed the non-violent form of the Greater Jihad 
in an effort to curb the negative image of Islam in the West.42 These interpretations of 
jihad, while still referenced by contemporary scholars, have failed to impede the revival 
of the Lesser (violent) Jihad and those who argue its necessity for the modern-day 
survival of Islam.  
The second group that has offered up new legal interpretations of jihad is often 
referred to as “fundamentalists” but what this chapter will call Islamic “radicals.” This 
group includes the works of Egyptian Hasan al-Bana (1906-1949), the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and his protégée Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who authored numerous 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 46  
39 Esposito, Islam, pp. 117-118  
40 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 48; Esposito, Islam,  pp. 187-190 
41 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 77 
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books on the need for force in the Islamic revival, including Signposts.  Mawlana Abul 
Ala Mawdudi of India/Pakistan (1903-1979) is also one of the founders of the Islamic 
radical school of thought. He formed the Jamaat-i-Islamii in 1941, a political party that 
has shaped political and social life in Pakistan. His books have been translated and 
distributed throughout the world, including Towards an Understanding of Islam. Dr.Ali 
Shariati (1933-1977) of Iran was instrumental in fomenting the Iranian revo lution. He has 
written extensively on Jihad and Martyrization including his pamphlet Shahadat. Lastly, 
Hasan al-Turabi of Sudan (1932-), is an important person not only for the intellectual 
thought he has provided on radical Islam, but also on his creation of an Islamic state after 
a 1989 coup in Sudan, his organization and coordination of numerous radical Islamic 
groups, and his alliance with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, which will be discussed in the 
following section.  
These radicals, building on the ideas of Taymiyya and Wahhab, have called for a 
return of Islam to its pristine state at the time of the Prophet and his companions: 
stressing the oneness of God, and teaching from the Qur’an and the Sunna. They, 
therefore, often identify themselves as Salafiyya, referring to the pious ancestors and the 
Prophet. Unlike their predecessors, these thinkers—although highly educated—have not 
had formal theological training and are not members of the ulama. Hasan al Banna 
studied at Cairo’s Dar al-Ulum, a school designed to train teachers in “modern” (meaning 
western) thinking. 43 Mawdudi was a journalist.44 Sayyid Qutb also studied at Dar al-
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43 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 
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44 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 50 
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Ulum in addition to studying in the United States.45 Shariati received his doctorate in 
Sociology at the Sorbonne in Paris.46 And Hasan al-Turabi received his masters in law at 
the University of London and his PhD at the Sorbonne.47 Despite (or perhaps because of) 
their western educations, these scholars have been instrumental in interpreting Islam in a 
modern context. Most of them have advocated for a resurgence of violent jihad to protect 
and purify Islam both from corrupt Muslims within the faith and from external threats. 
Most of the current jihad movements throughout the world can be traced back to the 
writings and inspiration of these modern thinkers including Islamic violence in 
Palestine/Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, Pakistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia.   
Mystical dimensions of jihad 
The legal use of jihad is not the only means by which to mobilize Muslims to 
spread and defend the faith. In addition, there are mystical forms of jihad that exist 
outside the juridical world and are governed by different types of authority in Islam. 
Whereas, historically, the legal use of jihad has been debated and used primarily by the 
members of the Ulama, the mystical forms of jihad are pronounced by individuals 
recognized by their constituents as possessing a unique link with the divine. This mystical 
link between charismatic individuals and God has two manifestations: as the Mahdi, a 
messianic-type figure who is believed to appear before the end of time and bring justice 
to the world, often by force; and as the baraka, the blessing of God and the Prophet on 
individuals manifested in success on the battlefield.  
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Both Sunnis and Shias believe in the Mahdi. In Sunni Islam, the Mahdi is an 
individual who will rise up, often in the midst of calamity and great injustice, and restore 
order to society in preparation for the end of time.48 The Mahdi could be any Muslim and 
appear anywhere and at any time.49 In Twelver Shia Islam, the Mahdi is understood to be 
the hidden Imam who will return to restore justice and rule over the Muslim community 
as its one rightly guided leader. In this case, the Mahdi is believed to be the same Imam 
that went into hiding in 874 CE. As with the Sunni understanding of the Mahdi, this 
figure will “vindicate his loyal followers, restore the community to its rightful place, and 
usher in a perfect Islamic society in which truth and justice will prevail.”50   
The concept of the Mahdi is important for the topic of jihad because, first, the 
Mahdi is believed to come at times of particular hardship and injustice to Muslim 
communities. Therefore, military, economic, social, and political instability are the 
conditions under which Muslims may long for and expect the coming of the Mahdi. 
Second, with this expectation in mind, individuals claiming to be the Mahdi can harness 
these emotions to mobilize Muslims into helping to overthrow oppression, including by 
force. Historical examples of individuals claiming to be the Mahdi have risen up in 
precisely such circumstances and mobilized Muslims to attack their oppressors. These 
examples will be highlighted below. 
                                                                                                                                                 
47 Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America, (New York: Random House, 
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Mahdi is believed to be the one who will prepare the way for the end of time and the final judgment of 
humanity; in Christianity, Jesus is believed to be the one who brings the end of time and is the judge. 
Second, the Mahdi is an individual believed to be blessed by God; in Christianity, the Christ is God 
incarnate. Therefore the Mahdi is not a Messiah in the way that Christianity and Judaism understand the 
one who will bring the end of time.  
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The second mystical form of jihad is the baraka, or the blessing of God and the 
Prophet in earthly success, including success on the battlefield. Unlike the Mahdi—which 
usually claims to be the expected one, mobilizes forces, and then goes out into battle—
this form of mystical jihad is recognized post facto in a battle.51 Therefore, if a ruler or 
individual in Islam mobilizes followers, goes into battle and is successful, his or her 
success, especially if against great odds, can be a sign of God’s blessing on the individual 
and on their decision to use force. The concept of God’s baraka in battle is often linked 
to the Prophet’s return from Medina to Mecca where he and his followers, despite being 
outnumbered, defeated the Meccan army and returned to the city to triumphantly 
proclaim God’s message. In addition, the baraka is cited as an explanation for the rapid 
spread of Islam throughout the Gulf region and beyond in the first years of the faith. 52 
Conversely, for those who fail in battle, this can be an example of God’s disfavor with 
the leader and his decision to use force.  
Holy warriors in Islam and the doctrine of martyrization 
Within both the legal and mystical doctrines of Islam is the concept of holy 
warriors—individuals sanctioned by leaders or by God with the express purpose of 
fighting in battle. There are two terms associa ted with holy warriors in Islam: the ghazi 
and the mujahidin. Ghazi literally means “warrior for the faith.” Originally a word used 
to describe mercenaries that fought on the borders between the dar al Islam and 
neighboring empires, ghazis were organized by the Caliph al-Nasir into a Muslim 
fraternity in the 13th century, at which time the term took on special meaning as a holy 
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warrior.53  Ghazis were employed by the Ottoman Empire to expand the borders of the 
dar al Islam, battles that were called ghaza. In this use, therefore, a ghaza conforms to the 
classical understanding of offensive jihad. This term has largely died out with the demise 
of the Ottoman Empire.  
The second term for an Islamic holy warrior, the one in common usage today, is 
the Mujahid (singular, plural Mujahidin). Mujahid comes from the same root as 
mujaddid, one who renews the faith, and mujtahid, one who discerns (ijtihad) shari’a law 
based on his interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunna.54 Therefore a mujahid is one who 
struggles in the faith, expressly by force. Unlike Ghazi, the term Mujahid corresponds 
more with defensive jihad. It emerged after the fractioning of leadership within Sunni 
Islam and the disappearance of the Imam in Shia Islam.55 The term came into common 
usage first in India, during the 19th century jihads of resistance against British 
occupation. 56 In modern times, Muslim fighters from around the world used the term to 
describe participants in the Soviet-Afghan War. The term was also used in connection 
with the Iran-Iraq war. 57 Today, this is the term used to describe the now defunct 
Taliban, members of al-Qaeda, and various other Muslim fighters waging war in the 
name of Islam. It is this term, therefore, that is important for the following discussion on 
jihad in the 19th century and jihad today. 
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Both Ghazi and Mujahidin are believed to receive unique blessings from their 
death in battle to defend or spread Islam; this is the doctrine of martyrs for the faith or 
shuhada, which literally means witnesses. The doctrine stems from passages in the 
Qur’an, such as Sura 2: 154: “Say not of those who die in the path of God that they are 
dead. Nay rather they live.”58 The doctrine is also strongly informed by Hadith of the 
Prophet and the Sunna of the early Muslim community. 59  Martyrization is strong in both 
Sunni and Shia Islam. Sunni Islam looks to the example of the early Muslim community, 
particularly the battle-deaths that occurred in the return from Medina to Mecca, and the 
early wars of expansion in the first years of the faith. 60 Shias look to the history of their 
Imams, all of whom died violently except for the twelfth Imam, who has gone into hiding 
and is not dead. In particular the death of Husayn in the Battle of Karbala—son of Ali, 
grandson of the Prophet, and entitled sayyid al-shuhada, prince of martyrs—is 
exemplified in Shia Islam.61 It is generally believed throughout Islam that those who die 
in defense of the faith will be free of sin and thus pardoned from judgment in the final 
days, that they will go straight to paradise where they will occupy a special place, and 
even that they are allowed to return to earth to fight on behalf of the faith. 62 There are 
also popular beliefs that young men who die in battle will be greeted by 70 virgins and 70 
wives upon their arrival in Paradise.63  
                                                 
58 Quoted in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume 3, edited by John L. Esposito, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Also referenced are Suras 3:169-171; 9:20-22; 47:4; 61:11; 
3:157-158, pg. 55  
59 ibid 
60 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume 3, pg. 57 
61 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume 3, pg. 56  
62 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume 3, pp. 58-59 
63 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), pg. 78  
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The doctrine of martyrization in Islam has been identified as a key component for 
individuals willing to fight as mujahidin and to die for the faith today. In particular, 
Palestinian suicide bombers and those that carried out the September 11th attacks are 
believed to be motivated by the doctrine of martyrization. This type of death corresponds 
with the concept of “eternal salvation” outlined in chapter one. However, it is important 
to note—while no doubt critical for understanding Islamic holy war, holy warriors, and 
belligerence in defense of the faith—first, that the violent means of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda 
and other Islamic terrorists today are not exclusively directed towards attaining eternal 
salvation. In other words, these groups have earthly goals for which they are working and 
are equally important for explaining religious mobilization and the use of force. These 
earthly goals will be discussed in the next section.  
Second, it is important to note that the doctrine of martyrization in Islam is 
debated. There are interpretations of the doctrine that call for “spiritual” martyrization; it 
argues that Muslims who keep the tenets of the faith and strive in the greater jihad are the 
true martyrs, not those that die in battle. It is also argued that the true martyrs are those 
who suffer in daily physical struggles, such as starvation, poverty, and even women who 
die while giving birth. 64 Therefore, while martyrization is a powerful doctrine in Islam, it 
is not universally supported as death on the battlefield in defense of the faith. Third, it is 
also important to keep in mind that Islam is not the only religion that contains a doctrine 
of martyrization; this doctrine is present in all of the world’s major religious traditions, 
including Buddhism and Hinduism.  
Finally, it is important to state that suicide bombing and a glorious death on the 
battlefield are not exclusive to religion. Numerous secular groups have used suicide 
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bombing as a form of terrorism, including anarchists at the turn of the 19th century and 
current-day Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.65 Likewise, the 42 million soldiers who died in 
World War I on behalf of their nation were honored as heroes for their sacrifice. The 
same can be said of battle-deaths in most all nations’ wars. Therefore, a glorious death in 
battle—particularly for a just cause—is a powerful motivation for war both within and 
outside the realm of religion.   
Historical examples of jihad and mujahidin  
 Historical examples of jihad can be divided into three major waves: the initial 
spread of Islam through offensive jihad in the years immediately following the Prophet’s 
death; a surge of defensive jihad in the 19th century; and the current onslaught of jihads 
throughout the Muslim world, including Bin Laden’s international declaration of jihad 
against the US.  
As previously mentioned, there are few historical examples of offensive jihad as 
described in classical Islamic jurisprudence. The most common examples are those of the 
Prophet and his companions including, particularly, the community’s victorious return to 
Mecca in 630 CE. This success was followed by 23 years of rapid expansion immediately 
following the death of the Prophet, from 632 to 655 CE, including the defeat of 
Byzantine and Sasanian forces throughout the region, the conquest of Jerusalem, Cyprus, 
Armenia, Sicily, and forces in Egypt both by land and sea.66 After this initial phase of 
rapid expansion, the Muslim community fell into disagreement over leadership, 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume 3, pp. 57-58 
65 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 100-101 
66 For more details on the initial phase of Muslim expansion, see Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of 
Islam: The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 200-216  
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eventually leading to the fractioning of the ummah, which made the condition of 
offensive jihad under one ruler impossible.  
  In addition to this initial surge of offensive jihad in the 7th century CE, there are a 
few post-classical examples of offensive jihad that conform, in part, to the legal code. 
The frontier wars of the Turcoman principalities in the 13th century and the Ottoman 
Empire, beginning in the 14th century, were undertaken as holy wars to expand the 
borders of the dar al Islam. In particular, the leaders of the Ottoman Empire claimed to 
be engaging in holy wars of expansion under obligation to fulfill the command to spread 
the faith.  In doing so, the rulers argued that they were the sole true leaders of the ummah 
for fulfilling this obligation. These raids, however, were not performed once a year but 
rather on a continual basis, a digression from the classical norm.67 The Ottomans used the 
term ghaza instead of jihad, deriving the term from the holy warriors that carried out the 
battles, ghazi.68 This example of offensive jihad is, by and large, an outlier to general 
trends in the use of the doctrine, and therefore, will not be analyzed in the following 
section. 
 The second major wave of jihad began in the early 19th century and peaked 
around the 1880s. This era of jihad was defensive and mystical, often involving a leader 
who declared himself to be the Mahdi.  Examples include ‘Abd al-Rahman (1812) and 
Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi (1831) in India; Bu Ma’zah in Algeria (1839); Muhammad 
Ahmad in Sudan (1881); Ahmad Urabi in Egypt (1882); and Muhammad ibn Abd Allah 
in Somalia (late 1800s).69 In addition, jihad movements erupted in Indonesia in 1825-
1830 and again in Ache from 1873-1904; in Central Asia in the second half the 19th 
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century; in present day Iran (1826-1828, 1891); and in Morocco (1912).70 See Table 3.1 
for a list of 19th century jihads.  This wave of jihads will be analyzed in the next section. 
It is also important to note that there have been other incidences of defensive jihad 
throughout history. First, in general, the command for all Muslims to fight in defense of 
the faith as a spontaneous reaction to immediate threat has undoubtedly occurred. 
However, concrete examples of spontaneous responses to attacks are not well chronicled, 
making the analysis of these events difficult. Second, there are, however, historical 
examples of defensive jihad undertaken by the command of a leader; this is a new 
interpretation of jihad, combining both offensive norms—the leader’s call to fight—and 
defensive norms to fight in defense of land and faith, what this chapter calls organized 
defensive jihad. Beginning in the 12th century CE, Nur al-Din and Salah ed-Din called for 
jihad to take back land captured by Christian Crusader forces. Nur al-Din succeeded in 
recapturing Damascus in 1148, during the Second Crusade. Salah ed-Din reclaimed 
Jerusalem in 1187 and portions of Palestine.71  In both of these cases, leaders called for 
jihad to take back what was viewed as the dar al Islam. These cases will not be 
considered in this chapter but are included in the chapter on Jerusalem and the battle for 
sacred space.   
The third wave of jihads began in 1979 and continues to the present. This wave 
was initiated by the Iranian Revolution in January 1979, followed by the June seizure of 
the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia by Juhayman ibn-Muhammad ibn-Sayf al-Utaibi, who 
claimed to be the Mahdi. This turbulent events were followed by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in December of 1979, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the intensification of 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 42-103 
70 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 39-40; and Johnson, pp. 158-159 
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the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s, the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1994), a coup in 
Sudan and the instillation of Islamic law (1989), and then a string violent conflicts in the 
1990s involving Islam, chronicled on Table 3.2, including Osama Bin Laden’s 
declaration of jihad against the US in 1996 and Al Qaeda’s attack on the US in 2001. 
This third wave will also be analyzed in the following section.  
 In sum: There is not one set doctrine of jihad; rather there are legal and mystical 
forms of jihad, both of which are subject to interpretation. Jihad, as a legal doctrine, 
includes an offensive mode—annual raids on the dar al harb led by the ummah’s one 
Imam to expand the dar al Islam—and a defensive mode—the spontaneous uprising of 
all Muslims to defend land, faith and community. In addition to these legal forms, there 
are mystical dimensions of jihad including the Mahdi—the “expected one” who will end 
chaos and establish justice, often by force—and the baraka—the blessing of God and the 
Prophet in battlefield success. Historical examples of offensive jihad are confined mostly 
to the initial expansion of Islam in the 7th century CE. A variation of defensive jihad, 
organized defensive jihad, called by a ruler, occurred in reaction to the Crusades of the 
12th century. And examples of the mahdi calling for jihad are most prevalent during the 
19th century. 
Jihad in the 19th Century and Jihad Today 
 This section outlines two major waves of jihad: the outbreak of jihads in several 
regions in the 19th century, and the current surge of jihad in various parts of the world, 
beginning in 1979. Drawing on the causal argument from chapter two, this section will 
ask the following questions concerning these episodes of jihad: Is there an identifiable 
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threat or the perception of a threat to which the violent parties are responding? What are 
the resources available to the involved groups? And what is the relationship between 
political and religious leaders?  
1. Jihads of the 19th century 
Beginning around the turn of the 19th century, Muslim leaders from a variety of 
regions called for jihad and mobilized local Muslims for holy war; these violent conflicts 
are listed on Table 3.1. Why was jihad such a common occurrence across such a wide 
span of regions and cultures? Why at this time and not others? In order to answer these 
questions, this section will consider the threats to which these groups were responding, 
their goals, their leaders, their interpretation of beliefs and scripture, and the connection 
between religious and political elites.  
First and foremost, this wave of jihads, with few exceptions, was in reaction to the rising 
presence of colonial forces throughout the Muslim world. Historian Rudolph Peters 
notes: “In the initial stages of European expansion into the Islamic world, Moslems [sic] 
in many places forcefully resisted the new situation and appealed to the doctrine of jihad 
in order to mobilize the population, to justify the struggle and to define the enemy.”72  
Colonizing forces included the British in South Asia, Egypt, Palestine, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and current day Malaysia; the French in North Africa and the Levant; the Dutch 
in Indonesia; the Russians in Central Asia and current day Iran; and the Italians in 
Somalia and Ethiopia. Local Muslim leaders called for jihad against their colonizers in all 
of these regions, as illustrated in Table 3.1.  
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3.1, Jihads of the 19th Century  
Location Date Against Leader Mahdi 
Nigeria 1804-1810 Hausa Kingdoms Usman dan 
Fodio 
No 
Iran (Persia) 1804-1813 Russia Abbas Mirza No 
India 1810 British ‘Abd al-
Rahman 
Yes  
India 1818-1898 Sikhs, British Sayyid Ahmad 
of Barelwi 
Yes 
India 1820s-1883 British Titu Mir  No 
Indonesia 1821-1838 Dutch Iman Tjanku 
Bonjol 
No 
Indonesia 1825-1830 Dutch Dipo Negaro No 
Iran 1826-1828 Russia Fateh Ali Shah/ 
Ulama 
No 
Algeria 1832-1843 French ‘Abd al-Qadir No 
Algeria 1843-1847 French Bu-‘Ma’zah Yes 
Indonesia 
(Ache) 
1873-1904 Dutch Sultan Ibrahim 
Mansur 
No 
Sudan 1881-1885 Egyptians Muhammad 
Ahmad 
Yes 
Egypt 1882 British Ahmad ‘Urabi No 
Iran 1891 British/Shaw Ali Shiraz No 
Sudan 1898 Egyptians/British ‘Abd Allah ibn 
Muhammad al-
Ta’ayishi 
No 
Somalia 1899-1920 British/Italian Muhammad ibn 
‘Abd Allah 
Yes 
Libya 1911-1915 Italians Al-Sayyid 
Ahmad al-
Sharif 
No 
Morocco  1912 French El-Hiba No 
Libya 1923-1931 Italians  ‘Umar al-
Mukhtar 
No 
 
The goals of these jihadist movements were two fold. First, these leaders and their 
constituents called for defensive jihad to protect land, faith and community from 
occupying colonial forces. The advance of non-Muslims was understood as the dar al 
harb encroaching on the dar al Islam and, therefore, required action to repel the invasion. 
For example, the 19th century Indian Muslim scholar Shah ‘Ad al-‘Aziz declared all land 
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under British occupation in India to be part of the dar al harb. His declaration inspired 
Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi to call for a jihad against the British. 73 Second, these 
movements typically understood their current demise to be the result of corrupt Muslim 
rulers, particularly their failure to implement Shari’a law, as the reason for their 
weakness. They further argued that the success of European powers in conquering the dar 
al Islam was punishment from God for straying from the true path of Islam.74 Therefore a 
second goal of these movements was to establish Islamic leadership based on the 
example of the Prophet and his companions and reestablish Shari’a as the law of the dar 
al Islam.  These movements often referred to themselves as salafiyya, connecting their 
uprisings to the example laid out by the Prophet and his companions. 
The leaders of these jihad movements largely came from outside the Ulama. In 
particular, this era witnessed a rash of Muslims leaders claiming to be the Mahdi, the 
“expected one” destine to restore justice and order before the end of time. Mahdist 
movements include ‘Abd al-Rahman (1810) and Ahmad Shahid of Barelewi (1831) in 
India; Bu Ma’zah in Algeria (1839); Muhammad Ahmad in Sudan (1881); Ahmad Urabi 
in Egypt (1882); and Muhammad ibn Abd Allah in Somalia (1899).75 Historian Rudolph 
Peters notes that rash of Mahdis was probably due to two factors. First, the conditions for 
the coming of the Mahdi—corrupt and cruel leaders, the oppression of the masses, and 
difficult socio-economic conditions—were pervasive in most of these regions.  Egypt, 
Sudan and Libya all had undergone particularly difficult economic conditions and its 
                                                 
73 Paul Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972),  pg. 51; 
Esposito, Islam, pg. 123  
74 Esposito, Islam, pp. 123-124 
75 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 42-103 
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Arab citizens were subject to heavy taxation from their occupiers.76 Such conditions even 
led to famine in Sudan. 77 Therefore, the masses were most likely in desperate search for 
an end to injustice and divine intervention. Second, Peters also notes that the approaching 
Muslim Millennium, in 1882 (h. 1300), may also have increased popular expectations for 
the coming of the Mahdi and inspired the surge of self-proclaimed restorers of justice.78 
Jihadist leaders also emerged who did not declare themselves to be the Mahdi. This 
includes Titu Mir of India (1820s-1883); the uprisings against the Dutch in current day 
Indonesia; and the Persian uprisings against the Russians and the British, to name a few. 
See Table 3.1.   
Moreover, by and large, the Ulama in various countries did not support the 
jihadist movements but, rather, tried to work for reform within their new social and 
political environments. The Ulama achieved this process by writing and reasoning—the 
jihad of the pen—rather than through force. As previously mentioned, scholars such as 
Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), and Muhammad Iqbal 
(1875-1938) of South Asia; and Taha Hysayn (1889-1973) in Egypt all offered ways in 
which the Muslim world’s exposure to the West could actually benefit the faith instead of 
threaten it.79 In addition, members of the Ulama in 19th century Sudan, Egypt and India 
often sided with their colonial powers, condemning jihadist uprisings as unlawful. 80  
Therefore, generally speaking, the Ulama sought to work within the new political 
structure of colonialism rather than to declare war against it.  
                                                 
76 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 63-89 
77 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 64 
78 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pg. 65. The Muslim’s use a lunar calendar and thus its years are shorter 
than a solar year. 
79 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 77 
80 Peters, Islam and Colonialism, pp. 50-52, 67 
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Those leaders that did take up arms against the encroaching colonial presence 
used several religious doctrines and resources as a means of mobilization. First and 
foremost, they used the doctrine of jihad. However, their interpretations of jihad did not 
conform to the legal doctrine. Their interpretations of jihad were not offensive, which 
required the presence of the imam to declare raids on an annual basis. Nor were their 
interpretations purely defensive jihad either, which was supposed to be a spontaneous 
reaction to imminent threat. Moreover, these uprisings were directed against the Muslim 
authority, which is not the classical understanding of defensive jihad, although it has its 
historical precedents, most notably the writings ibn Taymiyya and ibn al-Wahhab. This 
form of jihad therefore—not unlike the holy wars of Nur al-Din and Salah ed-Din—was 
organized defensive jihad.   
Another key religious resource employed in this era, as mentioned above, was the 
belief in the Mahdi. Mahdist uprisings sparked some of the more successful campaigns in 
this era, including a jihad in Sudan, which succeeded in establishing an independent state 
from 1885-1899 and took British and Italian forces twenty years to put down. 81 In 
addition to the belief in the Mahdi, many of these leaders also called for hijra—the retreat 
of Muslims from the dar al harb with the goal of creating a nearby dar al Islam.  For 
example, Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi moved into the Northwester Frontiers of the Indian 
Subcontinent and declared war against the Sikhs with the goal of creating a dar al Islam 
free from British and corrupted Muslim influences.82  Likewise, ‘Abd al-Qadir carved out 
a sphere of influence in the Algerian hinterlands with the intent of maintaining the dar al 
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Islam in those areas.83 In addition, the hajj—the pilgrimage to Mecca—was an important 
point of contact for these various movements. The hajj draws Muslims from all across the 
ummah, offering an opportunity for Muslims from around the globe to share ideas and 
information about religious, social and political happenings.84 For example, it is believed 
that Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi drew inspiration for his hijra and jihad from his 1821 hajj 
to Mecca.85 
Despite the fact that most jihad leaders came from outside of the Muslim 
leadership, these movements still consulted the Ulama regarding the legality of their 
uprising and asked for fatwas. For example, the Algerian ‘Abde al-Qadir consulted 
scholars both within Algeria and abroad concerning his conduct of jihad against the 
French. In 1837, he wrote to the Moroccan al-Tusli to ask for a fatwa on the use of force 
against local tribes that refused to pay taxes to support the war effort.86 He also consulted 
several scholars on whether or not Muslims under French rule in Algeria were required to 
emigrate, receiving fatwas from Egyptian and Turkish members of the Ulama.87 
Likewise, Muhammad Ali of the Sudan wrote to various Muslim leaders throughout the 
region asking them to accept his authority as the Mahdi. 88 Therefore, despite jihad leaders 
coming largely from outside the trained clerisy, these movements still consulted the 
Ulama and other Muslim leaders for legal advice and recognition. 
Overall, despite their success in mobilizing Muslims against their occupiers, these 
jihad movements lacked critical material resources to prosper their causes. The greatest 
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material resources these movements had were the organizations they formed and the men 
they mobilized. The Egyptian Ahmad ‘Urabi raised 25,000 troops to challenge the British 
in 1882.89 Likewise, a few campaigns did enjoy a period of success in fending off foreign 
forces. For example, Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi’s organization, the Path of Muhammad, 
existed for nearly a century before the British were finally able to squash its last remnants 
in the Northwestern Frontier in India.90  As previously mentioned, the jihad in Sudan 
resulted in the formation of an independent state from 1885-1899. Likewise, the Libyan 
jihad defeated Italian forces in 1915. The final destruction of the Somali jihad in 1920 
required the combined efforts of the Italians and the British. In addition to organizations 
and manpower, some movements attempted to accrue financial assets from other regions, 
including Sayyid Ahmad’s jihad in India and ‘Urabi’s jihad in Egypt.91 However, overall, 
the greatest material resources that these movements had were manpower and the 
organizations these groups formed, not the material resources they attempted to solicit. 
It is also worth noting that despite the emergence of so many jihad movements 
during this time and that they were likely conscious of one another—either through 
contact from the hajj or through correspondence and solicitations for money and legal 
advice—these movements could not join forces to create a trans-regional force against 
their occupiers. Even in neighboring countries, such as Morocco and Algeria, jihad 
movements did not join forces against common enemies. This is most likely due to two 
factors. First, these movements did not have access to rapid sources of communication 
that could have facilitated cooperation; they had to rely on correspondence by post and 
meetings at Mecca. This undoubtedly slowed the process of coordinating efforts of 
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leaders and their jihads across the ummah. Second, these movements were also largely 
personality driven and organized around a charismatic figure. This likely hindered 
cooperation in regions that experienced multiple uprisings, such as India, Algeria, Egypt 
and Morocco. In the last case, the Moroccan Sultan ‘Abd al-Rahman handed over the 
Algerian jihadist ‘Abd al-Qadir—who was seeking refuge in Morroco—to the French in 
1846.92 Therefore, despite jihadist uprisings across the ummah in the 19th century, these 
movements did not join forces.  
Likewise, it is equally important to note that Muslim religious and political elites 
did not join forces with the jihad movements, hindering these movements’ success. As 
previously mentioned, most of these movements were equally critical of their European 
colonial occupiers as they were of their Muslim religious and political elites. The 
jihadists’ goals were not only to expel colonial powers but also to depose Muslim leaders 
believed to be corrupt.  Therefore the jihadists, the Ulama and Muslim political and 
intellectual elites were not united against the common threat of colonial occupation. This 
lack of unity most likely affected the success of these movements.  
Virtually all of the 19th century jihadist uprisings across the ummah ended with 
colonial military power eliminating the movements’ leaders and most of their 
constituents. Although this took time—particularly in India, the Sudan, Somalia, and 
Libya—the end of these jihads occurred through force. However, this method of 
suppression was not exclusive to religious uprisings but to most all uprisings against 
colonial power in general. Therefore, the side with the greater resources prevailed. 
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2. Jihads today 
In November 1979, a Saudi named al-Utaibi—claiming to be the Mahdi—
organized a group of around 1,300 to 1,500 mujahidin from several countries and 
stormed the Grand Mosque, holding around 6,000 pilgrims on hajj hostage. He and his 
followers demanded the resignation of the Saudi royal family, which they perceived as 
corrupt and failing to uphold the tenets of Islam. The Saudi military, aided by French 
Special Forces, engaged in a two-week long siege of the mosque before finally squashing 
the uprising and executing the leaders of the movement.93 This event was the beginning 
in what has become a surge of jihadist movements around the globe. Muslim leaders 
from a variety of regions have called for jihad in defense of the dar al Islam; these jihads 
are listed in Table 3.2. Why has jihad become such a common occurrence across such as 
wide span of regions and cultures? Why now? In order to answer these questions, this 
section will consider recent historical events that have led up to this current outbreak of 
jihads, the threats to which these groups are responding, their goals, their leaders, their 
use of religious and other resources, and the connection between religious and political 
elites. 
In order to understand this current proliferation of jihads from around the world, it 
is important to outline three historical events that help shape religious, social and political 
dynamics within the Muslim world in general, and the Arab world in particular. First, the 
1967 Six-Day War is important for understanding this current wave of jihads. The 
stunning victory of Israel in a three-front war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria humiliated 
these states and their governments. All three of these countries had attempted to 
modernize their societies by embracing secular governments and nationalism based on a 
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3.2, Major Jihads of the 20th and 21st Centuries  
Location Group Date Against Leader(s) Constituents 
Saudi Arabia Group not 
named 
Nov., 1979 Saudi regime al-Utaubi Saudi, Egyptian, 
Kuwaiti, Sudanese, 
Iraqi, Yemeni 
Afghanistan Mujahidin  
(7 factions) 
1979-1989 Soviet Union Massoud, Azzam, 
Bin Laden, 
Zawahiri, 
Hekmatiyar 
Afghani, Pakistani, 
Saudi, Yemeni, 
Algerian 
Iran State 1980-1988 Iraq Iranian Government Iranians 
Iran None 1989-2000 Salman Rushdie Ayatollah Khomeni Global 
Trans-
national 
International 
Islamic 
Front for 
Jihad against 
the US and 
Israel 
1996, 1998- US, Israel Bin Laden, Zawahiri Global 
Egypt Islamic 
Jihad 
~1978— Egyptian Government al-Zamour 
 
Egyptian 
Egypt Gamaat al- 
Islamiyya 
~1982— Egyptian Gov., US Rahman Egyptian 
Lebanon  Hizballah 1982— Israel Nasrallah, Fadlallah Shia Lebanese 
Gaza/West 
Bank 
Islamic 
Jihad 
1980s— Israel Shiqaqi, ‘Awda Palestinian 
Gaza/West 
Bank 
Hamas 1987— Israel Yassin, Rantisi  Palestinian 
Algeria GIA 1990-1998 Algerian Gov., 
France 
Zitouni Algerian 
Kashmir Lashkar-e-
Toiba 
1993— India/ US Muntazir Kashmiri, Pakistani, 
Arab 
Kashmir Jaish-e-
Muhammad 
2000— India/ US Massod Azhar Kashmiri, Pakistani, 
Arabs 
Uzbekistan UMI mid-1990s- Uzbek Gov., 
communists 
Namangani (d. Nov. 
2001) 
Uzbekistani, 
Tajikistani, 
Kyrgyzstani, 
Chechen, Pakistani 
Chechnya Chechen 
Rebels  
1994— Russia  Khattab (Saudi) (d. 
2002) 
Chechen, Arab 
Philippines Abu Sayyaf 
Group 
1989— Philippine Gov. 
Christians 
Janjalini  (d. 1998) Filipino, possibly 
Arab 
Philippines Moro 
Islamic 
Liberation 
Front 
1997— Philippine Gov. Hashim Salamat Filipino, possibly 
Arab 
Indonesia Lashkar 
Jihad 
2000— Moluccan Christians Thalib Indonesian 
Malaysia Jemaah 
Islamiyya 
Early 1990s Secularism, US Ba’aysir, Isamuddin Malay, Filipino, 
Indonesian 
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pan-Arab identity. 94 The Six-Day War demonstrated that both of these tools of 
modernization had failed. Islamic revivalists cast the humiliating defeat in religious 
terms; it was a sign that these nations’ secular leaders had turned from the path of God 
and only the overthrow of these regimes and the return to Islam could save them.95 This 
catastrophic event, therefore, became the cornerstone for revivalist Islam, the call to 
return Islam to central positions within society and government.  
It is also important to note that in the Six-Day War, Israel—in addition to seizing 
the West Bank, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula—successfully captured and held the 
Old City of Jerusalem, which hosts the compound of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount 
(here forward the Compound). The Compound, which is sacred to both Jews and 
Muslims, contains the Dome of the Rock Shrine and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third most 
holy site in Islam. The capture of these sites was both humiliating and threatening to 
Muslims across the ummah, prompting the call by some to rise up in defense of these 
sites.96 Moreover, the 1967 Six-Day war also placed roughly three million Palestinians 
under Israeli military occupation. The conditions of the occupation and the fate of the 
Palestinians, the overwhelming majority of whom are Muslim, have become an 
                                                 
94 Esposito, Islamic Threat, pp. 70-73, 76; Meir Hatima, Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic 
Jihad Movement, (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 2002) pg. 
17 
95 It is  important to acknowledge that Israel’s success in the Six-Day War also inspired Jewish radicalism, 
including Jewish terrorism, for the opposite reasons. Fueled by Israel’s stunning victory, radical settler 
movements, like Gush Emunim, moved into the newly acquired territories in the West Bank, citing 
religious obligation to hold the land as justification, see Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, The Glory 
and the Power: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World, (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1992), 
Chapter Three: “Gush Emunim and a Fundamentalism of the Land,” pp. 89-128. 
96 Examples of current-day groups that call for violently defending Jerusalem include the Lebanese 
Hizbollah, Egyptian groups, and the Palestinian Hamas, to name a few. For the Lebanese Hizbollah, see 
Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, (London: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 49-51; for Egyptian terrorist movements, see Esposito, The Islamic Threat, pg. 
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emotional topic for the worldwide Muslim community and, as will be described, one of 
Bin Laden’s main grievances.  
The second key historical event to precipitate the current rise of global jihad 
movements was the 1973 “Yom Kippur/Ramadan” War and the oil embargo to the West. 
The 1973 attack of Egypt and Syria against Israel—although ultimately a failure in 
defeating Israel and recapturing land from the 1967 War—still managed to surprise and 
inflict suffering on the Israeli military. It therefore was regarded as a success to many in 
the Muslim world, an example that the Arabs could fight back.97  The 1973 OPEC oil 
embargo against the West, in retaliation to US military support to Israel, heightened that 
sense of empowerment. It demonstrated both to the Arabs and the Muslim world, as well 
as to the West, that peoples of the former European colonies had regained some of their 
strength and could also exert pressure on the powerful states in the West, particularly the 
US.  
Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the newfound strength of oil states 
through OPEC also brought financial prosperity to Muslim nations in the Persian Gulf 
region. This boom in revenue has become an influential resource for the Gulf States. 
Saudi Arabia, in particular, has devoted portions of its wealth to international Islamic 
organizations primarily geared towards providing social services to Muslims around the 
globe. Along with financial aid, the Saudi government has exported its particular brand of 
Islam, Wahabbism, which is believed to be influencing violent Islamic movements 
throughout the Muslim world.  
The third key historical event that helped to foment jihad movements was the 
January 1979 Iranian Revolution. Although primarily a Twelver Shia country, the success 
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of the radical Iranian clergy in leading a revolution that overthrew the corrupt, secular 
regime of the Shaw resonated throughout the ummah.  Like the 1973 war and the oil 
embargo, the revolution stood as a symbol of empowerment for Muslims everywhere, 
especially Muslims that felt under the thumb of western influence and domination. The 
revolution demonstrated that Muslims could shake off the powers of the West and find 
their own authenticity in politics and identity. 98 
 The creation of the first modern-day Islamic government also has offered a 
template for others aspiring to create an Islamic state. Although the Twelver Shia state 
has components that are unique to this particular branch of Islam—most notably 
differences in understandings of religious and political leadership, as previously 
mentioned—it nevertheless has made tangible the concept of the Islamic state.  In 
addition, Iran—emblazoned with religious zeal—has sought to export its own brand of 
Islamic revivalism abroad. This has included sending aid—money, military equipment 
and training—to Shii and Sunnis alike outside its borders.99 Iran’s attempt to export its 
particular interpretation of Islam has been countered and possibly checked by Saudi 
Arabia’s efforts to spread its own interpretation of Islam abroad through schools, 
hospitals, and other social services.100 This ideological spiraling has accelerated the 
spread of radical forms of Islam, which will be addressed further below.  
 These three events helped pave the way for a resurgence of jihadist movements. 
Key movements includes, first and foremost, the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) and the 
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international call for Muslims to fight and defend Afghan land and people; the Iran-Iraq 
War (1980-1988); the intensification of the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s and the 
creation of the Hizbollah; the first Palestinian Intifada (1987-1994) and the emergence of 
Hamas. These events were followed by a string of violent conflicts in the 1990s—
declared by some to be holy wars—including conflicts in Kashmir, Egypt, Algeria, 
Chechnya, the Philippines, Central Asia, and Indonesia, chronicled on Table 3.2. This 
wave of jihad includes Osama Bin Laden’s declaration of jihad against the US in 1996 
and Al Qaeda’s attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon in 2001. 
 Like the wave of jihads in the 19th century, this current wave is largely in 
response to perceived or actual domestic and international threats.  These twin threats 
have called for a two-front war against domestic and international adversaries.  First, 
many of these movements have formed in response to what they perceive to be impious 
and corrupt domestic leaders. Countries that have attempted to implement secular 
agendas—such as Egypt, Pakistan, India, Sudan, Syria, Palestine and Iran—all witnessed 
the emergence of radical Islamic groups who named secularism as a threat to the faith. 
For example, a key Egyptian activist, Abd al-Salaman Faraj, called for Muslims to 
violently defend the faith against the Sadat regime in his booklet The Neglected Duty, 
circulated in the late 1970s. In it, he argued that Jihad was the forgotten duty of Muslims 
and that force was not only necessary but also required for all Muslims to defend and 
purify the faith from the threat of secularism. This interpretation of the faith inspired the 
Islamic Jihad to assassinate Sadat in 1981; Faraj was executed in connection with the 
assassination. 101   
                                                 
101 His name is also transliterated as al-Farag, see Juergensmeyer, pp. 81-82; Esposito, Islamic Threat, pg. 
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Likewise, jihadist groups have emerged in reaction to monarchies that they 
perceive to be religiously and politically corrupt. For example, the 1979 storming of the 
Grand Mosque was in reaction to the practices of the Saudi monarchy and the threats it 
posed as the custodians of Islam’s most sacred sites. Osama Bin Laden also has been 
critical of the Saudi monarchy, which he perceives as failing to practice “true” Islam. In 
particular, he cites the monarchy’s alliance with the United States as particularly 
threatening to the sanctity of the holy sites in Saudi Arabia.102 He thus has called for the 
overthrow of the Saudi regime in order to ensure the safety of these sites and the 
reinstitution of “right” Islamic practices.  
Second, many of these groups are reacting to international threats that they 
believe require force in order to defend the faith.  Several jihadist groups have named the 
US in particular as an international threat for its support of regimes perceived as corrupt 
and threatening. This includes groups in Egypt such as Islamic Jihad and Gamaat 
Islamiyya, which have called for jihad against the US because of its financial, military 
and political support of the Egyptian government. Bin Laden also has criticized the US 
on this score. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, Bin Laden called for a boycott of 
US goods as a means of protesting their presence on Saudi soil and their support of Israel: 
American companies make millions in the Arab world with which they pay taxes 
to their government. The United States uses that money to send $3 billion a year 
to Israel, which it uses to kill Palestinians…When we buy American goods we are 
accomplices in the murder of Palestinians.103  
 
Thus, these jihadist movements are responding to both domestic and international threats. 
Directly related to the threats these groups perceive are the goals for which they 
are striving. First, most groups are calling for the overthrow of secular regimes in the 
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Muslim world and the instillation of rightly guided leaders that will implement Shari’a 
law; this is, at its core, the definition of the dar al Islam.  Moreover, many of these 
groups are calling for the recreation of the Caliphate, one rightly guided leader to rule 
over the entire dar al Islam. In addition, most of these groups are attempting to push the 
dar al harb out of lands and region that they understand to be inherently belonging to 
Islam. This includes, most importantly, removing foreign elements from Saudi Arabia 
and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina but also Jerusalem and other regions where 
Islam has had a history and Islamic sacred sites exist. 
Bin Laden in particular has named several specific goals for which he is declaring 
jihad. First, as mentioned above, he is fighting for the removal of US troops from Saudi 
soil. He and his supporters believe that the presence of non-Muslim troops is polluting 
the two most sacred sites in Islam, the Kaba in Mecca and the Prophet’s tomb in Medina. 
Second, Bin Laden is calling for the overthrow of the Saudi regime, which he believes is 
religiously corrupt.  Third, Bin Laden has taken very seriously the plight of the 
Palestinians, calling for an end to Israeli occupation and oppression, in addition to the 
suffering of the Iraqi people under the decade- long UN sanctions, headed by the US. 
Fourth, in order to achieve these goals—remove US troops from Saudi soil, overthrow 
the Saudi regime, defeat Israel, and end sanctions in Iraq—the United States must be 
attacked, humiliated, made to suffer, and beaten out of the Muslim world. More broadly, 
he aims to remove threats that face the worldwide Muslim community: corrupt 
leadership, foreign troops on Muslim soil, and the oppression of Muslims.  
Similar to the 19th century wave of jihadist movements described in the previous 
section, most of the leaders of these radical Islamic groups come from outside the Ulama. 
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Examples include Gulbaddin Hekmatiyar, the Afghani leader of the Hizb-i-Islami;104 Dr. 
Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the leader of Hamas;105 Djamel Zitouni, the leader of the Algierian 
GIA;106 Khattab, the leader of Chechen rebels;107 and Bin Laden and Zawahiri, the 
leaders of Al Qaeda.108 Almost all come from educated backgrounds but have not been 
trained in theology or Islamic jurisprudence. Also like the 19th century wave of jihadists, 
these movements have sought support from members of the Ulama. Trained scholars that 
have backed these movements include the late Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, former partner to 
Bin Laden during the Soviet-Afghani war; Skeikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of the 
Lebanese Hizbollah; Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas; and Sheikh Omar 
Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of the Egyptian Gammat. These men all have had 
religious training and, by traditional standards, are religious scholars.109    
 These movements have interpreted several religious beliefs and doctrines to 
support their violent campaigns against domestic and international foes. Most all groups 
have referred to their actions as jihad and their constituents as either mujahidin or as 
jihadis. Similar to the 19th century jihads, these groups have defined their actions in terms 
of defense, calling for all Muslims to rise up and fight “infidels” to protect the faith. For 
example, in his 1998 fatwa, Bin Laden states: 
The Arabian Peninsula has never—since Allah made it flat, created its desert, and 
encircled it with seas—been stormed by any forces like the crusader armies 
spreading in it like locust, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations. All this 
is happening at a time in which nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting 
over a plate of food…All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a 
clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger [the Prophet], and Muslims. And 
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ulema [sic] have throughout Islamic history unanimously agreed that the jihad is 
an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim countries.110 
 
These calls for jihad do not comply with the classical doctrine of offensive jihad or to the 
spontaneous imperative to defend Muslim land and faith. As with the 19th century jihads, 
these calls correspond more to the organized defensive jihads of Nur al-Din and Salah ed-
Din, historical examples that Bin Laden in particular refers to in his fatwas.111     
Similar to the 19th century jihads, these groups have also used fatwas to gain 
legitimacy for their violent actions. For example, initially Bin Laden consulted with 
religious clerics in Saudi Arabia to attain fatwas to condemn the presence of non-Muslim 
troops on its soil.112 However, beginning in 1996, Bin Laden himself began to issue his 
own fatwas, calling for the killing of Americans and jihad against the United States. 113 
Also like the previous wave, this round of jihads has benefited from the contacts made 
through the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Hajj.  For example, Bin Laden’s family hosted 
high-profile pilgrims in their Meccan home during his youth, including Afghan leaders. 
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Laden used these contacts to meet with key 
members in the Afghan resistance and eventually establish organizations geared at 
recruiting and training mujihidin for the Afghan cause.114  
Another key religious resource used by most of these groups is the doctrine of 
martyrization, or shuhadah. This doctrine has been particularly visible in the Palestinian 
suicide bombings against Israel, a key component of the second uprising, the “al-Aqsa 
                                                 
110 Osama Bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” World Islamic Front Statement, February 23, 
1998, taken from the Federation of American Scientists’ website, http://www.fas.org, downloaded on 
6/27/2002. 
111 Bodansky, pg. 185 
112 Kepel, pg. 316. The Saudis succeeded in gaining fatwas from high-ranking members of the Ulama in 
Saudi Arabia allowing for the presence of US troops. See Bodansky, pg. 30 
113 Kepel, pg. 317; and Bergen, pg. 30 
114 Bergen, pp. 50-51; Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 10 
 198 
 
 
Intifada,” which began in September 2000. Martyrization also undoubtedly played a role 
in motivating the 19 hijackers on September 11th.  It is commonly cited that groups like 
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad profess that those who give their lives in the 
jihad against Israel will die a martyr’s death; they will go straight to heaven where they 
will be greeted by virgins and a host of celestial delights.  It is important to reiterate, 
however, that martyrization—while now commonly associated with Islamic terrorist 
groups—also has secular counterparts including nationalist ideologies, Marxism, and 
Anarchism, as previously mentioned. It is also important to restate that these movements 
have earthly goals for which they are working such as the end of Israeli occupation, the 
creating of Islamic governments, and the withdrawal of US troops from Saudi soil, as 
previously mentioned. Therefore, these groups are motivated both by earthly and eternal 
salvation.  
Unlike the surge of organized defensive jihad in the 19th century, this wave has 
only had one leader claiming to be the Mahdi, al-Utaubi, who stormed the Grand Mosque 
in 1979. It is worth noting that despite the success of many of these leaders—both locally 
and globally—and despite the fact that they are claiming to bring justice back to the 
world by purging it of its evil elements, none of these leaders has claimed to be the 
Mahdi. Not even Bin Laden, with his international notoriety as the “Man Who Declared 
War on America” has assumed this title.115 This suggests that this current wave of Jihad 
is less mystical in nature than its 19th century counterpart. 
However, the baraka of God and the Prophets has played a critical role in 
validating the current wave of jihads, particularly for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Bin 
Laden’s battlefield successes in Afghanistan, particularly the 1986 battle of Jalalabad, 
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earned him the reputation as courageous and blessed by God.116 A mujahidin that served 
under Bin Laden is quoted as saying, “He not only gave his money, but he also gave 
himself. He came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants and the Arab 
fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug trenches with them. That was bin 
Laden’s way.”117 Bin Laden’s reputation as an individual not afraid to take action on 
God’s behalf earned him the honorary religious title Sheikh and his successes have been 
interpreted as God’s baraka.118 Moreover, Bin laden himself has attributed the battlefield 
success of Al Qaeda to the baraka of God. In his October 7, 2001 statement following the 
September 11th attacks on the US, Bin Laden claimed: “God Almighty hit the United 
States at its most vulnerable spot. He destroyed its greatest buildings. Praise be to 
God.”119  Therefore, the baraka of God on the battlefield has been an important 
validation for modern day jihadist groups, particularly Bin Laden. 
However, what really distinguishes this current wave of jihad from its predecessor 
are not the interpretations of religious beliefs and texts for jihad but, rather, the resources 
available to these groups. First, these groups have profited from well- trained leaders. 
Despite the fact that most leaders are not trained as religious scholars they, nevertheless, 
are usually highly educated with professional experience. Bin Laden holds degrees in 
public administration and economics. He also has had experience running portions of his 
family’s multi-billion-dollar business.120 Zawahiri was trained as a surgeon and put these 
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skills to use treating Afghan refugees during the Soviet-Afghan war.121 Al Turabi holds a 
master’s degree in law from the University of London and a PhD from the Sorbonne in 
Paris.122 Furthermore, in addition to being highly educated, many of these leaders are 
trained battle-hardened mujihidin from the Soviet-Afghan War. This includes Bin Laden, 
Zawahiri, the Saudi-born Chechen leader Khattab and, by some counts, thousands of 
soldiers that returned from Afghanistan to their homes throughout the ummah.123 
Therefore, this current wave of jihads is punctuated by educated, highly trained leaders 
and individuals.  
This degree of knowledge and training has helped create resilient, efficient, and 
effective organizations, this is especially true of Al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, Sheikh 
Azzam and Bin Laden founded a safehouse and training center for incoming mujihidin, 
the Beit Al-Ansar.124 This developed into the first military training camp, Ma’sadat Al-
Ansar.125 In 1984, Bin Laden and Azzam founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), 
which sought to recruit individuals with specialized training to aid in the war, in addition 
to keeping records on international mujihidin that came through the training camps.126 
This organization evolved into Al Qaeda in 1986, the base, or the data base, as Gilles 
Kepel translates it.127 These organizations turned the recruitment and training for jihad 
into what Bin Laden scholar Peter Bergen dubs “Holy War, Inc.,” a multi-national jihad 
corporation, headquartered in Peshawar.128 
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These organizations persisted beyond the end of the Soviet-Afghan War in 1989. 
Leaders of the Afghan campaign, particularly Zawahiri and Bin Laden, did not see the 
threat against Islam subsiding with the end of the war but, rather, the emergence of new 
battles threatening Muslim land and people including conflicts in Palestine, Algeria, 
Kashmir, Bosnia, and Chechnya. Therefore—with Azzam now dead from a car bomb in 
1989—Bin Laden and Zawahiri continued to mobilize, recruit and train mujahidin from 
all over the Muslim world with the aim of perpetuating the struggle to reestablish and 
preserve the dar al Islam. It was during the 1990s that a variety of regional and 
international organizations partially or wholly committed to jihad emerged. This included 
a proliferation of Islamic charities and coordinating bodies—organized largely with the 
help of Hasan al-Turabi, Islamic leader of the Sudan—who had granted Bin Laden and 
Zawahiri refuge in his country until 1996. See Table 3.3 for a list of international Islamic 
organizations.129  
Another key resource that has aided the current wave of jihadist groups is “safe 
havens,” countries that have allowed these groups to base their operations within their 
borders. Despite US rhetoric and policies after September 11th, Afghanistan was not the 
only safe haven for Bin Laden and his cohorts; rather, much of Al Qaeda’s operational 
success and ideological evolution came from its years based in Sudan. Bin Laden scholar 
Bodansky states: “Under Turabi [in Sudan], the Armed Islamic Movement played a 
major role in the consolidated emergence of a genuine international terrorist training and 
deployment system.”130  While in Sudan, Bin Laden and Zawahiri worked with Turabi to  
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 3.3, Major International Islamic Organizations  
Group Founded Founder/Leader Function 
International 
Muslim 
Brotherhood (IMB) 
1930s Al-Banna Spread the ideology of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Support 
existing chapters 
World Islamic/ 
Muslim League 
1962 Saudi Arabia Spread Wahabbism. Finance 
mosques, schools, hospitals, 
clinics, libraries 
Islamic Charter 
Front (ICF) 
mid-
1960s 
Al-Turabi International coalition of radical 
Islamic individuals and groups 
Organization of the 
Islamic Conference 
(OIC) 
1969 Saudi Arabia Promote Islamic solidarity. Safe-
guard Holy Sites. Support 
Palestinian Struggle 
Islamic 
Development Bank 
1970 OIC Promote Islamic banking. Finance 
development projects 
Human Concern 
International 
Society 
1982 Afghanistan 
(HQ in 
Stockholm) 
Funnel charity to Afghani 
refugees. Later to wars involving 
Muslims 
Maktab al-Khidamat 
(MAK) 
1984 Bin Laden and 
Azzam 
Recruit radical Muslims for the 
jihad in Afghanistan 
Al Qaeda 1986 Bin Laden and 
Azzam 
Recruit radical Muslims. Create a 
database of Muslims that have 
received training in camps 
World Assembly of 
Muslim Youth 
1975 Saudi Arabia Expose Muslim youth to 
Wahabbism 
International Islamic 
Relief Organization 
1978 Saudi Arabia Provide service to refugees. 
Believed to fund terrorists 
Islamist 
International 
1991 Al-Turabi  Umbrella organization for various 
jihadist organizations. Recruit and 
send jihadists around the globe. 
Armed Islamic 
Movement (AIM)/ 
International Legion 
of Islam 
Early 
1990s 
Islamist 
International 
Militant arm of the Islamist 
International comprised mostly of 
vets from the Afghan war 
Popular 
International 
Organization 
1991 Al-Turabi Unify Sunni Islam to challenge 
the threat from the West. Hold 
international conferences 
Advice and Reform 
Committee 
1994 Bin Laden 
(HQ London) 
Criticize the Saudi regime for its 
alliance with the US 
 
mobilize radical Islamic leaders from around the globe for jihad against the US. They 
argued that the Gulf War had shown US intentions to destroy the Muslim world and 
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prop-up corrupt regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Pakistan. The only solution 
to this threat was to attack the US, the source of the problem. 131 To mobilize for jihad 
against the US, Bin Laden, Turabi, and Zawahiri organized umbrella organizations, held 
conferences, met with state officials from Iran and Iraq, established publications, and 
opened up satellite offices in London and other cities in the West.132 Bin Laden also 
moved his corporation to Sudan, built up Sudan’s infrastructure with his construction 
business, and helped to route money for international jihad through his various financial 
channels. 133 Bin Laden and Zawahiri were deported from Sudan in 1996 after increasing 
US pressure on the Sudanese government; both returned to Afghanistan, their next safe 
haven, to resume the international Jihad. 
In addition to Sudan and Afghanistan, key safe havens have been provided by 
open societies in the West. This is true not only of Al Qaeda, but also of other groups 
such as Hamas, the GIA and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in addition to non-Islamic groups 
such as the Tamil LTTE. London, in particular, has hosted numerous terrorist and jihadist 
organizations. This includes the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Gammat and the Vanguard of 
the Conquest, a faction within Islamic Jihad; Bin Laden’s Advice and Reform 
Committee; Turabi’s International Muslim Brotherhood; the jihadist website azzam.com, 
and the Arab publications Al Hayat and Al Quds al Arabi.134 Islamic terrorist scholar 
Gilles Kepel claims that the proliferation of terrorist organizations in London was no 
accident but, rather: “In return for its hospitality, the militants declared Britain a 
sanctuary: no act of terrorism was committed there, and the refugee activists made no 
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attempt to stir up the young Indo-Pakistanis…”135 In addition, groups such as the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gammat, the Algerian GIS and FIS, and former mujahidin 
from Afghanistan sought refuge in Stockholm and Copenhagen. 136 Likewise, the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gamma also set up bases in New York, particularly around 
the Al-Farooq mosque in New Jersey where Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was imam.137 
Safe havens for these groups, therefore, exist not only in failed states like Sudan and 
Afghanistan but also in thriving western industrial democracies. 
These jihadist groups have also made good use of communications technologies 
to mobilize for holy war. Most all jihad organizations have websites today including the 
Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al 
Qaeda. Al Qaeda has used CD-roms and videotapes to recruit members, which Bergen 
states “is a graphic demonstration of how bin Laden [sic] and his followers have 
exploited twenty-first-century communications and weapons technology in the service of 
the most extreme, retrograde reading of ho ly war.”138  Furthermore, these groups have 
used fax machines, cell phones, encrypted emails, and satellites to spread their messages 
and mobilize for jihad.139 These groups have also established media outlets and created 
mass publications such as Al-Ansar and the Lebanese Hizbollah’s Al-Manar. In addition 
to creating their own media sources, these movements have profited from high exposure 
in international media outlets, using corporations such as CNN, BBC, Time, and 
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Newsweek to broadcast their grievances and spread the call for jihad against the US.140 
Various groups have also profited from rapid transportation, particularly airlines that 
have allowed their members to travel quickly around the globe. This technology is totally 
new and distinct from the past wave of jihad.  
Lastly, these organizations have prospered from financial assets. First, although 
difficult to prove, it is generally believed that many of these groups have received money 
and other material aid from states. Iran is reputed as a key sponsor of radical Islamic 
groups, both Sunni and Shii. Bodansky names an alliance between Iran and Sudan’s al-
Turabi as critical for developing Al Qaeda’s capacity as a jihad organization. 141  
Likewise, Iran is believed to finance Hamas and the Lebanese and Saudi Hizbollah, to 
name a few. 142 Saudi Arabia also has been named a state sponsor of violent Islamic 
radical groups particularly through educational institutions like the madrasas in Pakistan, 
Central and Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, some of which preach jihad in order to 
cleanse the Islamic world of domestic and foreign threats. Several scholars note that 
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the export of their brand of Islam has 
created a spiral effect between the two states, perpetuating the spread of radical, violent 
Islam and material assets to prosper various movements.143  Therefore state funding of 
radical Islamic groups appears to be an important dynamic for the proliferation of radical 
Islamic groups and the call for jihad.  
Many of these jihad groups also have profited from manipulating international 
financial systems. In 1991, the Bank of England shut down the Bank of Credit and 
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Commerce International (BCCI), a Pakistan-based institution suspected of financing 
radical Islamic groups, particularly with drug money and funding from Gulf States.144 To 
compensate for this loss, Bin Laden used his family’s multi-national corporation to route 
finances for various groups and projects throughout the 1990s.145 In 1994, the Saudi 
government froze Bin Laden’s personal assets in addition to expatriating him; this 
however, did little to slow financial flows to various jihad groups.146 Moreover, these 
radical groups have continued to prosper through opaque banking systems—banks that 
have not conformed to international regimes on banking practices—particularly in UAE, 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran. 147  In addition, the Hawalah system—informal money 
transfers routed through familial, tribal, and business networks—has worked alongside 
institutional banking systems to spread financial resources throughout the globe. 
Tracking these informal networks has proven extremely difficult for law enforcement 
agencies.148  
Many of these groups have also accrued financial and material assets through 
international Islamic charities and NGOs. The pillar of zakat, the 2.5% alms giving on 
accumulative wealth, has been the source of significant funds to Islamic charities, money 
that is then given to Islamic NGOs to provide services for Muslims in need around the 
globe.149  Since September 11, the US government has taken measures to identify which 
                                                                                                                                                 
143 Kepel, pp. 6-7; Deneoux, pp. 60-61; Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 108 
144 Bodansky, pg. 40 
145 Bodansky, pp. 40-47 
146 Esposito, Unholy War, pg. 14 
147 For more on international banking regimes, see The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 
(FATF), www1.oecd.org/fatf, visited on 6/30/03. For US initiative on combating terrorist funding, see US 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. www.ustreas.gov/ofac, visited on 6/30.03. 
148 N.S. Jamwal, “Hawala—the Invisible Financing System of Terrorism,” (Indian) Strategic Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 2, (April-June, 2002), pp. 1-14, taken from the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, website, 
www.idsa.org, downloaded on 10/18/02.  
149 Anonymous, pp. 36-37 
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charities are fronts for violent Islamic groups and to freeze their assets.150 Often times, 
however, it has proven difficult to discern which charities are funding what; many of 
these charities are indeed providing social services to populations in need in addition to, 
perhaps, funding violent operations.151   
Another source of revenue for these radical groups is drug trafficking. 
Afghanistan, in particular, has a thriving trade in opium, the largest in the world by some 
counts. The Afghan mujahid Hekmatiyar has relied heavily on the opium trade, which 
has continued to fund his radical Islamic group well beyond the Soviet-Afghan war into 
the 1990s.152 The Taliban were reported as possessing assets around $8 billion, the 
majority of which were earned through drug trafficking. 153 Likewise, it is reported that 
Bin Laden and Al Qaeda have profited considerably from drug trafficking, particularly 
from South Asia to Europe, which supplies an estimated 80% to 95% of Heroin in 
European countries, particularly in Great Britain. 154 One scholar agues that Bin Laden 
and Al Qaeda see drug trafficking to the West as killing two birds with one stone; the 
drugs finance their operations and help to undermine the social fabric of the West.155 
Finally, this current wave of jihad groups has worked with and against political 
elites to achieve their goals. Many of these groups have prospered from financial and 
material aid from states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, as previously mentioned. It is 
important to note that this aid is usually given from a state to a jihad group that is not 
                                                 
150 The Patriot Act, which President Bush signed into law on October 26, 2002, aims to investigate and 
arrest patterns of terrorist financing. See “Patriot Act Oversight: Investigating Patterns of Terrorist 
Financing,” US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on 
Financial Services, February 12, 2002. Take from http://commdocs.house/gov, downloaded on 10/23/2002. 
151 Bodansky, pp. 44-45. There is a website that posts all articles written on Islamic charities, 
www.newstrove.com, keyword search Islamic ‘Charities,’ visited 10/30/2002. 
152 Bodansky, pg. 42 
153 Anonymous, pg. 42 
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within its own borders, thereby creating problems for another state’s political elites. Iran 
and Saudi Arabia are both religiously based governments, which may expla in their 
motivation to fund religious groups. However, it is also worth noting that the US funded 
mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Pakistan is also believed to have funded mujihidin 
in Afghanistan and Kashmir, irrespective of its governments’ adherence to the tenets of 
Islam.156  Therefore, despite the religious adherence of the government, it is strongly 
believed that many of these groups have prospered from financial and material aid from 
states. Second, many of these groups have also worked with state elites that have 
provided safe havens for these movements and their leaders. This includes Sudan and 
Afghanistan but also the “open societies” of the West such as the UK and the US. These 
“basing privileges” have also been named as a valuable asset for jihad groups and their 
abilities to organize and execute their operations.  
Jihad groups have also worked against political elites. Most notably, these groups 
have targeted secular regimes in the Muslim world in their bid to purify the dar al Islam. 
Many of these groups—including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad, Hamas, Kashmiri groups, and Al Qaeda—see the overthrow of these regimes as 
necessary in order to install “right” leaders that uphold Shari’a law. Furthermore, many 
of these groups are working to reinstate one Caliph to rule over the dar al Islam, which 
requires the destruction of secular, political elites and states altogether. Therefore, despite 
receiving aid from certain states, most of these groups are at odds with political leaders.    
In sum: This current wave of jihads contains several similarities to the 19th 
century wave that preceded it. Most of these movements are reacting to perceived or 
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actual domestic and international threats. Their goals, therefore, are to repel these threats 
by overthrowing secular domestic governments, to create an Islamic government that 
upholds the tenets and Shari’a law, and to repel the international threats that are 
bolstering these regimes and threatening Islam itself. Most leaders of these movements 
come from outside the Ulama, are well educated, and consult religious leaders for support 
in their jihads. These movements have called on the doctrines of jihad and martyrization 
in addition to making use of connections made during the hajj. Unlike the previous wave 
of 19th century jihads, this wave has not seen many claiming to be the Mahdi, but leaders 
have emerged who are popularly recognized as receiving the baraka of God and the 
Prophet, most notably Bin Laden.   
This current wave of jihads differs from its predecessors in the resources available 
to these movements. These groups have well trained leaders who have formed resilient, 
efficient and effective organizations. These movements also have benefited from safe 
havens including Sudan, Afghanistan, and the “open societies” of the West. They have 
particularly profited from communications technology, which has aided their 
organization and mobilization. Lastly these groups have prospered from financial assets 
including state funding, Islamic charities and NGOs, opaque banking systems, informal 
money flows and drug trafficking.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued, first, that the doctrine of jihad is not fixed but rather 
subject to interpretation, which is the product of individuals grounded in specific 
contexts. In addition to the legal doctrine of jihad, there are also mystical interpretations, 
specifically those called by the Mahdi and battlefield success ascribed post- facto as the 
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baraka of God and the Prophet. Second, although a doctrine for offensive jihad exists, 
most jihads have been defensive in nature; they have been in response to perceived or 
actual threats to Muslim land, communities, and the faith. This is true of the first wave of 
jihad in the 19th century and the current wave of jihads around the globe. 
  Third, this chapter has argued that the interpretations of the faith generated by 19th 
century jihad movements and jihad organizations today have been largely similar. Both 
have called for organized defensive jihad—similar to the form of jihad used by Nur al-
Din and Saleh ed-Din against the Crusaders—to mobilize soldiers to defend land, 
community and faith.  Both waves have solicited the support of the Ulama for their 
actions, including the use of fatwas. Both movements have used the doctrine of 
martyrization and called those who died in battle martyrs. Both also have benefited from 
connections made through the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the Hajj. The first wave of 
jihads in the 19th century had many claiming to be the Mahdi, while this wave of jihad 
appears to benefit from the belief in the baraka of God and Prophet on the battlefield. 
 Fourth, this chapter has argued that resources such as strong leaders, resilient and 
efficient organizations, networks, means of communication and money are critical for the 
scope and success of jihad movements. This current wave of jihads, in comparison to its 
19th century predecessors, has far greater resources to commit to its causes. This is 
evident not only in financial resources available to these jihadist groups, but also in their 
access to—and manipulation of—communications technology, the mass media, banking 
systems and informal networks. These resources have facilitated international 
organizations aimed, in part, at striking the United States and its interests.  
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 Fifth, the 19th century wave of jihad reveals that most of these holy battles were 
fought in opposition to both political and trained religious elites. In most cases, the 
Ulama attempted to work within their new political circumstances brought on by 
colonialism, not oppose their new leaders. Therefore, most of the leaders of these jihads 
were not from within the trained clerisy but rather were either Mahdis or recognized as 
leaders through their battlefield success. In the current wave of two-front jihads, most 
movements are fighting against the leaders of the state, particularly states that are 
imposing ideologies perceived to be threatening to the vitality of Islam. This is true in 
Egypt, Palestine, Algeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, and in Kashmir. However, the 
international jihad against the US has received considerable support from various 
political leaders including funding, safe-havens, and permissive environments in which to 
propagate the call for jihad to defend the dar al Islam. Therefore, the current wave of 
jihads demonstrates that the separation of religious and political leaders has helped to fuel 
jihadist movements, particularly in reactions to threats to the social order. This wave also 
demonstrates that the mixture of political and religious leaders—such as in Sudan, 
Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia—have also aided the worldwide jihad. These 
findings are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Lastly, the way in which the 19th century wave of jihads ended—by long, drawn 
out, low intensity conflicts with colonial forces—suggests that these movements do not 
die easily. Movements that operated out of rugged terrain, such as in northern India and 
the hinterlands of Algeria, appeared to benefit from this difficult battle space. This 
suggests that jihad movements in hard to reach and hard to monitor terrain will be more 
difficult to rout out.  Also, in several cases, these movements continued despite the death 
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of their leaders. This is true of Sayyid Ahmad of Barelewi, who was killed in 1831 but 
whose movement persisted for roughly 60 more years. This suggests that charismatic 
leaders may be important for organizing movements and mobilizing fighters, but that 
they may not be essential for their survival.  
The 19th century jihads may have also ended because they were not trans-
nationally linked and orchestrated, which limited their resources and ability to wear down 
colonial forces. Perhaps had these movements been better coordinated, they could have 
been a more formidable obstacle to colonia l rule, particularly for the British, who were in 
several Muslim regions around the globe.  This last point suggest that the global 
networking of this current wave of jihad movements is another important dimension that 
sets it apart from its 19th century counterparts. 
4.1 Jihads of the 19th Century and Today  
 Threat Perception Resources Religious/ 
Political Leaders  
19th Century Jihads 
Goals: Repel 
Colonialism, Purify 
dar al Islam 
International— 
§ Colonialism 
Domestic— 
§ Corrupt Muslim 
Leaders 
Social— 
§ Mahdi, manpower 
Material— 
§ Few 
Techno— 
§ Few 
Mostly at odds 
Jihads Today 
Goals: Repel 
Western Presence, 
Purify dar al Islam 
International— 
§ Globalization, 
USFP, western/ 
secularism 
Domestic— 
§ Corrupt 
Governments, 
secular regimes 
Social— 
§ Educated leaders, 
resilient orgs. 
Material— 
§ Transnational and 
state funding 
Techno— 
§ IT, transportation 
State funding of 
jihad movements 
(outside borders). 
State target of 
most jihad 
movements. 
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II. 
Sacred Spaces 
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Overview of Battles Over Sacred Space 
 
 
 All religions have sacred space, specific sites recognized as important to the 
beliefs and practices of a tradition. Historian Karen Armstrong notes: “The devotion to a 
holy place or city is a near-universal phenomenon. Historians of religion believe that it is 
one of the earliest manifestations of faith in all cultures.”1 Sacred spaces may be a site 
where God is believed to have entered the earth such as Bethlehem—the celebrated 
birthplace of Jesus the Christ—and Ayodhya, the place Hinduism recognizes as the birth 
site of Vishnu’s avatar, Ram. A sacred site may also be a place where it is believed that 
God and humans can interact, such as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem—the historic place 
of ritual sacrifice in Judaism. Sacred space may also be the burial site of humans believed 
to have a special connection with the divine, such as saints’ tombs, which exist in 
Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Finally, sacred objects—articles believed to 
have come into contact with the divine—and the buildings that house them are important 
sacred spaces in religious traditions. These various types of sacred sites, therefore, are 
spaces where it is believed that humans and the divine meet and interact.  
As religious artifacts, sacred spaces are important sites of pilgrimage and 
veneration. In many traditions, the process of traveling to, visiting, and returning from a 
sacred site is a central component in the faith. In Islam, the hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, 
is a religious mandate that all Muslims should perform at least once in their lives, health 
and finances permitting. In Judaism, the hope of pilgrimage to Jerusalem, the historic site 
of the Jewish Temple, is remembered in the annual Passover ritual: “Next year in 
Jerusalem.” Pilgrimage is also important for Christians, Hindus and Buddhis ts who 
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venerate the places where it is believed that the divine has chosen to intervene in history 
and provide a place of transcendence between the earthly and spiritual worlds. 
This section considers two sacred sites that have come to have religious 
importance for several religions: the northern Indian city of Ayodhya, the Hindu 
celebrated birthplace of Ram and historic site of a Muslim mosque built in the 16th 
century; and Jerusalem, which is venerated by Jews, Christians and Muslims. As the case 
studies will show, these religions have cohabitated and shared these cities at certain 
points in history but they also have fought for exclusive rights to these sacred spaces at 
other times. Currently both cities are the source of conflict and violence for Hindus and 
Muslims in South Asia and Muslims and Jews in the Middle East. Why have these groups 
been able to live together and share these sites at some points in time but not at others? 
What has caused this current explosion of violence over both of these cities? 
This section offers insights into these questions by tracing the rise and fall of 
several waves of religious violence in Ayodhya and Jerusalem. The case study on 
Ayodhya considers three major incidents of Hindu and Muslim violence over its sites: 
Sunni Muslim attempts to seize a Hindu temple in 1853-1855, which are the first 
recorded incidents of religious violence in Ayodhya; the appearance of Hindu idols in 
Ayodhya’s Babri Mosque in 1949 and the riots they sparked; and a federal court’s 
decision to open the site to all in 1986, igniting riots and leading to the destruction of the 
mosque by a mob of militant Hindus in 1992. It argues that the current wave of violence 
over Ayodhya has become the focal point of Hindu nationalists, who aim to make India 
into Hindutva, a homeland of Hindu culture and religion. Hindu nationalist 
organizations—particularly the RSS, the VHP, and the BJP—have made inroads in India 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Karen Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), pg. xv-xvi 
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by coordinating political, social and financial resources aimed at realizing Hindutva in 
general, and “liberating” Ayodhya from “foreign”—namely Muslim—elements in 
particular.  
The second case considers three waves of religious violence over Jerusalem: the 
Christian Crusades to “liberate” Christ’s tomb in Jerusalem from the 11th through the 14th 
centuries; Muslim holy wars aimed at repelling crusaders from the region and retaking 
Jerusalem; and Israel’s seizure of Jerusalem in 1967 and the religious reactions it 
produced within militant Jewish and Muslim movements. It argues that these incidents of 
violence represent Christian, Muslim and Jewish efforts to seize Jerusalem in reaction to 
threats imposed to sacred sites by the policies of the governing group. This includes the 
current “al-Aqsa Intifada,” which is largely in response to threatening policies enacted by 
the Israeli government over Jerusalem and the occupied territories since 1967, and was 
sparked by the controversial visit of right-wing politician Ariel Sharon (now Israel’s 
prime minister) to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on September 28, 2000. 
These two cases share important similarities, particularly in the current wave of 
violence surrounding these holy cities. Both India and Israel experienced a major political 
shift in their governments in the late 1970s. In 1977, India’s Congress Party was defeated 
for the first time in the country’s history, paving the way for the rise of Hindu nationalist 
parties within the government, most notably the BJP. Likewise, Israel’s Labor Party was 
also defeated for the first time in the country’s history, supplanted by the Zionist 
nationalist Likud Party in 1977. Both the BJP and Likud formed alliances with religious-
nationalist organizations—such as the RSS and VHP in India and Gush Emunim in 
Israel—to secure votes in exchange for political support of these groups’ agendas. In 
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Israel, religious-nationalist groups have embarked on a campaign to absorb the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights into Eretz Yisrael, “greater Israel,” 
with the financial and political backing of various Likud governments. In India, Hindu 
nationalist groups have aimed to realize Hindutva, seizing on the controversy of the 
Ayodhya conflict to mobilize Hindus against the perceived threat of “foreign elements” 
to the vitality of Hindu culture and identity. In both cases, these political-religious unions 
have produced violent confrontations between nationalists and those outside their circles.    
The case studies on Ayodhya and Israel demonstrate that battles over sacred space 
have domestic repercussions. In the modern era, the management of religious sites has 
become an obligation of the state. This includes policies and actions aimed at providing 
security, access, and maintenance of these sites. Moreover, in the cases of Ayodhya and 
Jerusalem, both states have become responsible for managing disputes over religious 
groups’ ownership to these sites. Finally, as the case studies demonstrate, religious battles 
over sites in Ayodhya and Jerusalem have often sparked nation-wide violence, which has 
cost these countries lives, money and resources.  
In addition to domestic consequences, religious battles over sacred space also 
impact international relations. Ayodhya and Jerusalem are sacred sites of importance not 
only to Indians, Israelis and Palestinians but, more broadly, to Hindus, Muslims, Jews 
and Christians throughout the world. The 1992 destruction of the Babri Mosque in 
Ayodhya touched off riots in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh. Likewise, the 
September 2000 visit of right-wing Israeli to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount sparked 
street demonstrations from Egypt to Indonesia. Therefore, the policies and actions of the 
states currently governing these sacred sites are not only of importance for domestic 
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peace and stability but also for regional and even global relations between religious 
groups and countries.
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Chapter 5 
Hindu and Muslim Battles Over Ayodhya 
 
 
 On December 6, 1992, an estimated 300,000 Hindu activists gathered in the 
northern Indian town of Ayodhya, stormed a 350-year-old mosque and demolished it 
with shove ls, axes and their bare hands. In its place, they assembled a makeshift temple 
to the avatar Ram on the site where they believed he was born. 1 The incident sparked the 
worst riots in India since Partition in addition to touching off violence in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. An estimated 1,700 to 3,000 died in the riots, with more than 5,500 injured.2  
Again, in February of 2002, Hindu activists traveling on a train from Ayodhya through 
the state of Gujarat were attacked by an angry mob; their train was set on fire and all 57 
passengers died. This incident ignited riots in Gujarat, where at least 2,000 died, mostly 
Muslims.3 Why has Ayodhya—a site shared by Hindus and Muslims for hundreds of 
years—become the flashpoint for religious violence in current day India?  
 This chapter aims to provide insights into this question by considering three 
waves of Hindu and Muslim violence over sacred space in Ayodhya: Sunni Muslim 
attempts to seize a Hindu temple in 1853-1855, the first recorded violence at the site; the 
appearance of Hindu idols in Ayodhya’s Babri Mosque in 1949 and the riots it produced; 
and a federal court’s decision to open the mosque to the public in 1986, which provoked 
regional riots and two major incidents of violence, in 1992 and 2002. Drawing from the 
                                                 
1 Ramesh Thakur, “Ayodhya and the Politics of India’s Secularism,” pp. 645-664, Asian Survey, Vol. 33, 
No. 7 (July, 1993), pg. 645  
2 The BBC places the number around 3,000. See, “Ayodhya Defeat for Vajpayee,” BBC News, December 
19, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk, downloaded on 7/30/03 
3 Burhan Wazir cites 2,000 killed and 100,000 made homeless from the unrest, “Militants Seek Muslim-
Free India,” The Guardian, July 21, 2002. Zahir Janmohamed cites estimates of over 5,000 killed, “The 
Unbearable Burden of Belief,” Literate World Online, (July 2002), 
http://littworld.com/english/2002/soulshelf/july/saug22.html, downloaded on 10/8/2002. 
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causal argument presented in chapter two, this chapter will focus on three variables as 
possible explanations for violence over the sacred city: the role of threat perception in 
influencing actions of leaders and their groups; the amount of material, social and 
technological resources available to groups initiating the violence; and the relationship 
between religious and political leaders as a possible explanation for the rise of violence 
over Ayodhya. This chapter will test three empirical predictions from the causal 
argument. First, religious leaders will call for violence to defend Ayodhya if they believe 
their site is under imminent threat. Second, the group initiating the violence has greater 
resources than does the other group. And third, religious vio lence will be more likely if 
political and religious authority is intertwined, allowing religious leaders to use the 
resources of the state for its goals.  
 This chapter argues that groups initiating the violence over Ayodhya have acted 
largely under conditions of perceived or actual threat to their religious sites. Furthermore, 
the initiating group has had considerable resources at its disposal the most valuable of 
which have been well-structured organizations that coordinate their efforts for common 
goals. Finally, religious and political leaders alike have used Ayodhya to mobilize the 
masses for political and religious ends, namely for elections and the bid to make India 
into Hindutva, a homeland based on Hindu beliefs and culture.  
 The first section of this chapter offers a brief summary of Hindu and Muslim 
beliefs, practices, texts and forms of authority, which are necessary for understanding the 
religious dynamics of the Ayodhya controversy. The second section provides a 
chronology of Ayodhya, beginning with the Babri Mosque’s construction in 1528 to the 
present controversies surrounding the site. The third section considers three major waves 
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of violence over the site: in 1853-1855, in 1949, and from 1986 to the present. And the 
fourth section offers concluding remarks.  
Hinduism and Islam 
 The religious beliefs and practices of Hinduism and Islam are essential for 
understanding certain dynamics of the Ayodhya conflict. Therefore, before describing the 
history of Ayodhya and its episodes of Hindu and Mus lim violence, it is necessary to 
provide a brief overview of each religious tradition. Hinduism and Islam are rich and 
complex religions with much internal diversity. However, for the purpose of 
understanding the Ayodhya controversy, this section will touch briefly on four areas 
within Hinduism and Islam: their core beliefs, their practices, their texts, and religious 
authority.  
Hinduism 
 The core beliefs in Hinduism, as a religion, are concerned with the liberation 
(moksha) of humans from their earthly circumstances. Hinduism subscribes that humans 
are trapped in a cycle of life, death and rebirth, samsara. Samsara is the result of karma, 
good and bad actions that accumulate over time. Actions that produce good karma 
include moral deeds like caring for others, ritualistic practices such as animal or plant 
sacrifice, and praise to deities. Humans are rewarded or punished by their karma, which 
determines birth into different social strata, jatis. These different levels of birth, in turn, 
define earthly occupation. These occupations, based on ritual cleanliness, create varna, a 
social hierarchy or caste system within Hindu society: the Brahmins (priests), the 
Rajanyas/Kshatriyas (rulers and warriors), the Vaishyas (farmers and traders)—which 
comprise the upper castes—and the Sudras (laborers), which is the lower caste.  In 
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addition, there are those who are not part of this system; they are formerly known as 
“untouchables” and are currently called Dalits, or, as Gandhi called them, Harijan, 
“children of God.”4 Although Varna remains an important ritual distinction within 
Hinduism, it is important to note that, socially and politically, the separation between 
upper and lower castes is less clear and varies across region and jatis. Therefore caste, 
while an important dimension of Hindu society, is not completely fixed.  
Humans are not alone in their quest for liberation, but rather have the aid of The 
Absolute, Brahman, which is attained through knowledge. There are also earthly 
incarnations of the Divine, avatars, who come to earth to help humans in their path to 
salvation. Vishnu, Shiva, Brahman, and the Goddess Shakti all have earthly avatars. 
Avatars of Vishnu include Krishna and Rama, the latter of which is believed to have been 
born in Ayodhya.  
Hinduism has several practices aimed at attaining liberation and drawing closer to 
The Absolute. There are formal rituals, such as animal and plant sacrifice, which are 
performed by Hindu priests. Sacrifice is less common in Hinduism today but still exists 
in the Tantric form of the faith. Practices for sacrifices are laid out in Hinduism’s oldest 
texts, the Vedas, which are compilations of rituals surrounding gods of the ancient 
Aryans, believed by some to be the origins of today’s Indians.5  There is also Vedanta, 
the path to knowledge of The Absolute, which is liberation. The path to knowledge 
consists of four stages in life: the student, the married householder, the forest dweller, 
                                                 
4 For more details on Hindu beliefs, see Chapter 3: “The Earliest Forms of Hinduism,” pp. 83-101; Chapter 
4: “Classical Hinduism: The Way of Action,” pp. 102-114: Chapter 5: “Classical Hinduism: The Way of 
Knowledge,” pp. 115-127; Chapter 6: “Classical Hinduism: The Way of Devotion,” pp. 128-142; Chapter 
7: “Modern Hinduism,” 143-149; Religions of the World, Third Edition, edited by Robert K. C. Forman, et 
al, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) 
5 Chapter 3: “The Earliest Forms of Hinduism,” Religions of the World, Third Edition, pp. 83-101 
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and the renouncer or sannyasin. This path is usually only open to those in the upper 
castes.6 Finally, there is the practice of devotion to a deity, bhakti, which is open to all 
castes. This involves acts such as pilgrimage to sites related to deities—tirthas, places 
where the sacred and the profane meet—and by offering sacrifices of flowers and 
incense, puja, in the home or at temples. Most Hindus today practice bhakti in one form 
or another.7  Ayodhya, as the celebrated birthplace of the avatar Ram, is a popular 
pilgrimage tirtha. 
Hinduism has numerous sacred texts, which are not codified into a cohesive 
canon. The most common scriptures include, first, texts concerning ritual and sacrifice: 
the Vedas—the Rig Veda (the oldest), the Sama Veda, the Yajur Veda and the Atharva 
Veda; the Brahmanas; and the Upanishads. Sacred texts also include religious epics: the 
Mahabharata, which contains the Bhagavad Ghita; and the Ramayana, which involves 
Ayodhya. There are also the Puranas—six to Brahma, six to Vishnu, and six to Shiva; 
the Tantras (64 books in total); and the Laws of Manu. Lastly there are the works of 
medieval philosophers, Shankara and the Ramanuja (bhakti), which inform devotional 
practices. In addition, more recent works, such as the 20th century writings of Gandhi, are 
considered by some to be sacred texts.8 
Hinduism has several different types of religious leaders. As mentioned above, 
there are priests within the Brahmin caste. These priests require training and are tasked 
with performing marriage and death rituals in addition to sacrifice in the Tantric tradition. 
                                                 
6 Chapter 4: “Classical Hinduism: The Way of Action,” Religions of the World, Third Edition, pp. 102-114 
7 Chapter 6: “Classical Hinduism: The Way of Devotion,” Religions of the World, Third Edition, pp. 128-
142  
8 For more on Hindu scriptures see Gavin Flood, “Hinduism,” Sacred Writings, edited by Jean Holm with 
John Boker, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1994), pp. 71-100; and Sacred Texts of the World, edited by 
Ninian Smart and Richard D. Hecht, (New York: Crossroads, 1982), pp. 179-213. 
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Hinduism also has monastic orders affiliated with Shiva and Vishnu, which keep temples 
associated with their deities.9 Finally, Hinduism has gurus, or teachers, who guide 
disciples, shishya, in the path towards liberation.  
Islam 
The core beliefs of Islam are also concerned with human liberation or salvation. 
The path to salvation in Islam, however, differs in many ways from Hinduism. First, 
Islam takes very seriously the oneness of God, or tawhid, which is its central belief. The 
path to salvation in Islam involves submitting to the will of God, which is the meaning of 
the word Islam. In order to understand God’s will for humanity, God has provided 
revelations through prophets, nabi and rasul. Muslims believe that the Prophet 
Muhammad transmitted the final and complete revelation from God in the seventh 
century CE, recorded in the Qur’an. Thus the oneness of God and the Prophet 
Muhammad as his messenger form the shahaddah, the first of five Pillars of Islam, which 
is the proclamation of faith; one who proclaims the shahaddah is a Muslim. The other 
four pillars include ritual prayer said five times a day facing towards Mecca (salat); 
fasting during the holy month of Ramadan (sawm); almsgiving to the poor (zakat); and 
the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), which should be taken by every Mus lims at least once in 
his or her life, finances and health permitting. Along with the Pillars, Islam emphasizes 
the unity of the worldwide Muslim community, the ummah, which, in principle, is not 
divided by gender, race, class or any other human distinction.10 However, in practice, 
                                                 
9 Peter Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994) pp. 45-46 
10 For more details  on key beliefs in Islam, see John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988) 
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Islam has several internal divisions, the most important being the Sunni/Shia split, which 
arose from different understanding in leadership. 
In addition to the Pillars, one way in which Muslims apply their faith is through 
religious law, Shari’a. The formation of Shari’a differs according to time, region, and 
school of jurisprudence.11 Another key practice in Islam is ritual prayer, salat, mentioned 
above. Muslims can say the salat anywhere, but mosques are buildings designed 
especially for Muslims to gather in and pray. For this purpose, mosques are considered 
sacred places where humans interact with God; thus the maintenance and preservation of 
these spaces are important to the faith. This is a critical point concerning the Ayodhya 
conflict. 
Islam, unlike Hinduism, has two main bodies of scriptures. The first is the Qur’an, 
which—as the literal word of God—is immutable. The second set of scriptures, the 
Sunnah, contains recordings of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, the Hadith, and the 
actions of the Prophet and his companions, who are believed to be guides for living in 
submission to God’s will. These two texts, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, provide the 
scriptural foundation for Shari’a law. In addition, there are volumes of commentarie s on 
Islamic law compiled by historic scholars and judges. These texts are secondary but often 
consulted by scholars and judges when applying the law. 
Similar to Hinduism, Islam has more than one type of religious leader. First, Islam 
recognizes leaders that govern the ummah. In Sunni Islam, this leader is known as the 
Khalifa (Caliph), the “rightly guided one,” which is chosen by the community. In Shia 
                                                 
11 In Sunni Islam there are four major schools of law, al-Sharia; Maiki, Hanafi, Shaifi , and Hanbali .  In 
addition, Shia Islam has its own interpretations of the law, of which there is diversity between Twelver and 
Ishmaili Shiism.  See David S. Pearl A Textbook on Muslim Law, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), especially 
chapter 1, “The Historical Development of Islamic Law.” 
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Islam, this leader is called the Imam, and is determined by bloodline to the Prophet and 
familial descent.12 Second, there are trained scholars, the Ulama, who receive schooling 
in history, philosophy, language, law, and art. Within the Ulama are qadis and muftis, 
judges responsible for applying Shari’a law. In addition, Islam has mystical leaders, Sufis 
or Pirs, often given the title of Sheikh. Sufism is a particularly important dimension of 
Islam in South Asia, as will be described. Finally, there are individuals who attain status 
as religious leaders either through their charisma or success, but are neither Sufis nor 
members of the Ulama.  They also receive the title Sheikh or Mullah, another title 
denoting a religious leader. 
These core beliefs, practices, texts, and leaders within Hinduism and Islam play a 
key role in the Ayodhya conflict. The following sections will explore the conditions 
under which religious and political leaders have interpreted texts and beliefs to call for 
violent action in defense of Ayodhya at certain points in history.  
Historical Overview of Ayodhya 
 There is little disagreement that the Sunni Muslim Emperor Babur, the second 
ruler of the Mughal Empire, commissioned the building of a mosque in Ayodhya in 1528 
and that he chose Ayodhya because of its reputation as a holy city. 13 Prior to the 
construction of the mosque—known as the Babri Masjid or Babur’s Mosque—
archaeological and ethnographic evidence shows that Ayodhya was not only a city sacred 
to Hindus but that it also had Jain and Buddhist temples, the latter extending back to 
                                                 
12 Imams also lead the forma l prayer, salat, in Sunni Islam. Imams can be from the Ulama, but are not 
exclusively so. 
13 K.N. Panikkar notes that the mosque was actually constructed under the supervision of Mir Baqi, who 
was a member of Babur’s court. Although Baqi inscribed Babur’s name on the completed mosque, there is 
no direct evidence that Babur ordered the construction. See “A Historical Overview,” pp. 22-37 Anatomy of 
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around the fifth century BCE. 14 For Hinduism, the city is celebrated as the birthplace of 
Ram, an earthly avatar of the deity Vishnu. And, as previously mentioned, the story of 
Ram’s birth and life on earth is told in the Ramayana, a text that is regarded as one of the 
sacred scriptures in Hinduism.  The city hosts several holy sites relating to Ram including 
the Hanumangarhi, the temple-fortress of the monkey-god Hanuman; the Kanakbhavan, 
the palace of Ram and his wife Sita; and the celebrated birthplace of Ram, which is 
believed to be near or on the same site as the Babri Mosque. 
A popular belief held by many Hindus is that Babur destroyed a Hindu temple 
devoted to Ram and used the pillars from the temple to build the Babri Mosque, which 
was constructed over the actual birthplace of Ram. Muslim narratives disagree with this 
story, asserting that Babur did not destroy a Hindu temple; moreover, Babur and a later 
emperor Akbar were known for their tolerance towards other religions, especially 
Hinduism. 15  Archaeological evidence surrounding the contested sites have been 
interpreted both by Hindu activists and Muslim groups to assert their side of the story, 
offering no concrete evidence to resolve the disputed narratives.16 Nevertheless, during 
the time of the mosque’s construction and for three hundred years that followed, there is 
                                                                                                                                                 
a Confrontation: The Barbri Masjid-Ramjanmabhumi Issue, edited by Sarvepalli Gopal, (Delhi: Viking 
Press, 1991), pp. 27 
14 K.N. Panikkar, “A Historical Overview,” pp. 25-26 
15 Akbar in particular was known for his tolerance towards other faiths. Two examples of his tolerance are 
his abolition of the pilgrims’ tax and the poll-tax for non-Muslims during his reign, see Thakur, pg. 646.  
16 When the Ayodhya conflict flared up in the 1980s, the key questions being asked were: Was a temple 
destroyed to build a mosque? Was the Babri Mosque built with pieces of a ruined temple? And, is the site 
of the Babri Mosque the same as the celebrated birthplace of Ram? Archaeological evidence from 
excavated sites around Ayodhya has been interpreted by different parties both in the negative and the 
affirmative to these questions. However, there is little if no evidence that can answer each of these 
questions definitively in the affirmative. Moreover, there is no written evidence from the time of the 
mosque’s construction, either in Muslim or Hindu documents that affirm the destruction of a temple 
preceding the erection of the mosque. See K.N. Panikkar, “A Historical Overview,” pp. 27-30; and 
Reinhard Bernbeck and Susan Pollock, “Ayodhya, Archaeology, and Identity,” Current Archaeology, Vol. 
37, (February, 1996), pp. S138-S142.    
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no evidence to suggest that violence between Hindus and Muslims in the city or the 
region occurred as a result of the presence of the mosque in Ayodhya.  
In 1722, Nawabs, Shia Muslim kings, succeeded Mughal rule of Awadh, a region 
that included the cities of Ayodhya, Faizabad, and Lucknow. The capital of Awadh was 
moved first from Ayodhya to Faizabad in the 1730s, and then to Lucknow at the end of 
the century. 17 Under the rule of the Nawabs, there is little evidence of Hindu-Muslim 
conflict in Ayodhya. Rather, the era was marked by political cooperation between the 
Shia rulers and various Hindu elites, including the patronage of each other’s sacred 
sites.18 It was during this time that the presence of different Hindu monastic orders 
flourished and, from the 18th century on, Ayodhya became an important pilgrimage site 
for Hindus.19  
The first recorded violence between Hindus and Muslims over sacred sites in 
Ayodhya occurred between 1853 and 1855.  The kingdom of Awadh was under the rule 
of Nawab Wajid Ali Shah, who reigned from 1847 until British annexation in 1856.20 In 
1853, Sunni Muslims in the region, headed by Ghulam Husain, rose up against the Shia 
ruler and marched on Ayodhya, claiming that Hindus had destroyed a mosque in order to 
build the Hanumangarhi Temple. The Sunnis were defeated by an order of Naga Sadhus, 
Hindu warrior monks; around 70 Muslims were killed and buried in the graveyard next to 
the Babri Mosque.21 In 1855, a second Sunni leader, Amir ‘Ali, called for a jihad to 
                                                 
17 Koenraad Elst, Ramjanmabhoomi vs. Babri Masjid: A Case Study in Hindu-Muslim Conflict, (New 
Delhi: Voice of India, 1990), pg. 140 
18 Peter Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated!  A Hindu Liberation Movement in Ayodhya,” pp. 283-
301, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1987), pg. 287-288 
19 Peter Van der Veer, Gods on Earth: The Management of Religious Experience and Identity in a Northern 
Indian Pilgrimage Center, (London: The Athlone Press, 1988); and Hans Bakker, Ayodhya, (Gronigen: 
Egbert Forsten, 1986) 
20 Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pg. 288 
21 Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pg. 288; and Elst, pg. 141 
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liberate the land from non-Muslim occupation. British troops subdued the uprising with 
the aid of the Hindu Nagas and Shia Nawab troops. The British then officially annexed 
the kingdom in February of 1856.22 They erected a fence around the Babri Mosque, 
allowing Muslims to pray inside and Hindus to worship on a raised platform outside the 
structure. 
 Ayodhya settled into a tense calm under British rule. In 1885, a Hindu religious 
leader named Raghubar Ram made an appeal to the British judge of Faizabad to allow for 
the construction of a Hindu temple at the site of the Babri Mosque; the bid was rejected 
that same year.23 In 1912 and 1934, Hindu activists attacked the Babri Mosque on Bakr-
Id, the Muslim festival celebrating Isaac’s willingness to sacrifice his son Ishmael. The 
attack was part of a larger Hindu uprising known as the Cow Protection Movement, 
which will be discussed further below. 24  In the 1934 episode, there were considerable 
Muslim casualties—believed to be in the hundreds to thousands—and the British army 
was forced to intervene to restore order. The British imposed a punitive tax on the Hindu 
inhabitants of Ayodhya as retribution for the violence.25  
 The next big conflict over the status of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya came just 
after independence and Partition, in 1949. On the night of December 22-23, idols of Ram 
and his wife Sita appeared inside the mosque. Many Hindus believed this to be a miracle, 
while Muslims and the federal courts declared it to be the work of Hindu activists bent on 
claiming the mosque for themselves. The federal courts ordered that the idols be removed 
                                                 
22 Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pp. 289, 296 
23 Elst, pg. 142 
24 Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pg. 289 
25 ibid 
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but the local courts refused to comply.26 In 1950, the federal courts locked the mosque 
without removing the idols and placed guards around the building. Both Hindus and 
Muslims formed their own action committees to assert their claims over the site. Hindus 
formed the Ram Janmabhoomi Seva Committee and the Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yajna 
Samiti (Committee for the Ram Birthplace Liberation Ritual). Muslims formed the Babri 
Masjid Co-ordination Committee and the All-India Babri Masjid Action Committee.27 
These groups continued to present their cases to the courts following the mosque’s 
closure.   
The present day conflict over the sacred sites at Ayodhya began in full force in 
1986, when a district court ruled that the mosque should be unlocked and opened to the 
public. Prior to this decision, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)—an umbrella 
organization of religious Hindu leaders—together with the Rastriya Swayamsewak Sangh 
(RSS)—a group committed to promoting Hindu culture—organized a Dharm Sanda, or 
“Liberation Movement” in 1984, aimed at cleansing key religious Hindu sites of non-
Hindu elements, most notably neighboring mosques. This included a site devoted to 
Krishna in Mathura, a site to Shiva in Benares, and Ram’s celebrated birthplace in 
Ayodhya.28 In October of 1984, a Hindu procession—aimed at mobilizing support for 
“reclaiming” Ram’s birthplace—made its way through several northern Indian states.29 
The procession was interrupted en route to Delhi, however, when a Sikh bodyguard 
assassinated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in retaliation for Operation Blue Star, a federal 
                                                 
26 Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pg. 290 
27 Elst, pp. 145-154 
28 Elst, pg. 151; Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pg. 292 
29 Van der Veer, “God Must Be Liberated,” pg. 290 
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raid on the Sikh Golden Temple in Amristar.30 In 1985, the VHP organized another 
procession across northern India, this time carrying life-sized depictions of Ram and Sita 
behind bars.31 Amidst these campaigns, the district court of Faizabad ruled in favor of a 
Hindu-sponsored petition to allow the Babri Mosque to be unlocked and opened to the 
public, triggering riots throughout the country. 32  
In 1989, during the Kumbha Mela, a Hindu religious festival, several groups 
formed a plan to build a Hindu temple at the site of the Babri Mosque.33 Towards this 
end, the VHP initiated a Ramshilla, the gathering of sacred bricks from all over India 
with which to build the new temple. In addition to gathering bricks from across the 
country, bricks were also brought from as far as the US, Canada, and the Caribbean. 34 An 
estimated 300 people were killed in riots connected with the procession of bricks to 
Ayodhya.35 On November 9th, the procession reached Ayodhya and kar sevaks, Hindu 
“volunteers” or activists, were allowed to lay the corner stone in the ritual of shilanyas.36 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, during his election campaign, backed the procession and 
even laid a stone himself.37  
In 1990, Hindu activists called for a chariot procession through ten states with the 
goal of raising support for the construction of a Hindu temple at the site of the Babri 
Mosque. The military blocked the procession on the outskirts of Ayodhya and Lal 
Krishna Advani, the leader of the Hindu nationalist political party the Bharatiya Janata 
                                                 
30 Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., “India in 1984: Confrontation, Assassination, and Succession,” pp. 131-144, 
Asia Survey, Vol. 25, No. 2, (February, 1985), pg. 133 
31 Elst, pg. 152 
32 Thakur, pg. 655; Peter Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, pg. 3 
33 Elst, pg. 154 
34 Elst, pg. 155 
35 Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, pg. 4; Elst, pp. 156-157  
36 Elst, pp. 158-159 
37 Van der Veer, Religious Nationalism, pg. 3; Thakur, pg. 655 
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Party (BJP), was arrested.38 An estimated 30 Hindus were killed in clashes with the 
military, later to be called martyrs for Ayodhya.39 Despite the involvement of BJP leaders 
in the controversial procession, the party won 119 seats in the 1991 national elections and 
nearly 20% of the overall vote. Moreover, the BJP won state elections in Uttar Pradesh 
(Ayodhya’s state), Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajastan. 40  
On December 6, 1992, an estimated 300,000 Hindu activists gathered in Ayodhya 
for a rally. The activists stormed the Babri Mosque, destroying it in a matter of hours. 
The incident ignited nation-wide riots that left 1,700 to 3,000 killed and over 5,500 
injured.41  Neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh also experienced riots in reaction to the 
mosque’s destruction; Hindu temples were attacked in both countries.42 In response to the 
Ayodhya incident, the Indian federal government restricted Hindus from entering the 
mosque, dismissed the BJP- led governments in their four ruling states, banned three 
Hindu activists groups—the VHP, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS—in addition to two 
Muslim group, and called for the reconstruction of the mosque.43 In 1993, however, 
district courts allowed Hindus to resume their worship of Ram on the site of the 
demolished mosque. The mosque has yet to be rebuilt and the status of the site remains 
contested with Hindu activists vowing to build a temple on the ruins of where the Babri 
Mosque once stood. 
                                                 
38 Barbara Stoler Miller, “Presidential Address: Contending Narratives—The Political Life of the Indian 
Epics,” The Journal of Asian Studies, pp. 783-792, vol. 50, no. 4 (November, 1991), pg. 789; Van der Veer, 
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42 Mahmood Monshipouri, “Backlash to the Destruction at Ayodhya,” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 7, (July, 
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In December 2000, on the eighth anniversary of the mosque’s destruction, India’s 
parliament censured Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, a member of the BJP, after he 
stated that a Hindu temple should be built on the ruins of the Babri Mosque and that this 
was an “expression of national sentiment.”44  In March 2002, prior to the tenth 
anniversary of the mosque’s destruction, Hindu kar sevaks traveling from a rally in 
Ayodhya through the state of Gujarat were attacked by an angry mob. Their train was set 
on fire, killing all of the passengers. In retaliation, riots broke out in Gujarat, leading to 
the deaths of at least 2,000, mostly Muslims.45 Finally, in March 2003, the government 
announced plans to excavate the site at Ayodhya with the intent of answering if a temple 
had once stood where the ruins of the mosque now lay. The preliminary findings show 
that there is no evidence to support the claim of a temple on the mosque’s site.46 
Explaining the Variations of Violence and Peace Over Ayodhya 
 This chronology reveals that violence over the contested sites in Ayodhya has not 
been constant but, rather, has gone through several waves of peace and unrest. In 
particular, there are three prominent incidents of Hindu-Muslim violence surrounding 
Ayodyha. The first episode was the Sunni- led charge against Ayodhya’s Hanumangarhi 
Temple in 1853 and 1855, the first recorded Hindu-Muslim violence at the site. The 
second incident occurred just after Partition, in 1949. And the third wave of violence 
began in 1986 and has continued to the present. In contrast, the Ayodhya chronology 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 Manju Parikh, “The Debacle at Ayodhya: Why Militant Hinduism Met with a Weak Response,” pp. 673-
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reveals three periods of relative calm: first, from the time of the mosque’s construction in 
1528 to 1853; second, from 1856 until 1949; and third, from 1950 until 1986. Drawing on 
the causal argument from chapter two, this section will ask the following questions 
surrounding these episodes of violence: Is there an identifiable threat or the perception of 
a threat to which the violent parties are responding? What are the material resources 
available to the involved religious groups? And what is the relationship between political 
and religious leaders? 
The peace of 1528-1853. The violence of 1853-1855. 
 This section considers the absence of Hindu-Muslim violence over Ayodhya from 
the time of the mosque’s construction in 1528 until the first recorded outbreak of violence 
over sacred sites in 1853-1855. It argues, first, that the initial period of calm was marked 
by Hindu-Muslim elite cooperation, including shared religious holidays and cross-
patronage to religious sites. The outbreak of violence in 1853 is best explained by the 
decline of Sunni political authority in the region in general, coupled with the rise of Sunni 
revivalist movements in the region calling for internal reform and holy war against 
“infidels.” The end of violence in 1856 came with British political and military 
annexation of the region.    
The absence of recorded violence from the time of the Babri Mosque’s 
construction in 1528 until 1853 reflects a period of relative calm and cooperation 
between Hindus and Muslims throughout the region. As mentioned in the chronology, the 
reign of Sunni Mughal Emperors Babur (1526-1530) but particularly the rule of Akbar 
(1556-1605), Jahanjir (1605-1627), and Sha Jahan (1627-1657) are recorded as periods of 
religious cohabitation and cultural prosperity. It was during this time that poetry, music, 
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architecture and art flourished in India, drawing from both Islamic and Hindu motifs.47 In 
this era Islamic and Hindu religious feasts were co-celebrated, Muslim Sufi saints’ tombs 
were patroned by Muslims and Hindus alike, the emperors upheld Hindu tenets such as 
bans on cow slaughter and employed numerous Hindu elites in their courts.48  Moreover, 
these emperors chose to abolish religious taxes on non-Muslims, the jizya tax, and 
relaxed the scope of Shari’a law to family and personal matters, fostering a more peaceful 
coexistence between Sunni and Shia Muslims.49 It is important to note, however, that 
there were groups that criticized this religious cooperation during this era. In particular, 
Muslim religious clerics, the Ulama, called for the imposition of Shari’a law and more 
“orthodox” Islamic practices. In addition, the Naqshbandiyah Sufi order, formed in the 
beginning of the 16th century, opposed shared rituals and Sufi tomb worship.50 
Nevertheless, the era was marked by religious accommodation and coexistence between 
Hindus and Muslims.  
This era of religious cohabitation and cooperation came to an end with the 
ascendancy of Aurangzeb (1657-1707) to the Mughal throne. Aurangzeb—who rose to 
power by killing two of his brothers and imprisoning his father Shah Jahan until his death 
in 1666—formed an alliance with the Ulama to consolidate power.51  Together they 
sought to restore “orthodox” Islam to the empire. Aurangzeb re- imposed the jizya tax on 
non-Muslims, reinstated Shari’a penal laws, and encouraged conversion to Islam. 52 He 
executed the Sikh leader Guru Govind Singh, which, in turned, fueled the creation of a 
                                                 
47 Paul Hardy, The Muslims of British India, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) pp. 17-18 
48 Hardy, pp. 19-25 
49 Hardy, pg. 24. Sunni and Shia Muslims adhere to different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, which can 
lead to conflicts on religious, social and political matters. See Pearl, Chapter 1: “The Historical 
Development of Islamic Law.” 
50 Hardy, pp. 27-28  
51 Hardy, pg. 26 
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religious warrior order, the Sikh Khalsa.53  In addition, he embarked on numerous 
unsuccessful military campaigns, which drained the financial and military power of the 
empire. Battles against the Hindu Marathas were particularly destructive to the empire. 
These battles created stories of Hindu warrior monks who defeated the Mughal armies, 
tales that would reemerge in 19th and 20th century Hindu Nationalist rhetoric as examples 
of Hindu power and strength. 54 The weakened state of the empire led to an internal power 
struggle for succession after Aurangzeb’s death and allowed for other rulers to take 
regions that the empire could no longer defend. This included Shia Muslim Nawabs’ 
capture of Awadh in 1722. 
 The decline of the Mughal Empire sparked several Islamic revivalist movements 
on the subcontinent aimed at both explaining the cause of the empire’s decline and the 
path to its redemption. Two Islamic revivalist leaders in particular are important for 
understanding the milieu in which Sunni Muslims of Awadh rose to challenge the Hindu 
presence at Ayodhya. First, Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1702-1762) argued that the 
Mughal Empire had fallen into decline because its leaders had turned away from the true 
nature of Islam.55 The path to restoration lay in reviving “pure” Islam modeled after the 
example of the Prophet and his companions. Specifically, restoration required a return to 
Shari’a law formulated by freshly applying the words and deeds of the Prophet as 
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recorded in the Sunnah. 56 As a member of the Naqshbandiyah Sufi order, he argued that 
revival also required reforming Sufi practices to exclude the worship of saints’ tombs and 
rituals that incorporated Hindu elements. Wali Allah further stressed the importance of an 
elected caliphate for governing the ummah, in opposition to Shia practices of leadership 
through bloodline from the Prophet. Finally, he called for jihad against threats to the 
faith.57  
 Wali Allah’s reformist agenda paved the way for the creation of a jihadist 
movement of Sunni Muslims under the leadership of Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly (1786-
1831).58  Like Wali Allah, Saiyid Ahmad was a member of the Naqshbandiyah order, in 
addition to two other prominent Sufi orders, the Chisti and Qadiri. 59 Prior to forming his 
jihad movement, Saiyid Ahmad was a trooper under the Pindari Chieftain Ahir Khan, 
which was defeated by the British in 1818.60 In that same year, he founed a revivalist 
movement called “the Path of Muhammad,” and asserted that “true” Muslims should 
form a new polity. 61 In 1826, after organizing a band of mujihideen, soldiers of God, he 
declared war against Sikhs in the Northwest Frontier with the aim of capturing their land 
and establishing a Muslim stronghold; this offensive, however, ended in failure. In 1830, 
Saiyid Ahmad defeated the Shia ruler of Peshawar, Yar Muhammad Khan, and declared 
himself the new Muslim Caliph. In 1831, with an army of around 600, Saiyid Ahmad 
                                                 
56 The debate over how to formulate and apply Shari’a  law created a schism in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
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tried again to push the Sikhs out of Hazara and Kashmir, but was killed in battle.62 
Surviving members of the Path of Muhammad continued to hide out in the Northwestern 
Territories and fought against the British in the Frontier Wars of 1897-1898, before 
finally being defeated.63 
It was in this milieu that the Sunni leaders in Awadh attempted two attacks on a 
Hindu temple in Ayodhya. First, the Sunni Ghulam Husain rallied a band of Muslims 
around the battle cry that Hindus in Ayodhya had destroyed a mosque and built the 
Hanumanghari Temple on its site, an offense that required force to take back the space. 
The Muslims, numbering around 500, attempted to storm the temple but were repelled by 
Nagas, Hindu warrior monks.  Around 70 Muslims were killed in the attack and their 
bodies were buried in the graveyard next to the Babri Mosque.64  
The Shia Nawab King, together with the British, attempted to resolve the dispute 
by investigating Muslim claims of Hindu destruction of the mosque. They concluded that 
there had not been a mosque on that site.65 This, however, did not placate the Sunni 
leader Maulvi Amir-ud-din, also known as Amir ‘Ali, who declared jihad on the Hindus 
of Ayodhya in 1855 and mobilized a band of 2,000 Muslims to take the Hanumangarhi 
Temple.66 The band was stopped en route to Ayodhya by combined forces of British, 
Nawab, and Hindu troops; these forces suffered casualties estimated between 120 to 700 
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before finally defeating Amir ‘Ali’s troops.67 Amir ‘Ali was assassinated shortly after the 
attack; his head was given as a gift to the Nawab King and his body was buried in the 
graveyard next to the Babri Mosque.68 The British officially annexed Awadh shortly after 
this uprising, erected a fence around the Babri Mosque, and allowed Hindus to worship 
on a platform outside the fence. 
Although the British were essentially ruling Awadh at the time of these attacks 
and thus recording events in the region, there is considerable debate over what happened 
between Hindus and Muslims. Several accounts state that the two attacks took place in 
1855, although some argue that the first attack, led by Husain, occurred in 1853 and the 
second attack, headed by Amir ‘Ali, took place in 1855.69 However, all sources agree that 
the violence over the sites in Ayodhya ended when the British formally annexed Awadh 
in February of 1856 and separated the religious groups’ sacred spaces. Furthermore, most 
sources agree that the Sunnis mobilized in response to a rumor that Hindus had destroyed 
a mosque in order to build a temple, but there does not appear to be a clear understanding 
on the origins or timing of this rumor. It is worth noting, however, that rumors of 
destroyed mosques and temples have fueled violence in all three of the disturbances over 
Ayodhya examined in this chapter, not just in 1853-1855. Therefore, these rumors appear 
to be powerful inspiration for mobilization and violent action. 
The 1853-1855 episodes of violence have aspects both unique and typical to the 
overall Ayodhya dispute. This outbreak of Hindu-Muslim violence is unique, first, in that 
                                                 
67 ibid 
68 ibid 
69 For example, Sushil Srivastava, looking at several accounts of the events made by British officers, argues 
that the two battles occurred in 1853 and 1855, pg. 42. Van der Veer, “God Must be Liberated,” pp. 288-
289; and Panikkar, pp. 30-31, on the other hand, argue that both events occurred in 1855.   
 242 
 
 
Muslims were accusing Hindus of destroying a mosque in order to build a temple. In 
other words, the accusation is reve rsed from later claims in which Hindus argue that 
Muslims destroyed a temple in order to build the mosque. Second, the disputed site is not 
the Babri Mosque in this outbreak; rather, it is a neighboring temple. During the first 
round of clashes, it is recorded that Hindu fighters captured and occupied the Babri 
Mosque but then vacated the space when the conflict ended.70 This suggests that taking 
the Babri Mosque was not on the agenda of Hindus in Ayodhya at this time. Third, this 
episode of violence involved tensions between Shia Muslim leaders, who were the 
custodians of Ayodhya, and Sunni Muslim rebels. Therefore, in addition to the Sunni 
attack challenging the presence of Hindus in Ayodhya, these attacks also involved 
fighting within Islam’s factions. In contrast, Sunni and Shia tensions are not visible in 
subsequent clashes over the site. Fourth, this particular episode is unique in that it was a 
localized outbreak; violence over the disputed space did not lead to violence in other 
regions in South Asia. This is not the case in future clashes over Ayodhya. 
The 1853-1855 violence over sacred space in Ayodyha, however, does have 
elements that conform to the causal argument proposed in this dissertation. First, the 
aggressors—Sunni religious leaders in and around Ayodhya—organized groups in 
response to general and specific threats. As part of a larger movement of Islamic revival 
occurring on the subcontinent, these groups were reacting to the general threat of decline 
in Sunni political power and the perceived threats imposed by rulers such as the Shia 
Nawabs, the British, and Hindu groups. Ayodhya was no exception to this trend. 
Historians note that Hindu monastic orders in Ayodhya flourished under Nawab rule, 
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becoming numerous and wealthy by the 1800s.71 Coupled with the rise of British 
influence in the region, the Sunni elites of Awadh, once in a position of power, could see 
their decline relative to their neighbors.  
Moreover, this violent challenge to the status quo in Ayodhya occurred within the 
greater milieu of radical Islamic revivalism on the Subcontinent. It came in the midst of 
Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly’s call for jihad to defend the faith, as previously described. 
This era also saw violent Islamic uprisings in Bengal including the Muslim leader Titu 
Mir, who fought against British occupation. 72 Therefore, calls for jihad and violent 
Muslim uprisings were not unique at this time. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that 
the 1853-1855 uprisings occurred around the time of the last attempt of Mughal political 
elites to shake off the British and restore power, manifested in the 1857 uprising. This, 
like the attacks on the Hanumangarhi Temple, ended in defeat and the mass annexation of 
the subcontinent to British rule.73 Therefore, both religious and political elites were 
reacting to a general sense of threat to their power, their land, and their faith. 
Within these general perceptions of threat, there was a specific threat that helps 
explain why violence occurred at this time, namely the rumor that a mosque had been 
destroyed to build the Hanumangarhi Temple. Although it is not clear who started the 
rumor, it does appear that it was a power force for mobilizing men to fight a jihad both 
against Hindus at the site and against Nawab leaders, whom the Sunnis accused of not 
protecting the city’s Muslim sites.  
                                                 
71 See for example, Van der Veer, Gods on Earth; and Bakker, Ayodhya  
72 For more details on Titu Mir, see Rudolph Peters, Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in 
Modern History, (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979), pp.44-53 
73 For a summary of the 1857 uprising, see Hardy, Chapter 3: “1857 and its Aftermath,” pp. 61-91 
 244 
 
 
Second, the Sunni leaders’ call for jihad succeeded in mobilizing a modest force 
of Sunni Muslims in the area, which was their greatest asset. As previously mentioned, 
Ghulam Husain is reported to have rallied a band of around 500 men and Amir ‘Ali, a 
force of around 2,000. While both of these movements proved unsuccessful in taking the 
Hanumangarhi Temple, they did succeed in disrupting the peace, forcing the intervention 
of Hindu, Nawab, and British troops, and accruing considerable bloodshed. Amir ‘Ali’s 
attack in particular is reported to have caused hundreds of casualties within their own 
ranks in addition to the near destruction of the British First Regiment of the Avadh [sic] 
Irregular Infantry. 74 These two attacks also provided the occasion for Britain’s official 
annexation of the area. Therefore, these leaders’ succeeded in mobilizing forces for 
religious action that posed a threat to the status quo. 
However, the relationship between religious and political leaders does not 
conform to the predictions stated at the beginning of the chapter. Religious and political 
elites were not collaborating on these attacks but, rather, were at odds. Moreover, not 
only were religious and political leaders at odds but religious leaders targeted political 
leaders in their campaign.  After the successful defeat of Amir ‘Ali, his head was brought 
to the Nawab King as vindication for the trouble the uprising had caused within his 
domain. Therefore, religious leaders did not have the resources of the state to help 
achieve their aims.  
Finally, it is important to state that the 1853-1855 attacks on the Hanumangarhi 
Temple were not exclusively religious. The attacks involved underlying social and 
political factors, such as the loss of status, demographic changes, and reduction in 
political clout. However, the actions taken in attempts to reverse these social and political 
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factors were saliently religious. They involved the use of religious logic for the cause of 
decline and religious action to restore that loss. The actions were not against military 
outposts, governmental offices, or economic centers but rather against religious 
institutions and property. Therefore, religion was not just an opportunity to vent social 
and political frustrations; rather the grievances were saliently religious. 
The troubled peace of 1856-1948. The violence of 1949. 
 This section explores the troubled peace of Ayodhya under British rule, from 
1856 until Partition in 1947, followed by the appearance of Hindu idols in the Babri 
Mosque on the night of December 22-23, 1949, which sparked riots throughout India and 
prompted the federal government to lock the mosque and place military guards at its 
doors. It argues that the troubled peace—disrupted by several minor clashes—is best 
explained by British attempts to manage the Ayodhya dispute through a combination of 
separating religious space between Hindus and Muslims and by driving the dispute into 
the courts and away from the streets. The 1949 disturbance at Ayodhya, instigated by 
Hindus, is the result of mobilized Hindu activists seizing on a window of opportunity 
presented by post-Partition India—particularly the transfer of Muslim organizations and 
groups to Pakistan, which left Ayodhya and other Muslim sites vulnerable—rather than 
action prompted by threat. Violence over the mosque ended with the government 
intervening and closing the site to all.  
 The end of open hostilities over Ayodhya from 1856-1949 is best explained by 
two factors. First, British annexation of Awadh took the dispute over sacred space out of 
the Nawab’s hands and made it a concern of the colonial authorities. The British had far 
greater resources to control the problem including a strong and well organized military 
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and a legal process aimed at solving disputes through litigation. The combination of 
military and legal presence drove the Ayodhya conflict into the courts. In 1885, a Hindu 
Mahant, religious leader, filed a petition with the Secretary of State for India in Council 
asking permission for Hindus to build a temple on the platform next to the mosque; the 
plea was rejected on the grounds that altering the status quo could disrupt the peace.75 In 
1936, Sunni and Shia Muslim Waqf boards—religious leaders charged with maintenance 
of Muslim religious property—began litigation to determine whether the Babri Mosque 
was Sunni or Shia. The judge determined, inconclusively, that Sunnis built the mosque 
but that both sects had prayed there throughout its history. These legal battles, therefore, 
did little to resolve tensions of ownership, maintenance and visitation rights to these 
sacred sites in Ayodhya. 
Second, Hindu and Muslim religious and political leaders lacked the social and 
material resources to challenge either British authority or each other over Ayodhya. This 
situation began to change towards the end of the 1800s, however, with the creation of 
Hindu and Muslim societies, religious movements and political organizations. These 
groups organized religious and political leaders, their demands, and their constituents, 
allowing for challenges to the status quo, which included a challenge to the status of 
Ayodhya in 1949. This point will be discussed further below. 
The December 1949 Hindu attempt to take the Babri Mosque is the result of four 
major developments within Hindu-Muslim relations in South Asia: the construction and 
calcification of communal identities; the creation of separate Hindu and Muslim 
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“societies;” the formation of political organizations and parties along communal lines; 
and the partition of the Subcontinent into Pakistan and India. The Partition, in particular, 
depleted Muslim resources in India and created a window of opportunity for Hindu 
activists bent on challenging the status quo in Ayodhya.  
The emergence of communalism in India—individual and group identity based on 
religious affiliation—has received great attention from academia. Most scholars agree 
that communalism is a modern phenomenon and is largely the product of British 
influence on the Subcontinent. Historian Aditya Mukherjee identifies six conditions that 
he argues led to the formation of communal identities: the uneven development between 
Hindu and Muslim middle and upper classes; the British administration’s decision to 
replace the language used by the Mughal Empire, Persian, with English as the language 
of the government; uneven opportunities for English language and higher education 
favoring Hindus; British suppression of Muslim elites due to the 1857 uprising; overall 
economic stagnation; and the emergence of competition between Hindu and Muslim 
elites for government posts in the British administration. 76   
In addition to these six factors, communal identity sharpened with British census 
taking in India, which began in 1871. The census measured populations according to 
religious affiliation, thus strengthening emerging communal consciousness. Censuses 
demonstrated to both Hindus and Muslims their relative numbers in certain regions. For 
example, Muslims became painfully aware of their minority status in the North, where 
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they used to rule over most of the Subcontinent.77 Likewise, Hindus in Punjab became 
aware of their declining numbers relative to Muslims, fueling a sense of threat among 
Hindus, particularly elites in this region. 78 The emergence of communalism, therefore, 
divided Hindus and Muslims in 19th century India along religious lines, reorganizing 
society in a way that would affect relations between the two groups and the struggle over 
Ayodhya. 
Growing communal awareness prompted the creation of professiona l associations 
and societies, usually with the aim of strengthening identity and society within religiously 
defined groups, not across groups. One of the earliest societies formed along communal 
lines was the Brahmo Samaj, “the society of Brahma,” which began among Hindu elites 
in Calcutta. This society, which aimed to create Hindu identity based on the authority of 
the Vedic scriptures, lasted only briefly then dissolved over ideological disputes.79  
In 1875, Hindu religious leaders in Punjab formed the Arya Samaj, which 
flourished under the leadership of Swami Dayanada Sarasvati (1824-1883) and was 
headquartered in Lahore (now in Pakistan).80 As with the Bramho Samaj, the Arya Samaj 
attempted to use the Vedic texts as the cornerstone for Hindu national identity. While 
important to Brahmans, these texts were not part of the religious beliefs and practices of 
the masses. Therefore, this approach was only moderately successful in mobilizing 
Hindus for national cohesion. 
The Arya Samaj did succeed, however, in asserting protective measures around a 
commonly held Hindu belief—the sacredness of the cow. Their efforts to impose policies 
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aimed at preventing cow slaughter cut right along communal lines. In particular, Muslims 
were accustomed to slaughtering cows on the feast of Bakr-Id, the day commemorating 
Isaac’s willingness to slaughter his son Ishmael in obedience to God. God spared Ishmael 
by providing an animal to be slaughtered in his place. Thus Muslims slaughter an animal 
in commemoration of God’s mercy in sparing Ishmael. 81 Dayananda, the head of the 
Arya Samaj, formed the Gaurakhshini Sabha in 1882, or the Society for the Protection of 
the Cow. 82 The following year, cow related riots occurred in Lahore, Aballa District, 
Firuzpur, and Delhi.83 Cow related rioting occurred again in 1886, 1889, and 1912, the 
last of which included Ayodhya among other places. In 1932, cow related riots caused the 
deaths of hundreds to thousands of Muslims in Ayodhya. Therefore, although the Arya 
Samaj was not successful in creating a unified movement of Hinduism formed around the 
Vedas, it did succeed in stirring violent passions over the issue of cow slaughter. 
Another organization that is important for understanding Hindu mobilization is 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), formed in 1925 by K.B. Hedgewar, a 
physician by training.  Hedgewar founded the RSS as neither a religious organization nor 
as a political party, but rather as a Hindu cultural movement designed to provide 
“discipline and revitalization” to its members.84 Hedgewar argued that Hindus had fallen 
into a state of personal and national weakness, allowing their land and people to be 
occupied by foreign forces, first by Muslims for 1,200 years and then by Britain. Hindu 
weakness, therefore, had to be overcome in order to assert independence. The RSS 
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lionized Hindu warrior monks of the early 18th century, who defended the community 
against Aurengzeb’s forces, as examples of Hindu might necessary for transforming the 
nation. 
Hedgewar argued that actions, not beliefs, are what makes one a Hindu. The 
movement’s practices, therefore, stressed physical training, strength and discipline. As a 
fraternity, it targeted boys between the ages of 11 to 15.85 Although Hedgewar rejected 
Hindu texts as the basis for national identity, the RSS drew heavily on religious festivals, 
beliefs and symbols for mobilization. 86  Despite this, it is important to note that the RSS 
was formed not as an organization exclusive to Hindus but, rather, made a distinction 
between “indigenous” religions of India—Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism—
and “foreign” religions such as Islam, Christianity (the religions of India’s occupiers) and 
Judaism. The RSS advocated that Indians who practiced these religions were the product 
of foreign occupation; they, therefore, needed to return to their true religious beliefs, most 
likely Hinduism, in order to be bona fide Indians. Thus, although a cultural organization, 
their identity boundaries were drawn by religious distinctions. The RSS has become one 
of the most important societies connected to the rise of Hindu nationalism and, as will be 
described, has played a major role in events relating to the violent contestation of 
Ayodhya.  
Muslim elites also formed institutions and societies around this time; however 
they were divided over how to organize and for what ends. This division led to the 
creation of two broad political movements. The first group, inspired by the jihads of 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Gold, pg. 540; Jaffrelot, pp. 33-79 
85 Ainslie T. Embree, “The Function of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh: To Define the Hindu Nation,” 
Accounting for Fundamentalisms, pp. 617-652, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pg. 628 
86 Gold, pg. 548 
 251 
 
 
Bareilly and Titu Mir, called for Muslims to return to the “true” path of Islam, including 
adherence to the Five Pillars and maintenance of Shari’a law. Furthermore, they argued 
that British rule should be resisted and Muslims should work to end their occupation of 
India.  In 1867, this group founded the Deobandi College with the aim of educating 
Indian Muslims in orthodox practices of Islam. Proponents of this path remained small, 
but still exist on the subcontinent today. 87   
Second, a larger group of Muslim intellectuals headed by Sir Saiyid Ahmad 
Khan—perhaps the most prominent Muslim elite of this era—aimed to gain resources for 
Muslims by working within the British system rather than opposing it. In 1875, they 
founded Aligarh University, a school of higher learning for Muslims that taught skills 
important for attaining governmental jobs, such as English. 88  In 1877, another prominent 
Muslim, Saiyd Amir ‘Ali, founded the National Mahommedan Association with the aim 
of encouraging the British to promote Muslims in governmental posts.89 Also in the 
1880s, Muslim associations were formed in Amristar, Bareilly, Lucknow, Bombay, and 
Lahore.90 In 1888, Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan founded the Muhammadan Educational 
Conference in order to push for greater British resources for Muslim education. 91 In 
1906, the Muhammadan Educational Conference became the All- India Muslim League, 
which aimed to establish greater Muslims representation in the political sphere.92 Their 
efforts resulted in the creation of Muslim quotas within the government in 1909.93 
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Alongside the formation of societies, both Hindus and Muslims also created 
newspapers and other forms of print media aimed at informing and strengthening identity 
within their groups. Sir Sayid Ahmad Khan began the Tahzib al-Akhlaq in 1872, 
followed by similar publications in Lucknow and Lahore, including The Pioneer, which 
was widely circulated among Muslim elites.94 Several Hindu books published around the 
turn of the 20th century were also critical for the development of a separate Hindu 
consciousness. In particular, Savarakar’s book Hinduvta, which he wrote in 1910 while 
imprisoned for anti-British rhetoric, became important for Hindu Nationalism. 95 In the 
1920s, the RSS founded The Organiser, which continues to have a wide circulation 
today. 
Also during this time, Hindus and Muslims attempted to gain greater political 
power through the creation of a unified movement. In 1885, Hindu elites in Bombay 
called the first meeting of the Indian National Congress.96 The Indian National Congress 
aimed to unify all elites of India, not just Hindus, with the aim of ending British rule; this 
bid, however, was soon rejected by Saiyid Amir ‘Ali and the National Mahommedan 
Association. 97 Both Amir ‘Ali and Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan believed that British rule 
could not be dislodged from the Subcontinent and, therefore, Muslims should work 
towards improving their status and resources within the British system. They argued that 
agitating for total independence was futile and would only weaken the chances of 
improving the Muslims’ status with the British. 98  Although there were Muslim elites 
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who participated in Indian National Congress meetings, it suffered without the support of 
Amir ‘Ali and Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan. 99 
Again in 1920, under the leadership of Gandhi, the Indian National Congress 
attempted to unify Hindus and Muslims and oppose British rule through acts of civil 
disobedience in the “Non-cooperation Movement.” Gandhi joined forces with the 
Khalifat movement—a pan-Muslim effort to preserve the office of the Caliphate and 
protect Muslim religious sites—in order to mobilize the masses across the Hindu-Muslim 
divide.100 Gandhi, however, drew heavily on Hindu resources—symbols, texts, and 
practices—which alienated Muslims from the movement. The Non-cooperation 
Movement, therefore, while enjoying initial success, lasted only briefly and dissolved by 
1925.101 
In addition to these joint efforts at political mobilization, Hindus and Muslims 
also formed political organizations and parties that had expressly religious goals. These 
religious groups were formed largely in reaction to the secular nature of the more 
prominent Hindu and Muslim political organizations, such as Indian National Congress 
and the All- India Muslim League. The Hindu religious society, the Arya Samaj, became 
more active in politics in the beginning of the 20th century, particularly in reaction to the 
numerical and economic decline of Hindus in Punjab. These political concerns prompted 
the creation of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, which was particularly active in the 
1920s.102 This party died out, however, after it lost its headquarters in Lahore to Pakistan.  
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Muslim political movements and parties also began to assert their agendas during 
this time. In 1919, the trans-national Muslim Khalifat movement took root in South Asia, 
which was effective in mobilizing Muslim elites and making their presence felt in South 
Asia.103 The Khalifat movement was short lived, however, and died out in 1925. In 1941, 
keeping with the Deobandi tradition, Mawlana Mawdudi founded the Jamaat-i-Islami 
party, largely in reaction to the secular agenda of the Muslim League and its leader, 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah argued for the creation of an independent state in South 
Asia in which Muslims, as an ethnic category, would be the majority, thus ensuring their 
survival. Mawdudi argued that the creation of a state was not enough; the government 
and its people needed to affirm and uphold the tenets of Islam, particularly Shari’a law, in 
order to ensure the survival of “real” Muslims.104 However, from the 1937 elections in 
India until the time of Partition, the majority of Muslims backed the agenda of the 
Muslim League, not Jamaat-i-Islami.105 
Partition, however, was the critical event that changed the political and religious 
status quo in India and provided the opportunity for Hindu action against the Babri 
Mosque. The Partition of the subcontinent into the Muslim state of Pakistan and India, 
which was overwhelmingly Hindu, institutionalized the communalist divide. Most of the 
Indian Muslim groups formed prior to Partition moved to Pakistan, including Jinnah’s 
Muslim League, which was to form the first government in Pakistan, and Mawdudi’s 
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Jaamat-i-Islami party. This left Muslims within the borders of India and their interests 
vulnerable, including the status of Ayodhya.  
In this social and political environment, Hindu activists attempted to take the 
Babri Mosque via the fait accompli of placing Hindu idols in the mosque on the night of 
December 22-23, 1949. Hindu activists argued that the presence of idols required 
worship, which in turn demanded access to the mosque. The appearance of idols, 
therefore, succeeded in gaining Hindu activists a foothold into the Muslim site. However, 
despite the federal government’s proclamation and order to remove the idols, many 
Hindus believed that the idols appeared in the mosque by their own accord; it was a 
miraculous sign that Ram had taken back his own birthplace. For Muslims, this was an 
act of desecration. Idol worship—devotion to any human or animal figures—is strictly 
forbidden and is regarded as a breach of tawhid, the oneness of God. Therefore, the 
presence of the idols was an egregious violation to their faith. The resolution to lock the 
building, with the idols inside, did not end this religious offense, although it did quell the 
riots provoked by the incident.  
The 1949 outbreak of violence between Hindus and Muslims over the Babri 
Mosque in Ayodhya has characteristics that conform to the causal argument proposed in 
this dissertation. Most importantly, Hindus had considerable resources at their disposal in 
1949. Hindu nationalist organizations were still intact in post-Partition India, unlike 
Muslim organizations which had, by in large, moved to Pakistan. The RSS in particular 
was viewed as an influential force in Hindu nationalism and communalist rhetoric. Prior 
to the 1949 attack on the mosque, the RSS was blamed for inspiring Gandhi’s 
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assassination, although never proven to be directly connected to the perpetrator.106 
Nevertheless, the RSS was banned from February 1948 to July 1949.107 At the time of its 
censure, the RSS was estimated to have a core of 200,000 active members with a wider 
circle of 5 million sympathizers.108 Therefore, the RSS had the resources to mobilize 
large numbers of Hindus sympathetic to the Hindu nationalist agenda and was fingered as 
the most likely organization connected with the placement of idols inside the Babri 
Mosque and the riots that followed. 
However, the 1949 attack on the mosque diverges from the causal argument 
proposed in this chapter in three ways. First, the 1949 attempt to change the status quo is 
better understood as Hindu activists seizing upon opportunity rather than responding to 
threat. Muslims in India were politically and socially vulnerable after Partition. The 
majority of resources devoted to protecting and promoting Muslim rights on the 
subcontinent were invested in the creation of Pakistan. 109 Although portions of some 
groups remained, the Muslim community was at a disadvantage; they lacked the 
necessary resources to deter and protect Hindu advances on the mosque.110 Hindu activist 
seized on this opportunity of Muslim vulnerability and attempted to take the mosque in 
the absence of strong Muslim mobilization.  
Second, as with the first outbreak of Hindu-Muslim violence in 1853-1855, 
religious and political elites were not aligned on the attempt to take the Babri Mosque. In 
fact, Nehru’s government was hostile to Hindu actions at Ayodhya and took measures 
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aimed at returning the site to the status quo. Thus, Hindu activists did not have the 
resources of the state to aid in their agenda at Ayodhya. The government’s hostility 
towards the Hindu nationalist agenda was successful in ending the 1949 communal riots, 
but only partially successful in returning Ayodhya to the pre-1949 status quo. Therefore, 
although the federal government condemned the act, Hindu activists were partially 
successful in gaining a foothold into the mosque. 
Third, unlike the first disturbances in 1853-1855, controversy over Ayodhya 
resulted in nation-wide riots. One possible explanation for the scope and intensity of the 
riots is the persisting tensions surrounding Partition, which flared up with any issue 
involving communalism. Another possible explanation is that increases in media 
technology spread the news of events in Ayodhya more quickly and broadly than in the 
past, evoking emotions throughout the country. Nevertheless, the nation-wide sensitivity 
over Ayodhya in 1949 has persisted and become the norm. 
The peace of 1950-1986. The violence of 1986 to 2002. 
 This section covers the relative calm over Ayodhya from the time of mosque’s 
closure in 1950 until a district court ordered the mosque to be unlocked and open to the 
public in 1986, from which time there has been a constant stream of minor clashes 
between Hindus and Muslims over the site and two major outbreaks of violence, in 
December of 1992 and in March-July of 2002. This section argues that the erosion of the 
Congress party’s dominance and legitimacy, beginning in the 1970s, opened the door for 
other parties to enter mainstream politics in India, most notably Hindu nationalist parties, 
which have used Hinduism to mobilize mass support at the national level. In particular, 
Hindu nationalist groups have capitalized on the popularity of the Ramayana epic, 
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placing Ayodhya at the epicenter of the struggle to create Hindutva, a Hindu nation in 
India.  
As described in the previous section, the 1949 Hindu attempt to claim the Babri 
Mosque by placing idols inside the building ended with the federal government locking 
the mosque to all. This decision succeeded in quieting riots sparked by the events in 
Ayodhya but did not end the dispute over rights to its sacred spaces. The relative calm in 
Ayodhya of 1950-1986 is best explained by two connected factors: the dominance of the 
Congress party in Indian politics from 1947-1984; and the promotion of their version of 
Indian nationalism, which was predominantly areligious and attempted to be non-
communal. This brand of Indian nationalism took shape under the leadership of 
Jawaharlal Nehru, beginning in the 1920s, and became the dominant ideology after 
India’s independence.111 Nehru stressed industrialization and economic reform in his 
agenda for India, arguing that social classes—brought on by development—would 
supplant communalism. He further argued that popular participation in the democratic 
process together with liberal institutions and education would erode religious and ethnic 
identities. In its place would emerge a new Indian identity, one based on the democratic 
and economic values of the country, not on religion. 112  
Nehru’s vision, however, did not fully materialize. Instead of the democratic 
process supplanting religious, regional and caste identities, voting blocs emerged along 
these cleavages, reinforcing communalism. 113 Moreover, organizations and political 
parties formed in opposition to Nehru’s secular India, stressing that Hindu culture and 
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values should not be left out of the political process. Religious-nationalist political 
parties, however, remained on the fringe of political life until the advent of Indira 
Gandhi’s Emergency Rule of 1975-1977.114 When Emergency Rule was lifted, several 
parties opposed to the Congress party—including a Hindu nationalist party—joined 
forces to form the Janata Party. In the 1977 elections, the Janata Party won seats in the 
legislative assembly and received cabinet posts, bringing the Hindu nationalist agenda 
into the mainstream. 115 From this time, Hindu nationalism has grown in India, paving the 
way for Hindu activist support within the government, including the campaign to destroy 
the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya and erect a Hindu temple in its place. This shift in politics, 
therefore, helped to bring an end to the relative calm over Ayodhya. 
The success of the Hindu nationalist agenda in general, and the campaign to 
“liberate” Ayodhya from Muslim influence in particular, is primarily the result of three 
organizations in India: the Hindu cultural organization mentioned in the previous section, 
the RSS; the creation of Hindu nationalist political parties, first the Bharatiya Jana Sangh 
(BJS) and its successor the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); and, most importantly, the 
founding of an organization dominated by Hindu religious leaders, the Vishva Hindu 
Parishad (VHP). All of these organizations have used religious beliefs and practices for 
their own particular goals. All three groups have joined forces to work on the Ayodhya 
campaign. 
The RSS is perhaps the most important Hindu nationalist organization to survive 
Partition. Although banned from February 1948 until July of 1949 under suspicion of 
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aiding Gandhi’s assassin, the RSS has endured and, since the 1980s, flourished.116 The 
RSS has aided the Hindu nationalist bid in two important ways. First, it has exposed large 
numbers of Indians to its ideology and agenda. The organization runs camps, athletic 
events, and after school programs, targeting boys between the ages of eleven to fifteen. 
Attrition is high but many pass through the organization and are exposed to their 
worldview. 117 In addition, the RSS’s goals and ideology—strengthening Hindu society 
and culture—is broad enough to support a family of affiliate organizations with similar 
goals. This includes very loose ties to other organizations via individuals who have been 
affiliated with the RSS at some point, to groups that have RSS members working in the 
upper echelons—such as the BJP and VHP—to organizations that the RSS has created, 
such as the woman’s group Rashtra Sevika Samiti, university groups, and labor unions.118 
The RSS has also fostered international ties with Hindus in the diaspora.119 These ties 
have helped to spread Hindu nationalism across the worldwide Hindu population. 
Second, the RSS has influenced the Hindu nationalist agenda by throwing its 
support behind political parties sympathetic to its goals. The RSS stresses that it is not a 
political party but it also asserts that it participates in the political process and encourages 
its ranks to vote.120 In 1984, the Congress party, under Rajiv Gandhi, claimed to support 
RSS goals, earning RSS backing and the Congress party’s subsequent success in that 
year’s elections.121 In 1991, the RSS threw its weight behind the BJP, which supported 
the bid to build a Hindu temple on the site of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya.  The BJP did 
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exceedingly well, winning 119 seats in national elections and nearly 20% of the vote.122 
In addition, the BJP won state elections in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populated state and 
the location of Ayodhya, in addition to Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Rajastan. 123 Therefore, although not a political party, the RSS has demonstrated its ability 
to mobilize its supporters to affect the electoral process. 
The second set of organizations that is critical for understanding the rise of Hindu 
nationalism and battles over Ayodhya are Hindu nationalist political parties, particularly 
the BJS and its successor the BJP. The BJS was founded on October 21, 1951 by Dr. 
Prashad Mookerjee, a former member of the Hindu Mahasabha party. 124 The party argued 
that Nehru’s government favored minorities, particularly Muslims, and that this was 
detrimental to the Hindu majority; a party was needed, therefore, to counter this trend. 
After creating the BJS, Dr. Mookerjee sought the backing of the RSS, which it believed 
would provide the party with mass support.125 In 1952, the BJS received 3.06% of the 
vote for the Lok Sabha (the lower house). By 1967, it had received 9.41% of the vote.126  
In the face of rising corruption in the Congress party during the 1970s, the BJS stressed 
“value based politics,” rallying anti-Congress, anti-corruption groups throughout the 
country. In 1977, Indira Gandhi imposed Emergency Rule, banning the BJS and RSS, 
and imprisoning their members. With the end of Emergency Rule in 1977, the BJS joined 
the Janata Party, a coalition of political parties and movements, which enjoyed initial 
success in the 1977 elections.127 After weak election results in 1980, the BJS broke with 
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the Janata Party and formed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
as its founding president.128 
The BJP has followed on the rhetoric of the BJS to stress value-based politics, 
arguing that the crises facing India are due to moral decay. The party uses Gandhi’s 
philosophy as the cornerstone of its new political ideology, stressing the importance of 
Hindu culture and spirituality for creating a just society and government, what the party 
calls “humanistic liberalism.”129 The BJP argues that secularism, as expressed by the 
Congress party, is both alien and corrupt to the true nature of India and Indian people. 
The BJP capitalizes on two terms in particular, Hindutva, which means the Hindu nation, 
and Bharat, which they cite as the ancient name for India. The BJP’s platform, therefore, 
calls for India to return to its pre-conquered, organic state and to base its government on 
justice inspired by Hindu culture and spirituality. 
It is important to note that the majority of key members in the BJP have ties to the 
RSS. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP’s first president and current prime minister of India, 
was a former regional leader in the RSS. Lal Krishnan Advani, who has been president of 
the BJP since 1986, was a journalist for the RSS publication The Organiser.130  In 
addition to their ties with the RSS, most members of the BJP come from the upper or 
middle castes, are highly educated (many of whom hold post-graduate degrees), and over 
60% of current members’ fathers were active in the BJS.131 As previously mentioned, the 
RSS has also been critical for BJP electoral success, endorsing their campaigns in 1989 
and 1991. 
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The third organization, the VHP, is perhaps the most important organization for 
explaining why Ayodhya has become the epicenter of Hindu nationalism and the target of 
Hindu violence. The VHP was created at a conference of 150 Hindu religious leaders on 
August 29, 1964, in Bombay, on the birthday of the avatar Krishna.132 The overall goal 
of the VHP is to create a unified and organized version of Hinduism.133  The VHP aims to 
make this unified version of Hinduism the national religion and defining element of 
India. The VHP has sought to implement this goal, first, by shoring up differences 
between the Vaishnava and Shaiva strains within Hinduism and to minimize competition 
within orders.134 Second, the VHP has aimed to work within tribal and backward caste 
areas and bring them formally into the fold of Hinduism. Third, the VHP has sought to 
incorporate Hindus around the globe into its movement, opening up chapters in countries 
such as Trinidad, the US and Canada.135 In this last aim, the VHP has also encouraged 
Hindus in the diaspora to fund projects in India and abroad, which is believed to be a 
considerable source of revenue for the movement.136 
The VHP has links with both the RSS and BJP, which strengthens these 
organizations’ efforts to realize Hindutva. The RSS always supplies the general secretary 
for the VHP and, more generally, the upper ranks of the VHP usually have historic ties to 
the RSS, similar to the BJP-RSS relationship.137  However, the VHP does not allow any 
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active politician to be in its executive body. 138 Despite this, the BJP has voiced its support 
for VHP objectives, most notably its bid to build a temple on the site of the Babri Mosque 
in Ayodhya. Likewise, the VHP has endorsed the BJP in its electoral campaigns.139 In 
addition, it is important to note that the VHP, like the RSS and BJP, have sought to bring 
other “Indian” religions into its fold. It has invited Sikhs to participate in its meetings and 
events,140 and the Dalai Lama attended its second meeting in 1966.141 However, Islam 
and Christianity are considered “foreign” religions and not welcomed within the VHP’s 
ranks. 
Unlike previous attempts to create a unified version of Hinduism, the VHP has 
chosen to focus not on the ancient Hindu scriptures, such as the Vedas, but rather on 
religious practices, most notably the bhakti tradition of devotion to avatars and gods and 
texts surrounding these deities. In doing so, the VHP has emphasized popular Hinduism, 
not the Hinduism of elite Brahmans; this in turn has made the religious agenda of the 
VHP more resonate with the masses. Initially, the VHP followed on Gandhi’s use of the 
Mahabharata and the epic of the Bhagavad Gita as popular texts that exemplify Hindu 
spirituality and practices.142 However, as Hindu activists began to aggressively agitate for 
the “liberation” of Ayodhya in the 1980s—the celebrated birthplace of Ram—the VHP 
upheld the Ramayana and its epic tale of good versus evil as the exemplary text of 
Hinduism. 143 The tale of Ram and Sita’s battle against the “foreign” demons of Lanka is 
well known throughout India. The popularity of the epic was strengthened by the 1987 
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airing of the Ramayana story as a yearlong TV miniseries; it was enormously popular and 
dubbed “The [TV series] Dallas of India.”144 Therefore, Ayodhya, as Ram’s celebrated 
birthplace, has become a powerful and useful religious tool to mobilize popular sentiment 
towards the Hindu nationalist agenda. 
 The VHP’s biggest success in mobilization has been in its organization of mass 
processions, yatras, drawing on popular bhakti traditions. In 1983, the VHP organized an 
Ekatmatayajna Yatra for national unity. Three main envoys of activists carried giant 
water pots from the Ganges River—which is believed to be a Hindu deity and has the 
power to cleanse and grant salvation—throughout India, following traditional pilgrimage 
routes.145 The procession used the Ganges as a symbol of Hindu unity, literally carrying 
the river to the people and binding them together. The yatra was enormously successful; 
the VHP estimated that around 60 million people participated in the event and it helped to 
create local VHP chapters throughout the country. 146 
 The VHP embarked on another yatra in 1984, this time as “a sacrifice to liberate 
the birthplace of Lord Ram.”147 The procession began in Sitamarhi, the celebrated 
birthplace of Ram’s wife Sita, and progressed to Ayodhya, then onto Delhi, where it 
planned on demanding that the Babri Mosque be unlocked and Hindus be allowed to 
worship there.148 However, this procession was interrupted short of Delhi by the 
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in October of 1984. The third procession, 
arguably its most successful, the Ramshilla Yatra, aimed to collect bricks from 
throughout the Hindu world for the creation of a temple in Ayodhya. Bricks not only 
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came from the kilns of villages and cities throughout India, but also from as far away as 
the Caribbean, US, Canada and South Africa.149 Again in 1990, the VHP helped to 
organize a yatra through ten states in India, along with the BJP and RSS. Lal Krishnan 
Advani, the president of the BJP, was arrested just outside Ayodhya after the procession 
clashed with the Indian military. 150 Following this yatra, Advani appeared on the cover of 
India Today dressed as Ram and behind bars.151  It was during a VHP organized rally in 
Ayodhya in December 1992, that the 300,000-strong mass of Hindu activists attacked the 
Babri Mosque and reduced it to rubble. 
The rise of Ayodhya as the epicenter of Hindu nationalism, and the violent 
conflicts it has created, conforms to the causal argument proposed in this dissertation. 
First, Hindu nationalist rhetoric is saturated with the perception of threat both to Ayodhya 
and to Hindutva, the Hindu nation. The RSS, the BJP, and the VHP have all defined 
Hindutva as a nation that is weak, vulnerable, and under attack from foreign threat—most 
notably Islam and Muslim nations. Although Hindus make up 85% of India, these groups 
claim that Hindutva is under duress from the religious “other.” They cite, first, India’s 
occupation by Muslim rulers followed by British (Christian) occupation until 1947. More 
recent examples of threats to Hindutva include the 1981 conversion of an untouchable 
village to Islam, believed to be funded by money from Gulf States.152 They also name 
cyclical flare-ups in the Kashmir as a source of threat to Hindutva, particularly Pakistan’s 
actions in the region and the presence of mujahideen, Islamic holy warriors, in that 
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conflict.153 Moreover, neighboring Bangladesh’s declaration that it was an Islamic state 
in 1988 is yet another example cited by Hindu nationalists of the Muslim threat to the 
Hindu religion and culture. Thus, despite being the majority, these organizations have 
built a case around the threats posed to Hindutva by foreign forces, primarily Islam. The 
Ayodhya controversy has become an example of the greater threat posed to Hindutva by 
Islam. 
Second, Hindus have considerable resources with which to mobilize people for 
their agendas. All three of these organizations have used religious resources to mobilize 
the masses. These groups have drawn on Hinduism’s militant past, most notably Hindu 
Sadhu warriors’ battles to defend land and faith against the Muslim Mughal leader 
Aurangzeb in the 17th and 18th centuries. They have also conjured up the more aggressive 
side of Hinduism, calling on deities like durga, the goddess of power, to emphasize 
Hindu strength. These groups have identified the threat to Hindutva as foreign religions, 
specifically Islam and Christianity. In addition, these organizations have named 
secularism as a threat and have called for the end of secular governments based on 
“foreign ideas” such as western liberalism. In its place, they advocate for the return of 
Indian values and norms in politics, ideals based on Hindu spirituality and beliefs. 
Ayodhya has become the epicenter of the Hindu nationalist agenda through the 
use of the Ramayana—a religious epic well know throughout India—to show India’s 
current battle against the evil “other,” in this case Islam, and the need to defend Hindu 
faith and culture from this threat. The celebrated birthplace of Ram, Ayodhya, has 
become a tangible point at which the religious epic and the here-and-now meet, binding 
the religious past with the national present. The struggle for Ayodhya today is the 
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struggle of Ram and Sita against foreign demons. These organizations have strengthened 
this connection by using popular religious practices and symbols in Hinduism, such as 
pilgrimage, water from the Ganges, and chariots of the gods. The use of these religious 
resources has had a powerfully mobilizing effect, as is visible in the yatras surrounding 
Ayodhya. 
Furthermore, these organizations have brought social resource to the cause. These 
groups are well organized and led by charismatic figures. These organizations have also 
fostered ties to communities in the diaspora, making them capable of reaching a large 
number of Indians through their activities and soliciting funds. Moreover, each group has 
a different target audience. The RSS aims to indoctrinate and mobilize Indian youth for 
their national agenda. The VHP seeks to coordinate religious leaders and plan religious 
events for the Hindu nationalist goal. And the BJP works within the Indian government, 
striving to attain seats of power at the state and union levels.  Together these groups have 
been very successful in coordinating efforts for shared objectives. The success of the 
Hindu nationalist movement, therefore, lies in these groups’ organization skills—their 
leadership and ability to mobilize the masses through common beliefs and practices of 
Hinduism—for Hindu nationalist ends.  
Third, the Ayodhya controversy has gained national and regional salience through 
the mixing of religious and political elites. Since 1990, Hindu nationalists, through the 
BJP, have had a foothold in both the union government and several state governments in 
India. Arguably, this has allowed for the Hindu nationalist agenda in general, and goals 
for Ayodhya in particular, to prosper. The 1992 destruction of the Babri Mosque 
prompted the union government to dismiss the BJP-run governments in Ayodhya’s state, 
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Uttar Pradesh, on the grounds that it provided a permissive environment for the mosque’s 
destruction. 154 The BJP has since resumed authority in Uttar Pradesh, in addition to 
strengthening its presence in the central government. Furthermore, the close ties of the 
BJP to the RSS and VHP has created a link through which these organizations can draw 
on each other’s resources. This has allowed the BJP to benefit from RSS and VHP 
election endorsements and, in return, the BJP has lent political support for the bid to build 
a temple on the site of the Babri Mosque. This is a new development from past episodes 
of violence over Ayodhya where religious and political elites were at odds, leading to 
political and military intervention in religious and national groups’ campaigns to change 
the status quo. 
The result of these organizational efforts is that large numbers of Indians have 
given active or tacit support to the Hindu nationalist agenda. This is visible in the 
numbers that have participated in yatras, and in the numbers that have voted for the BJP 
and its political and social agenda. It is important to stress that, although these groups 
claim to promote Hinduism as a culture and a civilization, they have defined “cultural 
Hinduism” using religion. Cultural Hindus are those Indians who are Hindu, Buddhist, 
Jain, or Sikh. Cultural Hindus are not Muslim, Christian, or Jewish; these are the 
religions and identities of foreign invaders. To become a true member of the Hindu 
nation, therefore, requires “returning” to authentic Indian religions. These identity 
boundaries are, therefore, at their core religious; religion is the salient distinction between 
who is part of the Hindu nation and who is not.  
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Finally, it is important to note that while Hindu nationalist organizations have 
proliferated since Partition, Islamic organizations in India have not. Muslims elites that 
remained in India chose not to form a political party in India after Partition. 155 The Sunni 
Ulama in India maintained the pre-Partition Jami’yyat-i Ulama-i Hind, but its impact has 
been minimal relative to the VHP.  Muslims did form their own action committees to 
push for protection of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya following the 1949 threat to the 
status quo, specifically the Babri Masjid Co-ordination Committee (BMCC) and the All-
India Babri Masjid Action Committee (AIBMAC). However, relative to the Hindu 
activists, Muslims in India have not organized themselves effectively, which has 
benefited the Hindu agenda.  
It is worth noting that Muslims in India did react to the 1992 destruction of the 
Babri Mosque. In March of 1993, more than 700,000 Muslims demonstrated in Delhi in 
protest to the incident, the largest Muslim demonstration since Partition. Also in March, 
twelve car bombs exploded simultaneously throughout Delhi, one of the biggest 
coordinated acts of terrorism to date; the motive for the terrorist act was retaliation for the 
destruction of the mosque.156 However, both of these actions have paled in comparison to 
the organization of Hindu groups and the resources they have coordinated to realize their 
goals. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued, first, that Hindu-Muslim violence over Ayodhya has not 
been constant but rather has occurred in three distinct waves: in 1853-1855, in 1949, and 
from 1986 until the present. With the exception of the 1949 violence, these episodes have 
all occurred under the atmosphere of perceived or actual threat to the aggressing side; the 
1949 Hindu attempt to change the status quo at Ayodhya, on the other hand, was more a 
reaction to opportunity than threat.   
In each incident of violence, the aggressing side used religious resources to 
mobilize its constituents for action. In 1853-1855, Sunni leaders called for jihad against 
the rising Hindu presence in Ayodhya, most likely drawing on revivalist interpretations 
of Islam emerging in India during this time. In 1949, Hindu activists staged a two-week 
long kirtan, followed by the “miraculous” appearance of idols of Ram and Sita inside the 
mosque. And from 1986 until the present, Hindu activists have used the religious epic of 
the Ramayana and bhakti practices including pilgrimage and chariot processions to 
mobilize the masses with the aim of seizing sacred space in Ayodhya and building a 
temple to Ram.  
Furthermore, in each episode of violence the aggressing group has been well 
organized, drawing not only on religious resources but also social and material resources. 
Sunni Muslim leaders mobilized between 500-2,000 well-armed Muslims willing to fight 
for sacred space in Ayodhya in 1853-1855; attacks that were difficult to put down and 
required British intervention. The Hindu attempt to change the status quo in 1949 came 
on the heels of Partition, an era when Hindu activists were well mobilized, particularly 
through the RSS. Muslim resources, however—including social, religious, and political 
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organizations—were few in India; they had largely been invested in the creation of 
Pakistan, presenting a window of opportunity for Hindu activists. And the current Hindu 
challenge to Ayodhya involves three well organized groups—the RSS, the BJP and the 
VHP—which offer a wide-reaching combination of social, political and religious 
resources capable of mobilizing support for the Ayodhya cause. Moreover, the current 
challenge to Ayodhya involves the mixing of religious and political leaders. This has, 
arguably, increased the amount of resources available to religious leaders has created a 
more permissive atmosphere in which Hindu activists have been able to challenge the 
status quo in Ayodhya, and has reduced the degree of governmental interference. These 
finding are summarized in Table 4.1.      
4. 1, Variables Summary: Battles over Ayodhya 
Aggressor Threat Perception Religious and 
Political Leaders  
Material Resources 
1853-1855 
Sunni 
Muslims 
-Ghulam   
Husain 
-Amir ‘Ali 
General 
-Decline of Muslim 
power 
-Shia control of Mosque 
Specific 
-Rumor of Mosque’s 
destruction by Hindus 
-Aggressors and 
political leaders at 
odds.  
-Sunni challenge to 
Shia authority. 
-Mobilized men to fight 
-Contemporary 
examples of jihadist 
movements in South 
Asia 
1949 
Hindu 
activists 
(Possibly 
RSS) 
Opportunity 
-Muslims vulnerable 
post-Partition 
-Aggressors and 
political leaders at 
odds. 
-Secular 
government  
-Hindu organizations 
-Communal emotions 
high 
1986-2002 
 
Hindu 
Activists 
(RSS and 
VHP) 
General 
-Historic examples of 
Muslim and British 
occupation 
-Converts to Islam, 1981-
present 
-Pakistan declared 
Islamic, 1984  
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 Finally, this conflict—although involving political, social and economic 
elements—is saliently religious. The VHP has focused on the Ayodhya controversy 
because the holy city has mobilized mass numbers of Hindus throughout the country and 
bound them together to defend Hindutva against the foreign threat posed by Islam and 
secularism. Ayodhya has become the epicenter of the social and political agendas of the 
RSS, BJP and VHP precisely because of its religious resonance with the masses. The 
Ramayana story with its tales of good conquering evil is well known throughout India. 
Devotion to Ram, as a bhakti practice, is also popular. Moreover, pilgrimage is a 
common form of piety for many Hindus. All of these beliefs and practices have 
contributed to the success of the RSS, BJP and VHP, who have interpreted these religious 
resources with the specific aim of mobilizing the masses to “defend” Ayodhya and the 
wider goal of realizing Hindutva, the Hindu nation. 
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Chapter 6 
Christian, Jewish and Muslim Battles Over Jerusalem 
 
 
 Jerusalem is recognized as one of the most holy cities in the world. It hosts sacred 
sites that are of critical importance to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, earning it tiles like 
“The City of Peace,” “The City of God,” and the “omphalos,” the navel of the universe. 
Perhaps, then, it is surprising to most that Jerusalem has been the occasion for numerous 
religious confrontations throughout its several millennia of history, including the current 
“al-Aqsa Intifada” that has dragged Israelis and Palestinians into a spiral of bloodshed 
and animosity. How has the “City of Peace” fueled such violence and hatred? 
 This chapter aims to provide insights into this question by considering three 
waves of violence surrounding Jerusalem: Christian Crusades aimed at liberating 
Jerusalem, beginning in the eleventh century; Muslim holy wars to counter the Christian 
presence in the region and recapture Jerusalem; and Israel’s seizure of Jerusalem in 1967 
and the religiously-motivated reactions it has produced within militant Jewish and 
Muslim groups.  
 Drawing from the causal argument presented in chapter two, this chapter will 
focus on three variables as possible explanations for violence over Jerusalem: the role of 
threat perception in influencing actions of groups and nations, the amount of material, 
social and technological resources available to groups initiating violence over the sacred 
site, and the relationship between religious and political leaders. This chapter will test 
three empirical predictions from the causal argument. First, violent campaigns over 
Jerusalem will be initiated in response to perceived or actual threat to a religion’s holy 
site. Second, the group initiating the violence will have greater resources than does the 
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other group. And third, religious violence will be more likely if political and religious 
leaders’ authorities are intertwined, allowing religious leaders the opportunity to use state 
resources to further their agendas. 
This chapter argues that these three waves of violence represent Christian, 
Muslim and Jewish efforts to seize Jerusalem’s sacred space, often with the goal of 
excluding other religious groups from access to their sites. The desire to capture and 
control Jerusalem has primarily been in response to perceived or actual threats to the 
preservation of certain group’s religious sites, inspired by the actions and policies of the 
governing group. 
 The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief 
introduction to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, outlining their core beliefs, doctrine and 
the importance of Jerusalem to each tradition. The second section offers an overview of 
Jerusalem’s history, outlining major battles for the city. The third section traces three 
battles over Jerusalem: the Christian Crusades of the 11th through 14th centuries, Muslim 
jihads against the crusaders, and battles over Jerusalem since its 1967 capture and 
occupation by Israel. And the fourth section offers concluding remarks. 
Overview of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
 
 Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all diverse, complex, and rich religious 
traditions with lengthy histories involving numerous cultures and regions. For the sake of 
understanding the importance of Jerusalem to each of these faiths, this section will 
provide a very brief outline of each religion’s core beliefs, doctrine and relationship to 
the holy city. 
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Judaism 
 The religion that is now known as Judaism began well before the Common Era. 
Throughout its history, the origins of its beliefs underwent a complex process of 
development that is still debated by religious scholars and historians today. 1 In addition to 
disagreements on its origins and development, there is also considerable debate over the 
“right” practice of the faith today, producing many interpretations of the religion. 
However, despite this diversity, there are a set of core beliefs within Judaism that define 
the faith across time and interpretation.  
First, Judaism, as a monotheistic faith, believes in one God, which is articulated in 
the Jewish Bible’s book of Exodus: “I the Lord am your God who brought you out of the 
land of Egypt, the house of bondage: You shall have no other gods besides Me;” which is 
the first of the Ten Commandments.2 This belief is further stated in the Shem Yisrael, the 
statement of faith found in Deuteronomy: “Hear, O Israel! The Lord is our God, the Lord 
alone. You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and 
with all your might.”3   
 Second, Judaism contains beliefs relating to “redemption” or “salvation.” This 
belief is articulated in the Triple Hope: the expectation of ultimate deliverance of the 
Jewish people; the belief in the salvation of individuals; and the hope that society or 
creation as a whole will be redeemed.4 Therefore, Judaism contains notions of earthly and 
eternal salvation, both of which inspire actions in the here-and-now. Salvation is 
                                                 
1 Examples of scholarship that trace the development of Judaism include Armstrong, pp. 22-102; Jonathan 
Levison, Death and Resurrection of the Beloved Son, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); E.A. 
Speiser, Genesis, (New York: Anchor Bible, Doubleday, 1962)  
2 Exodus 20:2, The Tanakh, (Philadelphia and Jerusalem: Jewish Publication Society, 1985), pg. 115 
3 Deuteronomy 6:4, The Tanakh, pg. 284  
4 Milton Steinberg, Basic Judaism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, inc., 1947), pg. 159 
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important for a discussion on battles over Jerusalem because interpretations of earthly 
and eternal redemption have prompted some Jews to demand full sovereignty of 
Jerusalem for salvific ends, as will be described below.   
Judaism also possesses the concept of a savior, the Messiah, which is an 
individual that will come to restore the earth to its intended state of pristine 
righteousness. The coming of the Messiah is depicted in Isaiah 11:  
The spirit of the Lord shall alight upon him…Justice shall be the girdle of his 
loins, And faithfulness the girdle of his waist. The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, 
the leopard lie down with the kid…Nothing evil or vile shall be done; for the land 
shall be filled with devotion to the Lord, As water covers the sea.5 
  
There have been numerous individuals throughout history that have claimed to be the 
Messiah, including Jesus of Nazareth; however, most Jews believe that this individual has 
not appeared on earth yet.6  
Third, Judaism is also defined as a distinct group, often articulated as a people 
“chosen” by God. This concept of “choseness” is recorded in Genesis, where it describes 
the origins of the Israelites, the ancient Jews. Genesis chapter 17 depicts the creation of a 
covenant between God and Abraham: 
As for Me, this is My covenant with you: You shall be the fa ther of a multitude of 
nations.  And you shall no longer be called Abram, but your name shall be 
Abraham, for I make you the father of a multitude of nations.  I will make you 
exceedingly fertile, and make nations of you and kings shall come forth from you.  
I will maintain My covenant between Me and you, and your offspring to come, as 
an everlasting covenant throughout the ages, to be God to you and to your 
offspring to come.7  
 
                                                 
5 Isaiah 11:2, 5, 6, 9, The Tanakh, pp. 640-641 
6 Another example of an individual claiming to be the Messiah is Shabbatai Zevi, who created such a 
disturbance within Palestine and the Ottoman Empire during the 17th century that the Sultan had him 
imprisoned, where he chose conversion to Islam over death, see Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the Lord: 
Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 24-25; and Karen 
Armstrong, Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths, (New York; Ballantine Books, 1996), pp. 338-339. 
7 Genesis 17:5-7, The Tanakh, pg. 23 
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Judaism holds that God fulfilled this covenant through Abraham’s wife, Sarah, who 
miraculously gave birth to a son, Isaac, despite being barren and well beyond 
childbearing years.8 From this notion of choseness through progeny, Judaism has come to 
represent both a faith and an ethnic group. Therefore, there are Jews who do not practice 
the religious dimensions of the faith but still consider themselves and are considered to be 
Jewish through the link of ancestry.  
The Jewish faith also has doctrines that shape the religion, most notably a legal 
code, which is subject to debate and interpretation.  The Jewish Bible describes the 
origins of the law in Exodus chapters 19 through 25.9 God revealed the law to Moses on 
Mt. Sinai, which was the Torah, the first five books of the Tanakh: Genesis, Exodus, 
Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy. The legal code covers a variety of issues 
including family, criminal, trade and dietary laws in addition to relations with non-Jews. 
It also contains detailed descriptions for sacrifices and other religious practices in the 
Temple. Codification of the law did not begin until the fifth century BCE, and 
particularly not until after the destruction of the second Jewish Temple in Jerusalem in 70 
CE, at which time scholars shaped a body of laws, which became know as the Mishnah, 
along with interpretations and debates on the Mishnah, which is the Talmud. Study and 
debate of the Talmud remains a vital part of the Jewish faith today. 10  
Jerusalem is important to Judaism for a number of reasons. It is generally believed 
that God put Abraham to the test through his call to sacrifice his son Isaac on a hill later 
                                                 
8 Genesis, chapter 18, pg. 25; Genesis, chapter 21, pp. 29-30 
9 Exodus 19-25, The Tanakh, pp.114-124 
10 Armstrong, pg. 156 
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identified as Mt. Zion in Jerusalem. 11 After their freedom from slavery in Egypt, the 
Jewish Bible reports that the Israelites conquered the land of Canaan, which was 
promised to them, first, in Leviticus 20: “You shall posses their land, for I will give it to 
you to posses, a land flowing with milk and honey,” and later in Joshua:  
Every spot on which your foot treads I give you, as I promised Moses. Your 
territory shall extend from the wilderness and the Lebanon to the Great River, the 
River Euphrates [on the east]—the whole Hittite country—and up to the 
Mediterranean Sea on the west.12 
 
The Jewish Bible reports that Jerusalem was later captured and became the religious and 
political capitol of United Israel under its second king, David, particularly after David 
moved the Ark of the Covenant—which contained the tablets on which God inscribed the 
laws and commandments given to Moses on Mt. Sinai—to Jerusalem and began to 
construct a permanent temple where sacrifices to God could be performed. The Temple, 
completed by David’s successor Solomon, became the place where humans and God 
came into contact. Although it is believed that several Israelite Temples existed in the 
ancient Near East, Jerusalem became the most important site to perform ritual sacrifice.13   
Babylonian forces destroyed the First Temple in 587 BCE, and the Second 
Temple, completed in 60 CE, was razed by Roman forces in 70 CE. Since the destruction 
of the Second Temple, Jerusalem has continued to play an important role in Jewish 
                                                 
11 God spared Isaac after Abraham showed his obedience and devotion to God’s commandment. The 
biblical account of the binding of Isaac is found in Genesis, Chapter 22. The association of the place where 
Abraham was called to sacrifice Isaac is described in Armstrong, pg. 28. It is also worth noting that Islam 
also has the story of God’s call for Abraham to sacrifice his son. However, in the Muslim account, instead 
of Isaac being offered, Abraham’s other son, Ismael—which he had through his second wife Hagaar—is 
the potential sacrifice. Ismael is commonly believed to be the some through which the Arab people 
descended. See The Holy Qur’an, Sura 37: 83-113, taken from Kenneth Cragg, Readings in the Qur’an, 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1988), pg. 120; and John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path , (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), pg. 7  
12 Leviticus 20: 24, The Tanakh, pg. 188; and Joshua 1:4-5, The Tanakh, pg. 337 
13 Specifically temples in Arad and Beer-Sheba. See Zeev Herzog, “Israelite Sanctuaries at Arad and Beer-
Sheeba,” Temples and High Places in Biblical Times, edited by Avraham Biran, (Jerusalem: Hebrew Union 
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spiritual and political life. It has remained a site of pilgrimage throughout time and, since 
the 16th century, the Western Wall of the Temple in particular has been venerated by 
pilgrims. In 1948, Jerusalem became the de facto capitol of Israel after the city’s partition 
between Israel and Jordan. And in 1967, Israel effectively annexed the Old City after its 
capture in the Six-Day war, making it both its spiritual and national capital. 
Christianity 
The religion now known as Christianity began as a movement within Judaism. It 
was based on the belief that a man named Jesus of the house of David was the Messiah, 
the one that the prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah had foretold would come to restore justice 
and harmony to the earth. Judaism’s religious leaders of the time, however, rejected the 
belief that Jesus was the Messiah and persecuted its followers as heretics. The movement 
eventually broke away from Judaism after it took on non-Jewish followers and stopped 
adhering to Jewish law. Christianity grew in prevalence after it was made one of the 
official religions of the Roman Empire under Constantine in the 4th century CE. 14 It 
continued to spread, particularly in Western Europe and the Near East, eventually 
establishing four distinct branches: Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, 
Protestantism, and Eastern Traditions such as the Coptic and Ethiopian Christians. Each 
of these branches has further subdivisions, making Christianity very diverse in practice. 
Despite its diversity, Christianity still contains core beliefs that unite its many 
practitioners. First, Jesus the Messiah or Christ, the Greek word approximating Messiah, 
is central to Christianity. Christians believe that Jesus was not only the one to bring 
                                                                                                                                                 
College and Jewish Institute of Religion, 1977), pp. 120-122; and Beth Alpert Nakhai, Archaelology and 
the Religions of Canaan and Israel, (Boston: American School of Oriental Research, 2001), pp. 186-187  
14 For a summary of early Christianity, see Armstrong, pp. 142-149 
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justice and salvation to the world, foretold by Jewish prophets, but also that Jesus was in 
fact God incarnate, God in human form. This belief is expressed in many different 
ways—that Jesus was God’s son, born through the virgin Mary; that Jesus was the Logos, 
the word of God made human; and that Jesus was, paradoxically, both fully human and 
fully God. Regardless of the language used to describe Jesus, Christians believe that 
Jesus came to earth to bring a new social order, one in which all people would be equal: 
“…for in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith…there is no longer Jew 
or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; all of you 
are one in Christ Jesus.”15 Therefore, Jesus is understood as the one to bring equity to the 
earth.  
 Another core belief in Christianity is the understanding of Jesus as the savior of 
the world. Christians believe that, in addition to providing a path to save the world in the 
here-and-now by calling for social justice and equality, Jesus also brought salvation in 
life after death. 16 Christians believe that Jesus died via crucifixion—a Roman execution 
of death by hanging on a cross—but that he rose from the dead, which established a new 
path to eternal salvation. This path is open to all who believe in the saving power of Jesus 
the Christ. Therefore, Christianity contains beliefs for earthly salvation—the imperative 
to work for a more just and equitable world—and for eternal salvation through belief in 
the power of the divine Christ who overcame death to provide a new path for eternal 
salvation.  
                                                 
15 Galatians 3:26, 28, 29, Holy [Christian] Bible, New Revised Standard Version, (New York: American 
Bible Society, 1989), pg. 185 
16 For biblical accounts of Jesus’ death and resurrection, see Holy [Christian] Bible, Matthew 26-28, pp. 
29-33; Mark 14-16, pp.50-54; Luke 22-24, pp.84-89; John 18-20, pp. 110-112 
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Christianity has doctrines that apply these beliefs as guides for religious life and 
practices. Of particular importance for this chapter is the doctrine of sin. Most Christians 
believe that humans are imperfect and separated from God through Adam and Eve’s 
disobedience to God in the Garden of Eden; an event know as the Fall of Humanity or 
Original Sin.17 Humans, therefore, cannot save themselves from their own sinful nature; 
salvation requires God’s intervention. Within certain branches of Christianity, there are 
rituals individuals can do as repentance or remittance to sins, such as saying prayers or 
performing certain tasks. In medieval Christianity, these tasks came to include going on 
pilgrimages to distant holy sites, such as saints’ tombs, relics relating to Christ, and 
Christ’s tomb in Jerusalem. Also at this time, crusading—armed pilgrimages aimed at 
liberating the holy land—became a practice that was believed to remit sins, as will be 
described below.  
    Jerusalem is important to Christianity because it is the city in which Jesus was 
executed and resurrected from the dead. Jesus was born in Bethlehem, a city roughly 15 
miles south of Jerusalem, to parents that lived in Nazareth, a city north of Jerusalem, 
where he grew up.18 Most of Jesus’ ministry—his preaching, healings and other 
miracles—occurred around the Sea of Galilee, also known as Lake Tiberias.19 However, 
the Passion—the triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem followed by his arrest, trial, 
crucifixion, death, burial and resurrection—all occurred in Jerusalem. In the fourth 
century CE excavators uncovered the site now celebrated as place where Christ was 
                                                 
17 For the biblical account of the Original Sin, see Genesis 3, Holy Christian Bible, pp. 2-3 
18 For biblical accounts of Jesus’ birth and childhood, see Luke, chapter 2, pp. 57-58; Matthew, 1-2, pp. 1-2 
19 Some biblical accounts of Jesus’ ministry include the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew 5:1-11 and Luke 
6:20-23; the feeding of the five thousand, Matthew 14:13-21, Mark 6:30-44, and Luke, 9:10-17; driving 
spirits from a man into a herd of pigs, Matthew 8:28-34, Mark 5:1-20, and Luke 8:26-39; Jesus walking on 
water, Matthew 14:22-33 and Mark 6:45-52; to name a few. 
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crucified and buried, a site initially called the Anastasis but now known as the Holy 
Sepulcher.20 Sites in Jerusalem expanded to include the “Stations of the Cross,” the path 
that Jesus took from his arrest to his crucifixion; the “Upper Room” where Jesus and his 
disciples celebrated the Passover the night before his execution; the Garden of 
Gethsemane, where Jesus prayed before his arrest; the site of Mary’s tomb; and places 
associated with Jesus’ disciples.21 Christians from all over the world have made 
pilgrimages to the holy land throughout time and Jerusalem—along with Bethlehem, 
Nazareth, and the Galilee—are important sacred sites of Christian veneration.    
Islam 
Islam, as one of the monotheistic faiths, contains core beliefs that both unite and 
differentiate it from Judaism and Christianity. First, Islam takes very seriously the 
oneness of God, or tawhid, which is one of its core beliefs. The path to salvation in Islam 
involves submission to the will of God, which is the meaning of the word Islam. Similar 
to Judaism and Christianity, God has provided revelations to humans of God’s will 
through prophets. Muslims believe, however, that the Prophet Muhammad transmitted 
the final revelation from God in the seventh century CE, recorded in the Qur’an, or 
recitation. The oneness of God and the Prophet Muhammed as his messenger form the 
first of the Five Pillars of Islam, and makes up the shahaddah, or the proclamation of 
faith; one who proclaims the shahaddah is a Muslim. The other four pillars include ritual 
prayer said five times a day facing towards Mecca (salat); fasting during the holy month 
of Ramadan, the month the Prophet first received revelations from God (sawm); 
                                                 
20 In the 19th century, a British archaeologist claimed that a second site, known as the Garden Tomb, was 
the actual tomb of Christ, see Armstrong, pg. 365 
21 Armstrong, pp.180-192 
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almsgiving to the poor (zakat); and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), which should be taken 
by every Muslims at least once in his or her life, finances and health permitting. Along 
with the Pillars, Islam emphasizes the unity of the worldwide Muslim community, the 
ummah, which, in principle, is not divided by gender, race, class or any other human 
distinction. 22 However, in practice, Islam has several different branches, particularly the 
Sunni and Shii branches, which emerged from different understanding in secession of 
leadership. 
Like Judaism, Islam also has a religious legal code, Shari’a law. The formation of 
Shari’a differs according to time, region, and school of jurisprudence.23 Another key 
practice in Islam is ritual prayer, salat, which is one of the Five Pillars. Muslims can say 
the salat anywhere, but mosques are buildings designed especially to gather in and pray. 
For this purpose, mosques are considered sacred places where humans interact with God; 
the maintenance and preservation of these spaces is important to the faith. This is a 
critical point concerning the status of Jerusalem, which houses several important mosques 
and shrines. 
As with Judaism and Christianity, Jerusalem is an important sacred space to 
Islam. Jerusalem is the site of the first Qiblah, the direction in which Muslims’ face when 
performing the Salat.24 While the Prophet and his companions were in Medina, the 
direction of prayer was initially towards Jerusalem, reflecting the connection of the new 
revelations to the Abrahamic faiths of Judaism and Christianity. However, when the Jews 
                                                 
22 For more details on key beliefs in Islam, see Esposito, chapter 3: “Religious Belie fs and Practice,” pp. 
69-113 
23 In Sunni Islam there are four major schools of the law, al-Sharia; Maiki, Hanafi, Shaifi , and Hanbali.  In 
addition, Shia Islam has its own particular interpretation of the law, of which there is diversity between 
Twelver and Ishmaili Shiism.  See David S. Pearl A Textbook on Muslim Law (London: Croom Helm, 
1979), especially chapter 1, “The Historical Development of Islamic Law.” 
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of Medina refused to accept the Prophet’s recitations, a new revelation called for prayer 
to be directed towards the Kaba in Mecca, a stone structure that Muslims believe 
Abraham and his son Ismael built.25  Jerusalem is also important because it is the 
destination of the Isra—the Prophet’s midnight journey from Mecca to Jerusalem where 
he prayed with all God’s Prophets throughout time—and the Miraj, the Prophet’s 
mystical ascension to heaven. 26 Later narratives of the Miraj claim that the stone 
protruding from the platform of the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount bears the footprint of 
the Prophet and buraq, a winged horse that carried him to heaven. When Muslim forces, 
captured Jerusalem in the seventh century CE, they built the al-Aqsa mosque to 
commemorate the holiness of the city and later constructed the Dome of the Rock shrine 
to mark the site of the Miraj.   
Judaism, Christianity and Islam all hold Jerusalem as an important city for the 
history and practice of their faiths. Likewise, each tradition contains beliefs and doctrine 
that provide a foundation for taking action to defend the holiness of the city. The 
following section will outline major battles over Jerusalem throughout its history. 
Overview of Jerusalem’s History 
 
 Jerusalem’s history spans across millennia and includes the rise and fall of dozens 
of empires professing more than half-a dozen-different religious beliefs. The city itself 
has undergone several name changes corresponding to different occupiers and their 
beliefs. This section seeks to provide a very brief overview of Jerusalem’s history, 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Abdul Aziz Duri, “Jerusalem in the Early Islamic Period, 7th-11th centuries AD,” pp. 105-129, Jerusalem 
in History, edited by K.J. Asali, (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1999), pg. 105 
25 Annemarie Schimmel,  Islam: An Introduction, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
pg. 16; Esposito, pp. 16-17. The Kaba is also the destination of the Hajj, the Pillar of pilgrimage mentioned 
above.  
26 Duri, pg. 105 
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touching on the major conquests of the city and its religious developments, particularly 
its evolution as a city of central importance to Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
Earliest evidence of human habitation around Jerusalem dates back to around 
3200 BCE; however, it was not until the 14th century BCE that consistent occupation is 
evident.27 It is believed that people settled in the area not because the land was rich in 
material assets—such as water, minerals, or other natural resources—or because the area 
marked a critical junction for transportation or trade but, rather, because the site was 
identified as having divine or supernatural properties. Historian Karen Armstrong argues 
that Jerusalem’s earliest inhabitants probably chose to settle in the region because of a 
unique hill that protruded from the surrounding landscape in a way that suggested the 
presence of the divine.28 This hypothesis is bolstered by the religious beliefs of the 
ancient Babylonians, who introduced the concept of a holy city, a city believed to be 
established by a god to maintain order over the world and dispel the forces of chaos.29 
Moreover, the name Rushalimum, which is most likely the root-word for Jerusalem, is 
believed to come from a Syrian god hsalem and means “shalem has founded the city,” 
also suggesting the connection between divinity and the city. 30  
The story of Jerusalem’s origins in the Tanakh, the Jewish Bible, is connected to 
Abraham, the father of “a multitude of nations,” as previously mentioned.31 It is believed 
that God called Abraham to sacrifice his son on a hill later identified as Mt. Zion in 
                                                 
27 H.J. Franken, “Jerusalem in the Bronze Age: 3000-1000 BC,” pp. 11-41, Jerusalem in History, edited by 
K.J. Asali, (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1999), pp. 17, 36-37; Armstrong, pp. 3, 11 
28 Armstrong, pg. 8 
29 Armstrong, pp. 16-20 
30 Armstrong, pg. 7; Franken transliterates the word as Urusalim, pg. 18 
31 Genesis 17:4, The Tanakh, pg. 23  
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Jerusalem. 32 Interpretations of the Jewish Bible further claim that the city Salem, 
mentioned in Genesis and the Psalms, is Jerusalem. It is further believed that King 
Melchizedek, also mentioned in the Jewish Bible, founded the city; he became the king 
through which subsequent kings of Israel traced their lineage.33  
The Biblical story further describes the migration of the Israelites to Egypt during 
a time of famine and their enslavement under the Pharaoh. After a series of powerful and 
terrifying miracles, the Pharaoh let the Israelites go. They returned from exile and 
conquered Canaan through a divine mandate, the herem, which called for the destruction 
of all living things.34 The Israelites also retook Jerusalem and established its patriarchs 
there, first Saul then David—who united the kingdoms of Judah and Israel and brought 
the Ark of the Covenant to the city—followed by Solomon, who built the first Temple.35  
It is important to note that these biblical accounts, while important as stories of 
faith and identity, do not correspond with archaeological evidence, throwing their 
historical accuracy into question. Armstrong suggests that these stories are legends that 
say more about how the Israelites understood themselves in relation to the land, its 
inhabitance and the quest for establishing a unique identity than accounts of historical 
happenings.36 Likewise, religious studies scholar Keith W. Whitelam argues that these 
biblical accounts, which are fractured and historically incomplete, reflect the dominant 
cultures’ political and social agendas and silences those on the periphery; they therefore 
                                                 
32 The biblical account of the binding of Isaac is found in Genesis, Chapter 22; for the story’s connection to 
Jerusalem, see Armstrong, pg. 28.  
33 Franken, pg. 18; Armstrong, pg. 30 
34 For the Jewish Bible accounts of the Herem, see Joshua, chapters 1-7; I Samuel, chapter 14:47. For more 
on the Herem, see Susan Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in Ethics and Violence, (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 
35 For the Jewish Bible accounts of these kings, see I Samuel, chapters 9-31; II Samuel; and I Kings, 
Chapters 1-2. 
36 Armstrong, pp. 24-25 
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should be understood as politically driven and not created with the aim of recording 
history. 37 These debates about the historical accuracy of sacred texts are important 
because these texts form the foundation upon which future claims to Jerusalem have been 
generated, including the state of Israel’s claim to the city, which will be discussed further 
below. 
Following the death of Solomon and the breakup of the Israelite Kingdom, 
Jerusalem suffered a series of attacks and conquests, which impacted religious practices 
in the city.  In 587 BCE, Babylonians attacked Jerusalem, sacked the Temple and 
deported its inhabitants into exile. At this time the Ark disappeared, never to be 
recovered. The Israelites settled in Babylon, where they began codifying laws and 
practices central to the faith such as rituals surrounding sacrifice, circumcision and 
dietary restrictions.38 In 539 BCE, the Persian King Cyrus defeated the Babylonians, 
driving them out of Jerusalem. The king ordered the rebuilding of the Temple and 
allowed for the Jews to return from exile.39 Religious life in Jerusalem resumed, despite 
the absence of the Ark, until the arrival of Alexander the Great in 333 BCE, who 
conquered the Persians and introduced Hellenistic culture and religious beliefs to the 
region.  
In 175 BCE, King Antiochus Epiphanes imposed policies that forbade Temple 
rites and Jewish practices.  Those who disobeyed were publicly executed, later to be 
described as the first martyrs of the faith. 40 Also at this time Jerusalem was renamed 
                                                 
37 Keith W. Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History, (London: 
Routledge, 1996), Chapter One: “Partial Texts and Fractured Histories,” pp. 11-36 
38 Armstrong, pp. 89-90 
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“Antioch in Judea” and the Temple was desanctified and made into a Greek shrine. These 
actions prompted the Maccabeus revolt, which consisted of guerilla-type attacks on 
Greek and Syrian forces in addition to forced conversions and the slaughter of non-Jews 
in the region. 41  The revolt compelled Antiochus to rescind his orders and return the 
Temple to the Jews. 
In 63 BCE, Roman troops—under the leadership of Pompey—entered the Temple 
to put down riots caused by intra-Jewish tensions. A reported 12,000 Jews were killed in 
the operation, the city’s walls were razed, and Roman troops permanently occupied the 
area, which they called Palestrina.42 Mark Anthony appointed Herod, a local Jew, as 
governor of the region, who was later elevated to king in 40 BCE. Herod implemented 
major building projects in and around Jerusalem including new walls around the city and 
plans to build a new Temple, begun in 19 BCE, the raised platform and western wall of 
which still exist today. 43  
Religious and political tensions continued, however, under Herod’s rule.  In 
4BCE, as Herod was lying on his deathbed, a group of devout Jews revolted over the 
presence of Greek symbols on the Temple. Roman troops crucified the protesters, 
sparking riots that killed a reported 5,000 Jews. After Herod’s death, a Roman 
government was established, headed by Pontius Pilate and backed by the chief priest 
Caiaphas. It was during this time that Jesus of Nazarath, a Jew from the lineage of David, 
began to preach messages of reform that challenged the religious, social and political 
order of the time. It is believed that he and his followers briefly occupied the Temple 
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compound—chasing moneylenders and other “unclean” elements off of the platform—
when the city was filled with pilgrims for the Passover holiday. 44 This event, coupled 
with Jesus’ radical teachings, prompted Jewish Priests to have him arrested and handed 
over to the Roman authorities, who executed him by crucifixion. In 36 CE, one of Jesus’ 
followers, Stephen, created another disturbance at the Temple by preaching the message 
of Jesus and criticizing the Jewish leaders for not heeding the words of God’s prophets.45 
Angry Jews dragged him outside the Temple area and stoned him to death, the Jewish 
method of execution. The Jesus movement continued to grow despite persecution, 
particularly in the city of Antioch, where both Jews and non-Jews became members of 
this new movement called “The Way.”46 
Tensions in Jerusalem reached a boiling point shortly after the Temple’s 
completion in 60 CE. Militant Jewish groups, particularly the Iscari Zealots, began 
assassinating Roman officers with the hope of ousting Rome’s presence in the region. 47 A 
military confrontation with the Zealots resulted in the death of 5,000 Roman soldiers. 
This prompted Rome to take harsher measures and, in 67 CE, General Vespian was 
dispatched to the region and began uprooting the militant resistance movements.48 The 
Romans fought their way into the Temple on August 28, 70 CE, and killed an estimated 
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6,000 militants defending the site.49 The Roman offense ended with the total devastation 
of the Temple.   
In 118 CE, the Roman Emperor Hadrian announced his intentions to rebuild 
Jerusalem. Many Jews saw his efforts as the final destruction of the city and the 
eradication of its holiness. Militants, headed by Simon Bar Koseba, organized violent 
uprisings that became known as the Bar Kokhba revolt. The revolt succeeded in 
recapturing Jerusalem, which it held for three years until the death of Bar Koseba in 135 
CE. The Romans killed a reported 580,000 Jews and razed 985 villages before taking the 
city and draining it of all remaining Jews. 50 After defeating the revolt, Hadrian renamed 
the city Aelia Capitolina. 
In 313 CE, Constantine became emperor of Rome and declared Christianity to be 
one of the empire’s official religions. In addition to building churches and shrines for 
Christianity, he ordered the destruction of Greek temples in Jerusalem. The demolition of 
a temple to Aphrodite unearthed what was believed to be the tomb of Christ and his place 
of death, Golgatha. Constantine commissioned the building of a church to denote the 
holy site, which became known as the Anastasis, or site of the resurrection. In the mid-
fourth century, Constantine’s mother, Helena, visited the city and discovered what came 
to be celebrated as the True Cross on which Jesus was crucified.51 These finding inspired 
Christian pilgrims to come to Jerusalem in search of the places where Jesus ministered, 
died and was resurrected.  
The Christian aspects of Jerusalem flourished under the Roman and Byzantine 
Empires until the city’s invasion in 610 CE by the Persian King Khosrow II. In his 
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offensive, he killed a reported 66,555 Christians in the city. 52 Twelve years later, 
Byzantine forces defeated the Persians and retook the city. 53 Around this time, the 
Prophet Muhammad began receiving divine revelations, which he transmitted to citizens 
of Mecca and Medina in the Arabian Peninsula. These revelations, the Qur’an or 
recitation, created a new religious, social and political force known as Islam.  
In 638, Jerusalem fell to Muslim forces moving through the region. Omar, the 
second Caliph of the Muslim ummah, took charge of the city, calling it Bayt al-Maqdis.54  
Omar was remembered as a tolerant leader; he did not kill the existing population and 
allowed Jews and Christians to live in the city as dhimmis, protected religious 
minorities.55 He left Christian sites as they were and concentrated his attention on the 
platform where the Jewish Temple had once stood. It is recorded that both Jews and 
Muslims worked together to clean the site, which had been used as a refuse dump under 
Byzantine rule.56 Once cleared, Omar built a simple wooded mosque, which became 
known as the al-Aqsa mosque. Later, in 688, the Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik commissioned the 
building of a magnificent shrine over a rock that protruded from the platform, later to be 
identified as the place where the Prophet ascended in the miraj, the mystical journey to 
heaven. 57 The Dome of the Rock shrine, completed in 691, became the archetype for all 
Muslim shrines and remains one of the most revered pieces of Islamic architecture today.    
In 868, the region was stormed by bands of Turkish forces taking advantage of the 
weakened state of the Muslim Abbasid Dynasty. Soon after, in 983, the newly formed 
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Ismaili Shii Fatimid Dynasty seized the city, now called al-Quds, making it a Shia-
dominant city. In the tenth century, Turkish Seljuks began to conquer cities in the region, 
clashing with the Fatimids for control over areas in the eastern Mediterranean. The 
Seljuks, also expanding West, succeeded in defeating Byzantine forces in the battle of 
Manzikert in 1071, placing the bulk of Asia Minor under their control. Chronic fighting 
between the Fatimid and Seljuk empires weakened both forces and paved the way for a 
Christian conquest in the First Crusade of 1096-1099. The crusaders had two objectives 
in their military expedition: to free Christians that had fallen under Muslim control, and 
to liberate Jerusalem—particularly the Anastatis, which western European Christians 
called the Holy Sepulcher—and make it a Christian city again. Crusading forces 
succeeded in capturing Jerusalem in June of 1099 and made it one of three Crusader 
Principalities along with Edessa and Antioch. 
The arrival of crusaders prompted Muslim scholars and leaders to call for jihad, 
or holy war, to defend the people and places of Islam, particularly Jerusalem, which had 
become the third holiest city to the faith. The Seljuk leaders Zangi, Nur-al Din, and 
Salah-ed Din (Saladin) engaged in a series of battles that eventually succeeded in pushing 
back the crusader forces and placing Jerusalem in Muslim hands in 1187. The city was 
forfeited briefly to crusaders from 1229 until 1244, at which time it returned to Muslim 
leadership once again.  
In 1250, the Mamluk Empire, headquartered in Cairo, seized Jerusalem, followed 
by the capture of Acre in 1291, the last crusader stronghold in Palestine. The city 
flourished under Mamluk control and became a center of Islamic scholarship and 
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mysticism, or Sufism.58 In the fifteenth century, the rising Ottoman Empire expanded 
East as the Mamluk Empire declined, taking al-Quds in 1516. The Ottomans introduced a 
centralized bureaucracy to the city and initiated several development projects including 
rebuilding the city’s walls, creating a potable water supply, and establishing a sewage 
system. Under these improved services the city’s population tripled.59 The Ottoman’s 
also repaired religious sites in the city including both the Dome of the Rock and the al-
Aqsa mosque. It was at this time that the Western Wall of the Temple mount became 
recognized as a site of pilgrimage for Jews.60 
At the end of the 18th century, the West began to renew its interests in the Near 
and Middle East. Napoleon seized Egypt in 1798 and sent forces into Palestine in 1799.61  
From 1831 to 1840, Jerusalem was briefly occupied by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad 
Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha. Muhammad Ali, inspired by French ideals, instituted 
policies aimed at making the government in Palestine more secular, including reducing 
the power of Muslim Shari’a courts and abolishing restrictions on dhimmis. These 
policies sparked a region-wide revolt in 1834 that required the bulk of Egypt’s army to 
quell.62 Nevertheless, the liberated status of the dhimmis in Palestine remained, allowing 
Christians and Jews to build and expand their influence in Jerusalem.  
In 1840, a joint British-Prussian offensive defeated the Egyptians. This military 
operation piqued western interests in the region, particularly in the holy sites of 
Jerusalem. The two kingdoms began a joint Protestant mission to Jerusalem in 1841, 
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which introduced Anglican and Lutheran Protestantism to the region. These 
denominations opened ministries for local Christians, such as schools, hospitals and 
orphanages, often “converting” local Christians to Protestantism and creating tensions 
among the different denominations in the city. 63  
Judaism was also affected by the arrival of European influences. Jews from 
Europe began coming in larger and larger numbers to Palestine during the 19th century. 
Some came to the region with the desire of being closer to the site of the Temple while 
others came with the aim of building ideal societies inspired by Marxism, constructing 
kibbutzim first around Galilee and later in the Negev. In 1899, the first Zionist Council 
was called in Basal, Switzerland, with the purpose of discussing the fate of European 
Jews in the face of rising anti-Semitism. Although its spokesperson, Theodor Herzl, 
suggested immigration to Uganda as a possible homeland, certain members at the 
conference insisted on Palestine. The idea of a modern-day homeland for Jews increased 
migration to Palestine in the following decades. 
At the outbreak of World War I, the declining Ottoman Empire sided with 
Germany and the Austrio-Hungarian Empire, which led to the Empire’s dissolution at the 
end of the war and its partition between the British and French in the secretly negotiated 
Skyes-Picot Agreement. Under the agreement, Britain received Palestine, Jordan and 
Jerusalem; France gained control of Lebanon and Syria. British occupation of Palestine 
was seldom peaceful, particularly in Jerusalem. Riots broke out between Arabs and Jews 
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in 1920, 1929 and again in 1936, followed by the Arab revolt of 1936-1938.64 Both Arabs 
and Jews formed their own militant groups aimed at ousting the British from the region. 
In 1937, Britain proposed a plan for partitioning Palestine between Jews and Arabs, the 
Peel Commission, which aimed to make Jerusalem a corpus separatum and international 
protectorate. The Zionists agreed to the idea with some modifications but the Arabs flatly 
rejected the proposition. The outbreak of World War II, however, interrupted talks of 
partition. 
Despite the atrocities of the Jewish Genocide and the overtures of Jerusalem’s 
Grand Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husaini to Hitler during World War II, Britain chose to restrict 
Jewish immigration to Palestine during and after the war. In retaliation, a militant Zionist 
group, the Irgun, blew up a wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in July of 1946, 
which housed part of the British military administration. The blast killed 91 and wounded 
45, the most fatal bombing of a building in terrorism history prior to Oklahoma City in 
1995.65 In the face of growing unrest in the region, the British turned to the newly formed 
United Nations to solve the problem in Palestine. The UN proposed a new partition plan, 
which the General Assembly approved through vote in 1947. The Zionists accepted the 
plan—which also called for Jerusalem to be a corpus separatum, and for Jerusalem and 
Bethlehem to be put under international jurisdiction—but the Arabs refused to agree to 
partition, driving both sides into war. After a year-and-a-half, Israel and Jordan signed an 
armistice ending hostilities in 1949. The war left Israel with more land than delineated in 
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the UN partition plan, made around 700,000 to one million Palestinian refugees, and 
divided Jerusalem with Jordan controlling the Old City and its religious sites.66 
Jordan and Israel immediately took steps aimed at solidifying control over their 
portions of Jerusalem. The Jordanian authority forbade Jews from visiting the Old City 
and imposed restrictions on non-Jews wishing to visit Christian and Muslim sites.67 Both 
sides moved governmental offices to Jerusalem despite international criticism. The 
Israelis named Jerusalem as its capitol in 1949 and opened its parliament, the Knesset, in 
Jerusalem on January 23, 1950.  
In 1967, tensions mounted between Israel and its neighbors—particularly Egypt 
and Syria—over rumors of an Arab invasion of Israel. Israel responded to this threat by 
preemptively launching air strikes against airbases in Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, 
followed by a rapid ground offensive. In six days, from June 5 through 10, the Israelis 
captured all of the West Bank from Jordan including the Old City and East Jerusalem, the 
Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and roughly three million 
Arabs living in these areas. The UN condemned the occupation of these lands in 
Resolution 242, calling for Israel’s withdrawal. Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to 
Egypt in 1979 in exchange for peace with that country, but has continued to occupy the 
West Bank, Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights.  
Although opening the Old City to all people and ensuring the safety of all three 
faith’s religious sites, Israel has initiated a series of controversial policies including 
expanding the city’s borders, building massive apartment complexes in Palestinian  
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2.1, Major Battles Over Jerusalem  
Date Between Results 
~1000 BCE Israelites and Jebusites  Israelites gained Jerusalem, making it the capital of 
United Israel 
587 BCE Israelites and Babylonians Babylonians sacked the city, destroyed the Temple, 
deported Israelites 
539 BCE Persia and Babylonians Persia defeated Babylonians, captured Jerusalem, 
allowed Jews to return and re-sanctify the Temple 
333/2 BCE Alexander the Great and 
Persians 
Introduction of Hellenist culture and political ideas 
175 BCE King Antiochus and 
Maccabeus 
Forbade Jewish practices, desecrated the Temple. 
Maccabeus revolt attacked soldiers and non-Jews in the 
region, Antiochus rescinded orders 
63 BCE Roman Troops and Jews Romans put down intra-Jewish fighting, razed city 
walls, imposed military occupation 
~60-70CE Roman Troops and Zealots  Mass slaughter of Jews, complete destruction of 
Jerusalem and the Temple 
118-135 Hadrian and Bar Kokhba Hadrian attempted to rebuild the city, Bar Kokhba 
revolt recaptured Jerusalem for three years, around 
580,000 Jews killed to put down the revolt  
610 Persian and Byzantine 
Empires 
Persian King Khosrow sacked Jerusalem and killed a 
reported 66,555 Christians in the city. Byzantines 
retook the city twelve years later 
638  Byzantines and Muslims  Muslims capture city peacefully, allowed Jews and 
Christians to stay as dhimmis, built mosques and 
Muslim shrines 
983  Turkish forces and Shii 
Fatimid Dynasty  
Fatimids took the city and made it a Shii center of 
learning and arts 
1099 Crusaders and Fatimids Christian crusaders took the city, slaughtered a 
reported 30,000 inhabitants, established Crusader 
Kingdom 
1187 Saladin and Crusaders Muslim Saladin takes the city via negotiation, does not 
slaughter Christians in the city, allows Jews to return 
1516 Ottoman and Mamluk 
Empires 
Ottomans take the city without a fight, introduce 
centralize government, improved infrastructure, rebuilt 
walls  
1917 British and Ottomans British take the city at the end of World War I, impose 
Mandate Rule until 1947 
1948 Jordan and Israel Israel and Jordan sign an armistice partitioning the city, 
with Jordan possessing the Old City and its holy sites 
1967 Israel and Jordan Israel captures Jerusalem in the Six-Day War, 
effectively annexing the city 
2000 Israel and Palestine Right-wing politician Ariel Sharon visits the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount, sparking the “al-Aqsa Intifada” 
 
neighborhoods, and confiscating Muslim and Christian land in and around the Old City. 68 
These policies, coupled with aggressive actions of local and international Jewish 
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organizations to “Judaize” Jerusalem, have helped create an insecure environment for the 
religious and ethnic status of the city. These insecurities have been reflected in social and 
political violence around Jerusalem, particularly in the September 2000 outbreak of 
Israeli-Palestinian violence—the “al-Aqsa Intifada”—which will be discussed further in 
the following section.  
Christian, Muslim and Jewish Battles for Jerusalem 
 
 The previous chronology reveals that Jerusalem has experienced scores of violent 
conflicts throughout its more than three millennia of history; the major battles are 
highlighted in Table 2.1. Numerous nations and empires have attempted to seize the city 
and claim rights to its sacred places. This section focuses specifically on three major 
waves of violence over Jerusalem: the Christians Crusades of the 11th through 14th 
centuries, the Muslim call for jihad as a means of countering the Christian crusader 
threat; and Israel’s seizure of Jerusalem in 1967 and the Jewish and Muslim violence its 
governorship has sparked. Drawing on the causal argument from chapter two, this section 
will ask the following questions surrounding these episodes of violence: Is there an 
identifiable threat or the perception of a threat to which the violent parties are 
responding? What are the material, social and technological resources available to the 
involved religious groups? And what is the relationship between political and religious 
leaders? 
The Christian Crusades to liberate Jerusalem 
 This section considers the antecedent conditions that fueled Pope Urban II’s call 
for a Holy War in 1095CE.   Specifically it outlines the emergence of crusading, external 
and internal threats to Christian Europe at the time of the crusades, the call and response 
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of the First Crusade, the resources available to crusaders, the various goals of crusading, 
and religious and political leaders’ motives for calling crusades. It argues that threats 
from Muslim Seljuks in Asia Minor coupled with the Almoravid’s advance into the 
Iberian Peninsula prompted a military reaction from the pope and several European 
kings. The pope’s call for military action against Muslim forces received popular 
backing, however, because it included liberating Jerusalem and the tomb of Christ, which 
was an important symbol of popular Christian piety at the time. Furthermore, the initial 
crusade succeeded in capturing Jerusalem not because of superior material, social or 
technological resources, but because Muslim forces were weakened through infighting, 
leaving the area vulnerable to invasion. 
Most scholars agree that the crusades had their roots in the rise of European 
pilgrimages to the Holy Land, which began as early as the 4th century and took on 
increasing importance as the first Christian millennium drew near.69 European pilgrims 
aimed to travel—usually via land on foot or by horseback—to the cities in the Holy Land 
connected with the life, ministry, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus the Christ. This 
included Bethlehem (Jesus’ birthplace), Nazareth (the city where he grew up), the Galilee 
(where Jesus performed the bulk of his ministry and miracles) and, most importantly, 
Jerusalem where he died, was buried and rose from the dead.   
Christian pilgrims, although not part of the clerisy, held a special status in the 
eyes of the Church. Most notably, they took vows to the Church to perform and complete 
the pilgrimage, making them separate from ordinary citizens and like clergy for the 
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duration of their trip.70  Moreover, pilgrims were also unique in that the often took up 
arms or to hire knights as protection on their journey, making them not unlike small 
armies.71 These two facets of pilgrims to the Holy Land—unique status in the eyes of the 
Church and the presence of defensive forces—paved the way for the concept of 
crusading, which began in the late 11th century. 
The early crusaders were similar in many ways to pilgrims and, prior to the 13th 
century, the two groups were virtually indistinguishable.72 Like pilgrims, the early 
crusaders took religious vows that bound them to the performance and completion of 
their task. They were given special status in the eyes of the church and their local rulers.73 
Crusaders were accompanied by members of the clergy, as were the pilgrims, and both 
kept similar liturgical practices and religious rites.74  Likewise, the crusaders followed the 
same routes to the Holy Land used by pilgrims.75 Many early crusaders also brought their 
families on the journey, not unlike pilgrims.76  
Moreover, crusaders also resembled military forces of their times. Prior to 1095, 
several popes had assembled bands of knights with the aim of defending the Church and 
its interests. For example, in 1049 Pope Leo IX employed a militia to fight Normans in 
Southern Italy. 77 From 1059 to 1073, Popes Nicholas II and Alexander II also employed 
militias to defend papal land and interests including an offense against advancing Muslim 
forces in Spain. 78 In 1085, Frankish forces captured the Spanish city of Toledo followed 
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by the capture of Tarragona.79 These soldiers were often granted religious indulgences—
specifically the remission of sins for their services—and those that died in battle were 
called martyrs.80   
However, crusaders differed from pilgrims and papal forces in that, first, the 
forces called and sent out by the pope in 1095 had the goal of “liberating” Jerusalem and 
claiming territory believed to be inherently Christian. Pilgrims, on the other hand, sought 
merely to visit Jerusalem and its holy sites, not occupy them.  Second, the pope was the 
person responsible for calling crusades and also had the authority to grant indulgences for 
those who participated.81 Pilgrimages, on the other hand, were organized by both 
religious and secular leaders. Third, after the mid 12th century, crusaders had their own 
unique vow that was distinct from a pilgrim’s vow. 82 Moreover, crusaders also wore a 
unique cross on their clothes and armor; the word Crusade in fact comes from the Latin 
word for cross, cruci.83 Lastly, crusaders also formed their own unique military orders—
Templars and Hospitalers—associated with maintaining Crusader Kingdoms in the Holy 
Land.84 Crusaders, therefore, eventually became a distinct force of the Church and had 
their own vows, their own military orders, and the unique goal of liberating Christian 
land in defense of the faith. 
 Prior to the call for Holy War to liberate Jerusalem in 1095, domestic and 
international political circumstances created the conditions under which the Church 
began to sanction violence for religious ends. Following the end of the Carolingian wars 
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in the tenth century, France suffered from protracted insecurity caused by pillaging 
knights. Gradually, emerging local lords, Castellans, hired these free- lance knights to 
defend their interests, which often included defending bishops, monasteries, and religious 
land.85 In 1031, at the Council of Limoges, the Church reinforced a recent call for the 
“Peace of God,” which attempted to restore order to the region by compelling knights to 
swear an oath to respect the peace. Alongside this oath, the Church began to employ 
knights as defensive forces aimed at keeping the peace.86 Therefore, the Church soon 
possessed a force of knights who were bound by oath to defend the Church’s interests 
and keep the peace. 
Also around this time, Pope Gregory VII called on scholars to delineate the 
religious and legal conditions under which the church could use force. The scholar 
Anselm drew from the works of fourth century bishop St. Augustine of Hippo to 
distinguish between two types of holy war: those commanded by God and those approved 
by God.87 He differentiated this from Augustine’s concept of the Just War, which, 
although containing similarities, required the sanction of force by a king, not the pope. 
The 13th century scholar Thomas of Aquinas further defined the conditions under which 
the Church could sanction military action and the limits of force against non-Christians.88  
In addition to these domestic concerns, the era leading up to the First Crusade also 
had several important international developments, particularly vis-à-vis Muslim Empires. 
In the mid-eleventh century, the Seljuk Sultans of the Abbasid Empire began to push 
north and west through Asia Minor. In 1071, the Seljuks defeated the Byzantine Empire 
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in the battle of Manzikert, placing most of region under Muslim control.89 This loss was 
compounded by the Seljuk’s capture of Antioch in 1084, which was a Christian-majority 
city.90 Pope Gregory VII proposed raising an army that would push east to liberate Greek 
Christians and free the Tomb of Christ from Muslim rule.91  This proposal, however, was 
not heeded until Gregory’s successor, Urban II, officially called for holy war in 1095. 
Also around this time, Muslim Almoravids moved into North Africa and the 
Iberian Peninsula.  The Almoravids imposed a strict interpretation of Muslim law and 
practices, threatening Christians in the region. 92 In response, Gregory VII dispatched 
troops to the region in 1078 with the aim of pushing back this new Mus lim force.  Papal 
troops took Toledo in 1085 followed by the capture of Tarragona. In these military 
expeditions, knights were granted papal indulgences and those that died in battle were 
called martyrs, as previously mentioned.93 
In addition to these domestic and international developments, religious reforms at 
this time also helped fuel the call for a holy war against Muslim forces. In the post- 
Carolingian war era, clerics began to organize greater lay participation in the Church. 
They built more local parishes with the aim of reaching out to the common person. 94 
They also sought to apply monastic values in the world and to instill a new level of piety 
within the laity. These efforts inspired a popular religious zeal—aided by the 
millennium—visible in increased participation in pilgrimage and, later, the willingness to 
answer the call for holy war against the threat of Muslim forces. 
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This new piety was supplemented by popularly held beliefs about God’s 
interaction with humanity. It was commonly believed that God spoke through natural 
forces. In the decades leading up to the First Crusade and particularly in the year that 
Urban II called for holy war, numerous natural wonders occurred including solar and 
lunar eclipses, auras in the sky, meteor showers, and mysterious red glowing horizons; 
these phenomena were interpreted as God’s call for Christians to liberate Jerusalem. 95 
This message was compounded by a drought throughout France, which was interpreted as 
God’s disfavor, and which ended in the year the holy war was proclaimed.96 Therefore, 
these natural phenomenon added to the sense of growing popular piety and enthusiasm 
for taking action against Muslim forces. 
Lastly, increased pilgrimages around the time of the millennium fueled popular 
imaginings of the Holy Land in general and Jerusalem in particular. Historian Jonathan 
Riley-Smith argues that “the attitude of eleventh-century Christians towards Jerusalem 
and the Holy Land was obsessive. Jerusalem was the center of the world, the spot on 
which God Himself had focused when he chose to redeem mankind by intervening in 
history…”97 Returning pilgrims brought miraculous tales of their journey to Christ’s 
homeland that were spread through stories, songs and poems.98 In addition, returning 
pilgrims often brought home relics—artifacts believed to be authentically connected with 
Christ and his ministry—which were displayed in Churches throughout Europe.99 Of 
particular importance were pieces of the True Cross, found by Constantine’s mother in 
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the fourth century, and the Lance of Christ, the sword believed to have pierced Jesus’ 
side while he hung on the cross. These relics were later carried into battle and believed to 
grant imminent victory for the crusaders.  
With these domestic and international circumstances in mind, the pope called for 
a holy war at the Council of Claremont in November of 1095—to begin on the feast of 
the assumption of St. Mary, August 15, 1096—in order to liberate Greek Christians and 
Jerusalem. He proclaimed a holy war as the pope, speaking on Christ’s behalf, naming it 
the Via Dei, the Way of God.100 He called on young, able-bodied men to vow to defend 
the Church and don crosses on their clothes and armor as a sign of their holy mission. He 
forbade monks from participating, however, claiming that it violated their vows to 
renounce the world and to not take up arms.101 The pope toured through France and Italy 
from December into the following year to raise support for the expedition and to recruit 
forces.  
The popular response to the pope’s declaration was overwhelming, inspiring 
average people to preach and gather their own recruits for the offense. One layperson in 
particular, Peter the Hermit, zealously proclaimed the need for holy war, calling on all 
Christians—old, young, male and female—to embark on the expedition. 102 His message 
stressed the need to liberate Jerusalem from Muslim oppression, reflecting the importance 
of the holy city to current-day Christians. He gathered a following so whipped-up by the 
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proclaimed threat to Christianity that a mob stormed through the Rhineland in the spring 
of 1096, slaughtering Jews in what became known as the first holocaust.103   
Peter the Hermit succeeded in mobilizing a force of around 60,000 that left for the 
East via the traditional pilgrimage routes to the Holy Land in March 1096, five months 
before Urban’s stated start-date.104 This mass, although considered to be part of the First 
Crusade, is also often referred to as the “Peasants’” or “People’s Crusade.” Without 
planning and proper provisions, the majority of these armed pilgrims either starved en 
route or were killed by a Turkish ambush in August.105  
A second wave of crusaders set off on August 15, as scheduled. The force 
consisted of five armies of around 40,000 including castellans and their families, 
professional knights, lay knights, and other men sworn to protect the Church and its 
interests.106 Several historians note that the motives of these early crusaders to engage in 
holy war were mixed. Historian Jonathan Riley-Smith argues that the salient motivation 
was religious piety. However, some went in search of adventure and glory, others went as 
a means of performing penances for crimes committed, and perhaps a few went in search 
of fortune, although there is virtually no evidence that crusaders returned wealthy from 
the expedition. 107  Unlike the first wave that left in the spring, this group was better 
prepared for the long journey ahead. Participants had solicited funds, sold property, and 
received donations from congregations to finance the trip.108 Subsequent crusades were 
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even better organized and funded, often receiving financing from papal indulgences and 
regional taxes.109 
It took the force nearly three years to reach Jerusalem. They arrived in 
Constantinople and crossed the Bosporus in April of 1097. On June 19, the force took the 
city of Nicaea and established a principality in Edessa. Beginning in October 1097, the 
crusaders fought to regain the city of Antioch from the Seljuks, finally taking the fortress 
in June of 1098 and establishing a second principality. Throughout that winter in 
Antioch, one in seven knights died of starvation and half of the force deserted.110  
In November 1098, a force of around 10,000 to 15,000 troops—including knights, 
foot soldier and citizens—set off for Jerusalem. On June 7, 1099, they reached the 
ramparts and began their siege on the city, finally defeating its forces on June 15. It is 
reported that the crusaders then entered the city and indiscriminately slaughtered an 
estimate 20,000 to 30,000 of the inhabitants inside. One witness observed that, “men rode 
in blood up to their knees and bridle reins. Indeed, it was a just and splendid judgment of 
God that this place should be filled with the blood of unbelievers since it had suffered so 
long from their blasphemies.”111 The capture of the Holy City and its establishment as a 
crusader principality was deemed a miracle, both by the forces that took the city and by 
those that heard the news of the victory back in Europe, particularly after crusaders began 
to return home in 1100.112 
The miraculous success of the First Crusade spawned a series of subsequent holy 
wars stretching from the eleventh century to as late as the 1700s; the majority of 
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crusades, however, were concentrated from the 11th through the 14th centuries.113 
Although the First Crusade had as its goal the liberation of Greeks from Muslim 
occupation and the capture of Jerusalem, future crusades expanded to including other 
goals; all crusades, however, were perceived as necessary measures for the defense of the 
Church and its interests.114 Historian Jonathan Riley-Smith argues that the crusades can 
be divided into four broad categories. First, crusades were taken to liberate land and, to a 
lesser extent, people believed to be the property of Christianity. This category includes 
the First Crusade but also contains Reconquista Crusades fought to “liberate” Spain from 
Muslim occupation, particularly the 13th century battles in Cordoba, Valencia, and 
Seville.115 This category also includes subsequent crusades taken to defend and recapture 
Crusader Kingdoms established by the First Crusade, particularly to defend Jerusalem, 
which fell to Saladin in 1187, was regained by Frederick II in 1229, and lost to Turks in 
1244.116 This type further contains later crusades in the 14th and 15th centuries undertaken 
by French and Hungarian forces to push back Ottoman advances into the Balkans.117 
Second, crusades were fought in northeastern Europe with the aim of ridding the 
continent of paganism. This type of crusading includes the 12th century proclamations of 
St. Bernard of Germany, who encouraged the pope to sanction crusades against pagan 
Slavs. His request produced the papal encyclical Divina Dispensatione, which sanctioned 
the use of force for conversion and produced the Livonian Crusade in 1199 and a joint 
German and Danish Crusade in 1209.118 Third, popes called for crusades to battle kings 
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believed to be a threat to the Church. This includes crusades against Henry the VI, a 1240 
attack against Frederick II, and a 1265 offensive against the English monarchy.119 
Finally, crusades were taken to subvert heretics and schismatics within the 
Christian world. This form of crusading was called in the 12th century by the scholar 
Gratian and the Third Lateran Council.120 It includes military action against the Greeks in 
the 12th and 13th centuries and the Albigensian Crusade against a pocket of Catharism—
an ancient deviation of Christianity that claimed a special form of baptism could make 
people sin-free “Perfects”—in southern France.121 Within the 12th century milieu of 
threats stemming from heresy in Europe, Emperor Frederick II called for the death 
penalty for those found guilty of heresy and, under Pope Gregory the IX, new codes were 
added to papal canon law to allow for heretics to be executed by means of hanging, 
burning, or drowning, thus paving the way for the Spanish Inquisition. 122  
In the 13th century, Pope Gregory the IX created the office of the Inquisition to 
specifically combat heresy in Europe.123 In 1478, a papal Bull founded the Holy Office in 
Spain, which became known as the Spanish Inquisition, an institution that lasted until 
1834.124 The Inquisition focused on weeding out what the Church believed to be heretics 
to the faith, of which coverts—mostly Jews but also some Muslims—were the primary 
target. Jewish converts suspected of secretly continuing Jewish practices were called 
“marranos,” or pigs; it is estimated that over 300,000 were burned at the stake after being 
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declared heretics.125 Moreover, Jewish communities in general were often accused of 
blasphemy against Christ, providing legal grounds for destruction of religious property 
such as copies of the Torah or Talmud.126 Thus, crusading to stamp out heresy within 
Europe became a bloody enterprise that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. 
In addition to these four categories, several “popular crusades” occurred in and 
around Europe. These crusades were unique in that they were not sanctioned by the pope 
but, rather, called by laypeople believed to have a special connection to the divine. The 
first such offensive occurred prior to the First Crusade and was organized around the 
charismatic lay person Peter the Hermit, who called and led the “Peasants Crusade” until 
its demise against the Seljuks in 1097. In 1212, a young man named Nicolas from 
Cologne stirred up a force of thousands with a vision of Christian masses walking 
through the sea to liberate Jerusalem. This offense became known as the Children’s 
Crusade, despite the presence of men and women in its ranks.127  In addition, Stephen of 
Cloyes, a layperson connected with the pilgrimage center of Chatres in France, had a 
vision of Christ that called for him to organize a mass to deliver divine letters calling for 
the liberation of Jerusalem to Philip Augustus, King of France.128 Finally, a mass of poor 
believed to be mostly shepherds, rose up in support of Louis IX’s crusade against Egypt, 
which became known as the Shepherd’s Crusade.129 The major crusades are summarized 
in Table 3.1.  
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3.1, Major Christian Crusades to the Holy Land 
Crusade Date Against Goal(s) Result 
Peasant Crusade 
1096-1097 
Muslims Liberate Jerusalem Ambushed and defeated by 
Turks in 1097 
First Crusade 
1096-1109 
Muslims Liberate Greek 
Christians/ Jerusalem 
Created Principalities 
Captured Jerusalem in 1099 
Crusade of 1100 Muslims Expand crusader lands Defeated in Asia Minor 
Venetian 
Crusade of 1122 
Byzantines, 
Muslims 
Take Corfu, expand 
crusader kingdoms 
Defeated Fatimid armada, 
took Tyre in 1124 
Second Crusade 
1145/6-1148 
Byzantines, 
Muslims 
Take back Edessa, Free 
Iberian peninsula, defeat 
Byzantines 
Helped free Lisbon, forces 
defeated in Asia Minor and 
battle over Damascus 
Third Crusade 
1187-1192 
Muslims Take back Jerusalem Did not capture Jerusalem, 
battle ended in three year 
truce. Captured Cyprus 
Fourth Crusade 
1198-1198 
Muslims, 
Greeks 
Depose Byzantine king, 
take back Jerusalem 
Sacked Zara and 
Constantinople.  
“Children’s 
Crusade” 1212 
Muslims Retake Jerusalem Thousands of men, women 
and children marched to 
Marseilles to walk through 
the water to Jerusalem, 
ended in failure and ridicule 
Fifth Crusade 
1218-1221 
Egypt Take back Jerusalem via 
Egypt 
Besieged and captured 
Damietta in 1281, lost again 
in 1221. In 1229, Frederick 
II took Jerusalem by 
negotiation, lost in 1244 
Sixth Crusade 
1249-1250 
Egypt Retake Damietta Took Damietta, marched to 
Mansurah, sultan imposed 
blockade, defeated crusaders 
Crusade of 1261 Muslims Retake Jerusalem Captured Tunis, made it to 
Acre, returned home 
 
These different categories of crusades reveal that several motives inspired the call 
to holy war. Overall, however, crusading was couched in terms of defense and liberation 
not expansion and conquest.130 Religious and political leaders viewed Muslim advances 
towards Europe as a serious threat to the stability of Europe. However, these leaders also 
viewed heresy and paganism as threats to the faith, by some counts an even bigger threat 
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than the advance of Islam. 131  Likewise, disagreements between kings and popes also 
posed a threat to the Church. Therefore, although actions taken by crusaders resulted in 
conquest and expansion, their perception was one of defense, recapture and liberation of 
land and people believed to be Christian. Although crusading continued throughout the 
18th century against the Ottomans, Christian holy wars largely died out after Jerusalem 
and the other Crusader Kingdoms were lost to Muslim forces in the 13th century, which 
will be discussed further in the following section. 
The Christian call for holy war during the middle ages contains elements that 
conform and diverge from the causal argument proposed in this dissertation. First, the 
crusades conform to the causal argument through their saliently religious end-goals, 
particularly the goal of “liberating” Jerusalem. The bulk of major of crusades throughout 
the middle ages were called either to capture or defend Jerusalem. Another early goal of 
crusades was the defense of Greek co-religionists although, ironically, those same co-
religionists were attacked in subsequent crusades. Likewise, further crusades were called 
at home to purify the faith from heretics, pagans, and kings that did not defend interests 
of the Church. All of these goals, while containing social and political elements, were 
primarily religious. 
Second, the saliency of threat perception as a motivation for holy war conforms to 
this dissertation’s causal argument. The primary threat to the Church at this time was 
advancing Muslim empires. This included the Seljuks and Fatimids in the Near and 
Middle East, the advances of the Almoravids in North Africa and the Iberian peninsula 
and, later, the rise of the Ottomans and their capture of the Balkans. In addition to 
Muslim empires, European Christians also crusaded in response to threats posed by 
                                                 
131 Madden, pg. 124; Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?  pg. 26 
 315 
 
 
heretics and kings that disagreed with papal authority. Of all the threats perceived by 
Christians during this time, the crusades against pagans in northeastern Europe appear the 
least compelling as a threat to the health of the Church. However, even these crusades 
received papal blessings and were couched in terms of threat to the faith.  
The crusades, however, do not conform to two predictions inferred from the 
causal argument in the dissertation. First, the First Crusade succeeded in creating 
crusader kingdoms and capturing Jerusalem despite a severe lack of resources. The First 
Crusade, in particular, was plagued by lack of material resources and even social 
resources such as strong leadership and organization. Despite this, however, they 
succeeded in capturing the holy city and establishing four crusader principalities. 
Subsequent crusades were better organized and funded; however, this did not always 
result in success. Most of the later crusades failed to achieve their goals and ended in 
death and humiliation. This puzzling dynamic between resources and success is best 
explained by the resources and organization of the crusaders’ opposition in the Near and 
Middle East, which will be examined in the following section.  
Second, the crusades reveal that the relationship between religious and political 
leaders during this time is largely indeterminate for explaining the call to holy war and its 
successes or failures. The initial crusades to the Holy Land show a high degree of 
cooperation between the papacy and various kings, particularly the kings of France and 
England, but also Norway, Denmark and Germany. Kings were instrumental in providing 
men, materiel, and money for holy war and, in addition, they often provided the 
necessary leadership to organize troops for battle. However, despite this, papal and kingly 
crusades had only marginal successes. In addition to unified holy wars, the pope also 
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called for crusades against European kings. This demonstrates that the papacy had its 
own resources with which to make war and was not necessarily dependent on the assets 
of kings. Therefore, the call to crusade and its successes and failures were not dependent 
on a religious-political alliance. 
Muslim jihad in response to the crusades 
  This section describes the response of Muslim empires to Christian crusading 
from the 11th through the 15th centuries. It argues that Muslim empires’ initial failures in 
defending their religious and political interests, including Jerusalem, were due largely to 
infighting between Muslim empires in the region, which consumed resources and 
weakened their defenses against the Christian offense. Beginning in the 12th century, 
Muslim scholars called on their leaders to declare jihad. Jihad became a powerful means 
of unifying Muslims against the Christians, which concentrated their resources on this 
threat and succeeded in defeating the Crusader Kingdoms and recapture Jerusalem.  
 Political dynamics in the Near and Middle East at the end of the eleventh century 
directly contributed to the success of the First Crusaders. The region was divided between 
two main empires: the Abbasids, which were Sunni and controlled largely by the Turkish 
Seljuk sultans; and the Fatimid Dynasty, which was Shii Muslim. The Seljuks operated 
initially out of Damascus, later making Baghdad their capital in 1091, and controlled the 
majority of cities in the interior of Asia Minor and the Levant including Allepo, Hama 
and Homs.132 The Fatimid Dynasty, which originated in the 10th century as a littoral 
power, made Cairo its capital and grew to control most of the North African coastline, 
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cities along the Red Sea including Mecca and Medina, and cities along the eastern 
Mediterranean including Beirut, Tyre, Acre, and Jerusalem. 133   
Both the Seljuks and the Fatimids were trying to create a unified Muslim polity 
with their respective branches of the faith predominating. These ambitions propelled both 
forces into confrontation beginning around 1070.134 Seljuk influences increased after 
their defeat of Byzantine forces at Manzikert in 1071 and Antioch in 1084. Fatimid 
power, however, began to decline in the mid-eleventh century, particularly under the 
reign of al-Hakim, who most likely suffered from some form of mental illness.135 In 
1071, the Fatimids lost Sicily to the Franks and Tripoli to an internal rebellion. 136  The 
Seljuk and Fatimid Empires continued to fight one another throughout the rest of the 
century, in addition to combating the rising threat of Mongols in the North and advancing 
Christian forces from the West.  
During this time, Jerusalem changed hands between several leaders. The Fatimids 
gained control of the city at the end of the tenth century. Under the leadership of al-
Hakim, from 996 to his disappearance in 1021, the city’s non-Muslim holy sites were 
desecrated or destroyed including synagogues and the Anastasis, the Church that housed 
the tomb of Christ.137 Muslims sites also suffered under his rule, particularly the Dome of 
the Rock shrine, which partially collapsed in 1017.138  In 1071, a Sunni Turk general 
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captured Jerusalem from the Fatimids and drove out all of the Shias, but the Fatimids 
soon recovered the city in 1098, the year before crusading forces arrived.139     
 Amidst these confrontations between Muslim empires, crusaders moved into Asia 
Minor, taking Edessa, Nicaea and Antioch from the Seljuks before moving down into the 
eastern Mediterranean and seizing Ramle—the Fatimid capital in Palestine—followed by 
Bethlehem, and Jerusalem. 140 Both empires initially did little to stop the advance of 
crusading forces. Turkish troops were dispatched during the siege of Antioch, but failed 
to push back the offense.141 Jerusalem fell without reinforcements being issued from the 
Fatimids in Cairo. Neighboring Sunni Muslims saw the capitulation as divine disfavor for 
the Shias and their rule.142 Crusading forces continued to capture cities in the following 
decades, taking Caesarrea in 1101, Acre in 1104, Tripoli in 1109, and Beirut and Sidon in 
1110.143  Therefore, the crusaders moved in relatively unopposed, capitalizing on the 
divided and weakened state of Muslim forces in the region.  
The first call for jihad against the Christian presence in the region came from 
religious scholars and judges. In 1105, the scholar al-Sulami in Damascus argued in his 
book Kitab al-Jihad, the Book on Holy War, that the crusaders were not part of 
Byzantium but, rather, represented a new Christian offense aimed at taking Jerusalem 
from Muslim hands. Moreover, he interpreted their miraculous success as divine 
punishment for Sunni moral and political decay. 144 This argument was echoed by the 
Damascus scholar al-Rahim, who cited previous treaties and writings on jihad to 
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encourage the Seljuks to call for holy war in order to defend the Muslim world against 
the new Christian threat.145 
 The first political authority to call for jihad was the Turkish tribal leader Ilghazi, 
who swore an oath to fight a holy war in defense of Allepo against the new Crusader 
Kingdom of Antioch. He led Muslim forces in a major victory against the Crusaders in 
1119, in a battle dubbed “The Field of Blood.”146 The second Muslim leader to call for 
jihad was Imad al-Din Zangi, who created a semi-autonomous principality in northern 
Iraq and Syria in the 12th century. Through the aid of religious scholars, he called for 
jihad not only against Christians but also against immoral and corrupt Muslim leadership 
in the region. He encouraged Muslims to return to more orthodox practices and 
welcomed volunteers to fight in his armies against infidels.147 This proclamation 
prompted an alliance between his Muslim rival in Damascus, Mu’in al-Din Unur, and the 
Crusader Kingdom in Jerusalem.148 Despite this Chris tian-Muslim alliance, Zangi still 
succeeded in capturing the Crusader Kingdom of Edessa in 1144. After his assassination 
in 1146, his son Nur ad-Din succeeded him as leader in Allepo.     
Nur ad-Din took Damascus in 1154, aided by pro-jihad factions in the area and an 
accidental Christian attack on the city led by Norman, German, and Flemish Crusaders.149 
To commemorate the victory, he commissioned the construction of a minbar, a Muslim 
pulpit, to be placed in Jerusalem’s al-Aqsa mosque after the city’s inevitable recapture by 
Muslim forces. However, Nur ad-Din was forced commit the bulk of his troops to push 
back crusader ambitions in Egypt, blocking his goal of liberating Jerusalem. The troops 
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succeeded in thwarting the crusaders and one of its generals, a Kurd later known by the 
name Salah-ed-Din (Saladin) took charge of Cairo. 
Saladin converted Cairo from a Shia capital to a center of orthodox Sunni Islam. 
He founded Sunni madrasas, religious schools that teach theology and Islamic 
jurisprudence, and supported Sunni Sufis. With the death of Nur-ad Din in 1174, Saladin 
took control of Damascus and deposed ad-Din’s son, effectively uniting the two centers 
of Muslim power in the region. After consolidating his authority in the neighboring cities 
of Allepo, Mayyafariqin and Mosul, he responded to the pressures of his religious 
scholars and focused his resources on a jihad against the crusader presence in the 
region. 150   
Saladin had highly- trained, strongly led, and well equipped armies that succeeded 
in outmaneuvering crusader forces in the region. Saladin’s armies were composed of 
Turkish and Kurdish professional soldiers along with slave soldiers (Mamluks), 
mercenaries, and volunteers mobilized for jihad.151 His trained armies were particularly 
effective in their use of a unique longbow, which his forces could fire backwards while 
racing on horseback.152 Saladin’s troops made use of sieges, raids and ambushes, tactics 
that crusader forces were not accustomed to encountering. 153 Moreover, Saladin 
commissioned at least three military manuals aimed at making his large forces more 
efficient through organization and tactics.154 In contrast, crusader forces were small, often 
poorly trained, and dispersed among several strong points. They were no match to 
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Saladin’s forces, which numbered in the tens-of-thousands and were unified in one mass 
that moved from city to city. 155 
In June of 1187, Saladin led a force of around 30,000 troops into battle against the 
Crusader Kingdoms.156 He took the crusader stronghold in Tiberias along the Sea of 
Galilee in the Battle of Hattin, followed by the capture of Ascalon in September and the 
capitulation of Jerusalem in October of that same year.157 Unlike crusading forces a 
century earlier, Saladin negotiated the peaceful surrender of the city, allowing most of its 
inhabitants to leave with their possessions after paying a fee.158     
Once in Jerusalem, Saladin is reported to have immediately set about cleaning the 
Haram and restoring the Dome of the Rock, which had been converted into a church, and 
the al-Aqsa mosque. The pulpit commissioned by Nur ad-Din was brought from 
Damascus and installed in the al-Aqsa mosque and Friday prayers resumed.159 Saladin 
gave the Greek Christians control of the Christian sites in the city, punishing the western 
Latin Christians for their treatment of Muslim people and holy sites during the 
crusades.160 In addition, Saladin allowed Jews back into the city and welcomed those 
fleeing Christian persecution in Spain and France.161  
Saladin’s capture of Jerusalem sparked the call for another crusade back in 
Europe. During his offensive in 1187, Saladin did not take the port city of Tyre, which 
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allowed the crusaders to keep a foothold in the region. 162 In 1190, Richard the Lionheart 
of England and Philip II of France set off on what would become the Third Crusade. In 
1191, Richard captured Cyprus, establishing the island as a base for western naval 
operations, followed by the re-conquest of Acre in that same year. From October 1191 
throughout 1192, crusading forces attempted to retake Jerusalem without success. 
However, later that year, after a lengthy field battle that drained Saladin’s financial and 
material resources, Richard succeeded in forcing a truce after the Battle of Jaffa.163 
Saladin died in 1193, at which time his kingdom was divided among regional rulers. In 
1229, crusaders retook Jerusalem via negotiations only to be captured by Turks in 1244. 
With Jerusalem’s recapture and the defeat of crusader forces, the call for jihad over 
Jerusalem came to an end and was not revived until the modern era.  
The success of Muslim forces in driving the crusaders out of Palestine in general 
and Jerusalem in particular conforms to the causal argument presented in this 
dissertation. First, the counter-crusaders were expressed in saliently religious terms. The 
counter offensives led by Ilghazi, Zangi, Nur-ad Din and Saladin were called as jihads, 
holy wars in defense of Islam. In addition to professional troops, these forces contained 
volunteers who had answered the call for holy war and were willing to die for the defense 
of their faith. Moreover, these leaders called for jihad with the express purpose of 
liberating Jerusalem from the hands of Christian crusaders. Although capturing other 
crusader strong points was a goal of these jihads, Jerusalem continued to be the priority 
of the holy war. This is evident, first, in the pulpit commissioned by Nur-ad Din for the 
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al-Aqsa mosque and, second, in the persistence of clerics pushing for the liberation of 
Jerusalem. 
Second, Muslim leaders called for jihads in the 11th and 12th centuries largely in 
response to threat. The crusaders presented a general threat to the region; they had 
succeeded in capturing several cities on the eastern Mediterranean coast in addition to 
cities in the interior such as Jerusalem and Edessa; this created a menacing presence that 
threatened the viability of Muslim power in the region. However, the presence of 
crusaders was not merely a political or military threat, it was also a religious one. The 
crusaders showed no restraint when taking Jerusalem; they slaughtered tens of thousands 
of the city’s inhabitants and desecrated its holy sites. They converted the Dome of the 
Rock to a church and made the al-Aqsa mosque a headquarters for military officers. 
When Saladin retook the city in 1187, it is reported that his first order of business was to 
clean and re-sanctify the sites on the Haram, a project in which he personally helped. 
Therefore threat in general and religious threat in particular were motivations for jihad 
against the crusaders.  
Third, resources were key to the success of the jihads against the crusaders. Jihad 
forces and their leaders possessed greater social resources relative to their crusader 
counterparts. This included, most importantly, better trained soldiers and stronger 
leadership, which succeeded in optimizing resources for success against the crusader 
armies. It also allowed for innovation and flexibility in tactics, which consistently 
outmaneuvered their crusader opponents. In addition, Muslim forces had superior 
material resources to their crusader foes. This included more soldiers and more materiel 
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in addition to the possibility of reinforcements and more recruits from nearby cities 
within the region.  
Fourth, the relationship between religious and political leaders reveals that both 
groups of elites worked together to defeat Christian forces and liberate Jerusalem. 
Religious scholars were the first to call for jihad against the crusaders. Shortly after 
raising the call, political leaders began to push for the liberation of Jerusalem. Both Nur 
ad-Din and Saladin relied on clerics and scholars to spread the call for jihad and to help 
with recruiting volunteers to fight. Likewise, as previously mentioned, it was the 
religious scholars and clerics who continued to push for the liberation of Jerusalem under 
Saladin. Moreover, both leaders called not only for jihad against crusaders but also for a 
renewed Sunni orthodoxy in the region. Both leaders were noted for their own personal 
piety and their willingness to sponsor religious schools, Sufis, and the restoration of holy 
sites in the region. 
It is worth noting that, during this era, little is heard from Jewish communities 
regarding the governorship of Jerusalem and its holy sites. Records show that Jews were 
present in and around Jerusalem when it was under Shia Fatimid rule in the late tenth 
through mid-eleventh centuries and that the two religious groups coexisted. When 
Jerusalem fell to Turkish forces in 1073, both Shias and Jews were turned out of the 
city.164 Despite this, Jewish pilgrims are reported as coming to the city throughout the 
tenth and eleventh centuries.165 Moreover, Saladin’s personal physician was the Jewish 
scholar Maimonides, who had fled Spain amid Christian advances into the peninsula.166 
Likewise, Jewish refugees continued to come to the region from Europe and North Africa 
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during this time, fleeing Christian persecution. 167 It is likely to argue, therefore, that 
Jewish communities lacked the resources and the cohesion to affect change during this 
era. It is not until the arrival of more and more Jewish migrants in the modern era that 
communities were able to organize and assert their demands. This will be discussed in the 
following section. 
Jewish and Muslim battles over Jerusalem after 1967 
 This section traces the status of Jerusalem following Israel’s capture of the city in 
the 1967 Six-Day war to the present. It argues that Israel’s motives for preemptive attack 
against its neighboring states in 1967 was not religiously driven. However, following the 
seizure of Jerusalem, the Israeli government has implemented policies that reflect the 
importance of Jerusalem as a religious city. Furthermore, Israel’s capture of Jerusalem 
has inspired violent actions from both Muslim and Jewish organizations seeking to 
change the religious and political status quo of the city. 
 In 1947, as the British prepared to end its mandate rule, the newly created United 
Nations proposed a plan to partition Palestine into two areas: one that would become the 
state of Israel, which included the eastern Galilee, the upper Jordan valley, the Negev and 
the coastal plain; and the other that would become an Arab state consisting of the western 
Galilee, the lower Jordan valley, Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, and Hebron.  In this 
arrangement, Jerusalem would become a corpus separatum between the two states and, 
together with Bethlehem, would be placed under international control.168 The Zionists 
accepted the plan, despite disagreeing with some of its details; the Arabs, on the other 
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hand, rejected the proposal. The two sides went to war, ultimately ending in an armistice 
between Israel and Trans-Jordan in March 1948. Jerusalem was partitioned between 
Trans-Jordan and Israel into East and West Jerusalem respectively with a demilitarized 
zone restricting access between the two sides. Trans-Jordan gained control of the entire 
Old City with its Muslim, Christian and Jewish sites. Jews that had been living in the Old 
City were forced to flee as were Arabs that had been living in western suburbs of 
Jerusalem. 169   
Despite international condemnation of the partition—voiced in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 303—both Trans-Jordan and Israel took measures to solidify 
control of their respective sides of Jerusalem. 170 Trans-Jordan imposed restrictions on 
access to the Old City in violation of the armistice. In particular, they denied Israeli and 
international Jews access to the Western Wall, often requiring tourists to produce 
Christian baptismal certificates in order to ensure that they were not Jewish. 171 
Furthermore, the Jordanian government took measures to strengthen the Muslim and 
Arab character of East Jerusalem. It began a rigorous restoration program of the al-Aqsa 
mosque and the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area. The government also renovated the 
commercial area in East Jerusalem and built apartment complexes in the suburbs east of 
the city.  
Trans-Jordan also implemented controversial political changes to the organization 
of the Muslim leadership in Jerusalem. They appointed a new Grand Mufti, which 
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Jerusalem had not had since Britain’s deportation of its previous Grand Mufti in 1939, 
Hajj Amin al-Husaini, following the Arab Revolt.  The government also abolished the 
hereditary structure of leadership within the Muslim community, appointing their own 
leaders who would ensure compliance with the Jordanian government. 172 The Muslim 
leadership showed its disapproval of the reforms by assassinating Jordan’s newly 
crowned King Abdullah (I) in 1951.  
Israel also implemented policies aimed at securing their control over West 
Jerusalem. On December 5, 1949—despite international opposition—Israel declared 
Jerusalem its capital, followed by the convening of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, in 
Jerusalem on January 23, 1950.173 The president moved his office from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem in 1952 and the foreign ministry moved to Jerusalem the following year. These 
changed forced foreign diplomats to send their correspondence to offices in Jerusalem, 
prompting several to move from Tel Aviv altogether. By 1967, nearly 40% of foreign 
diplomats’ offices were located in Jerusalem, with the notable exception of the US, Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union, whose embassies remained in Tel Aviv. 174 During this time, 
therefore, Israel’s primary motivation for developing Jerusalem was to make it the capital 
of the state and not necessarily a religious city.   
 In May1967 rumors of an Israeli offensive against Syria heightened tensions in 
the region. The rumors prompted the creation of a Syrian, Egyptian, Jordanian and Iraqi 
alliance aimed at deterring Israeli military action. Egypt closed the Red Sea to Israeli 
shipping, which Israel interpreted as an attack on its sovereignty. After securing US 
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approval, Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq on the 
morning of June 5.  By June 10, it has succeeded in capturing the Golan Heights from 
Syria, the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from 
Jordan. 175 The UN condemned Israel’s seizure of these lands as illegal and called for its 
immediate withdrawal in UN Resolution 242.176 Despite this, Israel has continued to 
occupy these lands with the exception of the Sinai, which it returned to Egypt in 1979. 
Israel took immediate actions to secure Jerusalem and the Old City as its own. On 
the night of June 10, the day the armistice was signed, Israel evacuated around 650 
residents of the Maghribi Quarter then bulldozed all 153 homes of the neighborhood, 
including two mosques. The space was cleared to create room for the anticipated hoards 
of Jewish pilgrims wishing to visit the Western Wall.177 The international community 
condemned the destruction, which was in violation of the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions on the protection of cultural property. 178 The act also sparked alarm within 
the Palestinian community over the safety of its holy sites.   
The Israeli government also took political and legal actions aimed at solidifying 
its control over Jerusalem. On June 27, 1967, the Knesset passed the Protection of Holy 
Places Law as part of its overall legislation that “unified” East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank as Israeli property. 179  The Law ensured free access to the all holy sites, protection 
of sites from vandalism or destruction, a seven-year prison sentence for those who 
violated these laws, and the placement of all ho ly sites under the jurisdiction of the Israeli 
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Minister of Religious Affairs. The Act did not specifically state that it would uphold the 
status quo, however.180 Shortly after the passage of this law, Zerah Warhaftig, the Israeli 
Minister of Religious Affairs, declared that the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif was the 
property of Israel by biblical right; according to II Samuel 5:6-12, the ancient Israelites 
had purchased Jerusalem from the Jebusites in the time of King David around 1000 
BCE.181 Along with this cla im, he promised, however, not to remove the Muslim sites 
currently on the Temple Mount.182  The declaration of ownership and promise of 
protection, however, did little to build Muslim confidence regarding Israeli guardianship 
of the sites. 
In addition to declaring legal jurisdiction over the sacred sites in Jerusalem, the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs also assumed the authority to approve appointments of 
Christian and Muslim leaders. The Ministry required that all Qadis—Muslim religious 
judges—become Israeli citizens and denounce their Jordanian citizenship in order to keep 
their posts.  Moreover, they attempted to construct a “Board of Guardians” in Israel that 
would administer Shari’a law. 183 In response, the existing board of Muslim legal and 
religious leaders, the Awqaf Administration, set up their own council, the Higher Islamic 
Board. This body spoke out against Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem and criticized the 
government’s interference in religious affairs; in response, Israel deported the Board’s 
chairman in September of 1967.184 Despite this, the Muslim leadership in Jerusalem 
continued to organize against Israeli policies, which prevented the government from 
completely co-opting their authority. 
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The Christian authority in Jerusalem had a somewhat different experience with 
Israeli occupation. Under Jordanian rule, Christian leaders—the majority of whom were 
headquartered in the Old City—were faced with the difficult task of ministering to 
congregations on both sides of the Armistice line. Initially, the Jordanian government 
restricted the movement of the clerisy between the West Bank and Israel. They also 
imposed restrictions on Christian building and limited the number of students allowed in 
Christian schools.185  
After 1967, relations between most of the Christian clerisy and Israel were 
somewhat better than under Jordanian rule. This was due, in part, to Israel’s desire to 
foster good relations with western countries, develop tourism, and—it is argued—keep 
Palestinian leadership divided between the Christians and Muslims by favoring the 
Christians.186 Moreover, Christian holy sites were less of an issue with Israel because 
they were situated away from the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, the site that holds 
significance to both Jews and Muslims.  
However, the Israelis did subject the Christian churches to difficult treatment 
including, most notably, pressure for leaders to sell land to Israel. This was particularly 
true for the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and the Armenian Orthodox churches, 
which all owned substantial land within and around the Old City.  187  In more recent 
times, the emergence of Palestinian senior clerisy within some churches, particularly the 
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Roman Catholic Church, has resulted in Israel’s efforts to regulate promotions of church 
heads.188  
In addition to actions surrounding the Old City and religious leaders, the Israeli 
government also implemented policies aimed at developing “new” Jerusalem and its 
suburbs. On June 28, 1967, the government expanded the city limits to incorporate vacant 
lands and Jewish neighborhoods into the city and exclude Arab pockets, ensuring that the 
majority of voters would be Jewish. 189 The government also began a rapid development 
campaign in the newly annexed parts of the city, building enormous apartment 
complexes—such as Gilo near Bethlehem—and filling them with Jewish Israelis.190    
In 1977, in the wake of Israel’s costly 1973 “Yom Kippur/Ramadan” war, voters 
defeated the Labor Party for the first time in the country’s history, ushering in a new 
coalitional government comprised of the right-wing Likud and the National Religious 
Party and headed by the nationalist Menachem Begin.191 Unlike the Labor Party, which 
was reluctant to alter the status quo in the occupied territories, this new government was 
committed to absorbing all of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and Sinai 
Peninsula and making it part of the state of Israel.  
The new government began its incorporation of the “territories” by implementing 
a rapid building program of Jewish settlements modeled after the early settlements 
created by Zionists at the turn of the 20th century. The settler movement consisted of both 
secular and religious groups. Secular settlers, such as Begin’s “Movement for the Whole 
Land of Israel,” aimed to absorb the territories largely for perceived security benefits, for 
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Jewish lebensraum, and to reoccupy Eretz Yisrael, land believed to be historically 
entitled to the Jewish state based on biblical precedent.192 Their motivations, therefore, 
were nationalist and not driven by the desire to control particular sacred sites. Religious 
settlers, on the other hand, stated expressly religious motivation and goals for 
permanently occupying the territories. The umbrella organization Gush Emunim, the 
“Faithful Block,” became the central body for the religious settler movement, which 
believes that recapturing “Jewish” land and sacred sites will hasten the coming of the 
Messiah and the salvation of the world.193 Their motto is “The Land of Israel, for the 
People of Israel, According to the Torah [Bible] of Israel.”194 These groups, although 
divided in their ultimate goals, are united by the objective of appropriating as much land 
as possible. 
Once in office, the Likud government began a rigorous building program in the 
territories. Political scientist Ian Lustick reports:  
Between 1977 and mid-1981 the Likud government spent $400 million [US 
dollars] in the West Bank and Gaza, built twenty settlements in areas considered 
off limits by the previous governments, and increased the number of settlers 
living in the West Bank, minus the Jordan Valley and East Jerusalem, from 
approximately 3,500 to 18,500…By the end of Likud’s second term, in August 
1984, some 113 settlements were spread over the entire West Bank, including a 
half-dozen sizable towns. Some 46,000 Jewish settlers lived in the area (excluding 
expanded East Jerusalem), and housing and services were under construction to 
absorb 15,000 additional settlers each year.195 
 
The religious settlers targeted areas that had important religious sites. They began by 
creating an illegal settlement in Hebron during Passover in 1968, which later became one 
of the largest settlements in the West Bank, Kiryat Arba.  
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Religious settlers used various violent and non-violent tactics to achieve their 
goals including hunger strikes, demonstrations, illegal cessation of land, buying land, 
lobbying the government, running for office, encouraging “charitable donations” from 
Jews overseas and, later, assassinations, bombings, and attacks on Arab individuals and 
property. 196 In particular, however, they gained financial and political support through 
their ties with the Likud government, which provided the bulk of funding for settlement 
expansion. 197       
In addition to efforts to secure the West Bank and Gaza Strip as Jewish land, 
religious settlers also set their sights on Jerusalem. Groups like the Temple Faithful, 
Kach, and Gush Emunim, attempted to clear the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif of its 
Muslim sites in order to claim it for Judaism. This included at least three attempts to blow 
up the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque: an attempt in 1980, linked to Kach and 
Gush Emunim; an attempt in 1983, connected to Gush Emunium; and an attempt in 1984 
by a group of skilled explosives experts that escaped unidentified.198 In addition, militant 
Jewish groups have attempted to hold prayer vigils on the Mount and have made annual 
efforts to lay the corner stone of the Third Temple on the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple 
Mount.199 The government has succeeded in thwarting all of these attempts, but not 
without concern from Muslims in Jerusalem and all over the world for the safety of this 
sacred space. 
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By the 1970s, the permanence of Israeli occupation of the city had become real. 
This reality, coupled with threats to the Muslim sites in the Old City, prompted calls 
throughout the Muslim world for the liberation of Jerusalem and its return to Muslim 
hands. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) made the liberation and protection of 
Jerusalem one of its goals, both to preserve its Muslim integrity and to keep it an Arab 
city.200  The Lebanese Hizballah, which came into being after the Israeli invasion and 
occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982, made one of its objectives the liberation of 
Palestine, especially Jerusalem, from non-Muslim hands.201 And more recently, Osama 
Bin Laden and his international terrorist organization Al Qaeda have named the defense 
of the Palestinian people and Jerusalem as one of its justifications for jihad against Israel 
and the US.202 
In December of 1987, the death of four Palestinian laborers in a car accident at the 
Gaza checkpoint led to a series of events that ignited growing Palestinian frustration 
towards Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. 203 The 
massive Palestinian Intifada—uprising or “shaking off” of Israeli domination—lasted 
more than six years before negotiations at Oslo produced a shaky peace between the two 
sides. The Intifada prompted the creation of a new militant Islamic organization, HAMAS, 
which vowed not only to end Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and 
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Jerusalem but also to install an Islamic government to rule over the Palestinian people.204 
This program is also shared by another Islamic Militant organization in Palestine, the 
Palestine Islamic Jihad.205   
Both of these organizations, but particularly HAMAS, has grown in prominence 
over the last fifteen years. In addition to violent operations aimed at ousting the Israeli 
presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, HAMAS has provided social services to the 
Palestinians, such as health care, education, and vocational training.206 This approach has 
helped to win hearts and minds over to their cause. Likewise, these militant Islamic 
organizations have prospered from international donations and training. It is believed that 
Iran and Saudi Arabia have provided funds and possibly even weapons to these groups to 
support their goal of ending Israeli occupation and creating an Islamic state.207 
The Oslo Peace Accords ended open hostility between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis and marked the first time that the PLO, headed by Yassir Arafat, and the Israeli 
government recognized each other’s authority. However, the agreement had no definitive 
framework for achieving Palestinian statehood and specifically avoided five points of 
contestation between the two sides: the status of Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian 
refugees to return to Israel, Israeli settlements, security measures, and borders.208  All five 
of these issues have remained obstacles to a lasting peace between Israel and the future 
state of Palestine. Jerusalem, however, provided the occasion for the renewal of open 
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hostility between the two sides with the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising, the 
“al-Aqsa Intifada.” 
Prior to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Jerusalem experienced several 
incidents of violence over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The biggest, in 1996, 
occurred when Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu announced the opening of a 
tunnel underneath the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, sparking regional and 
international concern about potential damage to the compound’s structural integrity. 
Violent clashes over the issue caused 78 deaths—59 Palestinians, 16 Israelis and three 
Egyptians—and 1,500 injuries. 209 
In addition, tensions resumed around the holy compound when Arafat and Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak held final status talks at Camp David in July of 2000. In the 
talks, it was rumored that Barak made new concessions to the Palestinians regarding 
Jerusalem, including agreeing to the right of Palestinians to fly their flag over various 
East Jerusalem buildings, control over most of the Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, 
and some territorial sovereignty of Jerusalem’s suburbs.210 However, it is also believed 
that the talks broke down because Arafat believed this was less-than-the-minimum of 
what he could accept on behalf of the Palestinians and other Muslims who were 
pressuring him not to cede the holy city. 211  Arafat returned to a “hero’s welcome” in 
Gaza and “won support across the Arab world for his refusal to compromise over 
Jerusalem.”212 
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Tensions reached a boiling point in September 2000, when Barak and Arafat 
agreed to return to the US and resume peace talks with US President Bill Clinton. 
Rumors circulated that a new proposal was on the table for Jerusalem, including the 
controversial plan to place the Old City under the protection of the UN Security 
Council.213 Amidst these tensions, right-wing Israeli nationalist and leader of the Likud 
party, Ariel Sharon, visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount accompanied by members 
of his party and approximately 1,000 Israeli security forces. He visited the holy 
compound on September 28, 2000, the five-year anniversary of the signing of Oslo II, 
which gave the Palestinian Authority control over Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin, 
Nablus, Qalqilya, and Tulkaram.214  
Sharon’s visit was provocative not because he was a Jew, an Israeli, a politician, 
or because he came accompanied by 1,000 security troops, but because of his lengthy 
history of notorious acts against the Palestinians. In 1953, as a member of the “Unit 101” 
commandos, Sharon was responsible for ordering an attack on the village Qibya in trans-
Jordan, near the Israeli border, killing 69 civilians and destroying 45 homes.215  In 1982, 
as Defense Minister of the Israeli government and as part of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, Sharon oversaw a Lebanese attack on two Palestinian refugee camps near 
Beirut—Sabra and Shatilla—which resulted in the murder of hundreds—some say 
thousands—of Palestinian refugees, an incident for which Sharon was found indirectly 
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guilty in an Israeli tribunal.216 Sharon’s visit, therefore, was especially provocative to the 
Palestinians.  
Sharon’s visit sparked immediate reaction from Palestinians on the Holy 
Compound, who threw rocks and yelled at the entourage, “Murder, get out!”217 The tour 
ended with Israeli troops firing rubber-coated bullets at the protesters.218 In addition to 
this initial reaction from Palestinians, Sharon’s visit to the Holy Compound sparked 
condemnation from around the Muslim world: Lebanon, Syria, Oman, Tunis, Sudan, 
Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen all experienced spontaneous 
demonstrations against Sharon’s visit.219 Therefore, Sharon’s visit to the Haram al-Sharif 
was more than a threat to Palestinian sovereignty; it was a threat to the larger Muslim 
community. 
The following day, scores of Palestinians were shot and four killed after Friday 
Muslim prayers.220 Within hours, violence had erupted in all the major Palestinian cities 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the close of the weekend, at least 27 Palestinians 
had been killed, one Israeli, and one Israeli-Arab with over 700 Palestinians reported 
injured.221 Following this first weekend of violence, clashes between Israel and the 
Palestinians spiraled into a new Intifada that continues to date. 
                                                 
216 Hockstader, “Israeli defends visit to contested site,” The Washington Post, October 2, 2000, pg. 1. There 
is a plaque on the Site commemorating the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, see Mary Curits, “Sharon blames 
Mid-east unrest on Arafat,” LA Times, November 2, 2000 pg. 2 
217 “Shots fired at Jerusalem Holy Site,” BBC, September 28, 2000, pp. 1-2 
218 Horovitz, “Visit by Sharon provokes a day of violence,” Irish Times, September 29, 2000, pg. 2 
219 David Hir, “Spontaneity Marks Protests Across the Arab Countries,” The Chicago Tribune, October 10, 
2000, pp. 1-2 
220 “Events on the Temple Mount—September 29, 2000: Interim Report,” B’Tselem: The Israeli 
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (taken from their website: 
www.btselem.org ), downloaded 1/11/00 
221 “Barak threatens to use tanks to stop Palestinian uprising,” CNN, October 2, 2000, pg. 3 
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The goals of this current Intifada have been expressed both in secular and 
religious terms. Various groups sprang up in the wake of the September 2000 outbreak of 
violence voicing secular-nationalist goals, specifically the creation of a Palestinian state 
with East Jerusalem as its capital. This has included groups like the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ 
Brigade, an organization connected with Arafat and his political party Fatah. Other 
groups, however, particularly the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS, aim to end 
Israeli occupation but also to create an Islamic state in Palestine, one that would ensure 
the maintenance of Shari’a law and the “Islamic” culture of Palestine.  
Jewish and Muslim battles for control of Jerusalem contain elements that conform 
to the causal argument proposed in this dissertation. First, religion has played a salient 
role in the motivations and goals of some groups fighting for Jerusalem. Although 
Israel’s aims in the 1967 war were not religious—it strove to preempt a combined Arab 
attack by disabling the core of its military capabilities—the consequences of Israel’s 
capture of Jerusalem sparked religious battles over the city. Specifically, Jewish militant 
groups emerged, such as Gush Emunium and Kach, with the goal of appropriating all 
land believed to be Jewish and by cleansing the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif of its 
non-Jewish elements in hopes of hastening the coming of the Messiah. These groups have 
used a variety of tactics to achieve these aims including terrorism, assassination, and 
attempts at blowing up Muslim sites on the Holy Compound. In addition to Jewish 
militant groups, secular Israeli groups have also emerged with the goal of appropriating 
as much Arab land as possible, including Jerusalem. These groups have this goal not for 
religious reasons but for Zionist-nationalist aspirations; they want land for Israel’s growth 
and security. Both types of groups are united by the goal of seizing as much land as 
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possible, but they differ in their reasons for wanting the land; Jewish militant groups aim 
to hasten the coming of the Messiah while secular militant groups desire an expanded 
Zionist state. 
Likewise, Israel’s capture and occupation of East Jerusalem and the Old City 
sparked a religious reaction from within the Palestinian and wider Muslim community. 
Initially, the Palestinians formed groups around the secular nationalist goal of creating an 
independent Palestinian state, particularly through the efforts of the PLO. However, 
beginning in the 1980s, militant Islamic groups—most notably the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad and HAMAS—emerged alongside secular organizations. These groups have also 
sought to end Israeli occupation and create a Palestinian state; however, in addition, they 
are striving to make this state Islamic with a government that keeps the tenets of Islam 
and upholds Shari’a law. Both groups have used terrorist tactics to achieve these goals 
including attacks on settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and suicide bombing of 
civilians in Israel.  
Second, threat perception has been a salient cause of recent religious violence 
over Jerusalem. Jordanian occupation of the Old City from 1948 to 1967 resulted in the 
expulsion of all Jews from Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter and the restriction of Jews from 
visiting the Western Wall; these policies effectively stamped out the Jewish presence in 
the Old City. Karen Armstrong argues that the loss of Jerusalem coupled with its 
miraculous return in 1967 touched a nerve within Israelis and most Jews around the 
world, prompting the fervent desire to protect the city at all costs and to never let it fall 
out of Jewish hands again. 222 In 2000, rumors that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was 
willing to cede portions of Jerusalem to the Palestinians renewed this sense of threat in 
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Israeli society. These rumors prompted Ariel Sharon’s infamous visit to the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount in September of 2000, which, in turn sparked the al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Likewise, Islamic militants have responded to threats surrounding Jerusalem. The 
loss of the city to Israeli forces in 1967 marked the first time in nearly 800 years that al-
Quds had fallen completely out of Muslim hands; this alone provided an unsure and 
threatening environment for the status of the holy sites on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple 
Mount. Moreover, the Israeli government implemented policies that enforced this 
uncertainty, particularly its decision to level the Maghribi Quarter of the Old City, its 
deportation of Muslim leaders deemed uncooperative to the Israeli government, and its 
overall development of settlements in Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Militant Jewish groups’ plots to blow up the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque have 
further exacerbated this sense of threat. Although the government successfully thwarted 
these attempts, they have demonstrated the resolve of some Jews to destroy the Muslim 
presence in the Old City. Lastly, the provocative visit to the Haram al-Sharif of Ariel 
Sharon, who has a long history of persecution towards the Palestinians, inflamed 
emotions in an already stressed environment over the status and future of Jerusalem.  
Under these conditions of threat, Palestinians and Muslims all over the world took to the 
streets in protest, demonstrating the importance of Jerusalem to the faith.  
Third, the relationship between religious and political authority in both Israel and 
Palestine reveals that collusion between secular and religious groups has produced 
religious violence. Although Israel has had religious political parties since 1956, the 
importance of these parties for shaping Israeli policies was not realized until the 1970s. 
After the political and military blunders of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the religious and 
                                                                                                                                                 
222 Armstrong, pg 400 
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secular right in Israel joined forces to defeat the Labor party and win control of both the 
premiership and the Knesset. This relationship gained the Likud party much needed votes 
and provided militant Jewish groups with the political, legal and financial resources of 
the state to develop settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the 
religious and secular right were divided on ideology, motives, and ultimate goals, they 
were united on the immediate objective of appropriating as much Palestinian land as 
possible through the fait acomplis of settlements.  
The Palestinians have had a similar relationship between its religious and political 
authority. In the first Intifada, religious and secular groups joined forces in attempts to 
compel the Israelis to withdrawal from Palestinian land; they, therefore, were united in 
the goal of ending Israeli occupation. The groups were divided, however in their ultimate 
goals: secular nationalists sought to create an independent Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capitol; the militant Islamists, however, strove to create a Palestinian 
state that was distinctly Islamic in its leadership and character, which ultimately excluded 
the secular leadership.  
Fourth, material and social resources have aided recent religious battles over 
Jerusalem. In particula r, Jewish militants have received material resources through their 
ties to the Israeli governments. As previously mentioned, the legal, political and financial 
means for appropriating Palestinian land via settlements has come primarily from the 
government. Groups like Kach and Gush Emunium also have raised money through 
diasporic communities; however, the greater resources have come from the Israeli 
government. These groups lacked the material, political and social resources to carry out 
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their goals prior to the election of Likud to office in 1977. The arrival of Likud allowed 
for an explosion of settler activity in the 1980s. 
Islamic militants on the other hand, appear to have received greater material and 
social assets from international sources. This includes financing from foreign 
governments—specifically the Saudis, the Iranians and the Sudanese—and also includes 
alleged training from foreign governments and international militant Islamic groups. 
Lastly, these groups have profited from international Islamic charities that have provided 
heath care, schools and other resources to the impoverished Palestinian communities, 
particularly in the Gaza Strip, which have succeeded in undermining secular Palestinian 
authority in these areas. The success of these groups, therefore, has depended in large 
part on the resources they have been able to accrue through international sources. 
Finally, it is worth considering why the current battles over Jerusalem have been 
primarily between Jews and Muslims and have not—for the most part—included 
Christians. First, the sacred site of contestation between Jews and Muslims is the Haram 
al-Sharif/Temple Mount, which is not of critical importance to the Christian faith. 
Second, Christians are much fewer in number than Jews and Mus lims in the region. 
Census material reveals that Christians make up around 2% of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip’s population; therefore they lack a critical mass. Third, Christian leadership—
particularly in the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox Churches—is made up 
largely of foreign nationals. They therefore have been accused of not being personally 
involved with the liberation of Palestine, a country that is not their own. However, it is 
important to note that Palestinian Christians have played an active role in both Intifadas 
and, like their fellow Palestinian Muslims, are seeking an end to Israeli occupation of the 
 344 
 
 
West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Likewise, the more recent appointment of 
Palestinian bishops to the Latin Roman Catholic Church as well as the Anglican and 
Lutheran churches has provided indigenous Christian leadership that is actively 
outspoken against the occupation.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter has traced three waves of violence over control of sacred sites in 
Jerusalem: Christian Crusades to liberate Christ’s tomb beginning in the eleventh 
century; Muslim holy wars to counter the Christian presence in the region and recapture 
Jerusalem; and Israel’s seizure of Jerusalem in 1967 and the religious reactions it 
produced within Jewish and Muslim groups.  
This chapter has argued, first, that while not all historic battles over Jerusalem 
have had saliently religious end goals, these three waves of violence represent Christian, 
Muslim and Jewish efforts to seize Jerusalem’s sacred space, often with the goal of 
excluding other religious groups from access to their sites. The Christian call to liberate 
Jerusalem from Muslim hands inspired kings, clerisy, and laity to take up arms to free the 
city in which Jesus was arrested, crucified, buried, and raised from the dead. The invasion 
of European Christians prompted Muslim leaders, weakened by infighting, to join forces 
in a jihad against the crusaders and to return Jerusalem and its holy sites to Muslim 
custodianship. Although the aims of the 1967 Six-Day war were not to capture Jerusalem, 
Israel found itself in control of the holy city, inspiring militant Jewish groups to organize 
with the aim of violently cleansing the Old City of its non-Jewish elements. 
Second, threat perception has played an important role in explaining motivations 
for battles to seize and defend Jerusalem’s holy sites. The call for a Christian holy war 
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against Muslim forces was inspired by perceived threats to Christendom at large and 
Jerusalem in particular. Muslim empires in Asia Minor and North Africa presented a 
growing threat to Christian frontiers in Byzantium and Spain, prompting several popes to 
call for religiously sanctioned armed struggle against these invading forces. However, it 
wasn’t until Pope Urban II called for a crusade aimed at repelling these forces and 
liberating Jerusalem from Muslim hands that thousands of commoners took up arms and 
marched off to holy war; the goal of liberating Jerusalem, therefore, was a powerful 
motivating force that resonated with the masses. 
Likewise, after the loss of Jerusalem, Muslim leaders joined forces with the 
general aim of ousting crusaders from the region—which posed a security threat to 
Muslim empires in the Near and Middle East—and the more specific goal of liberating 
al-Quds and returning it to Muslim trusteeship. As with the crusades, the call to liberate 
Jerusalem inspired devout Muslims to join forces with Nur ad-Din and Saladin’s p troops 
and to march on Jerusalem. The importance of Jerusalem’s holy sites in the jihad against 
the crusaders is illustrated by reports that Saladin personally oversaw the cleansing of the 
al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock shrine after seizing the city. 
Israel’s capture of Jerusalem in 1967 ended a twenty-year restriction on Jewish 
access to the Old City and the Western Wall, imposed under Jordanian occupation of the 
city. Although the status of Jerusalem was not the salient threat in the Six-Day war—a 
three-front war with Egypt, Jordan and Syria was the motivation for Israel’s preemptive 
attack—Israel’s seizure and, more importantly, its continued occupation of Jerusalem 
reflects the perception that the Jewish dimensions of Jerusalem, both religious and 
national, could not be ensured without Israel’s governorship over the city. However, 
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Israel’s possession of Jerusalem has raised concerns within Muslim circles over the safety 
of their sites, particularly towards the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. This is clearly 
illustrated in the massive uprising sparked by Ariel Sharon’s visit to the compound in 
September 2000, plunging Israel and Palestine into the “al-Aqsa Intifada.”  
Third, resources played a role in determining the use of force to capture and hold 
Jerusalem, in varying degrees. Crusader forces succeeded in capturing Jerusalem in 1099 
despite being poorly equipped, badly outnumbered, and lacking in cohesive leadership; 
their success is best explained by infighting in the region that weakened Muslim forces 
and laid Jerusalem open for conquest. After consolidating its forces, however, Muslims in 
the region succeeded in driving crusaders out of the Holy Land, aided by larger forces 
that were better trained, had more materiel, and were united by strong leadership. In 
1967, Israel captured Jerusalem largely through its daring preemptive strike against its 
neighbors and in spite of being outnumbered. After 1967, militant religious and secular 
Jewish organizations have succeeded in appropriating land in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip primarily through resources provided by the state, namely money and a permissive 
legal and security environment, in addition to some international financing. Jewish 
militant groups aimed at destroying non-Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem, however, have 
not had the political and material assets of the government; their efforts, in fact, have 
been checked by Israeli security forces. Muslim militants have benefited from 
international resources including state funding and various resources through Islamic 
charities. 
Lastly, the relationship between political and religious leaders does not clearly 
explain motivations and successes in battles over Jerusalem. Kings and popes were 
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initially united in early crusades aimed at liberating and defending Jerusalem. However, 
popes also declared subsequent crusades against European kings that they perceived to be 
undermining the Church. In the call for jihad, religious and political leaders were united 
in the goal of ousting crusader forces in the region and liberating Jerusalem; the two 
authorities reinforced each other’s religious and political motivations resulting in a 
successful holy war. However, in post-1967 Israel—particularly after the 1977 election of 
a Likud-dominated government—militant religious and secular Jewish organizations 
have profited from their alliance with the state; militant groups have voted for and joined 
forces with Likud while Likud has provided legal, military and financial backing to 
settlers confiscating land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This relationship, however, 
broke down over Jewish militant aspirations to destroy non-Jewish holy sites in 
Jerusalem, particularly Muslim sites on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. In this case, 
the Israeli government has worked to thwart these efforts and arrest the perpetrators of 
violence. These finding are summarized in Table 4.1. 
Jerusalem, despite its religious importance to Judaism, Islam and Christianity, has 
not been a city of peace; rather, it is precisely because of its religious importance that 
nations, armies, empires and common people have risen up in defense of its religious 
significance. The challenge this city faces, therefore, is for all of its sacred sites to be 
perceived as safe, thus preventing groups from rising up and using force to defend their 
religious interests. There have been few governors in the city’s history who have 
succeeded in creating such an environment and, unfortunately, Israel is no exception. 
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4.1, Variables Summary: Battles Over Jerusalem 
 Threat Perception Resources Political/Religious 
Leaders  
Christian Crusades 
Goals: Liberate 
Jerusalem and 
“Christian” land, co-
religionists 
General, Christian 
Holy Sites in 
Muslim Hands 
Immediate, 
Advancing Muslim 
Empires 
Lacked material, 
social and military 
resources 
United in crusades 
against Muslims in 
the Holy Land 
Divided on other 
crusades 
Muslim Jihads 
against Crusaders  
Goals: Drive 
crusaders out of 
region, liberate 
Jerusalem 
Advancing Crusader 
Kingdoms, loss of 
Jerusalem 
After unifying, 
superior social and 
material resources 
United in efforts to 
defeat crusaders, 
supported each 
other’s authority 
Post-1967 Jerusalem 
Government goals: 
Keep Jerusalem 
Jewish Israeli 
 
Militant goals: Make 
Jerusalem mono-
religious 
Government— 
Open access to sites 
but aggressive 
development 
 
Jewish/Muslim 
Militants—claims of 
exclusive rights to 
Jerusalem 
Jewish militants in 
territories have 
resources of state, 
Jerusalem militants 
do not.  
 
Islamic militants 
have international 
aid. 
Jewish militants 
and Likud united. 
 
Muslim militants 
at odds with 
Palestinian 
Authority 
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Overview of Religious Revolutions  
 
 
 The 1917 Russian Revolution and China’s fall to communism in 1949 ignited 
fears in the US that the world was on the brink of succumbing to Marxism, an ideology 
infinitely at odds with democracy, liberty, and the American way of life. The United 
States’ foreign policy prerogative soon focused on containing this new threat and 
checking communist movements wherever they arose, assuming that the ideology was 
contagious and the fall of one state to communism would cause other states around it to 
fall like dominos.1 The official end of the Soviet Union in 1991 largely concluded the 
“Red Scare,” with only Cuba, China, and North Korea persisting as communist states. 
After fifty-odd years of fighting communism in the Cold War, the US emerged as the 
victor and sole superpower. 
 In the post-Cold War era, a new ideological threat has emerged—religious 
fundamentalism, particularly violent interpretations of Islam—leading sociologist Mark 
Juergensmeyer to ask if this is “The New Cold War?”2 The rise of bellicose 
interpretations of Islam—which seeks to overthrow existing regimes and create a 
religious system governed by Islamic law, Shari’a—presents the US with new foreign 
policy challenges. In particular, violent strains of Islam may present an obstacle for US 
efforts to export liberal democracy around the globe.3 Moreover, militant, radical forms 
of Islam pose a direct security threat to the US and its interests, as horrifically displayed 
                                                 
1 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), particularly chapter 5: “Eisenhower, Dulles, 
and the New Look,” pp. 127-163 
2 Quoting the title of his book: Mark Juergesmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts 
the Secular State, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993) 
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on September 11th. This new ideological threat has prompted President George W. Bush 
to declare a Global War on Terror—aimed primarily at militant Islam—with the goal of 
ridding the US and the world of this political and military challenge. 
Has political Islam replaced communism as the new revolutionary ideology 
threatening the United States? Are there any lessons to be learned from US efforts to 
minimize communism’s spread around the globe during the Cold War? This section aims 
to offer insights into these questions by comparing an Islamic revolution with Marxist-
inspired revolutions in Russia, China, and Cuba.  
The first case considers the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. It compares Iran’s 
two revolutions: its 1906 “Constitut ional Revolution” in which groups fought for a 
representational government with a constitution; and the 1978-1979 Revolution, which 
resulted in the overthrow of the Shah and creation of an Islamic Republic. It argues that, 
while the first revolution contained elements of religion—most notably the participation 
of the Ulama, Muslim scholars—the ultimate goal of the revolution was a government 
based on liberal democratic principles. The 1978-1979 revolution initially had similar 
goals; the revolution, however, became saliently religious through Islamic 
organizations—particularly the Liberation Movement and its revolutionary 
interpretations of Islam—and through the leadership of the Ayatallah Khomeini, who 
succeeded in uniting religious and secular movements with the unifying goals of 
deposing the Shah and ending the US presence in Iran. Once created, the Islamic 
Republic named as one of its foreign policy goals the export of the revolution and the 
creation of Islamic theocracies in other states.        
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, second edition, edited by 
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), especially 
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The second case considers the rise of Marxist ideology and its role in fomenting 
revolutions in Russia, China, and Cuba. It argues that Marxism contains both a program 
for revolution and specified end-goals of the revolution, most notably the liberation of the 
world’s masses from the ills of capitalism. The applications of Marxism in Russia, China, 
and Latin America, however, have focused primarily on Marx’s program for revolution; 
none of these cases succeeded in establishing a communist utopia and, quite to the 
contrary, resulted in mass killing, famine, and suffering. Despite this, countries that 
succeed in realizing the Marxist revolution made exporting the revolution one of its 
goals. While Marxist movements sprang up around the globe, most failed to realize a 
revolution or its goal of creating a communist utopia.    
Political Islam and Marxism share many traits. They are both revolutionary 
ideologies; in other words, they seek to radically change not only the structure of existing 
governments but also to change societies.4 Marxism sought to overthrow existing 
governments with the aim of introducing a radically new economic system that would, in 
turn, usher in more harmonious and just social dynamics. Likewise, Islamic 
revolutionaries aim to depose corrupt leaders in the Muslim world with the greater goal 
of establishing a social and political system based on the tenets of Islam and particularly 
Shari’a law. Therefore, both ideologies aim to achieve more than mere regime change.  
Moreover, both Marxism and political Islam have inspired post-revolutionary 
governments that have exported their ideologies in hopes of creating global change. 
                                                                                                                                                 
chapter 1: “Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?” 
4Theda Skocpol defines revolution as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, 
accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from below.” She further argues that 
revolutions are aided by a breakdown in a state’s coercive power, by international circumstances, and are 
aided by “marginalized elites” operating under structural constraints. See Social Revolutions in the Modern 
World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), “Explaining Social Revolutions,” pp. 3-22  
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Marxist-based governments in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba all attempted to export 
the revolution to countries around the globe through financial and military aid, education, 
and advisors. Similarly, post-revolutionary Iran has aimed to “support the just struggles 
of the freedom fighters against oppression in every corner of the globe.”5 To this end, it 
has been accused of funding various Islamic militant groups, such as the Lebanese 
Hizbollah and the Palestinian Hamas, in addition to mobilizing Shia populations for 
revolution in Bahrain and Iraq. Therefore, both ideologies seek not only change within a 
state but, more broadly, change on a global scale. 
However, comparing these two cases reveals important differences between 
Marxism and political Islam. First, Islam, as a religion, has existed for well over a 
millennium; the faith has gone through “golden eras” and crises but has persisted as a 
belief system in virtually every continent on the globe. Marxism, in contrast, appears to 
be dwindling as a belief system. Moreover, Islam also enjoys a broad base of adherents 
that numbers well over one billion. Marxism, on the other hand, failed to garner a popular 
base of support. This lack of popular support forced leaders such as Lenin, Stalin, Mao, 
and Castro to impose the ideology through coercion, intimidation and death. In the end, 
Marxism’s lack of support with the masses spelled its own extinction; it was an ideology 
to be challenged and deposed, not embraced as a liberating belief system.     
Furthermore, Marxism, in theory, has the goal of creating a communist utopia, 
which is similar to this dissertation’s definition of “earthly salvation.” However, Marxism 
in practiced failed to deliver salvation; rather, Marxist regimes in Russia, China and Latin 
America resulted in the deaths of millions of people through famine, imprisonment, and 
                                                 
5 The Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Chapter 10: Foreign Policy; Article 154: Independence, 
Support of Just Struggles. 
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civil war. This is a far cry from earthly salvation. Islam, on the other hand, offers a belief 
system that has, on varying levels, given its adherents hope in both earthly and eternal 
salvation. Islam takes very seriously the status and well being of fellow humans; one of 
its pillars is zakat, alms-giving to the poor. Islam has also inspired the creation of 
charities with the aim of improving the lives of the impoverished. The continued numbers 
of adherents suggests that Islam offers earthly and cosmic meaning to those who practice 
the faith.   
Finally, it is important to note that Islam is not the only faith that seeks to foment 
a religious revolution.  The JVP—a militant Buddhist organization in Sri Lanka—
attempted to overthrow its government in the 1970s and 1980s with the aim of creating a 
Buddhist theocracy on the island, which is discussed in chapter three. Likewise, certain 
elements within the Hindu national movement in India have similar designs on its 
government, as discussed in chapter five. The same can be said for militant Jewish 
organizations in Israel who are attempting to seize the government—either by force or 
through popular elections—in order to create a religious and ethnically pure Jewish state, 
which is discussed in chapter six. Lastly, although not discussed in this dissertation, 
fringes of the “Christian Patriot Movement” in the US have attacked minorities with the 
aim of starting a race war that would topple the government, paving the way for a 
Christian theocracy. 6  Therefore, religious revolutions are manifest in all the world’s 
major religions, in addition to Marxism and Liberalism. 
 
                                                 
6 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2000), chapter 2: “Soldiers for Christ,” pp. 19-43 
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Chapter 7 
Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979 
 
The 1979 revolution in Iran followed by the creation of the Islamic Republic with 
the Ayatallah Khomeini as the velayat-e faqih—the supreme religious and political 
authority—is the textbook example of a religious revolution. The revolution, coupled 
with the US hostage crisis that lasted 444 days, continues to affect US-Iranian diplomatic 
relations nearly twenty-five years later. What caused an educated, relatively modernized, 
oil rich country to overthrow its government and replace it with a system that has fused 
religious and political authority and which has declared the United States, its former 
closest ally, to be the “Great Satan”?  
 This chapter aims to provide insights into these questions by comparing Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution with its first revolution in 1906, in which Iranians fought for a 
representational government and constitution modeled after western democratic 
principles. Drawing from the causal argument presented in chapter two, it will focus on 
three variables as possible explanations for the rise of the Islamic Revolution: the 
relationship between religious and political leaders, the role of threat perception in 
influencing actions of leaders and their groups, and the amount of material, social, and 
technological resources available to groups calling for revolution. It will test three 
empirical predictions from the causal argument. First, religious leaders will call for 
violence to defend their role in society, if threatened. Second, religious leaders will call 
for revolt in response to perceived or actual threats from the government, particularly if 
the government is threatening the status of religious leaders or their resources. And third, 
the religious group initiating the revolution will have sufficient material, social and 
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technological resources—including finances, strong leadership, and organizations—with 
which to challenge the state. 
 This chapter argues, first, that while the 1906 Constitutional Revolution involved 
religion—namely the active participation of the Muslim clerisy, the Ulama—the goals for 
which people were fighting were not saliently religious. Rather, groups were agitating for 
a constitutional government and greater political participation. In contrast, the aims of the 
1979 revolution were saliently religious, specifically the creation of an Islamic republic 
ruled by Shari’a law. These religious end goals were realized by new interpretations of 
the faith, which inspired the masses, and by strong leadership that united the people 
against the Shah, specifically the leadership of the Ayatallah Khomeini. 
The first section of this chapter provides a brief introduction to Islam, outlining its 
core beliefs and doctrine, early history, and different forms of leadership. The second 
section offers an overview of Iranian history, highlighting key events. The third section 
compares the 1906 Constitutional Revolution to the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution. And 
the fourth section offers concluding remarks, testing the causal argument proposed in this 
dissertation for its explanatory power to the Iranian case.    
Overview of Islam  
This section provides a brief overview of Islam including its beliefs, doctrines, 
and an introduction to Twelver Shii Islam, the branch of the faith that predominates in 
Iran. In addition, this section considers the forms of leadership particular to Islam in Iran, 
including the relationship between Muslim clerics, the monarchy and society. 
The core beliefs of Islam stress the oneness of God, or tawhid, and the role of the 
Prophet Muhammad in transmitting God’s message, which is the Qur’an, the literal word 
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of God. These two beliefs—the oneness of God an the Prophet as God’s messenger—
make up the shahaddah, the proclamation of faith, and forms the first of five pillars of 
Islam; one who proclaims the shahaddah is a Muslim. The other four pillars include ritual 
prayer said five times a day facing towards Mecca (salat); fasting during the holy month 
of Ramadan, the month the Prophet first received revelations from God (sawm); 
almsgiving to the poor (zakat); and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), which should be taken 
by every Muslims at least once in his or her life, finances and health permitting. Along 
with the pillars, Islam emphasizes the unity of the worldwide Muslim community, 
ummah, which, in principle, is not divided by gender, race, class or any other human 
distinction. 1  
Islam’s beliefs form the basis for its doctrines, or application of the faith in 
individual, social and political life. One doctrine in particular, Shari’a, or Islamic law is 
especially important for understanding the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Islamic law 
involves all aspects of Muslim life including personal, spiritual, family, societal, criminal, 
economic and political life. Formation of the law is based on two texts: the Qur’an, and 
the Sunna, which are sayings of the Prophet—recorded in the Hadith—and the customs 
of the Prophet and his companions.2 The Qur’an, as the literal word of God, is the 
primary text and cannot be contradicted by any passages of the Sunna or interpretations 
of the law. However, despite this, the Qur’an contains few passages that offer explicit 
legal instruction; the Sunna, therefore, is used as authoritative examples of how the 
                                                 
1 For more details on key beliefs in Islam, see John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), Chapter Three: “Religious Life and Belief,” pp. 69-113 
2 David S. Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Law, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pg. 4. Pearl cites the 
definitions of scholars Ignac Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, translated by Andras 
and Ruth Hamori, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); and Joseph Schacht, Origins of 
Muhammedan Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), which are the foundational western works 
on Islamic jurisprudence.  
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Prophet and his companions applied the message of the Qur’an to actions in every day 
religious, societal and political life.3 
The Qur’an and the Sunna are the textual sources of Islamic law. However, the 
textual sources of law alone cannot prescribe guidance for all human actions; this 
requires interpretation. The Ulama, or “learned ones,” have historically been the 
interpreters of the law. Members of the Ulama have codified the law through qiyas, a 
process of analogy by comparing cases, and ijma, which is consensus among the jurists in 
the interpretation. Therefore the sources of Islamic law are the Qur’an, the Sunna, qiyas, 
and ijma.4 Ultimately, several schools of law developed within Islam. Four of these 
schools remain in Sunni Islam today: the Hanafi school, the Maliki school, the Shafi’i 
school, and the Hanbali school.5  In addition, there are several schools within the Shii 
branch of Islam; the most prominent is the Jafari school, which is practiced by Twelver 
Shiis concentrated in the Persian Gulf and Lebanon. 6  
In addition to the Ulama, political leaders also guide Muslim communities. After 
the sudden death of the Prophet in 632 CE, a debate broke out within the Muslim 
community regarding leadership and succession. The majority within the community 
believed that a new leader, called the khalifa or Caliph, should be elected from within the 
community. A minority believed that the Prophet had designated a successor, his cousin 
and son- in- law Ali, and that leadership should come from the bloodline of the Prophet 
and be determined through inheritance.7 This division in the understanding of leadership 
                                                 
3 Pearl notes there are only around 80 verses in the Qur’an that offer explicit legal instruction, pg. 1. This is 
also noted by Esposito, pg. 77  
4 Pearl, pg. 14; Esposito, pp. 79-83 
5 Pearl, pp. 16-17 
6 Esposito, pg. 85 
7 Esposito, pp. 37-47 
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ultimately evolved into the Sunni and Shii factions, respectively. Shii Islam underwent an 
additional schism over succession of leadership, creating the Ismaili Shii faction, which 
exist primarily in South Asia today, and the Twelver Shiis, which predominate in Iran but 
also have substantial numbers in Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. In 874 CE, the Twelver 
Shiis’ Imam disappeared. They believe that he has gone into hiding and will return as the 
Mahdi, the “expected one” to restore justice to the world at the end of the ages.8 
Within this structure of religious and political authority, Iran has developed its 
own particular forms of leadership. Under the Safavid Dynasty (1501-1722), the Twelver 
Shii Ulama became closely aligned with the royal court, which embraced Twelver Shiism 
as its official religion. Under the Safavids and later the Qajars, the Ulama developed a 
hierarchy structured according to knowledge and tasks they perform for society and the 
crown. The highest level of Ulama in Iran is the Mujtahid or Marja’i taqlid, who is 
qualified to practice ijtihad, discernment of the law, and issue legal edicts, or fatvas.9 
Often times, Mujtahids specialize in particular areas of the law and certain Mujtahids 
have higher status based on their skill and location. At the city level, one Mujtahid is 
appointed the Imam Jum’a, who acts as the link between the government and the 
Ulama.10 Within the Mujtahids is one who is considered especially gifted in discerning 
the law. This individual receives the title Ayatallah, which literally means miraculous 
signs.11 After the formation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the Ayatallah became the 
supreme authority on the interpretation of the law. In addition to the Mujtahid, lesser 
                                                 
8 Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi’ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1977), pp. 57-61 
9 Vanessa Martin, Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906, (London: IB Tauris &Co., 1989), 
pg. 12. Fatva is the Persian transliteration of the Arabic Fatwa. 
10 Martin, pg. 14 
11 The Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition Glossary and Index, compiled by J. Van Lend and H.U. 
Qureshi, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), pg 30 
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authorities within the Ulama include Mullas, which are graduates of seminaries, tullabi, 
seminary students, and Sayyids, individuals who can trace their lineage back to the 
Prophet.12  
The Safavid and Qajar Dynasties called on the Ulama to legitimate their authority; 
in return, the monarchy acted as the ideal Muslim ruler by upholding Shari’a law and 
protecting the faith. These dynastic rulers asserted their right to rule not on lineage to the 
Prophet but, rather, on behalf of the Hidden Imam; they described their leadership as zilla 
allah, the shadow of God.13 This claim to rule sparked considerable debate within the 
ranks of the Ulama over the limits of temporal authority in the absence of the Hidden 
Imam but, ultimately, the majority of Ulama backed the new leaders.14 Under the Qajars, 
a Mujtahid was appointed to officiate over religious affairs and to maintain religious 
property and endowments, the vaqf.15 Also under the Qajars, the rule of law was divided 
between Shar’ courts, which administered civil law based on Shari’a and applied by 
Mujtahids, and ‘Urf law, which governed over criminal and some commercial cases.16 By 
the 20th century, therefore, the Ulama and the monarchy had a mutually reinforcing 
relationship with both shared and separate spheres of influence.     
Alongside this evolving relationship between political and religious authority, 
several Shii practices and beliefs have become important to Iranian identity. Specifically, 
the martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala in 680 CE, the son of Ali and grandson of the 
Prophet, marks an important day of remembrance on the 10th day of the month of 
                                                 
12 Martin, pg. 37 
13 Said Amir Arjomand, “Introduction: Shi’ism, Authority, and Political Culture,”pp. 1-24, Authority and 
Political Culture in Shi’ism, edited by Said Amir Arjomand, (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1988), pg. 6; Martin, pg. 16 
14 Hairi, pp. 61-65 
15 Martin, pg. 17. Vaqf is the Persian transliteration of the Arabic waqf. 
16 Martin, pg. 8 
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Muharram, a day that has been fastidiously observed by Twelver Shii Muslims in Iran. In 
addition, the belief in the hidden Imam, the twelfth Imam that will return from hiding to 
justly rule the ummah, is a salient belief within Iran. Both of these practices and beliefs 
are important for understanding Iran’s Islamic Revolution, which will be discussed 
further below. 
Overview of Persian and Iranian History 
 Most scholars date the origins of Persian identity back to the Achaemenid Persian 
Empire of the sixth century BCE, which, at its zenith, established a polity from the 
Aegean Sea to the Indus River.17 One of the unifying elements of the Achaemenid 
Empire was the Zoroastrian faith—based on the prophetic revelations of Zoraster—a 
monotheistic tradition that espoused ethical conduct and the moral needs of the 
populous.18 Furthermore, the empire promoted agricultural, free trade, and encouraged 
tolerance among its subjects. The empire fell to Alexander in 331 BCE but, despite this, 
the Zoroastrian faith and other aspects of Persian identity continued to develop under 
Hellenistic influences.19     
At the time of Islam’s introduction in the seventh century CE, the Persian Gulf 
region was in a state of political and social turmoil. The two main empires, the Persian 
Sasanian Empire and the Byzantine Empire, were engaged in a protracted conflict, which 
weakened both polities to advancing Muslim forces.20  In 633CE, the year of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s death, Muslim forces captured Hirah, a Sasanian town near the Euphrates 
                                                 
17 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, Venture of Islam: The Classic Age of Islam, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), pg. 118 
18 Hodgson, pp. 126-130 
19 Hodgson, pg.119 
20 Hodgson, pg. 153 
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River. This was followed by a second offensive in 637CE, in which the Sasanian capital 
Ctesiphon was captured. In less than thirty years after its introduction, Islam spread 
throughout the Gulf region, uniting the former subjects of the Byzantine and Sasanian 
Empires into the first Muslim dynasty of the Umayyads, which lasted from 661 to 
750CE. The faith introduced a new social and political system to the region, one unified 
by the equality of its adherents.21   
Twelver Shiism and Persian identity did not formally unite until the creation of 
the Safavid Dynasty in 1501CE. Its founder, Isma’il, called on the legacy of the Twelve 
Imams, particularly of Ali, to justify conquest of its Sunni Ottoman neighbors to the West 
and Sunni Uzbeks to the North. 22 In addition to military conquest, Isma’il and his 
successors spread Persian art, literature and language to its new territories, particularly in 
the form of Persian manuscripts, which left their artistic mark from Constantinople to 
Calcutta.23   The Safavid Dynasty collapsed in 1722 after an Afghani invasion, leaving 
the region in a state of political chaos. 
In 1785, Muhammad Qajar fought his way to the throne, consolidated power and 
formed the Qajar Dynasty. From its founding, however, the new dynasty was fraught 
with external and domestic challenges. In 1813 and again in 1828, Russian troops on 
Iran’s western borders defeated Muhammad’s successor, Fath ‘ali Shah. In hopes of 
ending the protracted struggle, the two countries signed the Treaty of Torkmanchia, 
                                                 
21 Esposito, pg 35 
22 Abdolala Soudavar, “The Early Safavids and Their Cultural Interactions with Surrounding States,” pp. 
89-120, Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics, edited by Nikki R. 
Keddie and Rudi Matthee, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), pg. 90 
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which imposed particularly stringent terms for the Dynasty. 24 In response to this military 
defeat, the Qajars made efforts to modernize the dynasty, particularly its military. They 
acquired western weapons, created military academies, and opened a secular high school 
that specialized in science and engineering. 25 This was followed by efforts to consolidate 
the legal system in the empire, specifically codes surrounding trade, commerce, and 
taxation. 26 
Iranian society during this period was ethnically, linguistically, tribally and 
religiously diverse. The region was comprised of autonomous or semi-autonomous 
villages that were isolated from one another and the capital. Various tribes predominated 
in regions and were further diversified by different languages, religions and ethnic 
groups. Furthermore, the geographic diversity of Iran and its lack of roads and other 
means of transportation and communication further separated the population. Thus, 
although existing as a territory with frontiers, Iran was not a nation bound by a common 
sense of identity. 27  
In 1857, Nasr al-din Shah signed the Treaty of Paris with Russia and Britain to 
demarcate spheres of influence between the two colonial powers. The Shah conceded 
considerable rights to both countries, particularly concerning areas of commerce and 
trade.28 Nasr al-din Shah continued to implement policies aimed at modernizing the 
nation including the creation of a national bank backed by British investment, the 
development of transportation and communications infrastructure, and further 
                                                 
24 Firoozeh Kshani-Sabet, “Cultures of Iranianess: The Evolving Polemic of Iranian Nationalism,” pp. 162-
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25 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 
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advancements in education, print media, and national text books.29 The Shah failed to 
implement protective tariffs for the nation, however, which laid the local economy open 
to British and Russian commercial interests. 
In 1891, the Shah sold fifty-year monopoly rights on tobacco production and 
distribution to an English businessman. In protest, merchants closed down the bazaar in 
Tabriz and staged demonstrations. Many members of the Ulama backed the merchant’s 
protest, issuing fatvas that forbade smoking. The Ulama also acted as a mediating force 
between the merchants and the Shah, eventually succeeding in the annulment of the 
contract.30  
Also around this time, the government’s reformist minister attempted to place 
heavier taxes on imports and exports, which were unpopular with the merchants. This 
agitation was furthered by the government’s decision to accept two loans from Russia in 
1901 and 1902 followed by a 1903 tariff that favored Russian goods.31 In addition, the 
government increased taxes on salaries and pensions in 1904, raised guild fees, and then 
imposed a 10% stamp tax in 1905.32 Taken together, these fiscal policies hurt a wide 
spectrum of the population, creating a sense of frustration and mistrust towards the 
government. 
In December 1905, a series of protests marked the beginning of what became 
known as the Constitutional Revolution. Merchants, guilds, seminary students, and 
certain members of the Ulama joined forces to demand reforms in the government. The 
revolution culminated with key members of the Ulama leaving the city in protest and 
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14,000 demonstrators taking bast, or sanctuary, in the British Legation to draw attention 
to their cause. During the bast, demands of the protesters expanded to include the 
creation of a national assembly governed by a constitution. Through a series of 
negotiations, the Shah finally consented in August of 1906 and elections were held for 
the first national assembly, the Majles, in October of that same year.33  
The creation of a national assembly sparked debates within the Ulama over the 
nature and scope of a constitutional government vis-à-vis Shari’a law, a debate that 
ultimately created two camps: those that supported a constitutional government and saw 
it to be compatible with Shari’a law, and those that believed the political changes to be 
fundamentally at odds with Islam. The latter group, headed by Sheikh Fazlallah Nouri, 
backed the Shah’s policy to ban the constitution in November of 1908 on the grounds of 
protecting Islam. 34 
The Shah’s ban on the constitution plunged the country into a civil war between 
those loyal to the Shah and those demanding the maintenance of a constitutional 
government. In July 1909, constitutionalist forces marched on the Shah’s palace in 
Tehran, forcing him to flee to the Russian Embassy. The constitutionalists called for an 
ad hoc grand assembly and a new government was formed in August.35  The new 
government, however, collapsed within months and Russian, British and Ottoman forces 
were all present within Iran’s borders by 1915.36 Amidst this, an Islamic guerilla group 
called the Committee of Islamic Unity or Jangalis (men of the jungle) began launching 
military attacks against Russian troops on Iran’s western borders. 
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The Russian Revolution of 1917 and the end of World War I ushered in a new era 
in Iran’s domestic and foreign affairs. In 1919, the British and the Shah signed the Anglo-
Iranian Treaty aimed at preventing the Bolsheviks from attaining Iranian oil and 
meddling in Iranian domestic affairs.37 In February 1921, amidst increasing political and 
social chaos, the military general Reza Khan marched into Tehran, arrested 60 politicians 
and declared a coup d’état. Reza Khan proceeded to consolidate political and military 
power, defeat the Jangalis and, in 1926, crowned himself king and adopted the name 
Pahlevi, establishing the Pahlevi dynasty. 38    
The new Shah imposed radical cultural and social changes during his rule. In 
particular, he emphasized Iran’s pre-Islamic Persian identity, downplaying the salience of 
Islam. He also instituted several policies aimed at modernizing women including the 
formation of the “Society for Women” and a ban on the veil in 1936.39 In addition to 
cultural changes, Reza Shah also clamped down on secular organizations, banning 
political parties, unions and newspapers.40  
Although initially welcomed, the Shah’s harsh reforms diminished popular 
support for his rule. Underground movements began to emerge in the 1930s, organizing 
labor strikes and other forms of resistance. In response, Reza Shah arrested and 
imprisoned fifty-three intellectuals and accused them of being communists and 
subversives.41 In August 1941, amid fears of Nazi intrigue in Tehran, British and Soviet 
forces invaded Iran, deposed the Shah, and occupied the country. During this time, 
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twenty-seven of the arrested “fifty-three” began to form what would become the Tudeh 
party. They opened offices throughout the country, emerging as a well-organized 
nationwide party by 1943. In 1944, they sponsored twenty-three candidates for the 14th 
Majles and received over 70% of the vote.42 
In 1944, Britain and the US attempted to block oil sales to the Soviet Union. In 
response, the Tudeh party organized strikes and demonstrations demanding for 
nationalization of Iranian oil and the rights to export to the Soviet Union. These demands 
sharpened tensions between the Shah on the one hand, who was backed by the US and 
Britain, and the popularity of the Tudeh party on the other, which was more leftist in its 
ideology and policies. In 1949, an attempt was made on the Shah’s life, resulting in the 
imposition of martial law. 43  
During this time, Mohammad Mossadeq emerged as a leader of the opposition 
movement. Mosadeq worked alongside the Tudeh party to create the umbrella 
organization The National Front, which capitalized on growing unpopularity towards the 
Shah and his dependence on the US. The National Front mobilized the masses and 
demanded elections, free press, and maintenance of the constitution. In May 1951, after 
the assassination of Prime Minister Razmara, Mosadeq became prime minister. While in 
office, he implemented drastic reforms including the dismissal of numerous military 
officers. 
In 1953, Mossadeq called for a national referendum, which was widely supported 
by the public. One week later on August 16, several of the dismissed military officers—
believed to be sponsored by the CIA—staged a coup d’état, arrested Mossadeq, and 
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imposed martial law. Over the next five years, an estimated 3,000 members of the Tudeh 
party were arrested, of which 54 were either executed or died in prison. Mossadeq was 
confined to house arrest where he died in 1967.44 
The following twenty-four years were relatively quiet for Iran with one major 
demonstration in 1963. The 1963 protests occurred amidst the Shah’s “White 
Revolution” of economic and social reforms, which failed to produce visible 
improvements for the working and merchant classes.45 The newly emerging Liberation 
Movement called for strikes and protests during the holy month of Muharram. It was 
during these protests that the Ayatallah Khomeini entered the political scene as a 
charismatic leader demanding the overthrow of the Shah. The Shah’s regime survived the 
demonstrations, however, and order was reestablished, the Liberation Movement 
disbanded and Khomeini deported to Turkey. 46  
The Shah’s crackdown following the 1963 uprising forced several movements 
underground. During this time guerilla organizations formed with the goal of deposing 
the Shah, including the Feda’i organization—which espoused a mixture of Marxist and 
Islamic ideals—and the Mujahedin, which sprang out of the Liberation Movement and 
was Islamic in its ideals and goals. Both of these movements carried out assassinations, 
bank robberies, embassy bombings and attacks on military outposts, successfully 
challenging the authority of the state.47  
Also after 1963, members of the Ulama and lay people began to interpret Islam in 
light of their domestic and international circumstances. In particular, the Sociologist Ali 
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Shariati, who returned in 1965 from doctoral work in Paris, began to offer fiery 
interpretations of Shii Islam. He called for individuals to resist Marxism, to reject corrupt 
interpretations of Islam, and to take action to defend and revitalize the faith. He also 
called for an Islamic Revolution to purify the nation. His writings and talks were widely 
read among university students and resonated throughout the educated middle class.48  
Beginning in1975, the Shah implemented several policies that brought the Islamic 
revolution to fruition. First, he attempted to create a one party system in Iran, forming the 
Resurgence Party in 1975, which was popularly condemned. In addition, the Shah began 
a series of attacks on the Ulama and the merchant classes, attempting to penetrate and 
undermine their organizations. Also during this time, the Shah came under increasing 
international pressure to reform his political and human rights practices including 
criticism from the newly formed Amnesty International and the US government, 
particularly under the Carter administration. In response, the Shah announced that he 
would relax police and secret service activities and try dissidents in civil courts, as 
opposed to military tribunals. 49 
These reforms emboldened intellectuals and various organizations to write letters 
and speak out against the Shah. Old organizations—such as the Tudeh party and the 
Liberation Movement—reconvened and new groups sprang up with the intent of pushing 
for greater reforms. In November 1977, police broke up a political poetry reading in 
Qum, resulting in the death of one student. This event sparked a series of demonstrations, 
deaths, and memorials that mobilized the nation in opposition to the Shah. The 
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government further angered the people by publishing an article in the state-run newspaper 
in January 1978, criticizing the Ulama and defaming Khomeini.50  
Throughout that year, virtually all strata of society—the merchants, the working 
class, the clerisy, university students, and even the military and police—unified against 
the Shah. The revolt took on a particularly religious tone in September of 1978, after a 
series of demonstrations during Ramadan raised the call for an Islamic republic, 
hukomat -i Islami. By the end of December, the Shah had lost his power base; he left the 
country on January 16, 1979, followed by Khomeini’s victorious return on February 1 
and the creation of the first Islamic republic.    
The Islamic Revolution not only transformed domestic society and politics within 
Iran but also impacted Iran’s relations with its neighbors and the West. On November 4, 
1979, militants—angered by the US government’s decision to grant the Shah sanctuary—
stormed the US embassy and took 52 Americans hostage. In exchange for the hostages’ 
safe release, the militants demanded the extradition of the Shah to Iran to stand trial. The 
Shah, however, died before this demand could be met.  Following the end of the US 
hostage crisis in 1981, the US imposed sanctions against the republic and refused to 
recognize Iran as a state. In September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran in what would become an 
eight-year war with the aim of stamping out Iran’s revolutionary zeal. Iran also launched 
an initiative to export the revolution throughout the Muslim world, including through 
means of insurgency and terrorism, further inciting western criticism of the republic. In 
1989, the Ayatallah Khomeini issued a fatva, against Salman Rushdie for his book The 
Satanic Verses, which called for Muslims everywhere to kill Rushdie and those 
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connected with the book, also earning the republic condemnation. Despite these 
international confrontations, the Islamic Republic did not collapse. 
The Islamic republic has also had its share of domestic struggles. It has faced 
severe economic hardship as a result of the eight-year war with Iraq. In addition, the 
republic has had to work out complex relationships between clerics, politicians and 
technocrats in order to create a viable government.51 The republic has also had to 
confront social and political issues such as literacy, birth control, and press freedoms.52 
Despite this, the republic has survived amid bouts of unrest and political turmoil 
including a student- led revolt in 1999. The Islamic republic is nearing its twenty-fifth 
anniversary, making it the longest lasting regime since the creation of a constitutional 
government in 1906. 
Iran’s Constitutional and Islamic Revolutions  
 
 This chronology reveals that Iran has had not one but two revolutions in the 20th 
century: the 1906 Revolution for a national assembly and constitutional government, and 
the revolution for an Islamic republic in 1978-1979. Drawing on the causal argument 
from chapter two, this section asks the following questions concerning these two 
revolutions: Is there an identifiable threat or the perception of a threat to which the 
revolutionary parties are responding? What are the material, social, and technological 
resources available to the involved groups? And what is the relationship between political 
and religious leaders and how does that relationship affect each revolution? 
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The 1906 Constitutional Revolution 
 
This section considers the antecedent conditions that helped fuel the call for 
governmental reforms—specifically the international, domestic, and political 
environment leading up to the revolution—and the process whereby disgruntled groups 
came to demand a national assembly and constitution in 1906. It posits that the revolution 
had two main causes: economic policies that hurt the overall population in general and 
the merchant class, the bazaari, in particular; and the government’s economic 
dependency on Russia and Britain. Although the 1906 revolution aimed to create 
democratic institutions—specifically the right to popular representation and a constitution 
that limited the powers of the Shah—the Muslim religious leaders of Iran, the Ulama, still 
played a critical role in mobilizing groups, pressuring the government for change, and 
shaping the debate on the nature and scope of the new government. 
 In order to understand the causes of the 1906 Revolution, it is important to 
identify the key groups within Iranian society leading up to the revolt. First, prior to the 
revolution, the government consisted of the Shah and his appointed advisors and cabinet 
members. The ministers of finance and reform played a particularly important role in 
creating controversial policies that angered various groups in society. 53 Second, 
merchants, or bazaari, were key participants in the revolution. Merchants included shop 
owners, importers and exporters, and members of guilds such as shoe cobblers and 
masons.54 Third, Iran had an emerging educated middle class that had studied in western 
countries and were knowledgeable in western concepts of politics and philosophy, 
knowledge that became useful for shaping a constitutional government. Fourth, the 
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Ulama of Iran were a critical group that impacted the revolution through their role in 
mobilizing and organizing different groups, negotiating with the government, and helping 
to shape the nature and scope of the new government. These groups were not mutually 
exclusive of one another. For example, many of the educated middle class came from 
families of the merchants. Likewise, many of the Ulama had commercial interests, 
making them part of the merchants.55  
Three background factors helped to precipitate the 1906 Revolution: the 
government’s international policies, particularly towards Russia and Britain; the 
transformation of society aided by modernization efforts; and changes within the 
government itself. First, International circumstances impacted social and political 
dynamics within Iran. In particular, increasing Russian and British economic influences 
became a salient cause of discontent. Within the last half of the 19th century, British and 
Russian investors moved in on Iranian markets and development possibilities. 
Investments soared from nearly nothing to over 12 million pounds by the end of the 
century. 56 
During this time, the Shah forged several important international deals that bred 
discontent within the population. In 1872, the Shah negotiated a deal with the British 
entrepreneur Baron Julius de Reuter to develop Iran’s communications and transportation 
infrastructure in exchange for the total income of the customs bureau for twenty-five 
years, total mineral rights except precious stones, and full access to Iran’s forests.57 Lord 
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Curzon observed that the deal, “handed over the entire resources of Persia to foreign 
hands for a period of seventy years.”58 The agreement sparked outcries from merchants, 
the Ulama, the Qajar family, and European powers, especially Russia. Under domestic 
and international pressure, the Shah cancelled the deal.59 Despite this, British investors 
still made considerable inroads including contracts to build a telegraph system in Iran, 
shipping privileges, revenues on road tolls, and a monopoly on printing money. 60  
During this time Russian entrepreneurs also sought to capitalize on Iran’s 
investment potential. A Russian business, Cie del al Route, worked on developing Iran’s 
transportation infrastructure, dredging the port of Enzeli and paving roads from Tehran to 
nearby cities.61 In the West, Russians gained the rights to commercial fishing in the 
Caspian Sea and developed rail lines linking the western provinces of Iran with Russian 
towns near its borders.62 
In March of 1890, the Shah signed a deal with a British entrepreneur for a fifty-
year monopoly on the right to produce, sell and export all tobacco in Iran. In return, the 
Shah was given “an annual sum of 15,000 pounds, 25% of the annual profit, and a 5% 
dividend.”63 The agreement impacted a variety of merchants including those involved in 
retail, wholesale, and export. In 1891, merchants and members of the Ulama joined 
together to protest the concession, taking to the streets in peaceful demonstrations and 
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closing the bazaars.64 Some members of the Ulama joined in the protests out of solidarity 
with the merchants and in fear of their own economic interests through personal or 
familial ties to commerce.65  
In December of 1891, the nation participated in a boycott of all tobacco products. 
News of the boycott spread via the telegraph, prompting towns and cities throughout the 
country to join in the protest.66 This initiative was backed by fatvas from high-ranking 
members of the Ulama.67  A mass demonstration in Tehran clashed with armed forces, 
resulting in several deaths.68 By January of 1892, the Shah was forced to rescind the offer 
amidst growing public outrage.  
The cancellation of the tobacco agreement caused an economic crisis for the 
country, which resulted in Iran’s first major loan from the British. 69 In the late 1890s and 
the beginning of the 20th century, the Shah continued to take loans from both the British 
and the Russians. Two loans granted by the Russians in particular, in 1901 and 1902, 
earned condemnation from the merchants and certain members of the Ulama, who 
accused the Shah of selling the country to Russia.70 These controversial business deals 
and loans, therefore, helped incite public anger against the Shah.  
Second, changes in society also played a role in the rise of revolutionary 
demands. Iran’s exposure to the West encouraged individuals to travel abroad and study 
in European universities. Not only did these individuals return with valuable skills in 
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military training, medicine, and engineering, but they also brought back new ideas in 
politics and philosophy. This exposure to western ideas and concepts, in turn, threw into 
question Iran’s traditional forms of society, government and religious authority. Works 
by Descartes, Spinoza, Darwin and Kant, to name a few, were translated into Persian and 
sold in increasing numbers as the 19th century progressed.71  Moreover, in the second half 
of the 18th century, educated individuals returning from the West took up posts within the 
emerging government bureaucracy. These individuals began to push for reforms, 
particularly for judicial reforms and the creation of secular courts.72 These proposals 
raised considerable opposition with certain members of the Ulama, who argued that 
adjudication was the right of mujtihads and that Shari’a was the only legitimate law in the 
land.73 Western educated intellectuals continued to agitate for political and social reforms 
throughout the 19th century. They became one of the ideological voices during the 1906 
Revolution and key architects of the national assembly and constitution for the country, 
which will be discussed further below.  
During this time, Iran also experienced a wave of new religious movements that 
challenged the orthodoxy of Shii Islam and the power of the Ulama. In 1810, Shaykh 
Ahmad ‘Ahsa’i preached that humans, through mystical practices, could communicated 
directly with God, a notion that directly challenged Twelver Shii beliefs on the limits of 
the human/divine relationship. This movement became known as Shaykhism.74 From 
Shaykhism came the belief that special humans could act as gates, bab, to the divine and 
the hidden Imam. This belief became known as Babism and produced two offshoots in 
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the 1850s, the Baha’is and the ‘Azalis.75 The orthodox Twelver Shii Ulama condemned 
these movements as deviant innovations and called on the Shah to perform his duty as 
protector of Islam by ridding the country of these religious threats. In response, the Shah 
created an office, the sadr, whose purpose was to define Twlever Shii Islam, stamp out 
heresy, and maintain relations between the Shah and the Ulama.76 Despite the persistence 
of both the Baha’i and Azali traditions, this threat to orthodoxy strengthened ties between 
the government and Ulama. 
The development of communications and transportation infrastructure also 
changed Iranian society during this time and impacted the revolution. Communications 
technology, particularly the telegraph, put isolated communities throughout Iran in 
contact with one another. This, in turn, allowed for a new level of national cohesiveness 
that was previously not possible. For example, during the Tobacco Revolt of 1891-1892, 
telegraphs informed provinces of demonstrations and boycotts occurring in the big cities, 
allowing these other regions to take part and support the movement. The creation of 
national newspapers in the mid-1800s also helped unify the nation by spreading 
information on happenings in the capital to the provinces and vice versa.  Roads, railways 
and dredged rivers also changed social dynamics in Iran by providing infrastructure that 
linked regions in the country together.  
However, modernization also had adverse effects on society. For example, 
previously self-sufficient communities were exposed to foreign goods, prompting a new 
level of competition and driving some businesses into bankruptcy. 77  Merchants, angered 
by the government’s failure to impose protective tariffs, organized the Council of 
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Merchants in 1884 to assert their demands to the Shah. 78 However, the council had little 
impact on the government’s policies. Relations between the government and the 
merchants came to a boiling point after the Shah signed a tariff agreement with Russia in 
1903 that greatly favored Russian over domestic goods; this proved to be one of the 
triggering events of the 1906 Revolution. 79 
During this time, particularly after the Tobacco Revolt of 1891-1892, secret 
societies were founded with the aim of pushing for governmental reforms. These 
societies cut across key groups in Iranian society to include merchants, members of the 
Ulama, intellectuals, and even certain individuals in the royal court.80 These groups 
issued leaflets such as the “Night Letters” denouncing the government, particularly its 
fiscal policies.81 Secret societies formed one of the pillars of organizations that pushed for 
revolution in 1906 and helped shape the form and content of the new government.82 They 
also were the groups from which anjumans, grassroots councils, emerged during the 
revolution and served as pressure groups to the newly formed government, which will be 
discussed further below. 
Third, the government itself was going through changes during this time that 
impacted society and created unrest.  Muhammad Shah and his successor, Naser al-Din 
Shah, attempted to create a central governmental bureaucracy following Iran’s military 
defeat to Russia in the first half of the 19th century. This included consolidating and 
reforming Iran’s system of law, commerce, trade, taxation, land distribution and 
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education. 83 These changes required opening national offices throughout the country, 
including remote areas dominated by tribal and feudal systems, which confronted their 
autonomy and authority. Furthermore, the Shah attempted to create a military and police 
force that would not only protect Iran from foreign invasion but also unify internal 
dissidents.84 Several strata of society resisted these efforts of national consolidation, 
particularly tribal leaders who feared the loss of their autonomy, members of the Ulama 
who interpreted Shari’a law, and merchants not accustomed to paying taxes.  
At the end of the 19th century in particular, the government implemented policies 
that fostered resentment within several groups in society. First, the government asked 
several Belgians to organize Iran’s customs policies and made M. Joseph Naus, a 
Belgian, the minister of customs.85 This appointment became a source of tension for both 
the merchants and Ulama, the latter of which asserted that no foreigners should be 
allowed in the government.86  Despite this, he remained in office until the revolution. 
Amidst these controversies, Naser ed-Din Shah was assassinated in 1896.87 
In the face of growing debt, the government also imposed several new taxes 
aimed at generating revenue. This included, first, new import-export taxes in 1898-1899, 
which were so unpopular that they led to the reformist minister Amin al-Dawlah’s 
resignation. 88 The Shah appointed a hard-line relative in his place, Ain ad-Dauleh. 89 In 
1901, 1902, and 1903, the government imposed new tariffs that hurt local merchants and, 
in the case of the 1903 tariff, favored Russian goods over domestic products.  Each of 
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these new tariffs sparked protests.90 In 1904, the government implemented a new policy 
that taxed salaries and pensions. Also in 1904, the government introduced a 10% stamp 
tax that affected nearly all strata of society. 91 These increases in taxes were compounded 
by the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan in 1904 and Russia’s defeat in 1905. 
The war limited the supply of staple imports coming in from Russia—such as sugar and 
wheat—creating shortages and price-hikes that disgruntled a wide spectrum of society. 92 
The Constitutional Revolution, therefore, began largely in reaction to increased 
taxes, lack of tariffs that protected domestic goods, and governmental dependency on 
foreign loans. The revolution itself can be divided into three phases: the first phase from 
December 1905 through August 1906, in which three series of protests resulted in the 
creation of a national assembly; the second phase from September through December 
1906, in which groups debated the formation of a constitution; and the third phase, the 
struggle to uphold the constitution and the outbreak of civil war between those loyal to 
the Shah and the constitutionalists. In each of these phases, the key actors included the 
Shah and his advisors, the merchants and guilds, the Ulama, and the intellectuals. These 
groups were often internally divided and formed alliances with other groups, depending 
on the issues at stake. 
Two policies in particular explain the timing of the first phase of the revolution. 
First, the 1903 tariffs were scheduled to take effect in March of 1905. In April, merchants 
organized demonstrations and closed the bazaars in protest.93 Their initial demand was 
for reforms in policy and finance, not for a constitutional government.  In December, 
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amidst popular discontent over the soaring cost of basic staples, the government 
attempted to force merchants to lower the price of sugar. After refusing on the grounds 
that the import prices could not be lowered, the government ordered several prominent 
shop owners to be beaten. Merchants reacted by closing the bazaars and, together with 
members of the Ulama and seminary students, by taking bast, or sanctuary, in the royal 
mosque of Tehran. 94 They demanded the dismissal of Naus and ad-Dauleh, the creation 
of an adalatkhana—a house of justice where citizens could voice their grievances against 
the government—and the maintenance of Shari’a law. 95  
Within a month, the Shah agreed to the creation of a “House of Justice that would 
carry the rulings of the Shariat [sic];” however, its implementation bogged down in 
structure and scope. 96 During this time, prominent mujttahids including Sheikh Jamal ad-
Din and Sheikh Muhammad Va’ez began to speak out against the Shah and the 
government, demanding reforms. In July 1906, the government tried to arrest Va’ez, 
sparking a confrontation between the police and his seminary students, resulting in one 
student’s death. The student’s funeral turned violent and between twenty-two to over a 
hundred people died in clashes with the police.97  
The bloodshed prompted merchants and members of the Ulama to unite and 
coordinate protests against the Shah. In the days following the bloody funeral procession, 
key members of the Ulama left Tehran for Qum in protest.98 The entourage included 
Sheikh Fazlallah, who would later side with the Shah against the constitutional 
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government.99 On July 21, around 700 guild members, merchants, and students occupied 
the British Legation’s garden in Tehran. 100 This bast quickly grew to over 14,000 by the 
first week of August, the provisions for which were funded by wealthy merchants.101 
Protesters demanded the creation of a national assembly, the resignation of ad-Dauleh, 
and the return of the Ulama. After a series of negotiations between key merchants and 
Ulama, the Shah agreed to the creation of a national assembly, or Majles, on August 5th. 
After this agreement, the bazaars reopened, the bast ended, and the Ulama returned from 
Qum, ending the first phase in the revolution. 102  
Although the Shah had agreed to the creation of a national assembly, the details of 
the body still had to be determined. Therefore, the second phase of the revolution began 
when the Shah, members of the Ulama, and key merchants began to negotiate the details 
of a national assembly and constitution.  Two issues in particular required several rounds 
of negotiations among the parties: the power of the courts vis-à-vis the Ulama, and the 
power of the shah relative to the national assembly. The Shah eventually agreed to the 
creation of a national assembly comprised of 200 members and elections were held on 
September 29th.103 Through further negotiations, all sides agreed to the creation of a 
Senate with fifty seats appointed by the Shah and fifty elected members. 
Following the construction of a legislative assembly, debates began over the 
drafting of a constitution. The constitution was modeled after Belgium’s constitution, 
with the primary exception that it gave religion and important place in politics and named 
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Twelver Shii Islam as the official religion of Iran. 104 In addition, under the pressure of 
conservative members of the Ulama, the drafters created a set of Supplementary 
Fundamental Laws that included a “supreme committee” of five mujtahids to govern over 
all legislation, the right to ban non-Muslims from cabinet positions and provisions to 
stamp out heresy. 105 The Shah balked at the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, and 
called for provisions that would allow him greater control over the government and 
armed forces. This sparked demonstrations throughout several major cities, especially in 
Tabriz and Tehran. 106Amidst these debates, a man believed to be connected with the 
newly formed Social Democratic Party assassinated the prime minister. In the face of 
growing unrest and political chaos, the Shah promised to uphold the constitution and 
signed a draft on January 1, 1907, just days before his death.107 
The third phase of the revolution began with the coronation of the new Shah, 
Muhammad Ali, and struggles over implementation of the constitution. Despite the fact 
that the previous Shah had agreed to the Majles, allowed for elections to take place, and 
had signed the country’s first constitution, the nature and scope of the new government in 
relation to the authority of the Shah and the Ulama—the traditional keepers of power—
were still not clearly defined. In particular, a debate continued within the Ulama over the 
scope and limits of the new constitutional government vis-à-vis Shari’a law and the 
compatibility of this new system with Islamic principles of authority. Three prominent 
mujtahids in particular debated these issues. On the one hand, Sayyed Abdullah 
Bihbihani and Muhammad Tabataba’i argued that a constitutional government was not 
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incompatible with Islam and Shari’a law; the two could work together to promote justice 
and the tenets of the faith. These two mujtahids backed the newly elected members of the 
Majlis.  
On the other hand, Sheikh Fazlallah argued that a constitutional government 
clashed with key components of Islam, particularly freedom of religion, freedom of press, 
and the right of non-clerics to discern the law. 108  Fazlallah aligned with the new Shah, 
whom he believed would continue to serve and protect Islam.  In June 1907, Fazlallah 
organized a pilgrimage and bast at Hazrat ‘Abd al ‘Azim, a shrine outside of Tehran. The 
bast, believed to be funded by the Shah, consisted of conservative clerics who argued that 
constitutional law had no basis in Shari’a, and therefore should be resisted.109 They called 
on the Shah to uphold his duty as protector of Islam and abolish the constitution. 
Members of the Majles attempted to negotiate with the conservative Ulama, promising 
that the Shari’a would be upheld and that the federal courts would only adjudicate over 
criminal and commercial cases. The conservatives, however, rejected this offer. 
However, in the face of dwindling support, Fazlallah ended the bast in September of that 
same year.  
Throughout 1907 and 1908, the power struggle continued between the 
constitutionalists, backed by Bibihani and Tabatabai, and the conservative Ulama, led by 
Fazlallah and aligned with the Shah. The public grew disenchanted with the new 
government as it failed to balance the budget and improve the cost of living. Throughout 
1908, the Majles continued to push for political power, backed by anjumans, grassroots 
organizations from various strata of society, and by the Shah’s own royal family, which 
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demanded that he support the Majles or be deposed.110 Radical constitutional movements 
began to take root in Tabriz and later Gilan, challenging the authority of Tehran over 
areas outside of the capital.111 In the face of rising discontent, the Shah left the city on 
June 4, 1908. In the Shah’s absence, Bibihani and Tabatabai along with other 
constitutionalists attempted a coup d’état, but the Shah deployed his Russian- led Cossack 
Brigade, arrested the leaders and exiled the two clerics.112 The Shah then disbanded the 
anjumans before returning to Tehran.  
In November 1908, amidst popular discontent for the Majles and with the backing 
of the conservative Ulaman, the Shah banned the constitution in order to “protect Islam” 
and appointed a new legislative body. 113  His declaration received immediate 
condemnation from Russia and Britain, which froze their loans to the Iranian 
government.114 The Shah’s decision also sparked outcry from groups within the 
population, swinging sentiment back towards the constitutionalists. In December, 
merchants took bast in the Ottoman Legation and closed the bazaars. Around the same 
time, mujtahids and seminary students took bast in the Hazrat ‘Abd al ‘Azim. The 
mujtahid’s bast was further supported by the Ulama in Najaf, who voiced their criticism 
of the Shah’s decision.115 The Shah’s control over the country further deteriorated when 
tribes in the West and North rebelled, prompting Russian invasions to restore calm on 
their borders.116  
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The country fell into civil war in 1909 when groups loyal to the constitution 
massed and moved in on Tehran, backed by popular support. The Shah fled his palace 
and took sanctuary in the Russian Legation. On July 25, constitutionalist forces arrested 
Sheikh Fazlallah. He was tried and executed on grounds of sedition. On August 17, the 
constitution was restored and the second Majles called. Russian troops withdrew from 
Iranian territory and granted the new government fresh loans. 
Although the goals of the 1906 Constitutional Revolution were not saliently 
religious, religion still played a role in fomentation of revolution and subsequent debates 
over the nature of government in Iran. Specifically, the Ulama played a critical role in the 
revolution and the political struggles that followed. If the Ulama were involved, why was 
this revolution not religious?   
Details of the revolution reveal, first, that members of the Ulama were not united 
on their opinions surrounding the national assembly and formation of a constitution and, 
second, that the ir backing of those for and opposed to the constitution changed over time. 
Three cycles of confrontation between the pro- and anti-constitutionalists are visible. 
Within each cycle, the relationship between the Ulama, the Shah, the Majles and groups 
in society formed different alliances depending on what was at stake. 
In the first cycle, the initial bid for changes in the government appears to be 
driven by the merchant class and backed by the Ulama. The growing economic crisis in 
Iran, while ultimately affecting most all members of society, impacted the merchants the 
most. In particular, the government initiated increases in import and export taxes, tariffs 
that favored foreign goods, and foreign loans that further indebted Iran to investors and 
drove merchants into economic despair. The merchants responded by closing the bazaars 
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in protest and staging a bast in the British Legation. The Ulama supported these efforts 
by preaching against the injustices of the government and staging their own bast in Qum. 
Key Mujtahids, particularly Bihbihani, Tabatabai, and Fazlallah, all supported this protest 
and backed the merchants in their efforts for greater accountability of the government to 
the people. 
The second wave of confrontation emerged through debates over the nature and 
limits of the newly formed national assembly and constitutional government, particularly 
over the relationship between the authority of the national assembly and the Shah, and the 
legislative powers of the assembly vis-à-vis the Ulama. In this conflict, the Ulama 
divided between those that believed a constitutional government was compatible with 
Shari’a law—argued by Bihbihani and Tabatabai—and those that believed that secular 
leaders did not have the right to judge and formulate law, headed by Sheikh Fazlallah. 
These two camps were backed by other members of society. For example, the guilds 
tended to side with the conservative Ulama whereas the merchants tended to side with the 
pro-constitutionalist Ulama. However, the relationship of government legislation to 
Shari’a law appears to have been driven by the interests of the Ulama.  
The third wave of confrontation developed around the increasing polarization of 
the pro- and anti-constitutionalists camps. The pro-constitutionalists mobilized both 
within the Ulama and different stratas of society, especially through the creation of 
anjumans, to push for maintenance of the constitution and support for the national 
assembly. The anti-constitutionalist Ulama, on the other hand, formed an alliance with 
the Shah to push for protection of Islam. Fazlallah argued that, in the absence of the 
Imam, the best government was absolutism and that the notion of religious equality was 
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fundamentally at odds with Islam. In other words, the counter-revolutionary group had 
saliently religious goals—not the constitutionalists—and they lost this battle when 
constitutional forces, backed by popular support and the Ulama of Najaf, retook the 
capital in the summer of 1909 and demanded the return of the Majles and constitution.  
The Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979 
 This section considers, first, the antecedent conditions that helped fuel the rise of 
popular discontent against the Shah—specifically the domestic and international policies 
of Reza Shah (1921-1941) and Mohammad Reza Shah (1944-1979)—and, second, the 
process whereby groups organized to effectively challenge and overthrow the Shah’s 
regime in 1978. Furthermore this section considers why Islam became a salient factor in 
the revolution, both in its organization and the goals for which groups were rebelling. It 
argues, first, that new interpretations of Shia Islam, specifically the interpretations of Dr. 
Ali Shariati, offered Islamically- inspired motivation for revolution. Second, Islam 
provided bold leaders, particularly Khomeini, who were capable of mobilizing and 
uniting various groups for the common goal of ending the Shah’s regime. And third, 
Islam offered a salient distinction between Iranian and western identity, which was a 
popular mobilizing force against the perceived external threat of western cultural and 
economic corruption. 
 In order to understand the rise of mass discontent for the Shah during the 1970s, it 
is important to highlight controversial policies and events that occurred under the regimes 
of Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza, specifically the initial social reforms 
instituted by Reza Shah in the 1920s and 1930s, and the political restrictions imposed by 
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Mohammad Reza Shah following the 1953 popular uprising led by Mohammad 
Mossadeq and the Tudeh party. 
 The first set of antecedent conditions important for understanding the 
unpopularity of the Shah occurred in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1921, after ten years of 
political and social instability, the military leader Reza Khan marched into Tehran, 
arrested sixty politicians and declared a coup d’état.117  The new leader consolidated his 
authority through military force. Within his first year in power, he defeated the Jangalis, 
a Marxist/Islamic guerrilla organization on the western border with Russia, thereby 
establishing a monopoly on the use of force within Iran’s borders.118    
The new leader made economic and social modernization of Iran his priority. 
During the 1920s and 1930s, the Shah aggressively developed the country’s infrastructure 
including roads, agriculture, and heavy industry. He created the first trans-national 
railroad system and oversaw the construction of power plants that spread electricity 
throughout the country. 119 He developed the government’s bureaucracy and centralized 
authority through the creation of cabinets and taxation. 120 He also modernized urban 
centers and encouraged internal migration to cities to help support growing industries.121  
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In addition to developing the infrastructure, Reza Shah pushed for changes in 
Persian society, modeled after the policies implemented by Attaturk in Turkey. 122 First, 
Reza made several changes aimed at stressing Persian over Islamic identity. In 1921, he 
drafted a bill to end the monarchy, which received staunch criticism, particularly from the 
Ulama, who saw this as an attack on Islam. He then proposed that the monarchy be 
changed from the Qajar family to the Pahlevis, of which he claimed his lineage. This bill 
passed and, in 1926, he ascended the Peacock Throne as the new Shah. 123 In 1925, he 
changed Persia’s calendar from the Muslim lunar cycle to the ancient Persian solar 
calendar and reduced the status of Muslims religious holidays and holy sites.124 He also 
attempted to use Persian identity as a means of bridging linguistic, ethnic, religious, and 
regional differences within society. 125 In addition, he strengthened the ministry of justice 
and asserted a civil code of law while reducing the presence of clerics in the national 
assembly.126 He also worked to increase literacy rates by constructing secular schools 
throughout the country based on the French curriculum. 127  
Reza Shah’s biggest and most controversial reforms, however, came with projects 
aimed at modernizing women. In the 1930s, he began the “Society for Women,” which 
sought to educate women and encourage their presences in universities and the working 
world.128 In 1936, the Shah enacted legislation that officially banned the veil in public 
places including schools and places of work and required women to wear western 
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dress.129 This policy was rigorously upheld, leading to claims from women that their 
liberties were being violated.130 
 The policy to ban the veil, in particular, angered the masses. Coupled with 
increased taxation and further restrictions on organizations and publications, groups 
began to demonstrate against the government.131 The main cleric in Mashad preached 
against the government’s new policies, calling them “heretical innovations.”132 This was 
followed by demonstrations in the bazaars, which required military force to dispel. 133 In 
addition, intellectuals began to speak out against the Shah, claiming that his policies 
violated the constitution. This was backed by Persians abroad, who pushed for liberal 
reforms and the return of a popularly elected government.134 In 1937, under increasing 
criticism, the Shah arrested fifty- three activists believed to be connected with communist 
movements; these activists would later form the backbone of the Tudeh Party in the 
1940s and 1950s.135 
 In the midst of these criticisms, the Shah began to embrace German 
interpretations of race and superiority, using these arguments to support Persian 
superiority as part of the Aryan race.136 These arguments, along with increased German 
investments and trade in Iran, prompted the British and Soviets to invade in 1941 and 
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occupy the country. The Shah abdicated in 1944 and his son, Mohammad Reza, ascended 
the throne in his place.137 
 During the 1940s, Iran was plagued with political turmoil.  Between 1941 and 
1953, the country held elections for five Majles, had one political assassination, declared 
martial law twice, and ended with a coup d’état and installation of the Shah as political 
head of state.138 The country also experienced violent labor strikes surrounding the oil 
industry and mass demonstrations calling for maintenance of the constitution and 
nationalization of the nation’s oil resources.139  
Within this turbulent time, two political forced emerged that threatened the 
authority of the Shah and international investments in Iran’s oil. First, the Tudeh party—a 
political party headed by twenty-seven of the infamous “Fifty-Three” arrested by Reza 
Shah in 1937—moved onto the political scene in the 1940s. The Tudeh party—which 
drew largely on socialist and Marxist ideals—promised to uphold the constitution, to 
improve the lives of the Iranian people, and to reduce foreign manipulation of economic 
and political life.140  The party quickly spread throughout the country, setting up offices 
in all major cities and forming alliances with trade unions and other local 
organizations.141 As part of the broader coalition formed under the National Front, the 
Tudeh party organized strikes and demonstrations, particularly in the oil regions of the 
country, demanding higher wages and the right to export oil to the Soviet Union. The 
party’s activities provoked fears among the British and the US; they believed the party 
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was too Marxist in its orientation, a potential inroad for Soviet intrigue, and a threat to 
British and US oil interests.142  
Second, the politician Mohammad Mossadeq also emerged on the political scene 
during the post-War period, gaining power through mass popularity. Although not 
formally aligned with the Tudeh party, Mossadeq held similar goals, particularly the 
nationalization of Iran’s oil and the reduction of foreign influence in the country. In 1951, 
after the assassination of Prime Minister Razmara, Mossadeq became prime minister. 
While in office, he reduced the military budget, fired dozens of high-ranking officers, and 
pushed for reforms in land, education, and elections.143 In 1953, after Mossadeq called 
for a national referendum, recently fired officers staged a coup d’état with the aid of the 
CIA. Mossadeq and key members of the Tudeh party were arrested and the Shah returned 
to power, imposing martial law until 1957. This marked the end of popular participation 
in Iranian politics and ushered in twenty-four years of royal dictatorship. 
 The second set of antecedent conditions that explain growing discontent for the 
Shah came after the 1953 coup d’état, particularly the Shah’s dependence on US aid and 
his policies of political repression. Following the coup, the Shah was faced with the task 
of consolidating his power and asserting authority over a discontented public fraught with 
political, ethnic and class tensions.144 To combat these challenges, the Shah entered into a 
formal alliance with the United States, ending Iran’s historic posture as a state of non-
alignment. The Eisehower government offered immediate financial assistance of $23.5 
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million as “technical aid” and $45 million in emergency funds.145 US grants, loans, and 
aid continued to grow throughout the 1950s averaging around $45 million annually by 
the end of the decade.146 In addition to financial aid, the US government sent advisors to 
the country, numbering more than 900 by 1960.147 
 Immediately fo llowing the coup, the US also took action to resolve the status of 
Iran’s oil. Under the orchestration of Herbert Hoover, Jr. and J. F. Dulles, the Americans 
created an international oil consortium that involved American, British and French oil 
companies, which was approved in 1954.148 Under the contract, Iran was to receive 50% 
of the revenue from oil sales for a fifteen-year period with the option to renew the 
contract for three additional five-year periods. This agreement did not nationalize Iran’s 
oil—as was planned under Mossadeq—but, rather, placed Iran at the mercy of the 
consortium, which often resulted to collusion to keep costs low and their profits high. 149 
Iran also became dependent on the US through military aid. The US first sent 
military advisors to Iran in1942 with the aim of bolstering Iran’s defense against 
communist penetration. 150 After the coup, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act of 
1953-1963, which gave Iran a total of $535.4 million in military aid.151 Also during this 
time, the US government sent more than 10,000 military personnel to advise the Shah. 
The result was that “American aid and personnel played a decisive role in helping the 
Shah’s regime, between 1953 and 1960, to reorganize and expand its army from about 
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100,000 men to 190,000, and build up a modern air force and navy with 8,000 and 4,000 
trained personnel, respectively.”152 
The degree of military build up allowed the Shah to suppress social, ethnic and 
political unrest in the country. Between 1953 and 1958, the government arrested more 
than 3,000 members of the Tudeh party, leading to its virtual extinction by 1959.153 The 
Shah also shut down newspapers, journals and labor unions.154 In 1957, with the help of 
the US and Israel, the Shah created Iran’s first secret service, the National Security and 
Information Services (SAVAK), which crack down on “dissidents” and other threats to 
the government.155 The SAVAK, together with the military, became one of the key tools 
of political oppression and both “were used effectively in crushing and demoralizing 
opposition of all political coloring, manipulating the behavior of citizens, and controlling 
and redirecting public opinion for the benefit of the regime’s stability and security.”156 
Beginning in 1960, two crises confronted the Shah’s government. First, the 
country faced an economic crisis from 1960 to 1963 based largely on deficit spending.157 
Second, the Kennedy administration began to push the Shah for political, social and 
economic reforms. In 1960, in response to these pressures, the Shah allowed independent 
candidates to run in elections but then canceled the results amid claims of election 
rigging. 158 Also under US pressure, the Shah appointed a Washington-favored prime 
minister, Dr. ‘Ali Amini.159 
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During this time, the Shah attempted to improve domestic life in Iran through 
implementing the “White Revolution,” which included reforms in land distribution, 
ownership of factories and profit sharing, improved literacy rates, and women’s rights.160 
However, by the 1970s, despite a soaring GDP, the White Revolution had largely failed 
to improve the living conditions of the average citizen, particularly of the working 
class.161 Moreover, Iran had fallen into a state of political stagnation, denying citizens any 
opportunity to determine their government.  
In response to these economic and political tensions, opposition groups resumed 
strikes and protests. Between 1960 and 1963, Iran witnessed over 20 strikes, compared to 
just three from the period of 1953-1957.162 In 1963, during the holy month of Muharram, 
demonstrators poured into the streets to denounce the Shah. The demonstrations were 
organized through the Liberation Movement, a new group that included members of the 
Ulama, businessmen, and technocrats.163  It was at this time that the Ayatallah Khomeini 
emerged as a charismatic leader and succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of people. 
The demonstrations, which lasted three days and required the military to restore order, 
left an estimated 1,000 demonstrators dead.164 The protests ended with the arrest of key 
organizers, the abolition of the Liberation Movement, and the deportation of Khomeini to 
Turkey. Historian Ervand Abrahamian argues that the 1963 Muharram Uprising set in 
motion the wheels of the 1978 Islamic revolution. He states: “Just as the tobacco crisis of 
1891-1892 had been a dress rehearsal for the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909, the 
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Muharram upheavals of June 1963 were to be a dress rehearsal for the Islamic Revolution 
of 1977-1979.”165 
The 1963 crackdown on the Muharram uprising sparked the formation of 
domestic and international organizations aimed at undermining the Shah’s regime. 
Within Iran, several militant groups emerged after the 1963 crackdown. First, the 
Marxist-based Feda’i took root in response to the 1963 uprisings. The Feda’i 
successfully challenged the state through a series of terrorist acts including attacks on the 
military, bank robberies, hijackings and assassinations.166 Second, the Islamic-based 
Islamic Mujahedin, which was officially established in 1965 by members connected to 
the Liberation Movement, also successfully challenged the workings of the state through 
a series of terrorist acts.167  
Although these groups were united in the objectives of challenging the authority 
of the Shah, they differed in composition of their members. The Islamic Mujahedin came 
almost primarily from Shii families, had few women in their ranks, and drew heavily 
from middle and upper class students studying engineering and the natural sciences.168 
The Feda’i, on the other hand, included other religious groups, had a significant number 
of women, made considerable inroads with recruits from the working classes, and drew 
from university students in the humanities and social sciences.169 Although both groups 
suffered casualties and arrests by the SAVAK, they still managed to recruit new 
members, stay alive as organizations, and participate in the 1978 Revolution. 170 
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Also in response to the 1963 crackdown, groups in the diaspora began to mobilize 
against the Shah. The Liberation Movement in particular formed chapters throughout 
Europe and North America. The organizational efforts of Dr. Ibrahim Yazidi, an 
oncologist living in Texas, were particularly important for energizing the diaspora and 
calling for revolution. He helped form the Islamic Student Society, which mobilized 
young Iranian Muslims in the diaspora with the aim of deposing the Shah. After the 
revolution, Yazidi returned to Iran in 1979 and became the minister of foreign affairs.171  
In the face of rising militancy, the Shah imposed a one-party system in 1975, 
founding the Resurgence Party with the goal of “centralizing democracy.” The new party 
asserted its power with the help of the SAVAK and attempted to penetrate traditional 
organizations such as guilds, bazaars, and the Ulama.172 As part of this move towards a 
one-party system, the Shah strove to “modernize” religious institutions. He discouraged 
the chador, the veil, and attempted to modify certain aspects of Shari’a law. 173 In 
response to these policies, students in Qum closed down the seminary and seve ral key 
members of the Ulama spoke out against the formation of the Resurgence Party and the 
Shah’s reforms. The government arrested the protesters, drafting around 250 of the 
students into the army, and imprisoned several clerics including one who died 
mysteriously while in custody. 174  
In addition to domestic unrest, the Shah faced external pressure for social and 
political change. The newly formed Amnesty International issued a report in 1975 that 
criticized the Shah’s regime for its political and human rights violations.  In 1977, the 
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Carter administration threatened to end arms sales to Iran if the Shah did not allow for 
greater public participation in the government.175 In response, the Shah agreed to relax 
the government’s detention practices and to try political dissidents in civilian court, as 
opposed to military tribunals. This policy emboldened those opposed to the Shah to speak 
out against the government, setting in motion what would become a revolution. 
From the revolution’s beginnings in 1977, protesters had three consistent 
demands: the end of the Shah’s regime, the return of a constitutional government, and the 
end of Iranian dependence on the West. The revolution, therefore, did not begin with the 
demands for the creation of an Islamic republic governed by clerics. Rather, these 
demands emerged amidst growing popular mobilization against the Shah and his policies. 
Two individuals in particular were responsible for turning the 1977-1978 Revolution into 
an Islamic revolution, Dr. Ali Shariati and the Ayatallah Khomeini.  
Dr. Shariati was not a trained member of the Ulama but, rather, received his PhD 
in sociology from the Sorbonne. He attended university in Paris in the 1960s during 
political and social unrest surrounding Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam. 176 He was, therefore, 
immersed in the milieu of Marxism, revolution and radical philosophy. Upon his return to 
Iran in 1965, he took up teaching positions in Khurasan, Mashad, and the Husseinieh- i 
Ershad, a religious school founded by the Liberation Movement.177 In 1972, the SAVAK 
cracked down on the school and arrested Shariati; he remained in prison and under house 
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arrest until he was granted permission to leave the country in 1977. He died that same 
year in London. 
Through his knowledge of Marxism and radical philosophy, Shariati offered a 
revolutionary interpretation of Twelver Shii Islam. He argued, first, that the path to 
independence from imperialism lay not in a Marxist revolution but, rather, in the return to 
a country’s unique cultural and religious identity; for Iran, this was a return to the 
teachings and practices of Shii Islam. 178 Shariati also pointed to particular incidents 
within Shii Islam as examples of model behavior, particularly the martyrdom of Husayn 
at Karbala, which he interpreted as a righteous leader that resisted corruption and false 
leadership at all costs. He argued that Shii Muslims today must follow this example and 
resist corrupt ideologies, particularly Marxism, false teachings of Islam propagated by 
members of the clergy, and the leadership of the Shah. 179 He further argued that true faith 
was not just belief (kufur) but taking action for the truth. Iranian scholar Hamid Algar 
summarizes Shariati’s interpretation of Shii Islam by stating: 
…he presented Islam not as a religion in the sense commonly understood by 
western usage, that is, a spiritual and moral matter concerning only or primarily 
the relations of the individual with his Creator—but rather as an ideology—that 
is, a comprehensive view of the world and reality and a plan for the full 
realization of human potential, individually and collectively, in such a way as to 
fulfill the whole purpose of man’s [sic] being. 180 
 
Similarly, Historian Ervand Abrahamian argues that Shariati provided an inspiring 
religious ideology that “spoke the language of the masses and could inspire them to revolt 
against the Shah, the upper class, and the imperialists…”181  
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Shariati’s interpretation of Shii Islam resonated particularly with university 
students and the educated middle class. Abrahamian argues that these groups were 
particularly receptive because they largely came from families of the bazaars and other 
middle class groups, they were religious, and they had education and training in western 
skills and ideas. Shariati’s call for a return to the roots of Iran’s identity—what he 
identified as its Shii Muslim tradition— and to shake off imperialism and corrupt 
leadership was an ideology that inspired and mobilized these groups. Furthermore, as a 
western educated elite, Shariati could affirm the positive elements of western education 
and technology and call for their application to a post-revolutionary Iran.  
The second leader responsible for giving the 1978 revolution its Islamic salience 
is the Ayatallah Khomeini. Unlike Shariati, Khomeini received a cleric’s education, 
studying at the prestigious seminary in Qum during the 1940s. He wrote his first book in 
1944, which argued for the creation of an Islamic government and had hints of criticism 
towards the leadership of Reza Shah. 182 Khomeini did not become overtly outspoken 
towards the Shah until 1962, however, at which time he directed his criticisms towards 
the Shah’s corrupt lifestyle, the government’s failure to uphold the constitution, the 
current economic crisis, the sale of oil to Israel, the country’s dependence on the West, 
and the government’s failure to maintain its Islamic principles.183 This approach, which 
covered a wide range of issues relating to many different groups and classes, earned 
Khomeini popular support.  
Khomeini continued to be an influential figure in Iranian life and politics despite 
his deportation in 1963. He wrote prolifically and—as a teacher at the Muslim Shii 
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seminary in Najaf, Iraq—he continued to inspire a generation of Shii clerics including 
Sheikh Nasrallah, who would later become a key figure in the Lebanese Shii uprising.184 
During the revolution, Khomeini remained outspoken and offered guidance to the 
demonstrators from exile. In October 1979, when Iraq expelled Khomeini to Paris, he 
worked with the expatriate community in France, uniting secular and religious groups 
against the Shah. 185 Abrahamian summarizes Khomeini’s importance to the revolution by 
stating: “In brief, he was a charismatic revolutionary leader at a time when such leaders 
were in short supply and in great demand.”186 Lastly, he was the first to call for the 
formation of an Islamic government, hukomat-i Islami, which he helped to structure upon 
his triumphal return to Iran on February 1, 1979. 
 The revolution itself occurred in the span of just over a year—from the first 
demonstration-related death in November 1977, until the Shah’s departure in January 
1979—and included three major incidents. Although the beginning of the revolution 
could be dated to the Shah’s decision to try political dissidents in civil and not military 
courts—which occurred in August of 1977—the first incident of violence between the 
police and demonstrating students occurred on November 19, 1977, in which a political 
poetry reading was violently broken up by the police, resulting in the death of one 
student. This death sparked three cycles of demonstrations, protests and death: the first 
occurring forty days after the first student’s death—marking the end of the traditional 
mourning period in Islam—which resulted in the deaths of around 100 protesters in 
Tabriz; the second occurring forty days after the deaths in Tabriz and resulting in around 
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100 deaths in Yazd; and the third cycle, which occurred forty days after the deaths in 
Yazd and resulted in around 250 deaths in various cities.187 This cycle of deaths, protests, 
and more deaths ended with the Shah offering measures to appease the merchant class 
and reduce the cost of living.188   
The second major incident in the revolution was the publication of an article 
condemning Khomeini on January 7, 1978, written largely in response to unrest caused 
by the November 19th death in Qum. The article accused Khomeini of being a British spy, 
of “living a licentious lifestyle” and of writing erotic Sufi love poems. The article also 
accused the clerisy in general of being “black reactionaries.”189 The accusations caused 
outrage across the country and prompted protests by seminary students in Qum, leading 
to clashes with the police. Ultimately, the article galvanized support for Khomeini rather 
than weakening his influence.  
The third key incident in the revolution involved a series of working class strikes 
that began in Mashad in July of 1978. Striking workers clashed with the military, 
resulting in the deaths of around forty demonstrators. The following week, memorial 
services led to mass demonstrations that required the government to call out the army and 
declare martial law. 190 Then in August, a mysterious fire in a working-class neighborhood 
cinema killed over 400 men, women, and children. Rumors spread that the SAVAK 
started the fire. The following day, a demonstration of 10,000 people demanded the 
Shah’s abdication. 191 This was followed by a series of mass demonstrations that 
coincided with Ayd-i Fetr, the end of Ramadan, in which over 500,000 people 
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demonstrated in Tehran alone. It was during these protests that the first demands for an 
Islamic government were made.192  
On September 8th, 1978, the worst clashes to date occurred, causing an estimated 
4,000 deaths in what became known as “Black Friday.” The following day, workers in 
the oil refineries went on strike, effectively freezing Iran’s oil industry. Protests, strikes 
and demonstrations continued throughout the fall, culminating with mass demonstrations 
connected to the holy month of Muharram in December and particularly on the holy day 
of ‘Ashura, in which an estimated 2 million protestors turned out in Tehran. 193 At this 
point, the Shah made a few final attempts to appease demonstrators, such as promising 
free elections and ending oil sales to Israel, but these gestures yielded no concessions. 
Amidst chronic protests and strikes, the Shah and his family left Tehran on January 16, 
1979. 
Post-Revolutionary Iran  
 The leaders of the revolution were faced with monumental tasks following the fall 
of the Shah including the creation of a government, the consolidation of military and 
police forces, and the realization of an Islamic republic. Prior to the departure of the 
Shah, local ad hoc organizations, komitehs, emerged in various regions to provide social 
services to their communities; these organizations became essential building blocs of the 
new government.  
In March 1979, a referendum ended the monarchy and declared Iran an Islamic 
republic. In August of the same year, elections were held for a council of experts to create 
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a new constitution, which was ratified in November. This was followed by presidential 
elections in March 1980, and parliamentary elections in May, which brought the Islamic 
Republican party to power with the majority of seats.194 Khomeini was named the 
velayat-e faqih, “the ultimate legal authority and the supreme religiopolitical guide for 
state and society.”195 By 1981, the new government and clergy had consolidated control 
of the state and suppressed domestic opposition. 196 
 In addition to realizing an Islamic government, the architects of the new republic 
also made one of their goals the export of the revolution, which they wrote into the new 
constitution’s preamble, professing that “in the development of international relations, the 
Constitution will strive with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for 
the formation of a single world community…and to assure the continuation of the 
struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed people in the world.”197  This 
foreign policy aim did not sit well with Iran’s neighbors, particularly with Bahrain and 
Iraq, which both had Shii majorities.198 In December 1980, a failed coup d’état in Bahrain 
was blamed on the new Iranian government.199 On September 21, 1980, Saddam Hussein 
launched a massive air and ground offensive against Iran, ushering in the Iran-Iraq War. 
One of Saddam’s motives for launching the attack was to defeat the new Islamic republic 
and “to rescue the Gulf Arab states from the menace of revolutionary Shi’i subversion,” 
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particularly within his own borders.200 While the war failed to defeat Iran, it cost the new 
republic more than 600,000 lives and depleted its material resources.201 
The government, specifically Khomeini, also attempted to export the revolution 
through the 1989 fatva against Salam Rushdie for his composition of the book, The 
Satanic Verses, which Khomeini deemed blasphemous against the Prophet and God. The 
fatva, which called for the death of Rushdie and those connected with the book, 
culminated with the murder of several translators of the manuscript and of a European 
imam, who publicly disagreed with the fatva.202 Despite Khomeini’s death in 1989, 
international disturbances continued over the fatva until the Iranian government revoked 
the death warrant in 1998. 
Perhaps Iran’s best success in exporting the revolution came with the 
government’s support of the Shii uprising in Lebanon, beginning in the 1980s. As 
previously mentioned, Ayatallah Khomeini taught Sheikh Nasrallah while in Najaf, Iraq, 
a tie that strengthened the connection between Iran and Lebanese Shii militants, who took 
Nasrallah as their spiritual guide.203 Although difficult to prove, Iran has been credited 
with supplying the Lebanese Hizballah (the Party of God) with weapons, training, and 
money, including financial support for those killed in battle.204 
Iran’s hard- line foreign and domestic policies began to soften after the May 1997 
election of moderate Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, “who campaigned on a platform of 
civil society, rule of law, and expanded personal liberty,” an approach that won him 70% 
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of the vote.205 During Khatami’s first few years in office, he achieved rapprochement 
with neighboring countries and made diplomatic visits to numerous states and the UN, 
improving the republic’s image.206  Khatami also set about reforming domestic policies, 
moving more moderates into various cabinet positions and supporting the election of a 
new generation of politicians in the 1999 and 2000 elections. Despite bouts of domestic 
tension—the greatest being the July 1999 student uprising in Tehran—the Islamic 
republic has continued to operate, holding elections and adapting to domestic and 
international changes.  
There has been much academic disagreement on the causes of the 1978 revolution 
and its saliently Islamic character. Many scholars are quick to point out that participating 
individuals and organizations were not exclusively Shii Muslim, but rather included 
religious minorities such as Christians, Jews and Baha’i as well as Marxist and secular 
organizations.207 Furthermore, the revolution began with demands for the end of the 
Shah’s regime, foreign influence in the country, and the government’s maintenance of the 
constitution; it did not begin with the cry for an Islamic republic. However, the revolution 
ended with this demand along with the return of the Ayatallah. What explains this 
evolution towards saliently religious goals? 
The causal argument for religious war proposed in this dissertation helps explain 
this evolution. First, the relationship between religious and political leaders underwent 
changes in the 1970s that created animosity between the two groups. The Shah instituted 
                                                                                                                                                 
204 Hilal Khashan asserts that these groups were united primarily by their hatred towards Israel. Hilal 
Kashan, “The New World Order and the Tempo of Militant Islam,” British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies, pp. 5-24, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1997), pg. 15 
205 Sick, pg. 358 
206 ibid 
207 Abrahamian, Between Two Revolutions, pp. 532-533  
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several policies that threatened the influence and livelihood of the Ulama. This included 
reforms on Shari’a law and restrictions on religious practices such as wearing the chador. 
Moreover, the government disproportionately responded to protesting seminary students 
by conscripting them into the army, effectively ending their careers as clerics. The 
government also directly attacked the Ulama in its 1978 newspaper article, calling them 
“black reactionaries.” The result was that the Ulama, in greater and greater numbers, 
aligned against the Shah, breaking the traditional tie between the two authorities. The 
Shah no longer stood as the protector of Islam, but had become a threat both to the faith 
and to the clerics who maintained it.  In the end, only a very few remained loyal to the 
Shah; the rest sided with Khomeini to overthrow his regime.  
Second, the public in general felt threatened by the policies of the state. Following 
the Shah’s violent crackdown in 1963, militant groups—Marxist and Islamic—emerged 
with the goal of violently trying to dislodge the Shah through acts of terrorism. 
Furthermore, the Shah implemented policies in the 1970s that threatened different strata 
of society, especially the merchants and guilds, which he sought to penetrate and 
dismantle through economic policies and modernization of the bazaars. These policies 
helped to mobilize resistance against the Shah as intellectuals and the clerisy began to 
openly criticize his policies in 1977. 
Third, social resources played a critical role in the mobilization of society against 
the Shah. Social resources connected with Shii Islam were particularly important, 
especially its strong leaders and organizations. Throughout the 20th century, but 
particularly from 1953, the Shah rigorously rooted out political parties, social 
organizations, networks and other forms of collectivity in Iran. The result was that few 
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social and political organizations existed in Iranian society by the 1970s. The Ulama, 
although also the recipient of this oppression, still possessed resources useful for 
mobilization such as schools, buildings, finances, and especially trained leaders. These 
resources became particularly important in organizing the opposition during the 
revolution.  
The unfolding of the revolution and its unique Islamic character cannot be 
explained, however, without considering the role of the Ayatallah in mobilizing the 
masses and shaping the political outcomes of the national uprising. Other leaders existed 
in the revolution, but it was Khomeini who succeeded in uniting different movements and 
successfully propelling them towards the goal of overthrowing the Shah. The argument 
that, for many, the Islamic goals of the revolution were secondary still does not discount 
Khomeini’s success in rallying the nation around the battle cry to depose the Shah and 
create an Islamic state.   
Another key leader that gave the revolution its Islamic salience was Shariati. 
Although not a cleric, Shariati provided a new interpretation of Islam that combined 
western and Marxist concepts of revolution with Shii examples of faith in action. The 
result was a powerful religious ideology that inspired young intellectua ls to rise up, shake 
off the West and assert their own identity in the form of an Islamic republic. Shariati’s 
contributions, therefore, were two-fold; he offered a revolutionary ideology that was 
saliently Islamic and he encouraged young Iranian intellectuals to assert their unique 
identity as Shii Muslims. Although dead before the beginning of the uprising, Shariati’s 
contributions towards shaping the Islamic Revolution are vital for understanding its 
religious character. 
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Finally, the revolution’s Islamic character was the result of religious 
organizations, specifically the Liberation Movement. Despite the government’s 
crackdowns after the Muharram uprising in 1963, the Liberation Movement still managed 
to survive. In particular, its branches in the diaspora—especially in the US and France—
helped to keep the movement alive and draw in new recruits. Likewise, the Liberation 
Movement continued to function inside of Iran despite persecution from the government, 
including the creation of the militant Mujahedin and the formation of a religious school in 
Tehran, the Husseinieh-Ershad, both of which continued to draw recruits throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. While there were other groups and organizations at this time, the 
Liberation Movement moved into the foreground and ultimately articulated the end goals 
of the revolution, giving it religious salience. 
Conclusion 
 Comparing the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 with the Islamic Revolution of 
1978 provides an opportunity to test the explanatory value of the causal argument 
proposed in this dissertation and, specifically, to offer an explanation as to why religious 
goals—namely the creation of an Islamic republic—became a salient demand in the 1978 
Revolution and not in 1906. These findings are summarized in Table 4.1. 
 The two revolutions share several similarities. First, both revolutions were in 
reaction to domestic threats, specifically threats posed by the Shah’s rule. The timing of 
the Constitutional Revolution is best explained by policies of increased taxation that hurt 
several strata of society, including increased taxes on salaries, pensions, and a uniform 
10% stamp tax issued in 1905.  In response, merchants, guilds, the Ulama and students 
demonstrated against these policies and demanded greater representation in the 
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government. Likewise, the Islamic Revolution was in response to domestic threats posed 
by the Shah. Specifically, demonstrators took to the streets in response to the Shah’s 
dictatorial rule including restrictions on political participation, freedom of press and other 
civil liberties.  
Moreover, both revolutions were fought in response to perceived threats over the 
degree of foreign influence in the country. By 1906, British, Russian and Belgian 
investors had indebted the Shah and made him vulnerable to their economic preferences. 
This is most visible in the Russian loans issued to Iran at the turn of the century in return 
for tariff reductions on Russian imports, exposing domestic products to unfair 
competition. Likewise, the 1978 revolution was fought largely to end foreign—namely 
US—influence in the country. This included first and foremost US economic interests in 
Iranian oil, but also included the desire to end US cultural influences, which scholars like 
Shariati perceived to be undermining the strength of Iranian identity.  Therefore, the 
threats facing the Iranian public in both revolutions were largely similar. 
Second, religious leaders played a role in both revolutions, however in differing 
degrees. Although the Constitutional Revolution did not have saliently religious end 
goals, it still involved religion. Specifically, members of the Ulama actively participated 
in mobilizing the opposition and pressuring the Shah for greater reforms in political 
participation. In addition, there were members of the Ulama who backed the Shah, 
claiming that—in the absence of the Imam—the Shah’s rule was the best substitute and 
constitutionalism was incompatible with Shari’a law and the tenets of Islam. Therefore, 
although the Ulama participated in the Constitutional Revolution, they were divided on 
the best form of government and different members supported both sides of the struggle. 
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4.1 Iran’s Constitutional and Islamic Revolutions  
 Political and 
Religious Leaders  
Threat Perception Material, Social, and 
Technological 
Resources of Religion 
1906 
Revolution 
 
Goals: 
Elections and 
Constitution 
§ Authority 
intertwined 
§ Ulama divided 
between pro-and 
anti-revolution 
§ Economic 
policies of the 
Shah: taxation, 
foreign debt, 
tariffs 
§ Primarily Social: 
trained leaders, ties to 
other groups in 
society 
§ Material: mosques 
and shrines for bast 
Islamic 
Revolution 
Goals: Depose 
Shah  
Create Islamic 
Government 
§ Ulama united 
against the 
Shah and pro-
revolution 
§ Political 
oppression, 
foreign 
influence 
§ Primarily Social: 
trained leaders, 
networks, Islamic 
identity 
§ Material: schools, 
buildings 
 
In the Islamic Revolution, by contrast, the majority of the Ulama came to be 
united against the Shah. Beginning in the 1970s, the Shah implemented policies that 
directly harmed the Ulama, including efforts to modify religious customs and Shari’a 
law. Moreover, the Shah cracked down severely on protesters at the seminary in Qum, 
forcing hundreds of students to join the army and imprisoning members of the Ulama. 
Lastly, the Shah’s imprisonment and deportation of Shariati in 1976 and his continued 
policy of exile for Khomeini, coupled with defamatory statements towards the Ayatallah, 
helped mobilize the Ulama against his leadership in the early stages of the Islamic 
Revolution. Therefore, the Ulama were more unified against the Shah in the second 
revolution than they were in the first.  
The key difference that explains the move towards religious end goals, however, 
was the resources available during the Islamic Revolution, specifically the proliferation 
of organizations within Iran and the diaspora and bold leaders that brought groups 
together with the goal of deposing the Shah. Following the 1963 uprising, the Liberation 
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Movement continued to develop as an organization, despite facing chronic persecution 
from the state. It mobilized Muslims within Iran’s borders and throughout the diaspora. 
The emergence of guerilla groups also helped to mobilize the population against the state 
and successfully challenged the political and military authority of the government. In 
addition, student movements, labor unions, and seminarians also began to organize in 
opposition to the state, mobilizing a wide array of the population. 
Furthermore, the key leadership in the 1978 revolution managed to mobilize and 
unite different groups towards the common cause of deposing the Shah. In the 
Constitutional Revolution, the Ulama played a role in mobilization and pressuring the 
Shah for reforms. However, other leaders also played important roles, particularly 
influential merchants and young scholars. In the Islamic Revolution, however, the key 
leaders were clerics, specifically Khomeini, but also his students such as Shari’atmadari, 
Montezari, Mottahari, and Khamenehi, who succeeded Khomeini as velayat-e faqih in 
1989.  Khomeini in particular succeeded in the critical task of uniting secular and 
religious movements, minorities, the diaspora, and those at home for the common cause 
of overthrowing the Shah. In so doing, he also used their resources to implement his 
saliently religious goal of creating the first-ever modern Islamic republic. 
Finally, the 1978 Revolution had its antecedents in the new and inspiring 
interpretations of Shii Islam. Dr. Shariati’s interpretations of the faith in particular 
provided a compelling argument for rebelling not only against the corruption of the Shah, 
but also for throwing off the ills of imperialism and by asserting what he identified as 
Iran’s unique identity—Twelver Shii Islam. His speeches and writings were widely 
circulated, particularly among young university students who, later, took to the streets en 
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mass to demand the overthrow of the Shah, the end of foreign influence in Iran and the 
creation of an Islamic Republic. 
 Chapter 8 
Marxism in the 20th Century:  
A Religious Revolution? 
  
 
 Marxism has been blamed for numerous atrocities in the 20th century. Its legacy 
includes incidents of mass killing—in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin, in China 
under Mao, in Cambodia, and in Latin America1—in addition to being the ideology that 
sparked the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union and the ensuing 
nuclear arms race that brought the world to the potential brink of extinction. In fact, little 
good can be attributed to the application of Marxist ideology that the world has seen. Are 
these outcomes of Marxism the intended goals of the ideology, or did something go very 
wrong in its real world application?    
This chapter considers Marxist ideology and the revolutions it inspired in Russia, 
China and Cuba during the 20th century. It argues that Marxism should be understood, 
first, as a program for realizing a revolution aimed at drastic social, political and 
economic changes; and second, as an ideology with the ultimate aim of liberating the 
world’s masses enslaved by the ills of capitalism. Marxism, therefore, has salvific aims 
and corresponds to the concept of “earthly salvation” outlined in this dissertation. 
However, the application of Marxist principles in the three cases outlined—Russia and 
the Soviet Union, China and Cuba—has, in complete contradiction to its liberating goals, 
resulted in the profound suffering and death of millions. This chapter posits that the 
disastrous outcome of the communist experiment is due to the fact that, while Marxism 
contains elements that conform to this dissertation’s definition of religion, such as texts, 
                                                 
1 For a discussion on these incidents of mass killing, see Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: The 
Causes of Mass Killing and Genocide, (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Dissertation in 
Political Science, 2001 and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming) 
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leaders, resources, and beliefs, it did not enjoy the support of the masses who identify 
with communism’s beliefs and goals, thus prompting its leaders to use drastic measures 
aimed at forcing mass compliance with their Marxist programs. 
 The first section of this chapter offers a brief overview of Marx’s theory, 
highlighting the program for the communist revolution and its ultimate goals. The second 
section considers the application of Marx’s theory of revolution to three countries—
Russia and the Soviet Union, China and Cuba—evaluating the application of Marx’s 
theory for each context and leaders’ successes and failures in bringing about the salvific 
aims of communism. The third section determines, given evidence from the case studies, 
if Marxism is a religion. And the fourth section offers concluding remarks.  
Overview of Marxism 
 
 Scholars from numerous academic disciplines have produced volumes of 
commentaries expounding on the writings, theories, and observations of Marx and those 
who adapted his thoughts. These works contain a lively debate on what defines 
“orthodox” Marxism—its core elements—and the application of these elements in 
specific Marxist movements, such as in Russia, China, and Latin America.2 This section 
will not enter into this debate but, rather, will only provide a brief overview of two broad 
                                                 
2 A few examples of these debates include, Andrew G. Walder, “Marxism, Maoism and Social Change,” 
Modern China , Volume 3, No. 1, (January 1977), pp. 101-118. Walder argues that that criticisms of Mao’s 
use of volunteerism fail to acknowledge Marx’s own use of the superstructure in his theories and, 
furthermore, they operate on the assumption that the base and the superstructure and mutually exclusive 
and do not influence one another. Likewise, Nick Knight outlines debates over the orthodoxy of Mao’s 
Marxist theories and concludes that these debates are inherently irresolvable because the scholars are 
arguing from different points of epistemology. See “The Marxism of Mao Zedong: Empiricism and 
Discourse in the Field of Mao Studies,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No 15 (July 1986), pp. 
7-22. Wylie argues that the “Sinification of Marxism,” involved a two-stage process whereby Chinese 
scholars had to account for why China was ready for a Marxist revolution despite its lack of industrial 
development and to adapt a “foreign” theory of revolution to the Chinese context. This later point throws 
into question the universality of Marx’s world-wide revolution. See Raymond F. Wylie, “Mao Tse-Tung, 
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elements of Marxism: the ultimate goals of Marxism; and Marx’s program for achieving 
these goals, namely through revolution. 
 In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels raise the call for the proletariat of 
the world—landless, industrial workers forced to sell their labor for survival—to unite 
and overthrow their governments in order to create an entirely new political, economic 
and social system “in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all.”3 Marx and his followers called for a proletariat revolution in 
response to what they believed to be a fundamentally unjust economic system produced 
by industrialized capitalism. Marx argues that advanced capitalism forces society into 
two classes: the bourgeoisie, a small minority that own the land, the factories, and the 
capital of production; and the proletariat masses, which are forced to sell their labor to the 
bourgeoisie at minimum wage in order to survive.4 Marx further argues that advanced 
capitalism creates not only an unjust economic situation for the masses but that these 
dynamics are the source of conflict between husbands and wives, family members, 
classes within societies, and even nations.5 Advanced capitalism, therefore, causes 
immiserization, the personal, social, and economic oppression of the masses.  
Marx argues that the path to salvation from capitalism is a revolution of the 
masses that would destroy the economic and political system of the bourgeoisie. In its 
place, Marx envisioned a new and better system, one in which people reaped the benefits 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ch’en Po-ta and the “Sinification of Marxism,” China Quarterly, Vol. 0, Issue 79, (September 1979), pp. 
447-480. 
3 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels , “The Communist Manifesto,” Karl Marx: Selected Writings, edited by 
David McLellan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 221-247, quote taken from pg. 238 
4 Communist Manifesto, pp. 228-230, 232-233. Engels defines the Bourgeoisie as “the class of the great 
capitalists who, in all developed countries, are now almost exclusively in possession of all the means of 
consumption, and of the raw materials and instruments (machines, factories) necessary for their 
production,” Principles of Communism, taken from A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, Second Edition, 
edited by Tom Bottomore, (London: Blackwell References, 1991), pg. 56  
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of their own labor and worked towards a collective good. For Marx, humans are defined 
by the ability to produce their own subsistence.6 Marx further states that producing one’s 
subsistence is not merely for survival, but “rather it is a definite form of activity of these 
individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. 
As individuals express their life, so they are.”7 Thus Labor is more than survival; it is the 
very expression of an individual’s humanity. A just political, social and economic system 
therefore must allow individuals the right to their labor. 
Marx identifies such a system in communism.8 In Marx’s definition, communism 
would be grounded on the abolition of private property, the redistribution of land, and the 
communalization of production and other forms of capital. 9 Because the property and 
production would be owned by the collective whole, class divisions based on economic 
distinctions would disappear.10 As land and labor are redistributed more evenly between 
industry and agriculture, the distinctions between urban and rural would dissolve.11 
Moreover, as differences between individuals and groups disappear, antagonism between 
nations would also dissolve:  
In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the 
exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as 
the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one 
nation to another will come to and end.12 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Communist Manifesto, pp. 234-235 
6 Karl Marx, “The German Ideology,” Karl Marx: Selected Writings, edited by David McLellan, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 159-191, pp. 159-191, especially pg. 160 
7 The German Ideology, pg. 161 
8 The term communism first appeared in Parisian secret revolutionary societies in the mid-1830s. The term 
came to have two meanings: “an actual political movement of the working class in capitalist society, and a 
form of society which the working class, through its struggle, would bring into existence,” A Dictionary of 
Marxist Thought , pg. 102 
9 Communist Manifesto, pp. 237-238 
10 Communist Manifesto, pg. 237 
11 ibid 
12 Communist Manifesto, pg. 236 
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Furthermore, children would no longer be forced to work in factories but, instead, attend 
school.13 Women would be liberated from their confining roles as “slaves to their 
husbands” and mere producers of more workers.14 Marx’s communist revolution, 
therefore, is the path to human salvation from economic greed and the demise it 
produces; in its place would be a totally new system that realizes the full potential of 
individuals, families, societies and nations.   
 Marx outlines a revolutionary program for transforming the world from the ills of 
capitalism to the utopia of communism. Marx contends that the proletariat revo lution 
would be aided by the inevitable demise of capitalism. In The German Ideology, he 
argues that industrialized capitalism is one in several stages in the development of 
history. Capitalism is preceded, first, by tribalism, in which the family is the primary 
organizing principle, the division of labor is simple, and private property is minimal.15 As 
population grows and the “latent slavery” of the family increases, tribalism is replaced by 
the “ancient communal state,” which is defined by tribal alliances and the emergence of 
private property. 16 As private property increases, “feudal or estate property” develops, 
which is classified by sparse populations scattered over vast territory in which the 
principle form of production is agriculture.17 As the division of labor becomes more 
complex and new modes of production emerge—most notably industry—this gives way 
to more and more advanced forms of capitalism. Capitalism, like its preceding stages, is 
doomed to its own demise through the rapid concentration of private property into fewer 
                                                 
13 Communist Manifesto, pp. 234-235  
14 The German Ideology, pg. 168; Communist Manifesto, pg. 235 
15 The German Ideology, pg. 161 
16 The German Ideology, pg. 162 
17 ibid 
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hands and the alienation of the masses from the fruits of their own labor. The crisis sets 
the stage for the proletariat uprising.   
However, in order for a complete break with history to occur, a revolution is 
required. Marx lays out a program for effectively executing a communist revolution. 
First, the proletariat needs to realize its potential as a force in history. This is achieve 
through the organization and unity of various proletariat movements—aided by their 
concentration in factories and urban centers—and particularly through the formation of 
labor unions, which are inherently at odds with the bourgeois factory owners.18 Through 
increased organization and the formation of political parties, the proletariat recognizes its 
power as a class and asserts itself in the political arena. As the proletariat’s strength 
increases, other disenfranchised groups, such as the small business owners and 
tradesmen, join the movement in opposition to the bourgeoisie.19  
It is this increase in numbers, organization and power that eventually allows the 
proletariat to become the dominant class and to assert its will over the bourgeoisie. As a 
political force, it then will “wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to 
centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat 
organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as 
possible.”20 Marx does not state that the process of “wresting” power from the 
bourgeoisie requires violence but, rather, leaves open other means for seizing the state. 
Once in control of the state and its production, Marx outlines a series of actions to 
create a communist system including the abolition of private property and inheritance; the 
centralization of credit, banking, transportation, and communications; the 
                                                 
18 Communist Manifesto, pg. 228 
19 Communist Manifesto, pg. 229 
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communalization of factories, agriculture and all other forms of labor; and free education 
for all in public schools.21 The communist revolution is complete when, having destroyed 
the old system and establishing a new order, classes altogether disappear. The Manifesto 
states: 
…if; by means of a revolution, [the proletariat] makes itself the ruling class, and, 
as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production, then it will, along 
with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the existence of class 
antagonisms and classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own 
supremacy as a class.22  
 
 In sum, Marx’s vision for a communist utopia is defined by the liberation of all 
people to pursue their potentials as human beings and to possess the fruits of their own 
labor. Marx lays out a program for achieving this liberation—through a revolution that 
“sweeps away” the old system—and establishes a new order based on equity and 
cooperation. 
Marxism in Practice: Russia, China, and Latin America 
 
Marxism in practice has been extremely diverse, producing different and often 
contradictory applications. These varying interpretations have spurred lively debates in 
academia on the “orthodoxy” of Marxism and the degree to which its interpreters have 
adhered to true Marxism or have strayed. This section considers three examples of 
Marxism applied in specific revolutions: Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism for the 
Russian revolution of 1917; Mao’s use of Marxism for the Communist Revolution in 
China; and Ché Guevara’s interpretation of the Marxist Revolution for the overthrow of 
regimes in Latin America. It argues that all of these interpretations of Marxism have 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Communist Manifesto, pg. 237 
21 ibid 
22 Communist Manifesto, pg. 238 
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focused on programmatic Marxism—how to foment a revolution with the aim of 
deposing the government—but none of these revolutions have succeeded in realizing the 
salvific aims described by Marx. 
Lenin and the Russian Revolution of 1917 
 This section considers the interpretations of Marx that helped foment the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 and shape the succeeding government. It assesses, first, the writings 
of Lenin and Trotsky and considers how they interpreted Marxism to fit the Russian 
context. Second, it outlines the events leading up to the 1917 revolution and the strategies 
and tactics of the Bolshevik party in precipitating the revolution. Third, it compares the 
results of the revolution with the salvific goals of Marxism to create a more equitable 
political, social and economic system. It argues that, while the Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
defined the 1917 revolution as Marxist, the results of the revolution do not resemble 
Marx’ communist utopia but, rather, a system based on oppression and intimidation.  
As outlined in the previous section, Marx named a set of criteria necessary for a 
communist revolution to occur, specifically the presence of an advanced, industrial 
capitalist system in which the proletariat makes up a critical mass of the population. In 
his writings, Marx identified three countries that were ripe for revolution given their 
economic and social conditions: Germany, Hungary, and Austria.23 Of these three 
countries, Germany, in particular, was the country that would ignite a global revolution 
                                                 
23 Peter J.S. Duncan, Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism and After, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2000), pg. 50, quoting an article written by Marx in the Neue Rheinishe Zeitung in 
1849. 
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and save the world. Marx claimed that, “the emancipation of the German is the 
emancipation of the human.”24  
Russia, on the other hand, did not fit the economic and social conditions identified 
by Marx as necessary for a communist revolution. First, early 20th century Russia was not 
an advanced industrialized capitalist economy.  Second, the majority of Russians were 
not industrial laborers but, rather, worked as farmers. At the turn of the 20th century, 80% 
of the Russian Empire’s population was comprised of peasants.25 Third, Russian scholar 
Richard Pipes argues that the majority of the population was not alienated from their 
labor but, rather, were isolated into small disconnected communities and largely 
politically neutral. 26 Therefore, Russia resembled more the latter stages of a feudal 
system or the early stages of a capitalist system than it did advanced, industrialized 
capitalism.   
Nevertheless, intellectuals argued that Marxism spoke to the ills of Russian 
politics and society and offered a revolutionary path to liberation. Marx’s texts and 
articles were first translated into Russian in the 1870s, followed by the formation of a 
Marxist party, the Social Democrats, in the 1890s.27 Russian expatriate Marxists in 
London, Paris, Germany and Brussels aided the spread of Marxism back in Russia, 
including Alexander Ivanovich Herzen, who was a member of the International 
Association of Workingmen. 28 Herzen argued that Russia, while not possessing an 
advanced state of capitalism, still contained a unique combination of social and economic 
                                                 
24 Taken from “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the Right,” quoted in Duncan, pg. 49 
25 Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), pg. 3 
26 Pipes, pp. 8, 385 
27 Henry Eaton, “Marx and the Russians,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Volume 41, Issue 1, (January-
March, 1980), pp. 89-112, especially pp. 89-90 
28 Eaton, pg. 93 
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elements within its peasant population that would allow it to implement a communist 
revolution and lead the rest of Europe to rise up and overthrown their capitalist chains.29 
This particular argument created a movement in Russia known as “Populism.” 
However, it was the writings of Lenin and Trotsky that became the foundations on 
which the Russian Revolution was realized.  In 1902, after being arrested and exiled to 
Siberia for attempting to organize workers in St. Petersburg, Lenin wrote What is to Be 
Done? From his failed attempts to politicize workers, he argued that industrialized 
laborers, by themselves, could not realize the revolution. Left to their own devices, they 
would simply learn to negotiate with the bourgeoisie for marginal gains. Lenin further 
argued that, in order for the revolution to be realized, a select minority of leaders had to 
be entrusted with orchestrating the revolution. These leaders, the “vanguard” of the 
revolution, could actually accelerate the necessary conditions for the revolution, making 
the stages more subjective than objective forces of history. 30 Lenin identified Russia’s 
vanguard in the Social Democrats, which adhered to the Marxist principle that the only 
true revolutionary class was the proletariat.31        
Lenin further argued that the Social Democrats needed to work with non-Marxist 
groups in order for the revolution to be successfully implemented. In Lenin’s opinion, a 
revolution could only succeed if a critical mass were organized against the ruling power 
and this required mobilization of all forces opposed to the state, regardless of their 
ultimate objectives.32  Lastly, Lenin asserted—drawing from Marx’s observations of the 
                                                 
29 Duncan, pp. 48-49 
30 Kermit E. McKenzie, “Lenin’s Revolutionary Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry,” 
Essays in Russian and Soviet History: In Honor of Geroid Tanquary Robinson, edited by John Shelton 
Curtiss, (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1963), pp. 149-163 
31 Pipes, pp. 105-106 
32 Pipes, pg. 107 
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failed 1871 Paris Commune—that it was not enough for the proletariat to assume control 
of the state; rather, they had to smash the system in order to effectively establish 
communism. This could only be done by force. Lenin asserted: “The necessity of 
systematically imbuing the masses with this and precisely this view of violent revolution 
lies at the root of the entire theory of Marx and Engels.”33 Lenin’s call for a violent 
revolution was in direct contradiction to the German Marxist scholar Karl Kautsky, who 
argued that the communist revolution could be realized peacefully through parliamentary 
elections.34  
Just after the fall of the Tsar in 1917, Lenin outlined the creation of a communist 
government in his book State and Revolution. In it, Lenin argued that an interim phase—
the proletarian dictatorship—was necessary in order to destroy the preexisting system of 
the former regime. Once this goal was achieved, the government would no longer be 
necessary: “Under socialism, all will govern in turn and quickly become accustomed to 
no one governing.”35 However, although the political and social system of the former 
regime required total destruction, Lenin advocated for maintaining the capitalist system’s 
form but adapting its content to the socialist agenda.36 This combination of elements 
would produce the communist utopia described by Marx and Engels.37 
Lenin also developed a theory to explain why the Marxist revolution had not 
occurred in the industrially “ripe” countries. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of 
Capitalism, he argued that, as industrialized capitalist economies continue to expand, 
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they are forced to export their capital to compensate for a decline in domestic rates of 
return. Western economies, therefore, turn to colonies and developing countries to export 
their products for greater profits. Lenin further argued that imperialism has impeded the 
proletariat revolution because increased profits from exports have benefited the leaders of 
the working class—the vanguard that should be fomenting the revolution—who are, in 
effect, bought off by the profits. Lenin concluded, however, that as export markets shrink, 
causing profits to decrease, the vanguard will assume its role and organize the proletariat 
to rise up and revolt. Imperialism, therefore, was not a solution to the decline of 
capitalism but merely a slowing in its inevitable doom.38  
In addition to Lenin’s writings, the Russian Leon Trotsky also interpreted Marx 
and applied his ideas to the Russian case. In his 1906 book Results and Prospects, 
Trotsky maintained that the Russian proletariat was still the true revolutionary class. 
However, drawing from others that argue for the uniqueness of Russians, he believed that 
the Russian working force, although small, would succeed in accelerating the 
development of the necessary conditions for a communist revolution. Furthermore, not 
only would they realize Russia’s revolution, but they would also have to inspire 
revolutions outside its borders in order for the new system to survive.39 Therefore, like 
the Populist argument, Trotsky believed that Russians—the proletariat instead of the 
peasant—were uniquely positioned to foment a domestic and international communist 
revolution.  
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 With these interpretations of Marxism in mind, Lenin and Trotsky set about 
realizing a Marxist revolution in Russia. Prior to 1917, Russia had undergone a series of 
uprisings with the goal of overthrowing the Tsar. Beginning in 1879, several radical 
political groups formed with the aim of assassinating the Tsar, ending the monarchy in 
Russia, and triggering a popular revolution. The most aggressive of these groups, the 
People’s Will, succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexandar II, but his assassination failed 
to inspire a revolution. 40 Despite this, the People’s Will and other groups that used 
terrorist tactics continued to function into the 20th century. Alongside these groups, 
intellectuals formed political organizations with the goal of overthrowing the Tsar. The 
most notable of these was the formation of the Social Democrats in the 1890s, which—in 
line with Marxism—argued that the only true revolutionary class in Russia was the 
proletaria t.41 These groups, along with the less radical Constitutional-Democrats, formed 
political parties around the turn of the century in the hopes of forcing greater popular 
representation in the political process.   
Russian university students and industrial laborers played a critical role in 
demanding changes in Russia’s political system. Student protests, beginning around 
1900, challenged the authority of the Tsar’s government, often leading to violent clashes 
between students and police. Also around this time, the Russian Orthodox Priest Father 
Gapon began organizing labor unions in St. Petersburg with the aim of asserting workers 
rights in the political arena.42  
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In addition to domestic unrest, Russia also suffered from conflicts with its 
neighbors. At the turn of the century, Russia entered into a territorial dispute with Japan 
over Manchuria. On February 8, 1904, Japan attacked the Russian naval base at Port 
Arthur, on the Sea of Japan. Japan succeeded in taking the fort after ten months of 
protracted struggle and demolishing nearly the whole of Russia’s naval fleet.43 This war 
forced Russia to draw its forces away from the capital and deploy them on its eastern 
border, thus presenting a window of opportunity for the various groups agitating for 
political change.  
In January of 1905, Father Gapon’s labor unions organized a march through St. 
Petersburg’s streets, determined to present a list of demands to the government. Police 
and army forces opened fire on the demonstrators, killing 200 and wounding 800.44 The 
event, which became known as “Bloody Sunday,” sparked waves of protest and further 
strikes throughout the country. The unrest eventually forced the Tsar to agree to the 
“October Manifesto,” which called for greater civil liberties, the creation of a popularly 
elected lower house of parliament (the Duma), and restrictions on legislation proposed by 
the Tsar.45  
Not all parties were satisfied with these reforms, however, and radical groups 
continued to use terrorism as a means of toppling the Tsar. In particular, certain members 
of the Social Democrats were unsatisfied with the reforms brought about by the 1905 
uprising. The majority within the party believed that governmental reforms and the 
creation of labor unions was the best means through which to organize the working class 
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for political and social change. However a minority, led by Lenin and Trotsky, believed 
that this aided the existing regime instead of undermining it and that the only path to 
revolution lay in smashing the current political system. To this end, they began to 
organize clandestine groups that would prepare workers and intellectuals for a violent 
revolution. 46 These divided factions within the Social Democrats became known as the 
Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks, respectively.  
The outbreak of World War I further challenged the viability of Russia’s 
government. At the height of the war in 1917, the Tsar abdicated in the face of popular 
unrest and a military revolt. In his place, two rival political systems were created: a 
provisional government; and the first “soviet” in Petersburg, an elected council that 
sought to implement Marxist inspired changes to society and economics.47 The 
Mensheviks argued for working with the provisional government to affect change, largely 
because they believed the cond itions for a true Marxist revolution were not yet ripe.48  
The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, called for undermining the interim government and 
fomenting the revolution immediately. To this end they employed two strategies. First, 
they tried to encourage popular and military unrest through subversion, strikes, theft and 
terrorism. Second, they claimed to intervene in the midst of this chaos in order to save the 
newly formed soviets and with the greater intention of dissolving the government.49 
Although they were fewer in number, the Bolsheviks succeeded in orchestrating a 
coup d’état that effectively toppled the interim government in October 1917.  Lenin’s 
coup was aided by a secret alliance with Germany in which it funded the Bolsheviks in 
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exchange for Lenin’s efforts to close the Eastern Front, allowing Germany to concentrate 
its troops on the Western Front.50 In October, Germany further aided the coup by 
coordinating an offense in the Gulf of Riga.51 Once the coup was complete, the 
Bolsheviks claimed to offer a “democratic peace,” allowing elections to be held in 
November, but then immediately disbanding the new government.52 Post facto, Trotsky 
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union produced an official story of the “October 
Revolution” in which the Bolsheviks led the proletariats in the uprising, making the event 
more consistent with the Marxist program for the communist revolution. 53 
Following the coup, Lenin and the Bolsheviks then began to implement a totally 
new political system. Russian scholar Richard Pipes describes the new government as 
“…a dual authority: an extreme dictatorship exercised by a private body—the “party”—
behind the façade of popular self-rule represented by the soviets.54 The one party 
government, led by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, quickly pushed out all other political 
parties from the government, including the Mensheviks. These radical changes prompted 
riots, strikes and rebellions. In order to counter these challenges, the new government 
imposed the “Red Terror,” a program based on the post-French Revolution terror aimed 
at eliminating those hostile to the new regime. The Red Terror targeted peasant and urban 
uprisings, political parties other than the Bolsheviks, the royal family, and other 
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individuals believed to be subversive to the communist agenda.55 Thousands were 
executed, put in camps or exiled as a result of this campaign.56 
In conjunction with the Red Terror, the country disintegrated into civil war, a 
development that Lenin welcomed in hopes that the violence would effectively smash the 
existing social and political system. 57  The Russian civil war of 1917-1921 was fought on 
three fronts—in the North, West and South—and included four fighting factions: Whites, 
forces that strove to preserve a democracy; Blacks, the anarchists; Greens, peasant 
partisans; and Reds, which were the communist forces. The Reds enjoyed numerous 
advantages including material assets gained from the state and from the Bolshevik’s 
relationship with the Germans, greater ethnic cohesion, and the direction of unified 
leadership.58 Although the Whites had some international backing, most notably from 
Britain and Poland, they suffered from internal political divisions, lack of strong 
leadership, and incongruous multi-ethnic constituents.59 They, therefore, ultimately lost 
out to the Reds after three years of struggle. 
The end of the civil war sparked pogroms against minorities, particularly against 
Poles and Jews in the Ukraine, with an estimated 1,236 incidents of anti-Jewish violence 
alone.60 The civil war’s conclusion was also followed by widespread famine. In 1921, the 
Party implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the hopes of revitalizing Russia’s 
economy, devastated by the war. The NEP—a combination of radical land, labor, and 
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fiscal reforms—proved to worsen the famine. Both peasants and city dwellers rebelled 
under increasingly bleak circumstance, which the Party put down with brutal force.61   
In the midst of this domestic turmoil, the Party did attempt to implement reforms 
geared at realizing the communist utopia. Following the coup, the Party formed the 
Prolekult, whose goal was to aculturize the working class to Marxist ideals and rid them 
of bourgeois influences. The Prolekult argued that art and culture should reflect the 
corporate nature of society, not the individual: “Culture grew out of economic relations 
among human beings and their never-ending struggle with nature. In a socialist society, 
based on the principle of collectivism, culture would necessarily assume a collective 
character.” 62  To this end, they created studios where workers could draw, paint and 
compose poetry. The movement quickly faded, however, when it insisted on 
independence from political institutions.63    
The party also attempted to create free education for all. However, it lacked funds 
to face the overwhelming task of introducing universal education in a linguistically 
diverse region in which less than 45% of children attended school prior to the 
revolution. 64 The Party also attempted to implement a universal literacy program. 
However, despite the fact that around five million people went through this program 
between 1920 and 1926, it did little to raise the overall literacy rate.65 Therefore, 
education remained a unique privilege in the first decades of the Soviet Union.  
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Likewise, the Party—in keeping with Marxist themes—sought to liberate women 
from their traditional roles as wives and mothers. The Party attempted to create collective 
daycares and kitchens in the hopes of allowing women to join the workforce. These 
programs were coup led with relaxed divorce laws, allowing women to leave relationships 
in which they were unhappy. The Party also legalized abortion with the aim of giving 
women greater choices over the size of their families.66  
However, most of these efforts to realize the communist utopia quickly lost out 
over efforts to manipulate the masses. Alongside programs to free citizens from 
bourgeois culture, the Party implemented a rigorous propaganda campaign, aimed at 
conforming the masses to the Party’s program. They used a variety of mediums to spread 
their message including books, posters, newspapers, cinema and “agitational-
propaganda,” a form of street-theatre that parodied the pillars of bourgeois society. 67 
Moreover, the Party implemented a rigorous campaign that sought to destroy the Russian 
Orthodox and Catholic churches. Russian historian Richard Pipes argues: “Next to 
economic hardship, no action of Lenin’s government inflicted greater suffering on the 
population at large than the profanation of its religious beliefs, the closing of the houses 
of worship, and the mistreatment of the clergy.”68 Beginning in 1922, the Party 
confiscated land and church property—including its sacred objects—put thousands of its 
priests on trial or in prison, and abolished church festivals.69 These efforts, however, 
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largely backfired; Russians, particularly the peasantry, clung to their faith with greater 
tenacity. 70  
 Also in keeping with Marxist principles, the Party made one of its primary goals 
the export of the revolution. The Party created an organization expressly for this purpose, 
the Communist International, or Comintern.  In 1919, Lenin dispatched the Russian Karl 
Radek to Berlin as the Soviet Union’s ambassador. Radek, together with Germans Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, used his position as ambassador to foment a workers’ 
revolt. The uprising, which broke out shortly after Radek’s arrival, lasted only ten days 
and resulted in the arrest of all three leaders and the execution of Liebknecht and 
Luxemburg. 71 The Soviets encouraged subsequent revolts in Bavaria and Hungary, both 
of which ended in failure. The Comintern also took an interest in China’s social and 
political unrest, establishing the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in 1925, for the 
purpose of educating Chinese communists in Marxist doctrine and practices.72 Overall, 
however, the Comintern failed in its efforts to export the revolution, particularly to the 
countries deemed ripe: Germany, Austria and Hungary.  
The Bolshevik’s rise to power in Russia and the creation of the Soviet Union was 
Marxist to the extent that Lenin and Trotsky drew their inspiration for the revolution from 
the writings and theories of Marx and Engels. Despite the fact that Russia did not meet 
the level of capitalist development specified by Marx, Lenin and Trotsky continued to 
agitate for a communist revolution that would sweep aside the injustices of the existing 
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government under the Tsar and create a more equitable economic and political system.  
Both Lenin and Trotsky’s writings called not only for revolution, but revolution with the 
express purpose of realizing the communist utopia. To this end, they attempted—both 
domestically and internationally—to spread communist ideas. However, disastrous 
economic and social reforms at home, coupled with thwarted attempts to foment 
revolutions abroad, failed to bring about better conditions under the new political system. 
This, in turn, presented a crisis for the legitimacy of their rule, prompting the Bolsheviks 
to maintain power by force.  Russian historian Richard Pipes argues that “the Bolsheviks 
ceased to be utopians when, once it had become obvious that the ideal was unattainable, 
they persisted in the attempt by resorting to unrestrained violence.”73 
The ultimate result of the Bolshevik experiment, therefore, was a totalitarian 
system based on oppression and fear, which is incompatible with the Marxist vision of 
liberation.  Determining, therefore, as to if the Bolsheviks succeeded in creating a truly 
communist state, Pipes states: “Judging in terms of its own aspirations, the Communist 
regime was a monumental failure; it succeeded in one thing only—staying in power. But 
since for the Bolsheviks, power was not an end in itself but a means to an end, its mere 
retention does not qualify the experiment as a success.”74 
Mao and the Chinese Revolution 
This section considers the spread of Marxism to China and interpretations of 
Marxist literature that helped fuel the Chinese Revolution and shape the succeeding 
government. It assesses, first, the writings of Mao and considers how he interpreted 
Marxism to fit the Chinese context. Second, it outlines the events leading up to the 
                                                 
73 Pipes, pg. 393 
 438 
 
 
Chinese Revolution and the strategies and tactics of Mao in precipitating the revolution. 
Third, it compares the results of the revolution—specifically the Great Leap Forward and 
the Cultural Revolution—with the salvific goals of Marxism to create a more just and 
equitable political, social and economic system. This section argues that, although Mao 
self- identified as a Marxist, his theory of revolution follows Lenin’s model more than 
Marx’s. Likewise, while Mao aimed to create a more equitable and just society, the 
radical means through which he attempted to do so—particularly via the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution—had disastrous effects. Similar to the Soviet 
Union, the results of the revolution did not resemble Marx’s communist utopia but, 
rather, a system based on oppression and intimidation. 
China, like Russia, was not an advanced industrial capitalist society at the time of 
its civil war and revolution. Therefore, many of the same debates occurred surrounding 
the applicability of Marx’s program of revolution to the Chinese case. This debate, 
although rich and complex, will only briefly be touched on in relation to two elements of 
Marxist thought—the program for the Proletariat Revolution, and the ultimate goals of 
that revolution, a communist utopia.  
The Chinese Revolution, and the social, political and economic system that 
followed it, are largely the philosophical and strategic thinking of Mao Tse-tung. Mao’s 
writings, therefore, are central to understanding how Marxism has been interpreted and 
applied in the Chinese context. In addition, several preceding scholars’ writings exposed 
Mao to Marxist thinking and, therefore, are important for understanding Mao’s own 
interpretations of Marxist texts and doctrine. 
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One of the first Chinese scholars to embrace Marxism was the philosopher Che’en 
Tu-hsiu. He argued that democracy and science had failed to produce a system that would 
bring about the redemption of Chinese society. Marxism, on the other hand, “was a view 
of life marked by drastic, melodramatic contrasts and hopes of total redemption. What 
was more, the drama it envisaged was a global drama which finally brought China onto 
the stage of world history.”75 His 1920 essay, “The Value of Historical Materialism in 
Modern Historical Science,” extolled the virtues of Marxism and denounced other 
theories of reform as bourgeois thinking aimed at keeping the masses down. 76 Another 
Chinese scholar that embraced Marxism was Li Ta-chao, who argued that China could 
regenerate itself as a great society and political force, given the right philosophical 
framework. Following the Bolshevik Revolution, he wrote “The Victory of Bolshevism,” 
citing it as the path to China’ liberation. 77 He was instrumental in the founding of the 
Society for the Study of Marxism at Peking University in 1918.78 Mao—a librarian at 
Peking University during this time—learned from these early discussions on Marxism.   
Mao faced similar problems as Lenin in his interpretation of Marx and Engels’ 
program for realizing the communist revolution; specifically, China had not achieved the 
state of advanced capitalism necessary for a successful proletariat uprising. Like Lenin, 
Mao argued that, despite its lack of industrialization and the absence of a proletariat class, 
China was ready for a communist revolution. He believed that the conditions for 
revolution could be accelerated given the presence of dedicated leaders and human will. 
This argument, known as “volunteerism,” stands in tension to Marx’s program of 
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materialist history, which requires objective stages of development and necessary 
preconditions for the proletariat revolution to occur. In his form of volunteerism, Mao 
stresses the importance of human will in affecting history and fomenting revolution. He 
argued, “…man would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had 
reached out for the impossible. But to do that man must be a leader, and not only a leader 
but a hero as well, in a very sober sense of the word.”79 Mao further claimed that, “all 
things can be successfully achieved, if you are resolute, if you only have the will.”80 
Therefore, despite the lack of industrial development and the absence of a strong 
proletariat, China could realize the revolution through sheer force of will. 
Also similar to Lenin, Mao believed that imperialism was largely responsible for 
China’s ills. China’s immediate imperialist threat came from Japan. At the end of World 
War I, western powers transferred the Chinese province of Shantung from German 
authority to the Japanese, despite China’s claims to the territory. The Paris Peace 
Conference and Treaty of Versailles, therefore, became examples of western intentions to 
carve up the world for its own designs, ignoring the wishes of those that inhabit the 
land.81 Mao argued that the people of China needed to form “The Great Union of the 
Masses” in order to counter the threat of imperialism.82 Unification would be achieved by 
forming unions, associations, societies, and professional organizations that would then 
join forces and create national cohesion. 83 Mao named the Communist Party as the 
organization that would bring about this national unity and shake off China’s imperialist 
                                                                                                                                                 
78 Schwartz, pg. 16 
79 Quoted in Samuel Kim, China, the United Nations, and World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), pg. 61 
80 Quoted in Kim, pg. 61 
81 Robert A. Scalapino, “The Evolution of a Young Revolutionary—Mao Zedong in 1919-1921,” Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol. XLII, No. 1, (Nov. 1982), pp. 29-61, especially pg. 34 
82 Which was the title of one of his earliest articles, Scalapino, pg. 35 
 441 
 
 
vultures: “The force at the core leading our cause forward is the Chinese Communist 
Party. The theoretical basis guiding our thinking is Marxism-Leninism.”84 
Consistent with Marx’s goals for a communist utopia, Mao also stressed the 
importance of liberating society from domestic and international obstacles in order to 
create a more just way of life. Some of Mao’s earliest writings describe the plight of 
women in Chinese society and called for a new social order that would liberate them 
from a “bitter life.”85 Mao also wrote about the difficult conditions faced by China’s 
workers, peasants, policemen, primary school teachers and university students, who were 
subject to “backward pedagogical methods, and arrogant, unfeeling teachers.”86 In Mao’s 
mind, a communist revolution would sweep away both the detrimental structure of 
society and defend China from imperialist aggression. 
From these theoretical foundations, Mao developed a strategy for realizing the 
communist revolution. Mao, like Lenin, believed that the revolution had to be violent 
because only force could effectively sweep away the old political, social and economic 
system; the communist movement, therefore, had to prepare for war. This strategy called, 
first and foremost, for communist leaders to mobilize and politicize the peasant class, the 
largest percentage of China’s population. The Party would win the peasant’s support by 
introducing land reforms and redress their grievances.87 Alongside mobilizing peasants, 
the leaders would form a strong, well-organized party. Through Mao’s personal 
experience as a guerilla warrior in the 1920s and 1930s, he determined that the best 
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strategy of fomenting a nation-wide revolution would be by establishing rural bases, 
“soviets,” and using these bases to attack and encircle the cities.88 This strategy became 
the blueprint for realizing the revolution and eventually succeeded in defeating the 
Kuomintang in 1949.  
The rise of Mao and his call for a communist revolution occurred during a period 
of protracted political, social and military unrest. In 1911, after decades of political and 
social unrest, the Tongmenghui—the forerunner to the Kuomintang—sparked a revolt in 
Wuhan that spread to neighboring provinces, created dissent in the army, and eventually 
overthrew the Qing dynasty. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang, promised a 
republic ruled by a democratic government. Elections were held in 1913 and 1914, but 
the republic quickly collapsed after Yuan Shikai assassinated Kuomintang politician 
Song Jiaoren and imposed a military dictatorship.89 After Yuan’s death in 1916, the 
country fell into the hands of battling warlords. 
The failures of the 1911 Revolution prompted many scholars to look outside of 
Chinese philosophy for ideas on human nature and governance. Historian Suzanne Ogden 
argues that, “the Chinese desperately wanted to believe in someone, to feel someone 
could offer them a panacea.”90 The American philosopher John Dewey visited China in 
1919, giving a series of lectures on the importance of science and democracy for the 
progress of humanity. 91 In 1920, the scientist and philosopher Bertrand Russell was also 
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invited to China. Both of these western scholars, however, left intellectual circles 
disillusioned by the vagueness and complexity of the path to improvement.92   
Also during this time, Marxism became one of many potential philosophies 
considered as a solution for China’s political and social ills. Chinese scholars took 
interest in Marxism because of the successes of the Bolshevik Revolution in shaking off 
imperialism and the Tsar. Unlike Russia, which had expatriate scholars connected to 
Marxist movements in Europe and had easy access to Marx’s texts, Marx’s writings had 
not made inroads into China prior to the 1920s.93 Likewise, Lenin’s State and Revolution 
was not translated into Chinese until 1927.94 Mao himself notes: “Before [Russia’s] 
October Revolution we Chinese knew nothing about Lenin and Stalin, nothing about 
Marx and Engels.”95 Therefore, it was the Bolshevik revolution that drew Chinese 
scholars to Marxism, not the writings of Marx and Lenin per se. 
Debates over which political model to adopt for China created a rift between the 
liberals and Marxist in 1921, which were previously joined in an organization know as 
the Progressive Party. The Party, headed by Liang Chi’i-ch’ao, sparked the “May 4th 
Movement” in 1919, a series of boycotts and demonstrations that called for radical 
changes in the existing government.96 During this time, liberals and Marxists were united 
by the desire for change in China: “They wanted to break with the past and ‘progress’ in 
a new direction. And both groups were preeminently nationalists, so that in spite of 
ideological differences, they agreed that China’s major problems were economic 
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backwardness, political disunity, and bad government.”97 However, they disagreed on the 
solutions to these problems. The liberals argued for a system based on democratic reform 
while the Marxists called for revolution. After their split, the Communist Party of China 
was formally founded at the Third Communist Interna tional, held in Moscow in October 
1921.98  
Despite China’s lack of industrial development, the Soviet Union took an interest 
in its political and social turmoil during the 1920s. After failing to foment revolution in 
Germany, Austria and Hungary, Lenin turned his attention to “backward areas” 
undergoing national unrest as potential soil in which to plant communism. 99 Lenin and 
the Party identified China as a country where the Communist revolution could be 
exported. To this end, it sent advisors to China to meet with the burgeoning communist 
party. The Party also opened a school in Moscow with the aim of educating Chinese 
communists on Marx and Lenin. Mao, the principle architect of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution, however, did not attend the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and, later, 
purged the communist party of those who had received training there.100 
In addition to encouraging the Chinese Communist Party’s growth, the Soviet 
Union also attempted to orchestrate its political moves. Under the encouragement of 
Moscow, the newly formed Chinese Communist Party joined forces with the 
Kuomintang, headed by Chiang Kai Shek, with the goal of unifying the country and 
seizing control of the government. To this end, Moscow helped build and train forces in 
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the south of China.101 In 1927, however, after the Kuomintang effectively staged a coup 
d’état, Chaing Kai Shek expelled the communists from his ranks. In return, the 
communists staged uprisings in several provinces, which the government violently 
quelled.102   
The following decade saw increased efforts by the communists to establish 
independent bases from which to operate. They succeeded in creating several ‘soviets’ 
including Mao’s base in Jiangxi, which was eventually overrun by the Kuomintang in 
1934.103 As soviets collapsed, communist troops undertook “Long Marches” to other 
communist enclaves, eventually putting the bulk of communist forces in Shaanxi 
province in the north of the country. 104 The Kuomintang attacked these forces in 1937, 
destroying the base.   
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1937 dramatically changed the political and 
military dynamics in China to the communists’ advantage. Mao, who had moved his 
headquarters to Ya’an, began to consolidate forces opposed to the government. The 
Japanese attacked and destroyed governmental structures in the north, paving the way for 
communist forces to move in and win the loyalty of the local populations. To this end 
they defeated bandits and warlords that sprang up in the absence of centralized authority 
and secured the support of local inhabitants through gradual land reforms and more 
equitable economic activity. 105 Also during this time, the Party underwent a period of 
internal consolidation, resulting in the purge of many members as part of the 
‘Rectification Campaign.’ At the close of World War II, the Communists and their Red 
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Army were poised to challenge the Kuomintang. Through a series of fiercely fought 
battles, particularly in Manchuria, the Red Army succeeded in pushing the Kuomintang 
to the South and eventually driving them to Taiwan, where they set up their government.  
Once in power, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party sought to achieve the 
communist utopia through economic, social and cultural transformation. From 1958-
1960, the government launched “The Great Leap Forward,” with the goal of rapidly 
transforming China’ mode of production into an advanced industrial nation. The program 
succeeded in increasing heavy industry by 68% and steel production by 36%; these 
successes, however, came at an enormous price.106 Increased industrialization coupled 
with drastic agricultural reforms and rapid communalization resulted in a massive famine 
that claimed an estimated 15 to 30 million lives.107 Although the Party later called the 
Great Leap Forward a mistake, it nevertheless maintained the era in which it was 
launched as one of building the communist state, which involved some setbacks and 
sacrifices in order to achieve its ideals.108 
Also around the time of the Great Leap Forward, Mao and the Chinese 
Communist Party began to assert its independence from the tutelage of the Soviet Union. 
In the 1950s, Mao and other Chinese party leaders attended Moscow’s annual Party 
Congress. Likewise, leaders in the Soviet Union visited Peking on a regular basis and 
sent advisors to govern China on its communist path. However, there had always been 
disagreements between the two Marxist powers. Tensions increased between China and 
the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis in 1961 and China’s military 
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intervention in Ladakh and Assam, India in 1962.109 In response to these tensions, Mao 
announced that China was the true keeper of Marxist-Leninism and unveiled his 
intentions to create the “A-A-A” alliance between Asia, Africa and [Latin] America with 
the goal of fostering the worldwide Marxist revolution. 110 Ultimately these plans failed to 
realize a global revolution or to supplant the Soviet Union as the premier Marxist state. 
However tensions continued, in varying degrees, between both powers throughout the 
existence of the Soviet Union.   
Again, from 1966 to 1976, Mao and the Party instituted radical reforms aimed at 
cleansing China of its bourgeois elements in what became known as the Cultural 
Revolution. From 1966 to 1967, members of the ‘Revolutionary Young Generals’ of the 
Red Guard destroyed Buddhist temples, historical sites, books, music, furniture—
anything deemed to be bourgeois.111 Alongside the destruction of property, individuals 
and families believed to be sympathetic to bourgeois ideals were killed or sent to labor 
camps including schoolteachers, Party members, professionals and peasants. The 
bloodshed prompted revolts, which led to more bloodshed, spiraling the country into a 
state of chaos. Before the Party had succeeded in regaining control of the country, an 
estimated one million were killed.112     
The Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power and creation of a communist state 
was Marxist to the extent that Mao and other key leaders self- identified as followers of 
Marx and drew some of their inspiration from the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
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Stalin. In particular, Mao and other communists called on Lenin’s adaptations of Marx’s 
program for the revolution and on Lenin’s causal argument for imperialism as a barrier 
that must be overcome in order to realize the revolution. Mao was also motivated by the 
ultimate end-goals of communism—a self-reliant, more equitable society in which people 
were free to reap the benefits of their own labor. Furthermore, the Soviet Union 
recognized the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party as initially conforming to the 
Marxist agenda of the worldwide revolution. Moscow, through the Comintern, took 
measures to educate Chinese communists on Marxist teachings and supply financial, 
military and technical aid to Chinese communists. However, disagreements between Mao 
and Stalin over China’s independence as a Marxist state led to a rift in Sino-Soviet 
relations, one in which Mao ultimately labeled the Soviet Union as an imperialist force 
alongside the United States. 
Similar to Russia, China faced the problem of applying Marx’s program for a 
proletariat revolution to a country that did not meet the level of development outlined by 
Marx and whose population was not significantly composed of a working class. Mao 
argued, rather, that the peasantry was the class for realizing the revolution and that human 
will and spirit could overcome obstacles and accelerate the necessary stages of history. 
China scholar Benjamin Schwartz summarizes Mao’s approach to the Marxist Revolution 
by stating: “Essentially, the Maoist strategy involves the imposition of a political party 
organized in accordance with Leninist principles and animated by faith in certain basic 
tenets of Marxism-Leninism onto a purely peasant mass base.”113 
Also similar to Russia, the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to liberate the 
masses and create a communist utopia resulted in intimidation, mass slaughter, starvation 
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and pervasive suffering. These results, therefore, are a far cry from the harmony that 
Marx predicted would arise after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie’s cultural, political, 
and economic system. Like the Soviet Union, therefore, China’s attempt at realizing the 
communist dream can only be measured as a failure.  
Ché Guevara and the Marxist Revolution in Latin America 
 This section considers Ché Guevara’s interpretations of Marxist literature to call 
for revolution through guerilla warfare in Latin America. It assesses, first, Guevara’s 
writings and considers how he interpreted Marxism to fit the Latin American context. 
Second, it outlines the events leading up to the series of Marxist- inspired armed 
insurgencies in Latin America, particularly Cuba, and describes the strategies and tactics 
of Marxist groups in precipitating popular revolts. Third, it compares the results of the 
Cuban Revolution with the salvific goals of Marxism to create a more just and equitable 
political, social and economic system. This section argues that, while Guevara was 
committed to realizing the Marxist utopia, the results of the revolution do not resemble 
the communist dream but, like Russia and China, the Cuban government uses oppression 
and intimidation in order to stay in power.  
 Similar to Lenin and Mao, Ernesto Ché Guevara came from a stratum of society 
that allowed him to pursue a university education. Born in Argentina, he attended 
medical school in Buenos Aires beginning in 1948. While in medical school, he began to 
travel throughout Latin America, visiting such countries as Chile, Venezuela, Peru, 
Trinidad and Guatemala. Guevara’s travels exposed him to the poverty and suffering of 
the masses in these countries and the lack of basic needs such as nutrition and medical 
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services. Also while traveling throughout Latin America, he met several prominent 
Marxists including the Peruvian scientist Hugo Pesce and Fidel Castro, who encouraged 
him in his studies of Marx.  
 From these experiences, Guevara began to interpret Marxist texts and create his 
own strategy for realizing a revolution. Similar to Russia and China, Guevara was faced 
with the challenge of justifying a Marxian revo lution in countries that lacked developed 
industry and were predominantly composed of peasants. Guevara drew heavily from the 
writings of Mao, who had already grappled with this tension in Marxism and had 
presented an argument for a Marxian revolution in a peasant-based society. Like Mao, 
Guevara formulated his own brand of volunteerism, positing that the necessary conditions 
for revolution could be created through a highly dedicated, tight-knit band of guerilla 
fighters that he called the foco.114 The foco differed from Lenin and Mao’s strategy for 
realizing the Marxist revolution in that the band of guerilla fighters was not acting under 
the command of the vanguard of the Party or a few key leaders but, rather, it was the 
vanguard; it combined the military means for accelerating the conditions for a revolution, 
sparking the revolution, and directing the revolution’s outcome.115 The foco, therefore, 
was responsible for winning the peasant population to its side, gaining their moral and 
material support for a revolution, and mobilizing them for the overthrow of the existing 
regime. The foco gained its support and legitimacy not merely through its ideas and 
goals, but also through its successful military challenge of the state.116 
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 Furthermore, like Lenin and Mao, Guevara blamed imperialism—particularly US 
imperialism—for the ills affecting Latin America. He argued that US economic interests 
in Latin American, particularly in the areas of agriculture, were corrupting the local 
governments and preventing them from caring for their people. While in Chile, he wrote: 
The most important effort that needs to be done is to get rid of the uncomfortable 
‘Yankee-friend’. It is especially at this moment an immense task, because of the 
great amount of dollars they have invested here and the convenience of using 
economic pressure whenever they believe their interests are being threatened.117 
  
Guevara expanded this argument as the fault of the capitalist system in general:  
In El Paso [Costa Rica] I traversed the vast domains of United Fruit [a US owned 
company]. Once more I was able to convince myself how criminal the capitalistic 
octopuses are. On a picture of our old and bewailed comrade Stalin, I swore not to 
rest before these capitalistic octopuses are destroyed.118 
  
Disagreements with the Soviet Union and China later led Guevara to conclude that not 
only was capitalism a cause of imperialism but, more broadly, countries in the northern 
hemisphere—regardless of their political system—sought to dominate “southern” 
countries.119 Guevara, therefore, championed Marxist revolutionary movements in Latin 
America, Africa, and Southeast Asia with the aim of destroying North-South imperialism.  
 Finally, it is important to note that Guevara’s call for armed revolution against 
governments in Latin America and beyond was inspired by his desire to bring about a 
more just political and social system in these countries. As a doctor, Guevara devoted the 
early part of his adult life to working in medical clinics throughout Latin America and 
took a particular interest in aiding those with leprosy and other infectious diseases.120 
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While working as a doctor in Peru, he wrote: “I want to link my destiny to that of the 
poor of this world.”121 Through the course of his travels and meetings with various 
Marxists, and especially through his experiences during the 1954 US-inspired coup d’état 
in Guatemala, Guevara turned toward Marxist theory and practice as a viable path of 
liberation for Latin America.  
From these theoretical foundations, Guevara devised a strategy for realizing the 
revolution. He argued that certain general conditions had to be present in order for the 
foco to succeed as a catalyst for the revolution: a lack of legitimacy of the existing 
government; political and social tensions that cannot be resolved through existing 
mechanisms; and the perception that all legal means of redressing these grievances are 
closed to the population. 122 These conditions alone, however, did not ensure the success 
of the revolution. Rather, a successful revolution depended on the cohesion, training and 
commitment of the foco. Guevara specified that the foco should be comprised of around 
25-30 men unified under the authority of one leader. In order to rally the peasants to their 
cause, a substantial number of these men should be local peasants that understand the 
conditions and needs of the population in which they operate.123 As the foco succeeds in 
challenging the authority of the state and winning more and more of the population to its 
side, the small band then transforms itself into a rebel army that engages in large-scale 
battles against the government’s army, making the guerilla war a people’s war.124 Once 
the army is thoroughly demoralized and the war won, the conditions for revolution are 
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ripe. The leadership works with other groups and organizations to depose the government 
and then to create a communist state. 
 The theories and strategies of Guevara, as in the other cases presented in this 
chapter, were borne out of political, social and economic circumstances. Most Latin 
American countries of Guevara’s generation were hindered by weak central governments 
that could not provide services to its citizens outside the capital city. 125 Peasants were 
usually dependent on local hacendados, plantation owners, for their subsistence as well 
as for social and security services, making these landlords like semi-autonomous 
governments within the state.126  This system was most often beneficial to the central 
government and the hacendados but not to the peasants. The foco sought to challenge this 
system by not only agitating for land reforms, which was the central demand, but also by 
providing social services to the peasants including health care, education, and security 
from government and hacendado police forces.127 Latin American scholar Timothy 
Wickham-Crowley states: “A model for guerrillas was Ché Guevara, who carried a rifle 
in one hand and a medical kit in the other…”128 
Coupled with domestic injustices towards the peasantry, many Latin American 
countries were also affected by the interests of foreign countries, particularly the United 
States. In Guatemala, a teacher- led revolt in 1945 succeeded in overthrowing the existing 
dictatorship and creating a constitutionally governed democratic system. In the 1950s, 
increased efforts by the government, headed by Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, to implement 
land reforms and nationalize portions of the agricultural and transportation sector 
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threatened to undermine US investments in the country, particularly United Fruit.129 
These reforms coupled with Soviet aid to the country prompted the US to support a coup 
d’état against the Arbenz government in 1954, citing communist infiltration as the 
primary motive for action. 130 Guevara was in Guatemala at the time of the coup, helping 
resistance forces. It was this experience that prompted him to conclude that imperial 
interests, particularly from the US, need to be expelled from all of Latin America in order 
for a more just system to emerge. The means through which to do this was by organizing 
highly trained, devoted guerilla forces armed with Marxian ideology. 131 
In the late 1950s, Cuban peasants in the eastern part of the country also began to 
rebel under internationally backed injustices of the Batista regime. In 1956, after being 
expelled from Mexico, Fidel Castro and Guevara set up base in the Sierra Mastre 
mountains in eastern Cuba. In 1957, Castro and Guevara’s guerilla forces won their first 
victory in an ambush of the military barracks at La Plata. Through an alliance with the 
peasants of the region and the urban underground, Castro and Guevara succeeded in 
creating a people’s army that defeated the military in the country and the police force in 
the city. 132 In January 1959, in the face of mass uprisings throughout the country, Batista 
fled Cuba. Castro and Guevara then set about completing the revolution. The Castro 
regime seized control of Cuba’s sugar industry and established a monopoly over imports, 
exports and foreign financial transactions with the aim of ending its dependence on the 
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US market.133 Guevara became head of the National Bank and the Ministry of 
Industry. 134  By 1961, Cuba and the United States had cut all diplomatic ties. 
Cuba and other Latin American Marxist guerilla movements received 
encouragement from China and the Soviet Union, particularly after the Cuban revolution.  
As early as 1949, China began reaching out to Latin American countries, citing an 
affinity with their anti- imperialist struggles against the US.135 In 1959, Chou En-Lai 
asserted: “The Latin American peoples are standing in the forefront of [the] struggle 
against United States imperialism.”136 During the 1960s, they encouraged armed struggle 
against domestic and international capitalism with the hope of creating a regional 
communist revolution. 137 In particular, they advocated the theories and examples of Mao: 
“The road taken by the Chinese people in seizing political power by force of arms under 
Chairman Mao’s leadership is of general and practical significance for Latin America, 
and is the only correct road of revolution for the Latin American people…”138 
The Soviet Union also took interest in Latin America’s rebellions in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Prior to the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, Beijing and Moscow worked 
together to encourage potential communist revolutionaries in Latin America, including 
cooperative training camps.139 After the Sino-Soviet split, Moscow began to argue for 
multiple paths to realizing the communist revolution in Latin America, including by both 
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violent and peaceful means. This was in direct contradiction to China’s position that the 
only correct path was through Mao’s model of armed rebellion. Both China and the 
Soviet Union competed over influence with communist parties in Latin America, in many 
cases prompting schisms within Marxist movements, such as in Brazil and Paraguay. 140 
In most cases, however, the Soviet Union succeeded in asserting its influences over the 
communists in Latin America. Cuba, in particular, became a stronghold of Soviet 
influence in the region, particularly after 1964, when Castro called for an end to China’s 
spread of anti-Soviet propaganda in Cuba.141  
In addition to Soviet and Chinese efforts to export their particular brand of the 
communist revolution to Latin America, Guevara also made an effort to spread the 
theories and strategies of the foco throughout the developing world. In the early and mid-
1960s, Guevara is believed to have traveled throughout Eastern Europe, the Middle East, 
Africa and Southeast Asia offering encouragement and advice to guerilla movements in 
these regions.142 In 1966, Guevara and a small band of Cuban guerillas attempted to spark 
a revolution in southeastern Bolivia. Guevara’s forces, however, were not welcomed by 
the peasants in the region, who largely supported Bolivia’s popularly elected President 
René Barrientos.143  Guevara failed to convince the peasants to support their 
revolutionary efforts, ultimately isolating the movement and leading to his capture and 
execution in October of 1968.  
Did the introduction of Marxism improve the lives of the masses and bring about 
a communist utopia in Latin America? Cuba was the only country that succeeded in 
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transforming a guerilla insurgency into a revolution that deposed the existing regime and 
set about transforming the economic and social makeup of the country. Social Scientist 
Susan Eckstein argues that, overall, post-revolutionary Cuba improved equitable 
distribution of income and land, and increased the populations’ access to healthcare, 
nutrition and education. These improvements, however, came at the cost of continued 
dependence on foreign trade and investment, particularly from the Soviet Union. 144 When 
the Soviet Union disbanded in 1991, Cuba lost a critical source of financial support, 
plunging the country into an economic crisis.145 This, in turn, has led to social unrest, 
most notably riots in Havana in 1994.146 
However, despite post- revolutionary improvements in Cuba’s distribution of 
wealth and social services, many of its citizens have risked everything to flee its borders, 
usually to the United States. Cuba has experienced three enormous waves of 
emigration—in 1965, 1980, and 1994—in addition to a steady stream of émigrés since 
the revolution. 147 These waves of refugees suggest that there are substantial numbers in 
the country who do not feel their lives improved by the Marxist revolution. 
It is also important to note that other Latin American countries have gone through 
non-Marxian revolutions that have succeeded in implementing social, economic and 
political reforms. Bolivia, as previously mentioned, underwent a peasant-led guerilla 
revolt in 1952 that successfully overthrew the existing regime and prompted land 
redistribution in the country. However, Bolivia continued to maintain private property 
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and did not attempt to rapidly industrialize the country or implement any of the other 
stages associated with communism.148 Likewise, Mexico underwent similar changes but, 
like Bolivia, these changes were not accompanied by the Marxist program for realizing 
communism. 
Despite its lack of successes, however, Marxist inspired insurgencies have 
persis ted in Latin America. Guatemala underwent a Marxist inspired insurgency 
beginning in 1960. The insurgency resulted in one of the worst cases of government-
sponsored mass killings in the 20th century, ultimately ending through a process of 
increased democratic practices and an Oslo-sponsored peace agreement between the 
government and the rebels, signed in 1996.149  Columbia has had Marxist-based guerilla 
groups, specifically the ELN, which has continued to agitate for the end of imperialism in 
the country and the creation of a Marxist regime, with little success on either front.150 In 
addition, Nicaragua underwent a Marxist-inspired insurgency against the Samosa-led 
government beginning in 1961, which ultimately resulted in the pro-Marxists Sandinista 
National Liberation Front (FSLN) taking control of the government in 1979. After a 
decade of bloody civil war and economic deterioration in which “Nicaragua’s per capita 
income had fallen by 33.5% from its 1980 level, its infrastructure was in taters, and its 
modest tourism industry had all but collapsed,” the Sandinistas were defeated in popular 
elections held in 1990.151 Therefore, these movements may have succeeded in pressuring 
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for reforms and regime change, but they have not realized a revolution and the 
implementation of a communist system.     
Thus, the communist dream has not fared much better in Latin America than it 
has in China or the Soviet Union. Castro and Guevara succeeded in realizing a revolution 
in Cuba, which did achieve some of communism’s greater goals, specifically more 
equitable distribution of land and social resources. However, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Cuba has sunk into an economic and social crisis punctuated by increased 
waves of migrants to the US. Likewise, other countries that had Marxist- inspired 
insurgents may have contributed to political and economic changes, but none of these 
insurgencies have succeeded in fomenting a communist revolution. Finally, Cuba, like 
the Soviet Union and China, has had to resort to violence and intimidation in order to 
compel its citizens to comply with the communist agenda, prompting thousands to flee. 
Cuba, therefore, is far away from the communist dream.  
Is Marxism a Religion? 
 
In light of the previous discussion on the principles of Marxist thought and its 
application in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba; has Marxism functioned as a religion? 
Marxism is not typically thought of as a religion, although religious studies scholar 
Ninian Smart does include it in his survey of world religions.152 Considering Marxism as 
a religion is problematic for a number of reasons. First, Marx’s writings are saturated 
with claims that religion is one of the tools used by the bourgeoisie to keep the masses 
pinned down and, therefore, its abolition is necessary in order to realize a communist 
                                                 
152 Ninan Smart, The World’s Religions: Old Traditions and Modern Transformations, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 24-25. Smart also considers nationalism as another ideological 
force similar to religion, pp. 21-22 
 460 
 
 
system. Describing Marxism as a religion, therefore, would be accusing its principles and 
programs of the very ills it desires to overthrow.  
Second, in practice, Marxist ideas and strategies have often worked alongside 
religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. For example, Liberation Theology—a 
revolutionary interpretation of Christian Gospels that influenced popular resistance to 
governments in Latin America—has fused together Christian and Marxist ideals.153 
Likewise, Sinhalese Buddhists drew from Marxist arguments to help organize labor 
unions in Sri Lanka in the 1920s and 1930s.154 Therefore, Marxism in practice has not 
always been distinct from religions. 
However, in theory, Marxism contains components that are similar to the six 
elements used to define religion in this dissertation: beliefs, texts, leaders, a community 
of practitioners, identity, and material resources. Marxism has a core set of beliefs, most 
notably the belief in the corruptive nature of industrial capitalism led by the bourgeoisie 
and the need for a proletariat- led revolution that will set the stage for a new economic, 
social and political order, which will ultimately save the world. Marxism also has texts, 
particularly those written by Marx and Engels, but also later Marxist scholars such as 
Lenin, Mao, and Ché Guevara, as this chapter has outlined. Furthermore, key leaders 
have defined Marxism such as Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro, and Guevara. In countries 
where Marxist governments have assumed authority, they also have had considerable 
material resources with which to defend their regimes and spread Marxism abroad. This 
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is particularly true of the Soviet Union and China, but also true of Cuba after the 1959 
revolution. 
In addition, Marxism has had a community of practitioners, but the number of 
“true believers” in Marxism is debatable. In the 19th and 20th centuries, Marxism attracted 
intellectuals from all over the world who self- identified as Marxists, and made efforts to 
spread the tenets of Marxism around the globe. After the 1917 Revolution in Russia, 
Moscow became an intellectual center for Marxism. However, unlike other religions, 
Marxism never attained broad-based community of practitioners from the masses. This 
undoubtedly has impacted its success and survival as a global movement aimed at saving 
the world. 
Furthermore, Marxism has served as a form of governmental and state identity but 
less so with members of society. The Soviet Union identified itself as Marxist as have 
China and Cuba. However, Marxism did not succeed in supplanting regional, ethnic, 
linguistic and religious forms of identity in these countries. The Soviet Union never 
achieved a uniform “Soviet” identity but, rather, throughout its seventy-odd years of 
existence continued to be fraught with ethnic, regional, linguistic, and religious 
difference. These different forms of identity led to the Soviet Union’s fractionalization at 
the end of the 1980s and in certain republics—most notably in Russia and Georgia and 
between Armenian and Azerbaijan—this fractionalization erupted into violence. Cuba 
has also had difficulty shedding its pre-revolution identity, particularly its popular 
devotion to Roman Catholicism. In 1998, Pope John Paul II visited Cuba and presided 
over mass for tens-of-thousands of enthusiastic Cubans including Castro, who sat in the 
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front row. 155 Clearly Catholicism remains a salient aspect of Cuban identity in post-
revolutionary society.    
In addition to its definitional qualities, Marxism adheres to the function of 
religion proposed in this dissertation. Specifically, the communist revolution corresponds 
to the concept of “earthy salvation.” Marxism, in theory, has as its ultimate goal the 
salvation of the earth and humanity in the here-and-now.  For Marx, revolution was only 
a means to greater ends—the sweeping away of the former corrupt economic, political 
and social system in order to bring about a more just order that would benefit and redeem 
the masses. In practice, however, the salvific aims of Marxism have hardly been realized. 
It is truly ironic that, in many cases, Marxist inspired revolutions have led to the deaths of 
millions, as was the case in the Soviet Union, China and Guatemala. This is a far cry 
from earthly salvation. 
Marxism, therefore, while possessing many of the trappings of religion in theory 
and perhaps holding the potential of becoming a religion, is lacking in practice one of 
religion’s most important components: a broad-based community of practitioner that 
identify themselves with its beliefs and goals. Fur thermore, the failure of Marxist leaders 
to convert the masses to it social, economic and political agenda and to implement its 
vision of the communist state prompted the use of terror, violence, mass murder and other 
forms of intimidation to force mass compliance. In the end, therefore, the application of 
the Marxist program for a better world was a far cry from the communist utopia in which 
all people could live free of capitalist exploitations and enjoy the fruits of their labor. 
                                                 
155 “Pope Advocates Peace, Freedom in Final Mass,” CNN Online, January 25,1998, www.cnn.com, 
downloaded on 6/16/03 
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Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has argued that Marxism is not merely a program for realizing a 
revolution aimed at drastic social, political and economic changes, but that it also 
includes a salvific element, specifically the desire to improve the lives of the world’s 
masses enslaved by the ills of an advanced, industrialized capitalist system. Therefore, 
the “orthodoxy” of specific Marxist revolutions should be judged both by the 
interpretation and application of Marx’s program for revolution and by the success of 
these revolutions in improving the lives of masses that they claimed to liberate.  
 Each of the three cases presented—the Russian Revolution of 1917, the 
Communist Revolution of 1949, and the Cuban Revolution of 1959—have interpreted 
Marx’s program for the revolution to fit specific circumstances. Lenin argued that the 
objective, materialist phases of history outlined by Marx could be accelerated—via a 
party of trained and devoted Marxists—to create the necessary conditions for the 
revolution in a primarily agrarian society. Mao built on Lenin’s theory to argue that 
human will and determination could also accelerate the necessary conditions for a 
revolution in a peasant-based society. And Guevara posited that the foco—a small cadre 
of highly trained, disciplined guerilla Marxis ts—could act as the vanguard of the 
revolution, winning peasants over to the Marxist cause. 
 In all three cases, these leaders succeeded in realizing a revolution followed by 
drastic social, economic and political changes. However, in none of these cases did 
revolution lead to the lasting improvement of the masses’ lives. In Russia, the early 
Bolshevik government attempted to create reforms that would free the masses from the 
shackles of the previous system, including land reforms and social programs aimed at 
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liberating women and increasing literacy. However, with the onset of civil war, the Party 
instituted the Red Terror, slaughtering thousands of believed resisters to the communist 
agenda. The end result was a one party system that used death and intimidation to keep 
the masses in tow.  In China, Mao’s successful capture of the government following the 
Chinese civil war led to aggressive campaigns aimed at realizing the communist dream. 
This included the Great Leap Forward—designed to rapidly develop China’s heavy 
industry—and the Cultural Revolution, aimed at cleansing the country of bourgeois 
cultural elements. Both of these programs resulted in the suffering and deaths of millions 
in China. 
Initially, Cuba may have had the greatest success in realizing the communist 
dream, particularly through its achievements in creating a more even distribution of 
wealth and land among the masses and through its improved programs in healthcare, 
education and nutrition. However, its inability to create a self-reliant economy forced it to 
become dependent on the Soviet Union for trade and finance. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Cuba’s economic gains quickly dwindled. Despite its successes, however, 
Cuba has experienced chronic emigration, suggesting that its achievements have not 
inspired many within its borders to stay and help realize the communist dream.  
Lastly, Marxism contains many elements that make it similar to religion, 
particularly beliefs, texts, leaders and material assets. However, Marxism in practice has 
lacked key components vital to the application of its beliefs and goals: a broad-based 
community of practitioners who identify themselves with the beliefs and goals of the 
system. Furthermore, Marxism’s ultimate goals correspond with the notion of “earthly 
salvation” presented in this dissertation; it seeks to end the misery of the masses and 
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create a more just and equitable economic and social system. However, Marxism in 
practice has been a far cry from these goals. Rather, leaders who self- identified as 
Marxists have been responsible for the death and suffering of millions. 
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Chapter 9 
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications  
on the Not-So-Peaceful Disposition of the World’s Major Religions  
 
 
 The previous six case studies have shown that all of the world’s major religions 
have motivated, engaged in, or condoned violent conflict at some point in history. This 
includes Islam, the religion perhaps most strongly associated with religious violence, but 
also Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism. No religion, therefore, has a clean 
slate when considering its contributions to violent conflict and war. This chapter begins 
by offering some general conclusions on religious violence and war. It then summarizes 
findings on the three variables considered in this dissertation as causes of religious wars: 
threat perception; the amount of material, social and technological resources; and the 
relationship between religious and political leaders. Lastly, this chapter offers policy 
implications for these findings and focuses, in particular, on US foreign policy.  
General Observations on Religious Violence and War 
 
 This dissertation has argued, first, that all the world’s major religions have gone 
through periods of violence as a means of attaining specific goals.  This is true for Islam, 
the religion that most people associate with religious violence today. Bellicose 
interpretations of Islam have played a role in battles over Jerusalem and Ayodhya, bids to 
defend the dar al Islam, and Iran’s Islamic Revolution. However, other religions have 
perpetrated religious violence with the same goals in mind. Jews and Christians have also 
fought for possession of Jerusalem and Hindus have used violence to gain control of 
Ayodhya. Buddhists in Sri Lanka have justified the use of force to preserve the 
dammadipa, a holy Buddhist nation divinely mandated to protect and propagate the 
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teachings of the Buddha. And, likewise, in addition to Islam’s role in the Iranian 
Revolution, other ideologies have fomented revolutions—including Marxism and 
Liberalism—calling for the overthrow of political and social institutions with the aim of 
creating a new system. Therefore, Islam is not unique in its use of force to achieve 
saliently religious goals.  
Second, this dissertation has argued that none of these religions has been 
consistently violent; rather, all have gone through periods of bellicosity and periods of 
peace. This suggests that something within religion changes, making it violent at some 
points and places but not others. To answer this puzzle, this dissertation has argued that 
religious violence is the result of interpretations of a given faith, which are the product of 
individuals grounded in specific circumstances. Therefore, religious beliefs, doctrines, 
scriptures and rituals are not the cause of violence per se, but rather specifically 
interpretations, which vary according to individuals, time, and place. Thus, in order to 
understand religious violence, it is important to look at bellicose interpretations of the 
faith and the conditions that are fueling these interpretations. The three specific 
conditions tested in this dissertation—threat perception; the prevalence of material, social 
and technological resources; and the relationship between political and religious 
leaders—will be discussed further below. 
 In the cases provided in this dissertation, bellicose interpretations of religions 
have accompanied waves of religious violence. For example, 19th century Muslim 
violence against Hindus occurred in the milieu of calls for jihad to defend Islam in South 
Asia, perpetrated by Muslim leaders such as Saiyid Ahmad of Bareilly. Likewise, more 
recent Hindu violence against Muslim sites in Ayodhya followed the rise of bellicose 
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interpretations of Hinduism, most notably the works of K.B. Hedgewar and the RSS, 
which stresses physical strength, discipline and power in Hindu national identity. This is 
also true of Buddhist violence in Sri Lanka, which can be traced back to the 
interpretations of Dharmapala and Walpola Rahula. The same pattern is visible in Jewish 
militancy, particularly after the 1967 “Six-Day” war in which the organization Gush 
Emunim argued that seizing the West Bank and Gaza Strip would hasten the coming of 
the messiah. Likewise, Christian calls to liberate Jerusalem from “heathen” hands during 
the crusades was inspired by the interpretations of clerics and lay religious leaders, who 
argued that it was a Christian duty to take back the Tomb of Christ.  
Third, this dissertation has argued that bellicose interpretations of the faith by 
themselves are not enough to cause religious violence. Rather, it is necessary for these 
interpretations to be accepted as true by practitioners. In other words, the ideas of 
religious leaders require followers in order for these interpretations to matter. Bellicose 
interpretations and their acceptance by practitioners are a visible cause of violence in all 
the cases described in this dissertation. Religious battles over sacred space in Ayodhya 
and Jerusalem involve not only religious leaders but also practitioners willing to take up 
arms in defense of these religious sites. Likewise, religious violence to defend holy 
nations in Islam and Sri Lanka has occurred amid a religiously motivated call to arms and 
an answer from the masses, which has created the necessary peoplepower for these 
violent campaigns. This is particularly important when considering the call to arms by 
Bin Laden; it is not only that he has produced a bellicose interpretation of Islam but, 
rather, that this interpretation has resonated with Muslims across the ummah, the world 
wide community. 
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Fourth, these observations also confirm another important dimension of religion; 
while one can speak of religion in theory, in practice religions do not exist as a monolith.  
In other words, one can speak of a religion such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Judaism in 
theory, but the manifestation of religion in practice is never singular. All the religions 
discussed in this dissertation have gone through major changes and divisions in their 
histories. Second-Temple era Judaism looks very different from the types of Judaism that 
are practiced today. Likewise, Ashkenazi Jews have different customs from Sephardi 
Jews, which is the result of the regions and cultures in which these branches of the faith 
developed and the different interpretations these contexts have produced. This is equally 
true for Islam, which contains two major branches—Sunni and Shia Islam—in addition to 
different forms of Shari’a law. Likewise, the same holds true for Hinduism, Christianity, 
and Buddhism. Therefore, while Islam, Christianity or Buddhism may be violent at one 
point in time, it does not mean that this incident of violence represents the religion as a 
whole.  
Fifth, this dissertation has demonstrated that religious violence and war, in 
general, is not a new phenomenon. There are incidents of religious violence that reaches 
back several millennia. This observation is not new or perhaps even controversial; 
however, by looking back in time and across space, this dissertation has shown, first, that 
religious violence and peace varies across time and, second, religions that may not 
currently be involved in religious wars, such as Christianity, have been belligerent in the 
past. Moreover, this dissertation has elucidated the similarities and differences between 
past and current religious wars.  Therefore, as will be further discussed, the argument that 
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religious “fundamentalism” and its violent offshoots are uniquely modern is not 
supported by the findings of this research. 
Lastly, this dissertation has argued that religious wars are defined and 
differentiated from other wars by their end goals. Specifically, this dissertation has 
identified three saliently religious end goals: the defense of holy nations, battles over 
sacred space, and the desire to foment religious revolutions with the goal of creating a 
religious government. Whiles these goals do not cover the aims of all religious wars, they 
touch on history’s most bloody religious conflicts. This includes Christian Crusades, 
Muslim Jihads, and Jewish battles over Jerusalem; one cause of Hindu and Muslim riots 
in South Asia; the civil wars in Sri Lanka; the current rise of global jihads, and the 
Iranian Revolution. Therefore, understanding the conditions under which groups choose 
violence as a means of attaining these goals is important for moving towards possible 
ways in which to mitigate major religious wars.  
The Conditions That Fuel Religious Wars  
 
This dissertation has tested three variables as potential causes of religious wars: 
threat perception, the amount of resources available to a given group, and the relationship 
between religious and political leaders. These variables have been tested against the case 
studies for their strength in explaining the conditions under which religious wars arise.  
Overall, this research has found that social resources, particularly charismatic leaders and 
well-structured organizations, are present in all of the cases of religious violence. 
However, no one variable adequately explains the conditions under which religious wars 
arise and, moreover, each of the three types of religious wars—defense of holy nations, 
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battles over sacred space, and religious revolutions—arise under different combinations 
of these variables, which will be discussed below. 
Threat perception 
 Three predictions were posited in this dissertation on the role of threat perception 
as a cause of religious wars. First, if sacred sites are threatened, then religious groups will 
use force to defend these sites. Second, if the status of religious authorities is challenged, 
then they will use force to defend their status.  And third, if co-religionists are threatened, 
then religious groups will use force to defend their fellow religionists.  
 The case studies reveal that, while threat is present in all incidents of religious 
violence described, it is overdetermined as a cause of religious wars. In other words, 
generally speaking, it is a necessary but not sufficient cause of religious wars. Therefore, 
other variables in combination with threat perception determine the rise of religious wars. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that the second prediction—if the status of 
religious leaders is threatened then they will use force to defend that order—does not 
adequately explain the conditions under which religious leaders and their constituents 
engage in religiously motivated bellicosity. Rather, religious violence, particularly in 
defense of holy nations, occurs under threats to both religious leaders and wider society. 
Therefore, a new hypothesis is proposed: If the structure and norms of society are 
radically threatened, then religious groups will use force to defend that order. As the 
discussion will show, this hypothesis better explains the nature of threat that produces a 
religious reaction.  
Threat is chronically present in nearly all the cases described. For example, in 
battles over sacred space, Jews, Christians and Muslims have had to share Jerusalem 
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since the seventh century CE. Rarely have all three religious groups shared the space 
equally; instead, one group has typically governed over the city, presenting the possibility 
of expulsion for the other religious groups. Therefore, the threat of restricting access to 
Jerusalem is a fear that all three groups have experienced. Despite this, attempts to 
cleanse Jerusalem of religious groups have occurred infrequently. This same pattern is 
visible in religious dynamics in Ayodhya. Therefore threat perception alone does not 
explain the rise of religious wars to defend sacred space. 
 Likewise, threat perception alone does not explain the timing of religious 
revolutions. Iranian citizens had lived for over fifty years under the oppression of the 
Pahlevi dynasty. Both Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza introduced policies that 
threatened religious institutions and religious norms in society. However, it was only 
after a variety of organizations were formed in Iran and united under the leadership of the 
Ayatallah Khomeini in 1978 that Iranians became emboldened to challenge the 
government and overthrow the Shah, creating an Islamic republic in its place. Threat 
alone, therefore, does not explain the timing of this uprising.   
However, the case studies reveal that threat perception is a salient cause of 
religious wars in defense of holy nations. For example, Buddhist Sinhalese in Sri Lanka 
existed peacefully with their non-Buddhist neighbors for centuries. This peaceful 
dynamic was shattered, however, with the advent of British colonialism to the island in 
the 19th century. The British, unlike their Portuguese and Dutch predecessors, introduced 
radical changes to the island including land reforms, Christian missionary- led mass 
education, and a bureaucratic government. These changes undermined the social and 
political order of Sinhalese society—which was based on Theravada Buddhism—
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prompting calls by religious and secular leaders for Sinhalese to reconnect with the 
Buddhist identities and distinguish themselves not only from the British but also from 
their other non-Sinhalese Buddhist neighbors.  
Likewise, the two waves of jihad outlined in this dissertation correspond to 
radical changes introduced to society via colonialism and globalization.  The Muslim 
world underwent a rash of calls for jihad beginning in the 19th century following the 
incursion of western powers into South Asia, East Asia, and Africa. These calls to holy 
war were issued not only against Islam’s external enemies but also to purify the faith 
from within in order to defend the holy nation of Islam against these external threats. 
Again, beginning in the 1970s, the call for jihad was reissued, this time initially in the 
Middle East following the creation of the state of Israel and the defeat of its neighbors in 
the 1967 and 1973 wars. Jihad movements spread throughout the Muslim world as a 
result of the Soviet-Afghan war and the creation of trans-national jihad movements, most 
notably Al Qaeda. These movements claim to be reacting against specific threats, most 
notably US support of the state of Israel, its military presence in Saudi Arabia, sanctions 
against Iraq, and the spread of western culture and values in Muslim society. 
Thus the source of threat against holy nation has not necessarily been religious or 
even military in nature nor has it been directed merely at religious authority; rather, it has 
involved challenges to the structure of society, politics and group identity. Colonialism 
did introduce western Christianity to the lands that colonists occupied and converted 
people to the faith. However, these new converts were rarely a source of religious wars; 
rather, colonialism introduced more radical changes to society than converts. In the case 
of Sri Lanka, Christian missionary- led schools were a particularly strong source of threat, 
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especially to the Buddhist clerisy, which were the traditional educators in Sinhalese 
society. However, the threats posed by colonialism also included radical changes in the 
structure of government and the order of society. For example, in 1815, the British 
disbanded the Sinhalese monarchy and, in its place, began to construct a bureaucratic 
government. Likewise, increased access to education created the foundations of a middle 
class that were neither peasants nor merchants. This new class demanded employment 
that the traditional Sinhalese socio-economic structure could not provide, creating 
competition between the educated class for limited jobs. Finally, the presence of 
colonialism prompted a search for identity in Sri Lanka that drove both the Sinhalese and 
Tamils to differentiate themselves from their occupiers and, in so doing, differentiate 
themselves from one another in new ways. For the Sinhalese, religion played a salient 
role in that process. 
Similarly, the call for jihad to defend the dar al-Islam has not been in reaction to a 
religious threat. This is particularly true with the current wave of jihads in which Al 
Qaeda has called for a global war against the West, particularly the US, for its foreign 
policy decisions. Al Qaeda has perceived US foreign policy as threatening not only to 
holy sites in Islam—most notably the holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem—but 
also to the dar al Islam, the territory and people deemed central to the faith. Moreover, Al 
Qaeda has reacted both to the perceived threats posed by US foreign policy and to the 
spread of western culture and values into the dar al Islam, a threat they believe to be 
undermining the health of their holy nation. In addition, the call for jihad has not only 
been raised against foreign threats but also threats from within the dar al Islam. 
Specifically, many militant Muslim groups have named secular governments in the 
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Muslim world as a threat to the health of the dar al Islam and, therefore, a legitimate 
target of force. This is true with militant groups in Egypt, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, 
Indonesia, and Pakistan. These observations have important policy implications, which 
will be discussed below.  
Thus, threat perception is a necessary but not sufficient cause of religious wars. 
Threat perception is particularly important for understanding the timing of wars to defend 
holy nations, particularly threats to the structure and norms of society. 
Material, social and technological resources 
 One empirical prediction was proposed in this dissertation on the role of resources 
as a cause of religious wars: the greater the resources—material, social and 
technological—the more likely the religious group is to use force to attain their goals. 
Alongside this prediction, this dissertation has asked if one of these resources is more 
critical for determining the conditions under which religious wars and violence arise or 
not.  
The case studies reveal that, while all three types of resources are important 
conditions for religious wars, social resources are the most important, and strong 
leadership and organizations in particular. Nearly all of the incidents of religious violence 
within and across the case studies presented in this dissertation contain important leaders 
that are both charismatic and highly educated. Not all of these religious leaders have been 
trained as clerics; in fact one of the growing trends with more recent religious bellicosity 
is that leaders have come from outside the trained clerisy. For example, K.B Hedgewar, 
who was educated as a medical doctor, produced militant interpretations Hindu 
“culture”—calling broadly on religious symbols and rituals—which formed the basis for 
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the RSS in India. Likewise, the Sinhalese leader Dharmapala was not part of the Buddhist 
clerisy, but drew from their texts in order to create a list of practices and customs that all 
Sinhalese Buddhists should follow in order to strengthen society. Similarly, more recent 
bellicose interpretations of Islam have come from leaders educated outside the clerisy. 
Bin Laden received training in business administration, Dr. Abdul Rantisi of Hamas was 
trained in medicine, and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri—the second in command in Al Qaeda, 
was also trained as doctor.  
Evidence from the case studies further reveals that social resources are the most 
important variable for causing religious revolutions. The Iranian Revolution occurred 
under the leadership of the Ayatallah Khomeini, a highly respected religious cleric. 
Moreover, Khomeini succeeded in uniting different groups, movements and 
organizations both in Iran and the Iranian diaspora with the common goal of deposing the 
Shah. This included bringing together trade unions, student organizations, civic groups, 
the clerisy, the military, merchants and peasants to engage in civil disobedience against 
the state. Khomeini did not create these different organizations; rather, they developed 
independently with their own leaders and goals. However, Khomeini’s leadership was 
able to bring these groups and their various members together to mobilize the masses 
against the state. It is worth noting that the Iranian Revolution occurred despite the fact 
that the masses lacked material assets relative to the state such as finances and weapons. 
Instead, the masses defeated the Shah through the sheer numbers of participants in their 
demonstrations—ranging in the millions—that succeeded in bringing the government to 
its knees. This mass mobilization was the product of leadership and organization.  
Therefore, the timing and success of the Iranian Revolution can be explained by the 
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strong leadership of Khomeini and his success in uniting preexisting organizations under 
the common goal of deposing the Shah. 
Social and material resources are also important for battles over sacred spaces. 
Effective organizations, in particular, have been an important asset for groups wishing to 
challenge the status quo. The 1949 and 1992 Hindu attempts to claim the Babri Mosque 
followed the creation of Hindu nationalist organizations, particularly the RSS but also the 
VHP and the BJP in the latter case. These organizations mobilized Hindus throughout the 
country in a series of yatras—religious processions—with the call to liberate Ram’s 
birthplace from Muslim hands. These mobilization efforts ultimately resulted in the 
destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992 at the hands of an estimated 300,000 Hindu 
militants.  In contrast, the Muslim attempt to expel Hindus from Ayodhya in the 1850s 
ultimately failed due to its lack of organization relative to its opponents, specifically 
British and local authorities.  
It is also worth noting that the overwhelming failure of the Christian Crusades to 
seize and keep areas in the Holy Land was largely the result of poor leadership and 
organization. The First Crusade succeeded in capturing Edessa, Antioch, Nicea, and 
Jerusalem, despite the troops’ lack of strong leadership, organization, and material 
resources; their success was aided by the element of surprise and the weakened military 
strength of Muslim dynasties in the region. However, subsequent attempts to gain greater 
territory and defend captured land suffered from continued lack of leadership and 
organization. The absence of these resources, particularly as the Muslim dynasties in the 
region joined forces under the command of Saladin, ultimately led to the collapse of the 
western Christian presence in the Holy Land. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the current wave of jihads has benefited 
particularly from all three types of resources.  As previously argued, threat perception 
best explains the timing of religious wars to defend holy nations. However, the 
effectiveness of these calls to holy war is dependent on assets. The current wave of jihads 
has benefited from material, social and technological resources. Material resources 
include money from various sources such as drug trafficking, Islamic charities, states, 
and individuals; “safe havens” from various states including Afghanistan, Sudan, 
Pakistan, the UK and the US; in addition to hospitals and clinics, schools, and mosques 
around the globe. Social resources have also aided the rise of global jihads including 
educated and charismatic leaders, as previously mentioned, in addition to a host of 
organizations such as charities, youth groups, banks, and groups committed to recruiting 
and training fighters. Lastly, the current wave of jihad has managed to link together 
different movements from around the globe through its use of transportation and 
communications technologies, most notably the internet and email, but also through 
electronic bank transfers, cell phones, faxes, and via airplanes, which have allowed 
members of different movements to congregate quickly and easily. 
Thus resources, particularly strong leaders and well-structured organizations are a 
salient cause of religious wars. Technical and material resources increase the scope and 
intensity of groups’ bellicose aims.    
Religious and political leaders 
 One prediction was generated on the role of the relationship between religious and 
political leaders as a cause of religious wars: If religious and political leaders’ authorities 
are intertwined, then the greater the chances that they can use each other’s resources to 
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justify and call for war, including both “religious wars,” wars with saliently religious 
goals, and “wars with religion,” wars that use religious rhetoric and symbols for secular 
goals. Conversely, if religious and political leaders’ authorities are separated, then the 
lesser the chances that they can use each other’s resources to justify and call for war. In 
other words, this variable operates along a continuum where, on the one extreme is the 
fusion of religious and political authority with the prediction of more wars, and on the 
other extreme is the separation of religious and political authority with fewer wars.    
 The case studies reveal that this prediction only holds as an explanation for 
religious wars under certain conditions. Therefore, two new hypotheses are proposed that 
specify these conditions: First, if religious and political authority can offer a quid pro quo 
to further specific goals, then the greater the chances that they will form an alliance that 
could result in religious violence. And second, if the state is a source of threat for 
religious groups and their goals, then the greater the chances the state will become a 
target of religious violence. 
 The case studies demonstrate that the presence of religious leaders within the 
political sphere, ipso facto, does not produce religious violence. Religiously-based 
monarchies have existed for millennia but religious violence has only occurred 
sporadically within this time frame. Likewise, beginning in the 20th century, religious 
political parties have existed in several countries such as Israel, Jordan, India, and Sri 
Lanka but only with inconsistent incidents of religious violence. Therefore, the 
intertwining of religious and political authority, by itself, does not explain the timing of 
religious violence.   
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The rise of religious violence over sacred space in Ayodhya and Jerusalem reveals 
a condition under which the intertwining of religious and political leaders can produce 
religious violence. As argued in the previous section, the creation of effective religious 
organizations is important for mobilizing masses to achieve specific goals. This is visible 
in the creation of the RSS and VHP in India, and various Jewish militant groups in Israel 
including Gush Emunim and Kach, all of which have been instrumental in bids to capture 
sacred space.  
However, religious violence has occurred in both of these countries only after 
these organizations have formed conditional alliances with certain political parties. In 
India, the RSS encouraged its ranks to vote for Rajiv Gandhi and the Congress Party in 
the 1984 elections after Congress’ claims to support RSS goals, particularly concerning 
the status of Ayodhya. When the Congress Party failed to produce visible changes, the 
RSS then backed the BJP in the 1991 elections, in which they won 119 seats in national 
elections—nearly 20% of the overall vote—in addition to winning elections in four 
states. It was under BJP rule that Hindu nationalists destroyed the Babri Mosque.    
Similarly, the right-wing Likud Party joined forces with secular and religious 
Jewish militants to defeat the Labor Party in Israel’s 1977 elections. Once in power, 
Likud began an aggressive program of seizing land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and 
building settlements, which the government deemed legal despite international 
condemnation of the program. The confiscation of all land in the occupied territories was 
the goal of secular and religious Jewish militants. In addition, Gush Emunim and Kach 
made several attempts to blow up Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, all of which were 
thwarted. Therefore, both Hindu and Jewish militants had preexisting designs on sacred 
 482 
 
 
land and sites. It was an alliance with political parties, in exchange for voter support, that 
aided the implementation of these plans.   
In addition, it is important to note that in both of these case studies, the 
relationship between religious groups and political leaders has been fraught with tensions. 
Following the destruction of the Barbur Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, the BJP 
governments were dismissed in the four states in which they ruled in addition to being 
censured at the federal level. Militant Hindu groups were also outlawed, including the 
RSS. Likewise, the Likud party was forced to reign in Jewish militants, particularly after 
failed attempts to destroy Muslim sites in Jerusalem. Moreover, Kach was banned from 
elections in Israel after deemed racist by Israel’s supreme court. These events 
demonstrate, therefore, that the relationship between political leaders and religious 
groups has limits. 
Violence in defense of holy nations further reveals conditions under which 
dynamics between religious and political leaders lead to bellicose ends. As argued in the 
previous section, threat perception is a salient cause of religious wars for holy nations; 
however, the case studies further reveals that the source of threat matters for determining 
the relationship between political and religious authorities. In cases where the threat 
comes from outside of the holy nation, then religious groups and political leaders are 
likely to work together to counter this threat. This is visible in Sri Lanka, where Buddhist 
monks and politicians worked together to implement policies that they believed would 
preserve the damadipa, the Buddhist nation of the Sinhalese, and to undermine the non-
Buddhists, non-Sinhalese on the island. This dynamic is also visible in the current wave 
of jihads in which Muslims from across the ummah have joined forces to repel what it 
 483 
 
 
perceives as an imminent threat posed by US foreign policy and the export of western 
culture and values abroad, as previously mentioned. 
However, another dynamic is also visible in both Sri Lanka and battles to defend 
the dar al Islam. Alongside the call to violence to expel external threats, both holy 
nations have also experienced religiously motivated violence against the state, naming 
the government as the source of threat. In Sri Lanka, the JVP—a militant Buddhist 
organization—launched attacks against the Sri Lankan government beginning in the 
1970s with the hope of fomenting a Buddhist revolution. This fratricidal conflict is 
blamed for the deaths of between 40,000 to 60,000 Sri Lankans. Similarly, militant 
Muslim groups have risen up in various countries and attacked their governments, which 
they believe to be corrupt and undermining the faith. This is true in Egypt, Palestine, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as previously mentioned.  
Lastly, the success of religious revolution results in the mixing of political and 
religious authorities; therefore, it is not a cause of religious revolutions. This is visible in 
the one successful religious revolution studied in this dissertation, Iran. In addition, it is 
also worth noting, however, that post-revolutionary Iran has engaged in religious 
violence in order to preserve the Islamic republic, particularly in its eight-year war 
against Iraq. Moreover, post-revolutionary Iran is named as a principle financer of 
Islamic terrorist groups attempting to overturn their governments and create further 
Islamic revolutions. Iran has been tied to the Lebanese Hizbollah, which is Twelver Shia 
like the state of Iran, and also to militant Sunni movements in Palestine, Egypt, and 
beyond. Therefore, Iran’s success in realizing a religious revolution followed by the 
creation of an Islamic republic, which has fused religious and political authority, has 
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resulted in its attempts to export the revolution through alleged finance, training and safe 
havens.    
The findings of the three variables as causes of religious wars and the new 
hypotheses are summarized below in Table 2.1. 
2.1 Variables Tested as Causes of Religious Wars  
Type Threat Resources Fusion of Authority 
Holy Nations 
External— 
§ colonialism, 
globalization 
Internal— 
§ Secular or 
corrupt state 
Social— 
§ Leaders and orgs. 
Material— 
§ Increases intensity 
Technological— 
§ Increases scope  
§ State works with 
to counter 
external threat 
§ State the target 
in internal threat 
Sacred Space 
General and 
constant—doesn’t 
explain timing 
Social— 
§ Organizations  
Material— 
§ Assets of the state  
Technological— 
§ Not salient 
Limited quid pro 
quo between 
political parties and 
religious groups  
Religious 
Revolutions 
General and 
constant—doesn’t 
explain timing 
Social— 
§ Charismatic Leaders 
and coordinated orgs. 
Material— 
§ Not salient 
Technological— 
§ Not salient 
Religious and 
political mixing the 
result of religious 
revolution, not the 
cause 
 
New Hypotheses 
4. Threat perception: 
a. If the structure and norms of society are radically threatened, then 
religious groups will use force to defend that order. 
 
5. Religious and political leaders: 
a. If religious and political leaders can offer a quid pro quo to further 
specific goals, then the great the chances that they will form an alliance 
that could result in religious violence.  
b. If the state is a source of threat for religious groups and their goals, then 
the greater the chances the state will become a target of religious violence. 
 
Policy Implications  
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 The findings outlined in the previous section have important implications for US 
foreign policy-making in relation to religious violence in general, and the current wave of 
terrorist threats to the US. These policy implications will be outlined according to 
findings from the three variables tested as causes of religious wars: threat perception, the 
prevalence of material, social and technological resources, and the relationship between 
governments and religion.  
Policy implications for threat perception 
 The previous section argued that, generally, threat perception is an 
overdetermined cause of religious wars; in other words, threat is chronically present in all 
the cases studied but religious violence and war has occurred only sporadically. This is 
particularly true of battles over sacred space and religious revolutions. In battles to 
defend religious nations, however, threat perception is a salient cause of religious wars. 
Therefore, this section will consider the policy implications that stem from particular 
threats that provoke religious wars in defense of holy nations. 
 The cases studies have revealed that two types of threats provoke holy nations to 
war: threats from sources external to the holy nation and threats that come from inside the 
nation, particularly leaders or governments believed to be threatening the faith. The 
former type of threat is of particular importance to US foreign policy making. The case 
studies reveal that external threats are not usually in the form of one religious group 
attacking another or even one state attacking another. Rather, external threats to holy 
nations have often come in the form of radical changes to the structure of society. This is 
most visible in the arrival of colonialism in South Asia, East Asia, and Africa. 
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 Colonialism introduced radical changes to the societies they occupied. This 
included major changes to the form of government, types of economic production, and 
access to education, as previously mentioned. For the most part, these changes appear to 
have been motivated by economic gain to the colonizer and not with the intention of 
undermining the traditional structure of society. However, these structural changes were 
based on western models of society, economics and governance and therefore contained 
pieces of western culture and values, including norms on efficiency, materialism, the 
purpose of government, and the status of individuals.   
In both Sri Lanka and most parts of the Muslim world, these radical changes 
sparked a religious reaction aimed at defending the pre-colonial structure of society. Both 
holy nations offered up new interpretations of their faith aimed at distinguishing 
themselves from their occupiers and, in so doing, other groups within society. For both 
nations, religion became the salient tool of exclusion and, moreover, religious texts and 
symbols—reinterpreted in light of this new threat—became the foundation for the call to 
violence as a means of defending the holy nation. In the case of Sri Lanka, this call to 
violence persisted beyond the departure of colonialist rulers and extended to the non-
Buddhist, non-Sinhalese population on the island.        
 This dynamic between colonial policies on the one hand, and the unintended 
religious reaction they produced on the other, holds important lessons for US foreign 
policy making. In the post-Cold War world, the US has made the spread of democracy 
one of its foreign policy priorities.1 However, as with colonial policies in the 1800s, these 
                                                 
1 The US government has initiated several projects aimed at promoting democracy abroad. For example, in 
the 1970s, the Carter administration made human rights and “reconstituted democracy” one of its foreign 
policy pillars. This aim continued under the Regan administration in the 1980s, which began “Project 
Democracy” in 1981 under the National Security Council. Also under the Regan Administration, an 
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programs for governance carry inherently western values. The democratic model in the 
US is liberal democracy; this model of democracy is based on structural principles for 
governance along with values and norms that undergird this structure. The structural 
principles of democracy include universal suffrage, division of authority, checks and 
balances on that authority, and transparency in decision-making and allocation of 
resources.2 The liberal values undergirding this structure are, first and foremost, the right 
of all citizens to choose the leaders of their government. Implicit in this value is the 
supremacy of the individual in asserting his or her rights. Second, the US model of 
democracy is also founded on an acute separation of church and state. Third, liberal 
economic values also tend to accompany norms surrounding the US model of democracy, 
including open markets, private enterprise, and economic competition. Thus, liberal 
democracy is about much more than holding elections. 
 Some of these values are essential for a healthy democracy while others may not 
be. For example, the right of citizens to elect their government is an inseparable value of 
democracy; it is its very raison d’etre. However, does this value automatically preclude 
the presence of a king or tribal chief within the political system? What if it is the will of 
the people to have such a leader play a role in the government? Would the US still 
recognize that government as a democracy? Likewise, does a political system have to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
academic -governmental cooperative, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), was created in 1983 
with the express purpose of understanding and promoting democracy abroad. In addition, the US State 
Department’s aid program, US Agency for International Development (USAID) makes democratic reforms 
a condition for lending. See William I. Robinson, “Globalization, the World System, and Democracy 
Promotion in US Foreign Policy,” Theory and Society, Vol. 25, (1996), pp. 615-665 
2For example, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset define democracy as “a political 
system, separate and apart from the economic and social systems to which it is joined,” meeting three 
conditions: competitive, free and fair elections between multiple parties; highly inclusivity of the 
population and the right of all adults to vote; and a meaningful level of civil and political liberties including 
freedom of the press, speech, and assembly. They also add a fourth condition, “the notion that rulers will be 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens…” See, Politics in Developing Countries: 
 488 
 
 
secular in order to be recognized as a democracy? What if it is the will of the people in a 
country to have religious political parties within their system? While this would surely 
clash with the American model of liberal democracy, it may be a value that is not 
essential to a healthy democracy.  
In light of the colonial experience and the current wave of jihads against America, 
US foreign policy, therefore, needs to consider the cultural underpinnings of its attempts 
to spread democracy around the world. Scholars and policymakers should, first, more 
clearly define the essentials of structural democracy from non-essential western values 
and, second, seriously investigate the adaptability of structural democracy to other 
cultures and value systems.  Some work has been done on the compatibility of Islam with 
democracy ranging from theoretical comparisons to specific case studies.3 The US, 
therefore, should sort out structural democracy from its cultural, liberal values and seek 
to promote the former without the latter.  
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the current form of liberal 
democracy in the US is the result of an evolutionary process. For example, the right of all 
individuals to choose their leaders has not always been the norm in the US. The presence 
of slaves in the US for over 200 years, ended in 1865, was followed by former (male) 
                                                                                                                                                 
Comparing Experience with Democracy, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymo ur Martin 
Lipset, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 6-7 
3 A theoretical example includes Thomas M. Franck, “Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?” The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, No. 4, (October, 1997), pp. 593-627; Fatima Mernissi, 
Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Publishers, 2002); Ahmad 
Mawsilili, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, and Human Rights, (Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 2001); ‘Abd al-Karim Surush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of 
‘Abdolkarim Souroush , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). A few examples of specific case 
studies on Islam and democracy include: Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical 
Essays, (New York: American University In Cairo Press, 2002); Forough Jahambakhsh, Islam, Democracy, 
and Religious Modernism in Iran, 1953-2000: From Bazargan to Soroush , (Leiden and Boston: Brill Press, 
2001); Islam and Democracy, edited by John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996) 
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slaves’ right to vote.4 Likewise, women were not given the right to vote in the US until 
1920.5 Thus the US has only enjoyed true universal suffrage for 80-odd years. 
Furthermore, the voting age has not always been 18; this age was federally agreed to in 
1970 in order to give those eligible for the military draft (at age 18) the right to vote.6 In 
addition, debates persist at the state and federal level over the right of prisoners and ex-
convicts to vote.7 Therefore, the US continues to evolve on the most fundamental value 
of democracy. 
 US policymakers’ efforts to spread democracy around the world should keep in 
mind, therefore, that democracies are rarely born whole; rather they evolve over time. 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset acknowledge this by identifying different hybrids of “less than 
democratic” systems that have adopted some aspects of democracy but not all.8 Their 
argument is that, while these democracies are not complete, they are useful first steps on 
the road to a full- fledged, healthy democracy. Therefore, democracies require time and 
practice in order to adjust and evolve. This, in turn, requires patience. The US should 
allow time and flexibility for emerging democracies to evolve and incorporate their own 
values to structural democracy. 
Moreover, it is also worth noting that countries undergoing the transition to a 
democratic system are two-thirds more likely to go to war—either domestically or 
                                                 
4 Slavery was officially abolished in the 13th Amendment, ratified in 1865. 
5 Women were given the right to vote in the 19th Amendment, ratified in 1920. 
6 Voting age was lowered to 18 in some states in 1965. It became a federal law with the 26th Amendment in 
1970. 
7 Laws forbidding incarcerated convicts and former felons from voting are known as the 
disenfranchisement laws. Only Maine and Vermont currently allow incarcerated convicts the right to vote. 
See, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, Human Rights 
Watch and The Sentencing Project, (Washington, DC and New York: Human Rights Watch and the 
Sentencing Project, 1998); see also “Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States,” 
www.sentencingproject.org, downloaded on 6/24/03 
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internationally—than countries not experiencing any change in their political system, 
including totalitarian regimes.9 Therefore, if the US is committed to spreading democracy 
around the world, this foreign policy aim will take time and most likely be accompanied 
by violent instability.  
In addition, it is also important to note that the spread of liberal values is not the 
only US foreign policy aim perceived as threatening to other countries.  In particular US 
military action in the Muslim world and US support of Israel are perceived as threatening 
to the dar al Islam, as described in chapter four. US military action in Muslim countries 
is particularly problematic and may be fueling the call for jihad against the US.  First and 
foremost, US military action is helping to fulfill radical Islamic prophecies about US 
intentions towards Arabs and the Muslim world. Bin Laden has stated in his various 
fatwas and television broadcasts that the US aims to conquer the Muslim world and 
eradicate Islam. 10 In his list of examples, he has cited US policies towards Iraq as proof 
of US intentions to the region and to Islam. The United States should heed these claims 
because polls to the Muslim world reveal that recent US military actions appear to 
resonate across the ummah as hostile and aggressive to Islam as a whole.11   
                                                                                                                                                 
8 They identify five hybrids from closest to furthest from full democracy: semi-democracies, low-intensity 
democracies, hegemonic party systems, and pseudo-democracies. See Diamond, Linz, and Seymour, pp. 7-
9 
9Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, (Summer, 1995), pp. 5-38. 
10 For example, see “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” World Islamic Front Statement (Bin Laden), 23 
February, 1998, www.fas.org/irp/world/para/dpcs/980223-fatwa.htm, downloaded on 6/27/02; and “Bin 
Laden’s Warning: Full Text,” BBC Online, http://news.bbc.co.uk, downloaded on 10/11/01 
11 This point is elucidated in The 2002 Gallup Pole to the Islamic World: Tuesday Briefing, (Princeton: The 
Gallup Pole, 2002). In response to US military actions in Afghanistan, the Executive Summary states: 
“There is some recognition on the part of sizable percentages of the respondents that the United States is 
engaging in the actions in Afghanistan in reaction to Sept. 11 and in the attempt to shut down Al Qaeda and 
Osama bin Laden. But numerous others in the Islamic world say that the main motivation is power 
grabbing, attempts to take over and control additional peoples or lands, or an effort to corner Afghanistan’s 
resources, including uranium,” pg. 6. 
 491 
 
 
Likewise, the United State’s unconditional alliance with the state of Israel needs 
to be seriously considered in light of the rise of Islamically motivated violence against the 
US. Radical Islamic groups across the ummah cite an American-Jewish conspiracy to 
destroy Islam as grounds for jihad against the US and Israel. While this conspiracy theory 
is not true, US policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict drive this perception. In 
particular, a tight alliance with Israel fuels the perception that the US imposes a double-
standard on human rights, critic izing Muslim states for their human rights violations but 
then looking the other way at Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. More generally, the 
suffering of the Palestinians is an emotional topic that resonates across the ummah and is 
usually tied to the United States via its unconditional support for Israel. 12 
 Finally, internal threats to holy nations and the religious wars they provoke are 
also of importance to US foreign policy making. In particular, US support for the 
governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia appear to be producing a religious backlash 
motivated at the United States. While the US undoubtedly incurs benefits from its high 
level of political, financial and material aid to both of these countries, this support is 
making the US a target with Islamic groups hostile to the regimes in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, US support of these countries also contradicts the aim of promoting 
democracy abroad; neither of these countries permits free and fair elections and both 
countries practice limitations on civil society and other elements important to creating 
healthy democracies.  Therefore, the US government should weigh the costs and benefits 
of aid to Egypt and Saudi Arabia in light of the religious violence that it may be 
producing. 
                                                 
12 This is also mentioned as a salient perception in the Executive Summary of the 2002 Gallup Poll of the 
Islamic World, pg. 4. 
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Likewise, the US should also be concerned about regional instability caused by 
internal threats to holy nations. In South Asia, heightened tensions between Hindus and 
Muslims resulted in an estimated 2,000 to 5,000 killed in the state of Gujarat in 2002. 
While these deaths have not directly impacted the US, they have exacerbated tensions in 
the region. Coupled with continued violence in Kashmir, India and Pakistan—as two 
nuclear powers—remain a global concern for the possibility of nuclear confrontation.  
Therefore, these internal battles hold potential for affecting US and global interests as 
well. 
Policy implications for resources 
This dissertation has argued, first, that social resources—particularly well- 
organized groups and strong leaders—are an important cause of religious wars. As with 
threat perception, organization and strong leadership is a necessary but not sufficient 
cause of religious wars. Therefore social resources in combination with other variables 
explain the rise of the three types of religious wars presented in this dissertation: wars to 
defend holy nations, battles for sacred space, and religious revolutions.  
The case studies reveal that two analytically distinct yet empirically connected 
social resources are a salient cause of religious wars: effective organizations and strong 
leadership. Neither of these variables are uniquely religious; one can find strong 
leadership and effective organizations in Marxist, nationalist, and other ideological 
movements bent on challenging the status quo. However, religions do offer some 
advantages over other movements in the prevalence of these two resources. First, as 
argued in chapter one, religions are unique in that they are corporate phenomena. Chapter 
one also argued that religions come in three forms of collectives—groups, movements 
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and organizations—with organizations being the most highly structured and possessing a 
political agenda. Moreover, religious groups—unlike ethnic, national or material interest 
groups—come readymade with a set of beliefs, practices and texts, which form the 
pretext for the group’s existence. Often times with ethnic, national, or material interest 
groups, these resources have to be constructed in order to create a common definition of 
the group, its interests, and its distinction from other groups. Therefore religions are, by 
the definition proposed in this dissertation, corporate phenomena that are organized 
around a common set of beliefs and texts, potentially giving religious groups a head start 
in forming an organization. 
Second, as also argued in this dissertation, religions do not exist without leaders. 
In most cases, these leaders are not merely charismatic figures that develop a following; 
rather, they are trained and educated both in the texts and traditions of their religion and 
in the role of leading their constituents. Therefore religions, unlike ethnic groups or 
material interest groups, come both with leaders and a structure organized around leaders 
and followers, which may also give religion the advantage in mobilizing constituents 
with political goals in mind.  
The importance of well-structured organizations and strong leadership as causes 
of religious wars offer several policy implications. First, if belligerent organizations and 
leaders can be identified within a religion, then policies can be created to undermine their 
efforts to recruit and deploy combatants. Not all religious organizations are clearly 
belligerent, but some are. Bin Laden and Azzam created the organizations Maktab al-
Khidamat and Al Qaeda with the specific aim of recruiting and training militants for 
jihad. Likewise, the Sudanese leader al-Turabi founded the Islamist International and the 
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Armed Islamic Movement (also known as the International Legion of Islam) with the 
express purpose of coordinating various jihad movements around the globe and recruiting 
fighters. These organizations are clearly belligerent.  
Other Muslim organizations, however, are less clear-cut. The Palestinian Islamic 
organization Hamas contains political, social and military wings. Some argue, 
specifically the current Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, that the entire organization 
must be disbanded, while others assert that only the military wing needs to be 
neutralized.13  Destroying the entire organization could have adverse social and political 
consequences. First, it could anger Palestinians that benefit from services provided 
through their social branch, particularly medical aid. Second, it is also important to note 
that Hamas currently holds the greatest potential for an opposition party to the PLO, 
particularly Fatah, the political party of Yassar Arafat. Dismantling Hamas as a whole 
could hinder the development of oppositional parties, thus affecting a necessary condition 
for competitive, multi-party elections. Third, trying to take out the whole organization 
could anger and radicalize the organization, providing fuel for increased violent 
operations. Therefore, attacking organizations should be undertaken with extreme caution 
for both immediate and long-term effects. 
In addition to dismantling belligerent organizations, US foreign policy should 
concern itself with encouraging organizations that can compete with belligerent groups. 
These groups need not be secular in order to undermine belligerent organizations. As 
                                                 
13 See, for example, “Ha mas Ready to Lead Palestinians,” Hearld News Services, February 7, 2003; James 
Bennet, “The Mideast Turmoil: Jerusalem; Sharon and Abbas Weigh Concessions for Mideast Peace,” The 
New York Times, May 30, 2003; Ian Fisher, “Social Service With a Vengance; Ha mas, Extreme in Terror 
and Charity, is Key to Road Map,” The International Herald Tribune, June 17, 2003; Greg Myre with Ian 
Fisher, “Sharon Vows to ‘Hound” Hamas, Which Rejects a Cease-Fire Bid,” The New York Times, June 17, 
2003 
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mentioned in the previous section, civil society is an important component of a healthy 
democracy and associations are one component of civic society. Also as argued in the 
previous section, religion in the social and political sphere is not ipso facto a bad thing. In 
fact, several scholars have noted the importance of America’s Christian civic associations 
in the US in forming its political, economic and civil landscape.14 Therefore, competing 
organizations need not be secular in order to effectively challenge belligerent religious 
organizations. Rather, a variety of religious organizations would present a “marketplace 
of ideas” regarding theological responses to social and political challenges. Religious 
organizations, therefore, should be encouraged as a healthy function of civil society.   
Second, US foreign policy should consider strategies aimed at undermining 
leaders that purport belligerent interpretations of religions, particularly those that have the 
intent and capabilities of targeting the US. First and foremost, this strategy must emerge 
out of an understanding of the popular appeal of such interpretations. As previously 
argued, belligerent interpretations of a religion alone do not create religious wars; rather, 
they require followers that accept these interpretations as true and take up the call to 
arms. Therefore, undermining belligerent interpretations of the faith requires considering 
not merely the specifics of the message but the greater worldview in which it is being 
received. If Bin Laden’s argument that the US is engaged in a Christian-Jewish 
conspiracy to destroy Islam is clearly false to those in the US, why, then, is it resonating 
                                                 
14 For example, Alexis de Tocqueville mentions the importance of Christianity as a belief system and a 
social system in forming US civil society and democracy. See Alex de Tocqueville, Democracy In 
America: Part II, The Social Influence of Democracy, (New York: Vintage Classics, 1990), especially 
Chapter 1: “Philosophical Method of the Americans,” pp. 3-12; and Chapter V: “How Religion in the 
United States Avails Itself of Democratic Tendencies,” pp. 20-28. Likewise, Max Weber hypothesizes that 
Protestant work ethics are largely responsible for America’s entrepreneurial success. See Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Stephen Kalberg, (Los Angeles: Roxbury Press, 
2002). See also, Ernst Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress: The Significance of Protestantism for the 
Rise of the Modern World, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986)  
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with millions of Muslims around the world? Answering this question requires academic 
inquiry into the perceptions held by those in the Muslim world and the sources of these 
perceptions.   
In addition to leaders and organizations, it is also worth noting that material and 
technological resources play a role in the scope and intensity of religious violence. Both 
of these resources are somewhat easier to dismantle than social resources are and US 
foreign policy has made considerable strides in denying these assets to religious 
belligerents, particularly Islamic terrorists targeting the US. Both prior to and especially 
after September 11th, the US government has frozen bank accounts connected with 
terrorist groups, including not only Islamic terrorists but also Jewish terrorist groups such 
as the Jewish Defense League and its Israeli organizations.15  
Moreover, the US has taken measures to end “safe havens,” states that provide 
sanctuary to terrorists. This has included military action against Afghanistan, training and 
operations with troops in the Philippines, and missile strikes in Yemen. In addition to 
these efforts, the US government should also take measures to shut down militant 
organizations in the West, particularly those operating out of London, as argued in 
chapter four. Lastly, the US has also aimed to shut down technological resources of 
terrorist groups, including websites of Islamic and Jewish militant, in addition to using 
technology as a resource to monitor movements and conversation of militant groups.16 
Finally, it is worth considering if military action is the best means of taking out 
belligerent religious groups, their leaders and their resources or if non-violent approaches 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Dean E. Murphy, “Terror Label No Hindrance to Anti-Arab Jewish Group,” The New 
York Times, December 19, 2000; Greg Winter, “Two Held in Plot to Attack Mosque and Congressman,” 
The New York Times, December 13, 2001 
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would be more effective. One of the tactics of the US is to use covert and overt military 
force as a means of fighting the Global War on Terror, which is primarily targeting 
Islamic terrorists. The state of Israel has also used this approach, including assassinating 
leaders of Hamas and other militant organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 
use of military force may not be the best means with which to fight these groups for 
several key reasons. First, military strikes against Muslim nations supports bin Laden’s 
argument that the US seeks to attack and destroy the Muslim world. Polling in the 
Muslim world confirms this perception, as previously mentioned. Following on this 
point, reinforcing misperceptions about US intentions can become useful propaganda for 
groups wishing to mobilizing new recruits. To avoid these problems, the US may benefit 
from non-military actions, such as encouraging states around the world to outlaw overtly 
belligerent groups and use domestic and international law enforcement agencies to arrest 
leaders and members. 
Second, past examples of attempts to defeat guerilla and terrorist groups militarily 
have proven time consuming and costly. The jihadist movement in the Northwestern 
Frontiers of India took the British roughly seventy years to defeat, as described in 
chapters four and five. Likewise, efforts to defeat Marxist- inspired insurgency groups in 
Latin America proved equally as difficult to defeat militarily in addition to creating some 
of the worst incidents of mass-killing in the 20th century, as described in chapter eight. 
Therefore, military solutions to the current wave of religious violence will most likely 
cost time, lives and resources.    
                                                                                                                                                 
16 See, for example, Dean E. Murphy, “Two Unlikely Allies Come Together in Fight Against Muslims,” 
The New York Times, June 2, 2001 
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Third, assassina ting leaders also could be aiding belligerent groups’ recruitment. 
Those who fall in battle are honored as heroes; this is as true for countries as it is for 
ethnic groups and religious warriors. Rather than assassinating leaders, the US should 
arrest these leaders and put them on trial, threatening an ignoble and unglorious life 
imprisonment sentence to those found guilty of violent acts against US property and 
citizens. Such punishment undermines a martyr’s death on the battlefield. Likewise, the 
US could demoralize these organizations by buying off certain members with “golden 
parachutes”; the US could offer money and other material incentives for members to 
defect from the ranks of the organization. This option would not work with “true 
believers” but may work with those who have joined up for material gains.    
Policy implications for religious and political authority 
This dissertation initially proposed that the intertwining of religious and political 
authorities would allow each to use the other’s resources to further their agendas, 
including violence and war. However, the case studies have reveals that religious and 
political mixing, ipso facto, does not increase the likelihood of religious wars. Rather, 
certain conditions create this possibility. First, if religious and political authorities can 
offer a quid pro quo to further specific goals, then the greater the chances that they will 
form an alliance that could result in religious violence. And second, if the state is a source 
of threat for religious groups and their goals, then the greater the chances the state will 
become a target of religious violence.  
Of these two additions, the latter condition—the state as a source of threat for 
religious groups and their goals—is currently of greater policy concern to the US. The 
case studies reveal that illegitimate governments have inspired, in part, the current wave 
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of jihads around the globe. Most states across the Muslim ummah have been plagued by 
unstable and often corrupt leadership. Coupled with this, civil liberties are often restricted 
in Muslim countries. Freedom of speech, for example, is rarely upheld. This prevents 
individuals and groups from voicing grievances against the state, further frustrating 
popular participation in the destiny of the country. Freedom of association is also often 
restricted. This includes bans on the creation of political parties, such as in Egypt and 
most of the Gulf States.17 
In many countries, radical Islamic leaders have spearheaded critiques against 
corrupt regimes and have called for better leadership, often at the risk of imprisonment 
and even death. 18 Moreover, radical Islamic groups have stepped in to provide social 
services that governments have failed to give their citizens. For example, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine have opened clinics and schools aimed 
at meeting these social needs.19 Hamas in Palestine has also opened clinics, particularly 
in the Gaza Strip where the PLO has failed to provide for the densely populated 
Palestinian exclave.20 In addition, the Hizbollah has provided social services to 
Lebanon’s Shia population, often neglected by the government.21  These services are 
                                                 
17 Egypt has gone back and forth with allowing political parties to form, see Sana Abed-Kotob, “The 
Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, (1995), pp. 321-339 especially pp. 320-329; see also Nora 
Bensahel, “Political Reform in the Middle East,” Security Trends in the Middle East and Their Implications 
for the United States, edited by Nora Bensahel and Daniel Byman, pp. 15-51, (Santa Monica: RAND, 
forthcoming), pg. 27. 
18 This is particularly true of the Brotherhood in Egypt. Thousands  of its members were imprisoned by the 
Egyptian government between 1954 and 1982, see “The Muslim Brotherhood—Egypt,” Encyclopaedia of 
the Orient, http://i-cias.com/c.o/mus_br_egypt.htm, downloaded on 6/24/02. 
19 John L. Esposito, Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 131-
133 
20 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 20-27 
21 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, (London: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997), pg.  36 
 500 
 
 
cited as strengthening popular support for these radical groups, often at the expense of 
support for the state. 
Given the popular support of many Islamic groups, governments are faced with 
two broad options: either to clamp down on Islamic groups or to bring them into the 
political arena as political parties. The general consensus among political scientists and 
policy makers in the US is that allowing Islamic groups to form political parties will 
undoubtedly lead to disaster along the lines of the Iranian Revolution or the cancelled 
1991 Algerian elections that plunged the country into civil war.22 However, other 
examples suggest that allowing religious political parties to participate in elections can 
produce a largely beneficial outcome. For example, in the face of riots over governmental 
corruption and increases in the price of basic necessities, King Hussein of Jordan called 
for elections to the House of Representatives in 1992.23 The elections resulted in a strong 
victory for Islamic political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, which together won 34 
of the 80 seats.24 Allowing Islamic groups to participate in elections exposed them to 
legal restrictions such as bans on receiving foreign money for campaigning and 
services.25 It also forced these groups to compete with other parties for support; when the 
Islamic groups failed to deliver on their promises, they suffered at the following elections 
in 1993 and won only 16 seats.26 
                                                 
22 As argued in S.V.R. Nasr, “Democracy and Islamic Revivalism,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 10, 
No. 2, (1995), pp. 261-285  
23 Abla Amawi, “Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan,” Middle East Report, (January-February 1992), pp. 26-
29; Beverly Milton-Edwards, “Façade Democracy In Jordan,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 20, Issue 2, (1993), pp. 191-203; Anoushira Van Ehteshami, “Is the Middle East Demo cratizing?” 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 26, No. 2, (1999), pp. 199-217  
24 Milton-Edwards, pg. 195 
25 Milton-Edwards, pg. 199 
26 Milton-Edwards, pg. 202 
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A similar pattern is visible in Pakistan. The Islamic group Jama’at-i Islami, 
formed in India prior to Partition, has participated in Pakistan’s elections in addition to 
mobilizing opposition during Pakistan’s periods of military rule.27 Despite its rhetoric to 
take over the political system in Pakistan and affect an Islamic revolution, Jama’ati has 
never succeeded in gaining the necessary votes to form a critical mass within the 
government and to implement its agenda. Rather, Jama’ati, like any other political party 
in the system, has had to modify its platform to secure votes, form alliances with other 
political parties, and deliver on its promises. Jama’ati has even been credited with 
mobilizing votes across ethnic, regional and class groups, forming an important 
crosscutting cleavage in Pakistani politics.28 Therefore, Jama’ati, like Islamic parties in 
Jordan, have contributed to evolving democracy in Pakistan.  
These examples illustrate that allowing religious political parties to run for 
elections offers several benefits. First, elections provide these groups with a legitimate 
means of voicing their grievances and attempting to change the status quo non-violently. 
Second, it puts these groups to the test in delivering their promises and goals. Like any 
other political party, if they fail to deliver, they are voted out of office. Third, it forces 
these groups to compete for their constituents, further holding them accountable to their 
promises. Fourth, it compels these groups to act within the limits of the law and disavow 
violence against the state and other illegal activities. Fifth, if elected to government, 
Islamic party members are forced to work with other political parties, most likely 
resulting in compromise. And finally, the success (and failures) of political parties at the 
polls reflects the will of the people, thus making democracy more genuine.  
                                                 
27Nasr, pg. 266 
28 Nasr, pg. 268 
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It is worth noting that allowing religious political parties to run in elections is not 
a uniquely Muslim phenomenon. Israel has experienced a growth of religious parties 
participating in its elections in the past few decades. Israel’s first religious party, formed 
in 1956, was the National Religious Party. In the 1980s, several new parties emerged 
including Shas, Moledet, Tzomet, Tehiya and Kach, which was banned from elections in 
1992 after the courts determined its rhetoric to be anti-Arab.29 Likewise, Sri Lanka and 
India have also allowed religious political parties to run in various elections in its past, as 
mentioned in chapters three and five, respectively. Therefore, religions other than Islam 
seek to form political parties and run in elections. 
It is also important to note, however, that allowing religious political parties to 
run in elections carries certain risks. As elucidated in the chapters on Jerusalem and 
Ayodhya, the presence of religious groups and parties in the political sphere could result 
in collusion for specific end goals. In both Israel and India, religious groups wishing to 
change the status quo on sacred land used the political system to create a more permissive 
environment. However, in both cases, the system has also imposed restraints on these 
activities. In Israel, the government has allowed settlers to build throughout the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip but has clamped down on activities aimed at destroying Muslim 
sites in Jerusalem. Similarly, following the destruction of Ayodhya’s Babri Mosque in 
1992, the BJP—the party believed to have created a permissive environment for activities 
in Ayodhya—was dismissed from the states they governed in addition to being censured 
                                                 
29 Samuel C. Heilman, “The Orthodox, the Ultra-Orthodox, and the Elections for the Twelfth Knesset,” 
Elections in Israel: 1988, edited by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, pp. 135-154, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1990); Etta Bick, “Fragmentation and Realignment: Israel’s Nationalist Parties in the 1992 
Elections,” Israel at the Polls: 1992, edited by Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, (Jerusalem: Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs, 1995); Aaron P. Willis, “Shas—The Sephardic Torah Guardians: Religious 
“Movement” and Political Power,” pp. 121-143, The Elections in Israel: 1992, edited by Asher Arian and 
Michal Shamir, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995) 
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at the federal level. Therefore, the system does provide some limits on the activities of 
religious groups wishing to violently change the status quo. 
 Perhaps the biggest danger with religious political parties is that they may carry 
the risk of excluding or endangering minorities; in other words, if they function like 
ethnic parties. As with ethnic parties, religious political parties must be formed with 
crosscut ting cleavages in mind to reduce the possibilities of these parties “capturing” the 
state. However, as both the Islamic parties in Jordan and Jama’at-i Islami in Pakistan 
have shown, religious political parties can cut across ethnic, regional and class 
differences, forming cross cutting cleavages. Thus, the presence of religious parties does 
not necessarily result in religious or ethnic tension.  
Conclusion 
 
 The good news about religious wars is that they are not constant, they are fought 
with specific goals in mind, and they have identifiable causes. This dissertation has 
sought to identify the conditions under which religious groups and their leaders choose 
violence as a means of attaining specific goals. In so doing, it has demonstrated that 
religious wars function, in many ways, like any other war; they are a response to 
perceived or actual threats and they are undertaken to preserve resources deemed 
valuable to religious adherents.   
However, the bad news about religious wars is that they are often the unintended 
product of policy aims. In particular, waves of religious violence occurred in the wake of 
drastic changes to society brought on by colonialism. These changes were introduced 
with the aim of making society more efficient, not more violent; however the result was 
religious violence within Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu societies. This historic lesson is 
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of particular importance to US foreign policy-making, particularly in light of its efforts to 
spread democracy and liberalize economies around the globe, which could be 
inadvertently producing a religious backlash. The good news, again, is that the US can 
make choices that will help mitigate the possibility of a religious backlash. But this 
requires soul-searching honesty both in US foreign policy motives to non-western 
countries and rigorous assessment of these policies’ effects. If not, history will most 
likely repeat itself.  
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